xxxxxx
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 26-20609-CV-WILLIAMS
PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, et al.,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ response to the Court’s May 29,
2026, Order on the non-party movants’ Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order, or, in
the Alternative, for Leave to Appear as Amici Curiae (DE 89).1
On May 27, 2026, thirty-five non-party movants filed a Motion for Relief from
Judgment or Order (DE 63), in which they requested this Court to set aside its dismissal
pursuant to Rule 60 because the case, and its purported settlement, is “a fraud on the
Court.” (Id. at 6). The non-party movants highlighted the atypical way the litigation had
unfolded and argued that the purported settlement reached in this matter “is a product of
collusion.” (Id. at 9). In light of those serious allegations and the Court’s own view of the
unusual circumstances of the case, the Court entered an Order on May 29, 2026, (the
“May 29 Order”) (DE 65), directing Plaintiffs to detail their position as to various issues,
“including (1) the charges of collusion and whether the Parties are truly adverse; (2) the
assertion that the dismissal in this case was premised on deception by the Parties; and
1 Throughout this Order, the Court uses the CM/ECF pagination rather than the document
pagination.
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(3) the question of whether the case should be reopened because the Court was the
‘victim of a fraud.’” (DE 65 at 3). On June 12, 2026, Plaintiffs responded to the May 29
Order. (DE 89). The non-party movants filed a reply on June 19, 2026. (DE 94).
In the very first paragraph of the Complaint, Plaintiffs introduce their claims stating,
“President Trump served as the 45th President of the United States, and is the 47th
President of the United States.” (DE 1 ¶ 1). They then go on to state that “President Trump
brings this suit in his personal capacity.” (Id.) After a review of the record, and the Parties’
statements, the Court declines to adopt or accept the credulous exercise of divorcing
President Trump’s current job title from an understanding of what happened here.
But perhaps the most startling misstatement2 advanced by Plaintiffs is their
characterization of this case as “ordinary.” (DE 89 at 9). The Parties here are not private
actors to a mine-run dispute, recounting their proficiency in the art of the deal they
negotiated. Lead Plaintiff and Defendants are public servants—the pinnacle of the
Executive Branch—sworn to uphold the law, faithfully perform the duties of their office,
and protect the interests of the American public. The issue before the Court is whether,
instead, they ignored ethical norms, court rules, and legal authority to manipulate the
judicial process. The issue is whether they did so to gild their efforts to gain
unprecedented access to the public fisc with the patina of legitimacy. There is nothing
“ordinary” about this case; it is the very definition of sui generis.
2 Plaintiffs also—with no apparent sense of irony—criticize the non-party movants’
political motivations, their previous disinterest in the case, and their purported
inappropriate promotion of “abstract grievance[s].” (DE 89 at 10).
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I. BACKGROUND3
On September 29, 2023, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) charged Charles
Edward Littlejohn (“Mr. Littlejohn”) with illegal disclosure of “[tax] information associated
with Public Official A and thousands of the nation’s wealthiest people,” in violation of 26
U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1). Information, United States v. Littlejohn, No. 23-cr-00343, DE 1
(D.D.C. 2023).
4 It was subsequently revealed that Mr. Littlejohn worked as a contractor
for Booz Allen Hamilton Inc. (“Booz Allen”) which, in turn, maintained a contract with the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to perform certain work for the agency.5 During his plea
hearing on October 12, 2023, Mr. Littlejohn identified President Donald Trump
(“President Trump”) as the “high-ranking government official” at issue, whose tax
3 The Court sua sponte takes judicial notice of articles reporting on relevant events
attendant to this case, dockets of other cases, and statements the Parties made. See
FED. R. EVID. 201(c); Griffin v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 746 F. App’x 873, 876 (11th Cir.
2018) (“Courts typically take judicial notice of record documents from other judicial
proceedings.”). The Court incorporates these sources to provide an overview of the
architecture of this litigation. Moreover, the Department of Justice has directed courts to
look to unsworn public statements as binding party admissions. See Floyd v. Dep’t of
Just., No. 26-cv-01399, DE 62 at 4, n.1 (E.D. Va. filed June 5, 2026) (“Because the Acting
Attorney General’s statements were recorded, this Court can take judicial notice of
them.”) (citing FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2)); see also Citizens for Resp. and Ethics in Wash. v.
Dep’t of Just., No. 26-cv-01789, DE 15 at 4, n.1 (D.D.C. filed June 5, 2026) (same). The
Court will do so here.
4 The illegal disclosures of tax information all transpired during President Trump’s first
term. During this period, Charles Rettig was Commissioner of the IRS and Steven
Mnuchin was the Secretary of the Treasury Department. See Nomination of Charles P.
Rettig to be Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 115th Cong. (2018),
https://www.congress.gov/nomination/115th-congress/1620; Nomination of Steven T.
Mnuchin to be Sec’y of the Treasury, 115th Cong., 1st Sess., Vote No. 63 (Feb. 13, 2017),
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1151/vote_115_1_00063.htm.
Mr. Littlejohn’s prosecution, however, was undertaken in 2023 during the administration
of President Joseph R. Biden.
5 Richard Rubin, IRS Leaker Sought Job With Aim of Releasing Trump Tax Returns, DOJ
Says, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2024, at 22:13 ET), https://www.wsj.com/us-news/law/irs-
leaker-sought-job-with-aim-of-releasing-trump-tax-returns-doj-says-93944811.
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information was illegally disclosed to news organizations like the New York Times and
ProPublica. Transcript of Plea Agreement Hearing at 10, United States v. Littlejohn, No.
23-cr-00343, DE 13 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2023). The following exchange took place during the
October 12, 2023, plea colloquy:
THE COURT: Before I go on to accept or not accept this plea, are there any
victims or their representatives here today that would like to exercise their
rights to be reasonably heard under the Crimes Victims’ Right Act?
MS. ALINA HABBA: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Please come up.
MS. ALINA HABBA: Thank you, Your Honor, for the opportunity to be heard. As
an attorney, I find that I should probably state I am not licensed in this state, in the
District of Columbia. I’m here on behalf of President Trump who was a victim,
as we just heard, of this atrocity.
Id. at 14.
On January 29, 2024, Mr. Littlejohn was sentenced to sixty months of
incarceration, followed by thirty-six months of supervised release. See United States v.
Littlejohn, No. 23-cr-00343, DE 35.
Subsequent to Mr. Littlejohn’s disclosures, various parties sued Mr. Littlejohn,
Booz Allen, the IRS, and the United States Department of the Treasury (“Treasury
Department”) for damages pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7431.6 This statute confers a private
right of action on individuals whose tax returns were improperly inspected or disclosed.
See 26 U.S.C. § 7431. However, any action arising under this statute must be brought
“within 2 years after the date of discovery by the plaintiff of the unauthorized inspection
6 These cases include: (1) Griffin v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 22-cv-24023 (S.D. Fla.
filed Dec. 13, 2022); (2) Warren v. Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., No. 24-cv-01252 (D. Md.
filed Apr. 29, 2024); (3) Safe Harbor Int’l, LLC v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 25-cv-00139
(D. Md. filed Jan. 14, 2025); and (4) Scott v. Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., 26-cv-00845 (M.D.
Fla. filed Mar. 23, 2026).
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or disclosure.” 26 U.S.C. § 7431(d). The statute provides for damages, including “$1,000
for each act of unauthorized inspection or disclosure[.]” 26 U.S.C. § 7431(c)(1). In these
actions, where the IRS or Treasury Department was named as a party, the DOJ zealously
defended the government by challenging the timeliness of the plaintiffs’ claims; disputing
whether damages had been correctly calculated; and denying that the government could
be held liable under § 7431 because the unlawful disclosures at issue were made by “a
[Booz Allen] employee working on IRS contracts,” and not an officer or employee of the
United States. United States’ Mot. To Dismiss, Safe Harbor Int’l, LLC v. Internal Revenue
Serv., No. 25-cv-00139, DE 31 (D. Md. filed July 23, 2025). In every case naming the
government as a defendant, the DOJ engaged in a vigorous defense.
7
That is, every case until the instant litigation.
This Complaint was filed on January 29, 2026—two years and three months after
Ms. Habba’s appearance at Mr. Littlejohn’s plea hearing—by Plaintiffs President Trump
(“Lead Plaintiff”), Donald J. Trump Jr., Eric Trump, and The Trump Organization, LLC
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) against the IRS and the Treasury Department (collectively,
“Defendants” or “Government”). Because Defendants are government agencies, they
are afforded sixty days from the date that the United States Attorney was served to file
an answer or responsive pleading. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(2). However, on April 17,
2026, three days before the sixty-day period lapsed, Plaintiffs filed a Consent Motion for
a 90-day Extension (“Consent Motion”) to relieve Defendants of their obligation to file a
responsive pleading to the Complaint “while the Parties engage[d] in discussions
7 In two related cases, the IRS and Treasury Department were not named as parties. See,
e.g., Warren v. Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., No. 24-cv-01252 (D. Md. filed Apr. 29, 2024);
MacNeil v. Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., No. 25-cv-00963 (D. Md. filed Mar. 24, 2025).
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designed to resolve this matter and avoid protracted litigation.” (DE 40 at 2). The Consent
Motion also represented that Daniel Epstein, co-counsel for Plaintiffs, conferred with
counsel for Defendants, and Defendants consented to the requested extension. (DE 40
at 3). Counsel for Defendants was not identified. Other than the Complaint and Notice of
Voluntary Dismissal, this was the only pleading filed by any party in this matter before
dismissal.8
At this point, because the Court had serious concerns about whether it had subject
matter jurisdiction in a case where the Lead Plaintiff ostensibly had direct, unassailable
control over Defendants, it ordered the Parties to file memoranda of law on this issue by
May 21, 2026. (DE 41). The Court then appointed amici curiae “to assist the Court in
identifying the applicable law governing an analysis” of its subject matter jurisdiction. (DE
43). The amici were also directed to file a memorandum of law by May 21, 2026. (Id.) On
May 14, 2026, the court-appointed amici filed their memorandum. (DE 45). Neither Party
to this action, however, filed any pleading to address the Court’s concerns.
Instead, on May 18, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a two-page Notice of Voluntary Dismissal
with Prejudice (“Notice of Dismissal”) (DE 52), where Plaintiffs stressed that the Notice
of Dismissal automatically divested the Court of jurisdiction.9 Subsequently, the DOJ
8 The Court notes that various non-parties have filed motions to appear as amici curiae.
For example, on February 5, 2026, one week after the Complaint was filed, a Motion for
Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae was filed by Former Government Officials and Public
Interest Organizations. (DE 7). On February 12, 2026, another Motion for Leave to file a
Brief as Amici Curiae was filed by Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington
and Public Citizen. (DE 15). Because the latter motion indicated that, based on conferral,
Plaintiffs were opposed to the motion, the Court entered an order giving Plaintiffs two
weeks, until February 25, 2026, to file a memorandum in opposition. (DE 27). No
opposition was filed, however, and the motions were granted by default. (DE 28).
9 Plaintiffs argued that “a Rule 41(a)(1)(A) dismissal is self-executing, terminates the
action upon filing, and divests the district court of jurisdiction” and stated that “the [N]otice
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issued a press release about a “settlement” that had been reached in this matter, and
published what purported to be the “settlement agreement” (the “settlement agreement”)
signed by lawyers for both Plaintiffs and Defendants.10 In this document, the Parties
referenced the instant litigation and claimed that, “[i]n the interest of resolving the dispute
between the parties,” they stipulated and agreed to certain terms, which included “a
formal apology from the United States” to Plaintiffs, along with the creation of an “Anti-
Weaponization Fund.”11 The Anti-Weaponization Fund, ostensibly set up “to provide a
systematic process to hear and redress claims of [individuals] who suffered
weaponization and lawfare,” was to be financed by the Treasury Department’s Judgment
Fund in the amount of $1.776 billion dollars.12
The day after the dismissal, Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche testified before
Congress.13 In response to a question as to why the “settlement agreement” had not been
does not require judicial action.” (DE 52 at 1). They emphasized that “no judicial analysis
is appropriate.” (Id. at 2).
10 Settlement Agreement, Trump v. Internal Revenue Serv., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May
18, 2026), https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1441201/dl?inline. At the same time that
the DOJ publicized the “settlement agreement,” the Treasury Department’s General
Counsel, Brian Morrissey, announced his resignation. Andrew Duehren, Top Treasury
Lawyer Resigns After Creation of ‘Anti-Weaponization Fund’
, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2026),
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/18/business/anti-weaponization-fund-brian-
morrissey-treasury.html.
11 Id.
12 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Anti-
Weaponization Fund (May 18, 2026), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-
announces-anti-weaponization-fund. The Court notes that the DOJ previously
established a “Weaponization Working Group” in February 2025. Memorandum from the
Att’y Gen. to All Dep’t Emps., Restoring the Integrity and Credibility of the Department of
Justice (Feb. 5, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/ag/media/1388506/dl?inline.
13 A Review of the President’s Fiscal Year 2027 Budget Request for the Department of
Justice: Hearing Before the Subcommittee. on Commerce, Justice, Sci., & Related Agen-
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provided to this Court for review, he replied that “there is no judge” because the case had
been dismissed and, therefore, there was “no mechanism” for reviewing the “settlement
agreement.”14 On that same day, Acting Attorney General Blanche issued an “order” (the
“Release Order”) which referenced the “settlement agreement” and released the
President, his relatives, companies, and affiliates from “any and all claims, counterclaims,
[and] causes of actions” that “have been or could have been asserted” against Plaintiffs
that arise out of “(1) any matters that were raised or could have been raised in the Case
or the Pending Agency Claims; (2) Lawfare and/or Weaponization; (3) any matters
currently pending or that could be pending (including tax returns filed before the Effective
Date) before Defendants or other agencies or departments.”15 Unlike the “settlement
agreement,” which was signed by purported representatives of both Plaintiffs and
Defendants, only Acting Attorney General Blanche’s signature was on the Release
Order.
16 Also on that day, it was reported that IRS officials had prepared a 25-page
memorandum17 that outlined major flaws with Plaintiffs’ claims and listed the various
cies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 119th Cong. (2026) (statement of Todd Blanche,
Acting Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice), https://www.appropria-
tions.senate.gov/hearings/a-review-of-the-presidents-fiscal-year-2027-budget-request-
for-the-department-of-justice.
14 Id.
15 Order of the Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (May 19, 2026),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1441216/dl.
16 Id.
17 Andrew Duehren, The IRS Thought It Could Fight Trump’s Lawsuit, but It Reached a
Deal Anyway, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2026), https://www.ny-
times.com/2026/05/19/admin/irs-trump-lawsuit-deal.html. The actual memorandum has
yet to be published by the Government.
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defenses that could be advanced on behalf of Defendants, defenses that had been raised
in other litigation arising from the disclosures.18
On June 2, 2026, in testimony before the United States House of Representatives,
Acting Attorney General Blanche advised that the Anti-Weaponization Fund would not be
moving forward.19 He did not, however, commit to a similar termination of the audit and
immunity protections set forth in his Release Order. Six days later, President Trump
nominated Mr. Blanche to permanently serve as Attorney General of the United States.
II. DISCUSSION
As it must, the Court begins with jurisdiction. See Leedom Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v.
Perlmutter, 532 F. App’x 893, 895 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that courts must “always
address threshold jurisdictional issues first, since [a court] cannot reach questions that [it]
never had jurisdiction to entertain.”). Typically, a voluntary dismissal filed under Rule
41(a) divests the court of its jurisdiction over the merits of a case. See Anago Franchising,
Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 677 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Absolute Activist Value
Master Fund v. Devine, 998 F.3d 1258, 1266 (11th Cir. 2021) (citations and quotation
marks omitted). But a voluntary dismissal does not deprive the court of authority to resolve
issues collateral to the merits. Absolute Activist Value Master Fund, 998 F.3d at 1266.
Among these collateral issues are those relating to Rule 11 sanctions. Id. (noting that “it
18 The Court notes that in a subsequent response to a Freedom of Information Act request
by Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, the DOJ stated that there were
no “responsive records within the Civil Division pertaining to [this litigation].” Letter from
Brian Flannigan, Div. Couns. for Recs. & Info., Civ. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Kayvan
Farchadi, Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. (June 3, 2026).
19 Hailey Fuchs & Jordain Carney, Anti-Weaponization Fund Is Dead, Acting AG Says,
POLITICO (June 2, 2026), https://www.politico.com/news/2026/06/02/todd-blanche-anti-
weaponization-fund-00947083. As the article notes, Acting Attorney General Blanche
refused to commit to the termination of the Anti-Weaponization Fund in writing.
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is clear that even when a voluntary dismissal disposes of an entire action, district courts
retain jurisdiction to consider at least five different types of collateral issues: costs, fees,
contempt sanctions, Rule 11 sanctions, and motions to confirm arbitral awards.”); see
also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990) (“As the violation of Rule
11 is complete when the paper is filed, . . . a voluntary dismissal does not expunge the
Rule 11 dismissal.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
“Although [the Eleventh Circuit] call[s] these issues ‘collateral,’ that doesn’t make
them any less important.” Hyde v. Irish, 962 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 2020). “Many
involve the power to enforce compliance with the rules and standards that keep the
judiciary running smoothly.” Id. Indeed, “[w]ithout them, abuses of the judicial system
would go unchecked, burdening courts and individuals alike with needless expense and
delay.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “And that’s not just a matter of procedure.” Id.
Consequently, the Court will examine the matters raised in the non-parties’ motion under
the rubric of Rule 11 because the issues are collateral and their resolution is essential to
assuring the integrity of the Court’s jurisdiction and process. See id. (explaining that a
court retains jurisdiction over collateral matters to “ensure that justice is done.”); Baker v.
Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 523 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Rule 11 motions are collateral to an action
and are not barred if filed after a dismissal order, or after entry of judgment.”).
In order to examine whether Plaintiffs brought this case for an improper purpose,
the Court must consider and “inevitably decide” the question posed to the Parties in its
April 24, 2026, Order: is there a case or controversy presented in this litigation. See
Comparelli v. Republica Bolivariana De Venezuela, 891 F.3d 1311, 1328 (11th Cir. 2018)
(“We recognize that merits and jurisdiction will sometimes come intertwined . . . If . . . the
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district court’s resolution of the jurisdictional questions . . . requires it to inevitably decide
some, or all, of the merits issues, so be it.”) (quoting Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v.
Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 581 U.S. 170, 178 (2017)) (quotation marks omitted).
Although jurisdiction ordinarily precedes the merits, a court may consider both where, as
here, jurisdiction overlaps with the merits. See Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209, 217
(2021) (explaining that “the merits and jurisdiction will sometimes come intertwined, and
a [district] court can decide all . . . of the merits issues in resolving a jurisdictional question,
or vice versa.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted); Gutrejman v. United States, 596
F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2022) (“[T]he Court must resolve a jurisdictional defense . . .
before resolving the two merits defenses . . . , but the Court’s resolution of that
jurisdictional defense will require the Court to address the merits as well.”); Jakubowicz
v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, No. 18-1450, 2022 WL 3354719, at *7 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 2022)
(addressing both standing and the merits and noting that “it is not uncommon for courts
to consider jurisdiction and the merits together”); Force v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 464 F.
Supp. 3d 323, 361 (D.D.C. 2020) (“Although courts must, in general, resolve jurisdictional
questions before reaching the merits, in the present context, the questions of jurisdiction
and the merits merge. The jurisdictional test and the federal cause of action are, in
relevant respects, the same[.]”) (citation omitted).
A. Justiciability: Case or Controversy
“Judicial Power . . . is the power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment
and carry it into effect between . . . parties who bring a case before it for decision.” Muskrat
v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Article
III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution confines judicial power to matters that
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present a case or controversy. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This precept exists as the
defining principle for the federal judiciary. See Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. 251, 255 (1850);
see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239–41 (1937).
Indeed, the Framers, relying on their knowledge of English law and practice, did not intend
for Article III to empower federal judges to hear every possible dispute brought before
them.20 Thus, the terms “case” and “controversy” mark the threshold of federal judicial
power.
The case or controversy requirement imposes two important limitations on the
federal judiciary. First, the requirement limits “the business of federal courts to questions
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of
resolution through the judicial process.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). Second,
the requirement ensures that “the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to
the other branches of government.” Id. at 95. “Federal judicial power is limited to those
disputes which confine federal courts to a rule consistent with a system of separated
powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial
process.” Id. at 97. “Whenever the claim or contention of a party takes such a form that
the judicial power is capable of acting upon it, then it has become a case [or] controversy.”
Smith v. Adams, 130 U.S. 167, 173–74 (1889).
20 See CONST. ANNOTATED, art III, § 1.2, Historical Background on Judicial Review,
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artIII-S2-C1-2/ALDE_00001243/ (last
visited on July 13, 2026) (discussing three occurrences in 1787 where the Framers de-
clined to expand federal judiciary power).
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1. Adverseness is a Prerequisite to Article III Jurisdiction.
The “judicial power conferred by the Constitution” grants the federal judiciary “the
right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted
in courts of proper jurisdiction.” Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 361 (emphasis added). A justiciable
controversy “must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 300 U.S. at 240–
41. Adverseness is essential to a federal court’s ability to adjudicate the merits of a case
where federal courts are restricted to “questions presented in an adversary context[.]”
GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 382
(1980) (noting that adverseness “sharpens the presentation of issues”). Indeed, “[e]ven
when Article III permits the exercise of federal jurisdiction, prudential considerations
demand that the Court insist upon ‘that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.’” United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 760 (2013) (quoting
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
21
21 In Windsor, the United States refused to pay the plaintiff a real estate tax refund due to
§ 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act’s definition of marriage, despite acquiescing to the
plaintiff’s position that § 3 of the Act was unconstitutional. 570 U.S. at 753, 756. As the
Court reasoned, “Windsor’s ongoing claim for funds that the United States refuses to pay
thus establishes a controversy sufficient for Article III jurisdiction.” Id. at 758. Plaintiffs fail
to acknowledge that there was a controversy in Windsor precisely because the plaintiff
did not control the actions of the defendant, as Lead Plaintiff does here, and therefore
could not secure the refund to which she was entitled. See infra pp. 17–38. Here, Plaintiffs
do have the ability to control the “stakes” of the litigation and determine whether
Defendants can or will give Plaintiffs the relief they seek independent of a judicial
determination or statutory amendment. The decision in Windsor addressed the argument
of when adverseness ceases and not whether adverseness exists as a threshold matter
due to the relationship of the parties.
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For more than a century, the Supreme Court has recognized the adverseness
requirement. See Veazie, 49 U.S. at 255. In Veazie, a defendant, and his brother-in-law
entered into a contract to institute a lawsuit that would procure a favorable court opinion
as to land rights. Id. at 254. After examining the record, the Veazie court determined that
there was no real conflict of interest between the parties because their interests regarding
the issue of law were “one and the same[.]” Id. In fact, the Veazie court declared that “any
attempt, by a mere colorable dispute, to obtain the opinion of the court upon a question
of law which a party desires to know for his own interest or his own purposes, when there
is no real and substantial controversy between those who appear as adverse parties to
the suit, is an abuse which courts of justice have always reprehened [sic], and treated as
a punishable contempt of court.” Id. at 255. Veazie recognized that even where parties
may work together to avoid the expense of litigation, there still must be a “real dispute
between the parties concerning some matter of right.” Id.
The Supreme Court repeated and reinforced the adverseness requirement in
Muskrat. In Muskrat, several plaintiffs endeavored to halt the enforcement of legislation
that affected their land rights. 219 U.S. 346, 349 (1911). The plaintiffs initiated the suit at
the behest of Congress who authorized the plaintiffs to sue the United States on behalf
of themselves and others with similar interests. Id. at 350. Aware of Congress’s
acquiescence to the suit, the Muskrat court nonetheless questioned its jurisdiction to
entertain the proceeding. Id. at 351. The court there noted that “[t]he term [‘case’] implies
the existence of present or possible adverse parties, whose contentions are submitted to
the court for adjudication.” Id. at 357. After examining precedent establishing the limits of
judicial power, the Muskrat court determined that the parties did not present a case or
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controversy as contemplated under the Constitution. Id. The Supreme Court was not
persuaded by the fact that the United States was named as a party defendant where the
government did not have an interest adverse to the plaintiffs. Id. As a result, the Court
held that, without sufficient adverseness between the parties, the action presented “no
justiciable controversy” to be determined by the court. Id. at 363.
The decisions in Veazie and Muskrat establish beyond cavil that adverseness
between litigants is a constitutional minimum that must be satisfied in every federal case
seeking judicial determination. “[T]here is no Art. III case or controversy when the parties
desire ‘precisely the same result[.]’” GTE Sylvania, Inc., 445 U.S. at 383 (quoting Moore
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47, 48 (1971)); see also NLRB v.
Constellium Rolled Prod. Ravenswood, LLC, 44 F. 4th 395, 398 (4th Cir. 2022) (finding
that the parties lacked adverseness where any judicial determination by the court “would
only rubberstamp an agreement that the parties memorialized in writing and
consummated before ever arriving on a federal court’s doorstep”). Moreover, the
adverseness requirement “subsists through all stages” of a federal judicial proceeding.
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (citations omitted). Therefore, a federal court
must revisit the case or controversy inquiry as often as it deems necessary. Id.; see also
Hartfield v. King, 184 U.S. 162, 165 (1902) (noting that “it is the duty of a court to make
such inquiry, in order that it may not be imposed on by an apparent controversy to which
there are really no adverse parties”) (citations omitted).
Adverseness is not determined merely by affixing the labels “plaintiff” and
“defendant” to the parties. See Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 361 (declining to find adverseness
although the United States was a named defendant where the record revealed that the
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United States’ interest was not adverse to that of the plaintiffs). Courts must look beyond
names and titles to determine whether a justiciable case or controversy is presented. See
e.g., Cleveland v. Chamberlin, 66 U.S. 419, 425 (1861) (dismissing an appeal where one
party was in fact both appellant and appellee); United States v. Interstate Com. Comm’n,
337 U.S. 426, 430 (1949) (acknowledging that “courts must look behind names that
symbolize the parties to determine whether a justiciable case or controversy is
presented.”).
With this principle in mind, a court must consider whether “one party is actually
and formally in control of the other party,” and if so, “adjudication may be refused.” 13
Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 3530 (3d ed. 2026). Put another way, a
court must determine whether a single party acts as the “dominus litis”
—the “master” or
owner of the suit—on both sides of the litigation. See South Spring Hill Gold-Min. Co. v.
Amador Medean Gold-Gold-Min. Co., 145 U.S. 300, 301–02 (1892) (determining that the
litigation “ceased to be between adverse parties” where control of the corporations on
both sides “had come into the hands of the same persons,” causing the plaintiff to become
the “dominus litis” on both sides); see also Veritas Vincit v. Brown, No. 24-cv-00079, 2024
WL 3543414, at *6 (E.D. Tex. July 25, 2024) (“The Court finds that Plaintiffs do in fact
control Defendant Reticulum and that no case or controversy exists between Plaintiffs
and [Defendant Reticulum], necessitating [Defendant] Reticulum’s dismissal from the
present case.”). Courts “do not engage in the academic pastime of rendering judgments
in favor of persons against themselves.” Interstate Com. Comm’n, 337 U.S. at 430.
Consonant with the general principle that “no person may sue himself[,]” adverseness is
lacking where one party controls the other party. Id.; see Dasma Inv., LLC v. Realty
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Assoc. Fund III, L.P., 459 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1304 (2006) (“It is undisputed that Ms.
Padron controls both Dasma and PWC[] . . . Insofar as an action between Dasma and
PWC is concerned, therefore, the necessary adversity under Article III of the Constitution
is lacking.”); Carson v. Monsanto Co., 72 F.4th 1261, 1266 (11th Cir. 2023) (allowing an
appeal to proceed where “both parties [had] a real interest in the legal positions” they
advanced, and “nothing in the record establishe[d] that Monsanto control[led] [plaintiff] or
his representation”); id. at 1269 (Jordan, J. concurring) (“In principle it is easy to see why
an important constitutional issue should not be determined in a proceeding in which one
nominal party has dominated the conduct of the other.”) (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
John F. Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer, & David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal
Courts and the Federal System 96 (7th ed. 2015)).
2. The Parties Were Not Sufficiently Adverse to Satisfy Article III’s Case or
Controversy Prerequisite.
The Complaint purports to present a controversy between Plaintiffs—President
Donald J. Trump, Donald J. Trump Jr., Eric Trump, and the Trump Organization, LLC—
and Defendants—the Internal Revenue Service and United States Treasury
Department—claiming Defendants caused Plaintiffs reputational and financial harm for
which they now seek “at least $10,000.000,000.00.” (DE 1 ¶ 11; Id. at 26). At first glance,
the Complaint seemingly satisfies Article III by establishing causes of action “arising under
. . . the laws of the United States[.]” U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2. However, closer examination
reveals that a justiciable case or controversy is absent; Plaintiffs and Defendants are not
adverse because one party controls this litigation. See Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 361 (noting
that judicial power only extends to “actual controversies arising between adverse
litigants[.]”). In reaching this conclusion, the Court determines that Plaintiffs improperly
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employed this lawsuit to justify a particular award in this matter—access to taxpayer funds
and exemption from audits and other investigations—which was accomplished by
leveraging control over Defendants.
a. There is No Case or Controversy Because One Party Controls This
Litigation.
President Trump is Chief of the Executive Branch, see U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 1 (the
“Vesting Clause”), and the Vesting Clause is the bedrock of his authority over that branch
of government. Id. Specifically, the Vesting Clause states that “The executive Power shall
be vested in a President of the United States of America.” Id.; see also Free Enter. Fund
v. Public Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496–97 (2010) (“[T]he President ‘cannot
delegate ultimate responsibility or the active obligation to supervise that goes with it,’
because Article II ‘makes a single President responsible for the actions of the Executive
Branch.’”) (citing Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712–13, (1997)); Seila Law LLC v.
CFPB, 591 U.S. 197, 213 (2020) (“The entire executive Power belongs to the President
alone.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Indeed, just recently, the Supreme Court
cited Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 133 (1926) as a “landmark decision” and
“perhaps our best word on the subject” of whether the President could remove
subordinates in government service at will. Trump v. Slaughter, 609 U.S. __, slip op. at
16 (2026). Finding that he could, the majority ruled that “[s]ubordinates who exercise the
President’s power are subject to removal by him. Then, and only then, can they remain
accountable to the President, and the President to the people.” Id. at 36. “[T]hese officers
exercise the President’s power, not their own, and thus must be responsible to him.” Id.
at 35 (emphasis in original).
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Here, Defendants are the Treasury Department—an Executive agency—and the
IRS, the largest bureau of the Treasury Department. Both Defendants are unquestionably
part of the Executive Branch and ultimately answer to its Chief Executive, President
Trump. President Trump’s authority to appoint and remove federal officers as he sees fit
is evidence of his ability to exercise control over Defendants. See U.S. CONST. ART. II, §
2. Article II explicitly states that “[t]he President shall . . . appoint . . . all Other Officers of
the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for[.]” Id.; see
also Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63 (1890) (noting that the ministerial officers are
marshals of the United States who are “appointed by the president,” and are “removable
from office at his pleasure[.]”). While the Constitution strategically allows “individual
executive officials” to “wield significant authority,” such “authority remains subject to the
ongoing supervision and control of the elected President.” Seila Law LLC, 591 U.S. at
200; see also Br. for Pet’r at 10, Trump v. Slaughter, 609 U.S. __ (2026) (No. 25-332)
(“Article II requires that the President control all executive power—especially the authority
wielded by agency heads, who are ‘the most important’ of the President’s subordinates
and who ‘must be the President’s alter ego[s]’ in their agencies.”) (citing Myers, 272 U.S.
at 133); id. at 2 (“Removal is the President’s indispensable tool of control.”). President
Trump’s supervisory authority directly implicates two key individuals acting on behalf of
Defendants: Scott Bessent,
22 the Secretary of the Treasury Department and Acting
22 “On January 28, 2025, Secretary Bessent was sworn in as the 79th Secretary of the
Treasury of the United States.” Scott Bessent, U.S. Dept. of Treasury,
https://home.treasury.gov/about/general-information/officials/scott-bessent (last visited
July 9, 2026). Secretary Bessent also serves as the “Acting” Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue Service. See The Commissioner’s Section, Internal Revenue Serv.,
https://www.irs.gov/about-irs/the-commissioners-section (last updated Feb. 12, 2026).
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Commissioner of the IRS, and Frank J. Bisignano,
23 the Chief Executive Officer of the
IRS. Plaintiffs cannot argue before the Supreme Court that Executive Branch actors
“unquestionably exercise[] executive power, and must therefore be controlled by the Chief
Executive[,]” Slaughter, 609 U.S. at 27, and then here, argue that the Parties are
sufficiently adverse to establish an actual case or controversy.
Secretary Bessent, in particular, is subject to President Trump’s actual and direct
control in both of his representative roles. First, as Secretary of the Treasury Department,
Bessent is a member of President Trump’s cabinet. In this role, Secretary Bessent is “the
President’s alter ego” in the matters of the Treasury Department “where the President is
required by law to exercise authority.” Myers, 272 U.S. at 133. Consequently, Bessent is
under President Trump’s direct control as an appointed member of his cabinet.24
Second, President Trump’s actual control over Secretary Bessent is grounded in
statute. The Internal Revenue Code establishes that in “the Department of the Treasury[,]
a Commissioner of Internal Revenue . . . shall be appointed by the President[.]” 26 U.S.C.
§ 7803(a)(1)(A). The Internal Revenue Code also provides that, Bessent, in his role as
Acting IRS Commissioner, “may be removed at the will of the President.” 26 U.S.C. §
7803(a)(1)(D). President Trump employs his authority to remove the IRS commissioner,
without cause, and has done so as recently as August 2025.
25 Through Secretary
23 Frank Bisignano also serves as the “18th Senate-confirmed Commissioner of the U.S.
Social Security Administration.” See Commissioner, Soc. Sec. Admin.,
https://www.ssa.gov/agency/commissioner/ (last visited July 11, 2026).
24 See The Executive Branch, The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/govern-
ment/executive-branch/ (last visited July 6, 2026) (“[T]he members of the Cabinet are
often the President’s closest confidants.”).
25 Nicole Markus & Brian Faler, Billy Long Out as IRS Commissioner, POLITICO (last
updated Aug. 8, 2025), https://www.politico.com/news/2025/08/08/billy-long-irs-
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Bessent, President Trump also wields significant control over CEO Bisignano, who
Secretary Bessent selected to be the “first Chief Executive Officer of the Internal Revenue
Service.”26 CEO Bisignano reports directly to Secretary Bessent who oversees CEO
Bisignano’s management of the IRS’s daily operations.27 “Through
the President’s oversight, ‘the chain of dependence [is] preserved,’ so that ‘the lowest
officers, the middle grade, and the highest’ all ‘depend, as they ought, on the President,
and the President on the community.’” Seila Law LLC, 591 U.S. at 224 (citing 1 Annals of
Cong. 499 (J. Madison)). Therefore, not only is Secretary Bessent directed by President
Trump as his alter ego, but the President’s ability to remove him at-will, and control
Bisignano through his oversight, unquestionably impedes Secretary Bessent and CEO
Bisignano’s ability to zealously represent the Treasury Department and IRS in a matter
that is directly adverse to the President.
In addition to the Constitutional and statutory bases for President Trump’s control
over Defendants, President Trump’s Executive Order confirms his intent to wield actual,
comprehensive control over Defendants in this matter. Executive Order 14215: Ensuring
Accountability for All Agencies (“Executive Order”) sets out the scope and breadth of
President Trump’s control over federal agencies. The Executive Order was issued on
February 18, 2025, shortly after President Trump took office for his second term, and
commissioner-trump-00500365 (noting that President Trump removed Billy Long as IRS
commissioner just two months into Long’s five-year tenure).
26 CEO Frank Bisignano, Internal Revenue Serv., (last updated Mar. 4, 2026),
https://www.irs.gov/about-irs/ceo-frank-bisignano.
27 See Brian Scwartz, Bessent Picks Social Security Chief Frank Bisignano as IRS CEO,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2025, at 14:37 ET), https://www.wsj.com/us-news/law/irs-leaker-
sought-job-with-aim-of-releasing-trump-tax-returns-doj-says-93944811.
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expands the President’s oversight of federal agencies and employees.28 Notably, the
Executive Order provides that “it shall be the policy of the executive branch to ensure
Presidential supervision and control of the entire executive branch.” Id. § 1.
Most relevant to the issue of control in this matter is Section 7 of the Executive
Order which explicitly addresses President Trump’s ability to direct Defendants’ conduct
in litigation. Section 7 begins by declaring, “The President and the Attorney General,
subject to the President’s supervision and control, shall provide authoritative
interpretations of law for the executive branch.” Id. (emphasis added). The Section
continues by making clear that “The President and the Attorney General’s opinions on
questions of law are controlling on all employees in the conduct of their official
duties.”29 Id. (emphasis added). The following language further animates the Court’s
concern as to adverseness in this matter:
No employee of the executive branch acting in their official capacity may
advance an interpretation of the law as the position of the United States that
contravenes the President or the Attorney General’s opinion on a matter of
law, including but not limited to the issuance of regulations, guidance, and
positions advanced in litigation, unless authorized to do so by the
President or in writing by the Attorney General.
Id. (emphasis added).
Therefore, in this case, unlike others that private parties have instituted,
Defendants and their representatives are unable to advance any legal position or
28 See Exec. Order No. 14215, 90 FED. REG. 10447 (Feb. 24, 2025).
29 Counsel for Plaintiffs points to the other Plaintiffs—Donald J. Trump, Jr., Eric Trump,
and the Trump Organization, LLC—as having separate, disinterested claims from those
of President Trump, establishing a viable case or controversy. However, these Plaintiffs
share the same attorney, the same parent company, and the same parent and have not
espoused any different or distinct view of this matter or this “Settlement.” Accordingly, the
Court will treat their role as parenthetical to that of Lead Plaintiff President Trump.
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interpretation—however legitimate or well-reasoned—contrary to that held by Lead
Plaintiff in this matter, President Trump. See, e.g., Griffin v. Internal Revenue Serv., No.
22-cv-24023, DE 23; DE 58 (S.D. Fla. 2024) (challenging similar allegations through
motions to dismiss the complaint and amended complaint). Not surprisingly then, no
attorney appeared30 on Defendants’ behalf, challenged Plaintiffs’ actions, or justified the
United States’ position in any way.
Plaintiffs seem to suggest that the course of litigation in Griffin, supports their
position on adverseness, claiming that the plaintiff in Griffin asserted “substantially
identical allegations against the same defendants, arising from the same course of
conduct by the same individual.” (DE 89 at 18). But unlike this case, the plaintiff in Griffin
is a private, non-governmental actor. And, unlike this case, the Griffin defendants
challenged the plaintiff’s allegations. See United States’ Mot. to Dismiss Complaint at 2,
Griffin, No. 22-cv-24023 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2023), DE 23. In Griffin, the defendants (the
same IRS and Treasury Department sued here) contested the plaintiff’s privacy act claims
by arguing preemption and, alternatively, the plaintiff’s failure to plead actual damages.
Id. The Griffin defendants also challenged the section 7431 claim, arguing the complaint
was a shotgun pleading based solely on conclusory allegations. Id. After the motion to
30 The DOJ, Civil Division “represents the United States, its departments and agencies,
Members of Congress, Cabinet Officers, and other federal employees in any civil or
criminal matter within its scope of responsibility.” See Dep’t of Just., About the Civil
Division, https://www.justice.gov/civil/about (last visited June 16, 2026). Notably, although
the statute allows President Trump to receive the Attorney General’s “advice and opinion
on questions of law when required,” President Trump is not obligated to obey the Attorney
General’s opinion on issues of law. See 28 U.S.C. § 511; see also Saikrishna Bangalore
Prakash, Too Unitary, 135 Yale L.J. Forum 533, 552 (2026) (“The President, and not the
Attorney General, is the chief law-enforcement officer of the United States.”). Indeed, “a
lawyer’s counsel does not bind the advice seeker.” Id.
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dismiss was granted in part and denied in part, the government filed an answer asserting
a sovereign immunity defense and denying several allegations in the amended complaint.
That action was settled after two years of litigation.31
Likewise, in Safe Harbor Int’l, LLC v. Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., a class action
lawsuit brought by non-government plaintiffs, the government appeared and moved to
dismiss the plaintiff’s class action complaint. No. 25-cv-00139, 2026 WL 900051, at *1
(D. Md. Apr. 2, 2026). After the court denied its motion to dismiss, the government filed
an answer, asserting sovereign immunity and statute of limitations defenses. To date,
that litigation remains pending. Here, unlike Griffin and Safe Harbor Int’l, LLC, the same
defendants, faced with the same claims caused by the “same course of conduct”
attributable to the “same individual,” did not endeavor to defend their agencies, safeguard
taxpayer monies, or even file an appearance. Instead, before the Parties’ deadline for
addressing the Court’s critical jurisdictional questions passed, the Parties executed the
“settlement agreement” that effectively mooted the issues the Court identified. This case
was “resolved” before any litigation occurred and before the Government was required to
explicate its position.
31 Additionally, Griffin was filed in 2022, well within the applicable statute of limitations
period. And while the question of whether the government was the appropriate party
survived a motion to dismiss challenge, the court there noted it was a matter more suited
to summary judgment. Significantly, the settlement reached after two years of litigation
with the IRS amounted only to a nonmonetary apology, not an award of billions of
taxpayer dollars and conferral of immunities to plaintiff, his family, and affiliates.
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Considering the brief chronology,
32 the silent docket, and Defendants’ deviation
from basic litigation strategies pursued in similar cases, the Court must conclude that
32 By comparison, the limited universe of other civil cases involving publicly available
settlements of similar or greater monetary magnitude had significantly more active
dockets, required much more time to resolve, and involved serious allegations of
catastrophic environmental destruction, life-threatening physical harm, or egregious
market fraud:
• O’Brien’s Brien’s Response Mgmt., LLC v. BP Expl. & Prod. Inc., MDL No. 2179
(E.D. La.) (multidistrict litigation that consisted of approximately 3000 cases
relating to the catastrophic explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig; claims were
resolved for approximately $20 billion after several years).
• In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (claims
based on fraudulent accounting; case settled for approximately $6 billion after six
years of litigation, with a docket spanning 3366 entries).
• Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 23-cv-01495 (W.D. Wash. 2023)
(nonconsensual enrollment of consumers into subscriptions; parties stipulated to
a $2.5 billion judgment, after litigating across 695 docket entries).
• In re: Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 15-MD-02672 (N.D. Ca. 2015). (Volkswagen AG, in a case involving
Volkswagen’s use of illegal software on its 2.0-liter diesel vehicles, agreed to pay
up to $14.7 billion after vigorous motion practice in a case with 8281 docket
entries).
• United States ex rel. Thorpe v. GSK, No. 11-cv-10398 (D. Mass. 2011) (false price
reporting and off-label use practices; settlement resolved four pending qui tam
lawsuits; approximately $3 billion settlement resolved four pending qui tam
lawsuits).
• In re: Enron Corp. Sec., No. 02-md-01446 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (Enron Corp. agreed
to settle claims alleging investment fraud for a collective amount exceeding $7
billion—only after several years of vigorous litigation across multiple lawsuits, with
the consolidated case spanning 473 entries).
• Brown v. Am. Home Prod., No. 99-cv-20593 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (heart valve disease
was caused by the combination of fenfluramine and phentermine; the
manufacturer of the pharmaceuticals agreed to a $3.75 billion settlement after
zealously defending their position with a docket spanning 5448 entries).
All of these billion-dollar civil settlements involved more time, effort, and advocacy than
that expended in the instant case. Moreover, in these cases, the claims resolved were
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Defendants chose not to “advance an interpretation of the law as the position of the United
States that contravenes” President Trump’s opinion regarding this lawsuit. See Executive
Order § 7. It is clear that obeisance to the mandate of his Executive Order has been
fulfilled by Defendants’ actions (or more accurately, inaction) in this case. Therefore, not
only does the Executive Order demonstrate President Trump’s espoused control over
Defendants’ conduct generally in litigation, it also demonstrates President Trump’s actual
control in this litigation. See 13 Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 3530 (3d
ed. 2026).
Adverseness is further defeated by President Trump’s influence over the DOJ
here. During an interview with the New York Times, President Trump publicly expressed
his belief in his unequivocal control over the DOJ. See Excerpts From Trump’s Interview
With The Times, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/12/28/us/politics/trump-interview-excerpts.html (“I have absolute right to
do what I want to do with the Justice Department.”). However, the DOJ is tasked with
zealously representing the United States’ interests, see 28 U.S.C. § 516,
33 and is trusted
legally cognizable: discrimination, property damage, or tort as defined by applicable state
and federal statutes. Here, however, the terms “Anti-Weaponization” and “Lawfare” are
inchoate and the “settlement agreement” provides no legal definition as to what
constitutes either term, outside their meaning in political discourse.
33 “The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the Office of the Attorney General which evolved
over the years into the head of the Department of Justice and chief law enforcement
officer of the Federal Government.” See Office of the Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of
Just., https://www.justice.gov/ag (last visited June 17, 2026). “Since the Judiciary Act of
1789, the United States Attorney General has had the authority ‘to give his advice and
opinion upon questions of law when required by the President of the United States, or
when requested by the heads of any of the departments, touching any matters that may
concern their departments.’” See Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. United
States Dep’t of Just., 922 F.3d 480, 483 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing Judiciary Act of 1789, §
35, 1 Stat. 73, 93 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 511–513)).
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to remain insulated from political influence. Fidelity to the rule of law can be achieved only
when the DOJ is free to assess the facts and governing law of each case it reviews without
the stain of political interference.34 There is “an expectation that even the Attorney
General must be able to draw the line between political allegiance and fidelity to the
people, as well as the fair administration of the law.” Tonna Onyendu, Department of
Justice’s Role in Electoral Politics: Maintaining Neutrality in the Enforcement of Voting
Rights, 31 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 799, 803 (2018).35
b. The Conduct of Executive Branch Actors Demonstrates Lack of
Adverseness and Improper Motive.
Here, Defendants’ actions (or inaction), as directed by the DOJ, and the
subsequent “resolution” of this lawsuit leads the Court to conclude the Parties’ interests
34 Legislators on both sides of the political aisle have emphasized the need for an
independent DOJ. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Michael B.
Mukasey to be Attorney General of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 478 (2007) (Patrick J. Leahy, (D.)) (“There is good reason why the
rule of law requires that we have an Attorney General and not merely a Secretary of the
Department of Justice. This is a different kind of Cabinet position. It is distinct from all
others. It requires greater independence”); Nomination of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Nominee to
be Attorney General of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 403 (2009) (Arlen Specter, (R.)) (“Next to the President of the United States, there
is no Federal officer more important than the Attorney General. The Attorney General is
different from any other Cabinet officer because Cabinet officers ordinarily carry out the
policies of the President. But the Attorney General has an independent duty to the people
and to uphold the rule of law.”).
35 It has been reported that a Principal Deputy Associate Attorney General advised United
States Attorneys around the country that the President is the Department’s “chief client.”
Ben Penn, In-Your-Face DOJ Aide Rides Prosecutors for ‘Chief Client’ Trump,
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 19, 2026), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/in-your-
face-doj-aide-rides-prosecutors-for-chief-client-trump; see supra p. 26. Former Attorney
General Pam Bondi also characterized DOJ attorneys as the President’s “lawyers.” See
Memorandum from the Att’y Gen. to All Dep’t of Just. Emps., General Policy Regarding
Zealous Advocacy on Behalf of the United States (Feb. 5, 2025), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/ag/media/1388521/dl.
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were “one and the same.” Veazie, 49 U.S. at 256. In justifying the “unusual”36 settlement
to resolve Plaintiffs’ claims, the DOJ and Acting Attorney General Blanche in a press
release, and Acting Attorney General Blanche’s Congressional testimony respectively,
cited Keepseagle v. Vilsack, 99-cv-03119, (D.D.C. 1999), as the “precedent” for the
unprecedented establishment of the $1.776 billion dollar fund. However, Plaintiffs’ briefing
is conspicuously silent as to this justification, making no mention of the Keepseagle case.
Understandably so.37
In Keepseagle, the parties—including the Department of Agriculture represented
by the DOJ—engaged in a decade-long litigation regarding alleged discrimination
perpetrated against thousands of Native American farmers and ranchers who had been
illegally denied farm loans and access to benefit programs. Keepseagle v. Vilsack, 118
F. Supp. 3d 98, 104 (D.D.C. 2015). As the presiding judge observed, “[i]t was a major
class-action seeking to remedy what many felt was the latest chapter in the federal
government’s sordid history of mistreating Native Americans.” Id. at 104. There, “[f]or
36 See A Review of the President’s Fiscal Year 2027 Budget Request for the Department
of Justice, 119th Cong. (2026) (statement of Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General) (“So
what we’ve done with this fund. . . And by the way, it is true that this is unusual”).
37 During the first administration of President Trump, Associate Attorney General Rachel
Brand delivered remarks to the Washington, D.C. Lawyer Chapter of the Federalist So-
ciety. Rachel L. Brand, Assoc. Att’y Gen., Remarks to the Washington, D.C. Lawyers
Chapter of the Federalist Society (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/archives/opa/speech/associate-attorney-general-brand-delivers-remarks-wash-
ington-dc-lawyers-chapter. In her remarks, Ms. Brand acknowledged that the “Depart-
ment of Justice is not your typical litigant or litigator.” Id. She explained that “protecting
the public fisc is something the Attorney General takes seriously,” and highlighted
Keepseagle as “one of the worst examples” of settlements involving the DOJ. Ms. Brand
critiqued the fact that, under the mechanism of the Keepseagle fund, “hundreds of millions
of dollars of the taxpayer’s money will be spent in ways never appropriated by Congress,
with virtually no oversight.” Id. In President Trump’s second administration, the DOJ now
contrives to rehabilitate Keepseagle as the rationale for this “unusual” settlement.
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nearly ten years, the parties engaged in extensive and contentious discovery and motions
practice,” id. at 105; propounded notice to putative class members regarding a proposed
class settlement; defined the mechanisms of class claims for recovery; and participated
in an hours-long fairness proceeding, where every person who attended was heard. The
Keepseagle case history stands in stark contrast to the 109-day sojourn of this matter
where Defendants never appeared, never challenged Plaintiffs’ claims, and never filed a
single pleading.
Ultimately, the DOJ has endeavored to justify its position to create the appearance
of a case or controversy “resolved” under the aegis of the Court. But the Parties, most of
whom are government actors, did not engage in any public discussion or judicial review
regarding their “unusual” arrangement and whether they were legally adverse; indeed,
they actively avoided such an undertaking.38 And the extraordinary award fashioned by
the Parties for claims that were never litigated, and have yet to be defined, on behalf of
unidentified third parties39 whose future remedies bear no relationship to the claims in this
case, indicates that real adverse interests were never before the Court. Cf. Monsanto Co.,
72 F.4th at 1266 (finding a justiciable case or controversy where the parties zealously
38 The Court is extremely troubled by the testimony given by Acting Attorney General
Blanche on May 19, 2026. In response to why the “settlement agreement” had not been
submitted to this Court for review, he stated that “there is no judge” because the case had
been dismissed and, therefore, there was “no mechanism” for reviewing the agreement.
See supra note 13. While temporally accurate, this answer is, at best, misleading and, at
worst, disingenuous. The Court was available to review any pleading by any Party at any
time during this lawsuit. And if Acting Attorney General Blanche had thought the dismissal
was improvidently granted or thought Plaintiffs misspoke when they said, “no judicial
analysis is appropriate,” (DE 52 at 2), he only had to file an appearance and ask for relief.
39 Compounding these concerns, an official at the DOJ publicly stated that he intended to
apply for compensation from the Fund. See Daniel Lippman, DOJ Official Sought
Weaponization Fund, POLITICO (June 10, 2026), https://www.polit-
ico.com/news/2026/06/10/doj-official-sought-weaponization-fund-patrick-davis-00955.
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asserted their rights and there was “no suggestion” that the defendant “selected or
control[ed]” the plaintiff’s counsel). Indeed, the DOJ seems to have purposefully adopted
the strategy of creating a “slush fund disguised as a settlement, and then doling the
money out to whatever constituency the Executive wants bankrolled.” Keepseagle v.
Perdue, 856 F.3d 1039, 1058 (D.D.C. 2017) (Rogers, J., dissenting).40
The Court’s conclusion regarding the Parties’ shared interest is also underscored
by the circumstances surrounding the execution of the “settlement agreement.
” First, the
“settlement agreement” is signed on behalf of Plaintiffs by Daniel Epstein (“Mr. Epstein”),
a former White House Senior Associate Counsel and Special Assistant to President
Trump from 2017 until 2020. Notably, Mr. Epstein was never counsel of record in this
case; the Complaint’s signature block identified him as counsel41 for Plaintiffs but
represented that his pro hac vice application was “forthcoming.” (DE 1 at 27). Since no
such application was filed with the Court, and since, in other matters pending in Florida
and elsewhere, Mr. Epstein sought pro hac admission within weeks of filing the
40 While ignoring the facts and history of the Keepseagle case, the DOJ also seems to
studiously ignore the lessons of Keepseagle. Here, the DOJ chose to bypass notice,
adversarial advocacy, legal analysis, and court review altogether to go straight to creating
its own billion-dollar Cy Pres fund for non-parties with no pending claims against the
United States. In this way, the DOJ has both disregarded the precedential meaning of
Keepseagle while engaging in the constitutional assault predicted by its most ardent
critics.
41 Mr. Brito signed the Complaint—he is admitted to the Florida Bar and is admitted to the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Mr. Brito did not sign the
“settlement agreement,
” but his name appears on it. Mr. Epstein’s name appears on the
Complaint, but he did not (and could not) sign it. Mr. Epstein did sign the “settlement
agreement.”
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complaint,42 the Court can only surmise that Mr. Epstein was aware that he would never
need to appear and litigate the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims.
Second, the “settlement agreement” is signed on behalf of Defendants by Stanley
Woodward, Jr., the current Associate Attorney General at the DOJ, and Acting Attorney
General Blanche. Before he went to the DOJ, Associate Attorney General Woodward
represented several individuals charged in connection with the events of January 6, 2021,
at the United States Capitol.43 He also represented Walt Nauta, who was President
Trump’s personal aide and a co-defendant in the criminal matter involving the return of
classified documents at Mar-a-Lago.44 Before his appointment to the DOJ, Acting
Attorney General Blanche served as President Trump’s personal criminal defense
attorney in several high-profile matters. See, e.g., United States v. Trump, No. 23-cr-
80101 (S.D. Fla. 2023) (“Mar-a-Lago Documents Case”); United States v. Trump, No.
23-cr-00257 (D.D.C. 2023) (the criminal case charging President Trump with conspiring
42 See Trump v. Brit. Broad. Corp., No. 25-cv-25894, (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 15, 2025); see
also Trump v. N.Y. Times Co., No. 25-cv-02487 (M.D. Fla. filed Sept. 15, 2025). Mr.
Epstein also appeared as counsel for President Trump after appropriately filing pro hac
papers in Trump v. CBS Broad. Inc., No. 24-cv-00236 (N.D. Tex. filed October 31, 2024).
In that case, Mr. Epstein sought pro hac admission despite being a member of the State
Bar of Texas.
43 Associate Attorney General Woodward appeared and represented Connie Meggs and
Kelly Meggs (husband and wife), Ryan Samsel, and Federico Klein. See United States v.
Meggs, No. 21-cr-00028 (D.D.C. 2021); United States v. Meggs, No. 22-cr-00015 (D.D.C.
2021); United States v. Samsel, 21-cr-00537 (D.D.C. 2021); United States v. Klein, No.
24-cv-02610 (D.D.C. 2021).
44 See United States v. Trump, No. 23-cr-80101 (S.D. Fla. 2023). In that same matter,
Associate Attorney General Woodward also represented Yuscil Tavares, an information
technology worker at Mar-a-Lago who was charged alongside President Trump and Walt
Nauta for his role in allegedly deleting surveillance camera footage. That representation
was the subject of a conflict of interest hearing pursuant to United States v. Garcia, 517
F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975).
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to overturn the 2020 election and for attempting to obstruct with the election’s results
before, during, and after January 6, 2021); People v. Donald J. Trump, No. 71543-23
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Dec. 3, 2024) (the “hush money” case that raised allegations of
President Trump falsifying business records).
While the Court appreciates that attorneys successfully transition between private
practice and government service, such transitions do not absolve counsel of their ethical
obligations. For example, Rule 11.1(c) of the Southern District of Florida Local Rules
incorporates the Florida Bar’s rules of professional conduct as ethical standards. See
S.D. Fla. L.R. 11.1(c) (“The standards of professional conduct shall include the current
Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.”). As relevant here, Rule 4-1.11 of the Rules Regulating
the Florida Bar provides a conflict-of-interest rule which specifically governs former and
current government officers and employees. The commentary to this rule explains, in
relevant part, the following:
This rule represents a balancing of interests. On the one hand, where the
successive clients are a government agency and another client, public or
private, the risk exists that power or discretion vested in that agency
might be used for the special benefit of the other client. A lawyer
should not be in a position where benefit to the other client might
affect performance of the lawyer’s professional functions on behalf of
the government.
R. Regul. the Fla. Bar 4-1.11 (emphasis added).45 The spectre of that risk seems to be
present here.
45 These principles, however, are not confined to Florida practitioners or Florida Bar rules.
The attorneys involved in the negotiation and execution of the “settlement agreement” are
governed by similar ethical standards in the states in which they are admitted to practice
law. The Court may take judicial notice of those admissions. See Jackson v. United
States, Nos. 12-cv-388, 20-cr-198, 2014 WL 5474132, at *12 n.6 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2024)
(taking judicial notice of attorney’s Florida bar membership status because attorney’s
membership and status “can be readily and accurately determined from Florida Bar
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The gravamen of the “settlement agreement” is to fund claims premised on events
including those arising from, inter alia, the Mar-a-Lago Documents Case and the events
of January 6, 2021.
46 Indeed, these two cases have been referenced as quintessential
Anti-Weaponization and Lawfare claims.
47 Instead of either recusing48 because of their
previous representations or vigorously defending this lawsuit as required to do so by DOJ
records on www.floridabar.org, and the accuracy of those records cannot reasonably be
questioned”). Attorney Epstein is admitted in Texas, the District of Columbia, and
Maryland. Attorney Woodward is likewise admitted in the District of Columbia, and as
noted above, Attorney Blanche is admitted in New York.
46 “President Trump’s views about the prosecution of those who attacked the U.S. Capitol
on January 6 . . . are well known[.]” United States v. Nordean, No. 21-cr-00175, DE 1098
(D.D.C. July 10, 2026) (dismissing indictments with prejudice following appellate court’s
vacatur of judgments against four defendants convicted at trial of “serious offenses”
arising from January 6, 2021).
47 See supra note 11; see also Sabrina Lam, Trump defends ‘Anti-Weaponization Fund’
amid GOP blowup, POLITICO (May 22, 2026), https://www.polit-
ico.com/news/2026/05/22/trump-defends-anti-weaponization-fund-00933727 (reporting
on President Trump’s May 22, 2026, statement that “I gave up a lot of money in allowing
the just announced Anti-Weaponization Fund to go forward. I could have settled my case,
including the illegal release of my Tax Returns and the equally illegal BREAK IN of Mar-
a-Lago, for an absolute fortune. Instead, I am helping others, who were so badly
abused by an evil, corrupt, and weaponized Biden Administration, receive, at long
last, JUSTICE!”) (emphasis added). Acting Attorney General Blanche expressly acknowl-
edged that the Anti-Weaponization Fund “is not limited to in any way scope or form to
January 6th” but declined to ensure that the funds would not be disbursed “to anyone
convicted on the January 6th attack on Congress.” Supra note 13 at 37:26 and 01:48-37.
48 See Katelyn Polantz, Exclusive: Acting AG Todd Blanche was told last year to recuse
from Justice Department matters involving Trump, CNN (May 14, 2026),
https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/14/politics/todd-blanche-recusal-trump-investigations-
brennan. As a Justice Department spokeswoman stated: “[Blanche] is recused from many
cases before DOJ. In any cases that are still ongoing where he previously represented
someone, he is recused.” Id. In this case, however, notwithstanding his prior
representation of President Trump, Blanche did not recuse.
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policies and procedures,49 these lawyers agreed to a “settlement” involving a staggering
amount of money potentially benefitting former clients.
Moreover, the Release Order, signed only by Acting Attorney General Blanche,
extends a blanket grant of immunity to all Plaintiffs and their families and “affiliates,” and
precludes all “current or possible” investigations or actions before any other agencies or
departments.50 The Release Order also purports to bar the IRS from conducting any
future tax audits of President Trump, his sons, and their entities.51 This provision directly
contravenes 26 U.S.C. § 7217, titled “Prohibition on executive branch influence over
taxpayer audits and other investigations,” which states:
It shall be unlawful for any applicable person to request, directly or
indirectly, any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service to
conduct or terminate an audit or other investigation of any particular
taxpayer with respect to the tax liability of such taxpayer.
26 U.S.C. § 7217(a).
The explicit text of this statute prohibits President Trump and his lawyers—one of
whom was former White House Counsel—from asking for or promoting termination of an
audit directed toward him.52 And acquiescing to any such demand is wholly incompatible
49 See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 4-3.432 (2018) (requiring that request for
compromise “demonstrate a thorough, thoughtful exploration of any issues relating to
jurisdiction, liability, and damages, with the ultimate goal of ensuring that a proposed
settlement is in the best interests of the United States and that the United States has
brought peace with respect to any claims that the plaintiff could bring based on the subject
matter of the case”).
50 See supra note 15.
51 Id.
52 This proviso of the “settlement” also raises the question of whether the agreement
violates Article II, Section 3 of the United States Constitution, which directs that the
President “shall take [c]are that the Laws be faithfully executed[.]” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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with the duties of DOJ attorneys (as well as CEO Bisignano for the IRS) to enforce the
law and protect the public interest. Moreover, the conferral of possibly millions of dollars
in tax relief and corollary benefits potentially violates Article II, Section I of the United
States Constitution, a limitation surely known by former White House Counsel and the
current Acting Attorney General. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7: “The President shall,
at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be
encreased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he
shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any
of them.”53 No sitting President has ever sued federal agencies completely subject to his
control for monetary benefits, or any benefits that inure to him, his family, and associates.
The failure of any attorney in this case to address, on this docket, the relationship of this
Article II proscription with the benefits conferred by the “settlement” is a glaring omission
that speaks to the control of the Lead Plaintiff.54
Another signal that adverseness was absent was Acting Attorney General
Blanche’s unilateral repudiation and severance of the purported “Anti-Weaponization
Fund” associated with this lawsuit.55 Two weeks after the dismissal, in testimony before
the House of Representatives, Acting Attorney General Blanche conceded that the DOJ
53 “Neither the Union nor any of its members will be at liberty to give, nor will he (the
President) be at liberty to receive any other emolument than that which may have been
determined by the first act.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (A. Hamilton).
54 As recently discussed in a decision affirming attorney sanctions, the Eleventh Circuit
observed that “one of a lawyer’s chief duties is to give his clients a clear-eyed view of
whether the law says what the client wants it to say.” Est. of Lane Caviness v. Atlas Air,
Inc., No. 24-11033 (11th Cir. July 10, 2026).
55 See Defendant’s Notice of Filing, Floyd v. Dep’t. of Just., No. 1:26-cv-01399, DE 93
(E.D. Va. filed on May 22, 2026).
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was “not moving forward with the fund, period.”56 Acting Attorney General Blanche’s
decision, which has not been memorialized or adopted by Plaintiffs57 or their lawyers,
demonstrates his confidence that he could speak for, and bind, both sides of this matter.
This certitude supports the conclusion that the Parties worked in tandem and were never
actually adverse. Indeed, “a party may not unilaterally repudiate a settlement agreement
once it is reached.” Reed by and through Reed v. United States, 891 F.2d 878, 881 n.3
(11th Cir. 1990).
“It is ‘hornbook law’ requiring no citations of authority, except common
sense, that a contract once entered into may not thereafter be unilaterally modified;
subsequent modifications require consent and ‘a meeting of the minds’ of all of the initial
parties to the contract whose rights or responsibilities are sought to be affected by the
modification.” Tropicana Pools, Inc. v. Boysen, 296 So. 2d 104, 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974). Acting Attorney General Blanche’s apparent capacity to speak for both Plaintiffs
and Defendants, sign a “settlement” document on behalf of all Parties to this action, and
then repudiate part of that agreement, demonstrates that there was only one party whose
interests were being represented throughout this case.
In this case, the President58 filed a lawsuit alleging reputational and financial harm
from the unlawful disclosure of his tax returns. (DE 1). He sued the IRS and the Treasury
Department—entities that are part of the Executive Branch headed by him and, more
56 Supra note 19.
57 In an interview with CNN, President Trump defended the “Anti-Weaponization Fund” to
reporters, noting that he didn’t know whether the fund was “fully dead or just on hold” and
that he would “have to ask the lawyers.” See Sarah Ferrls, et al., Trump tells CNN he
doesn’t know if $1.8 billion fund is dead, calling it ‘a beautiful thing’, CNN (June 3, 2026),
https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/03/politics/anti-weaponization-fund-trump.
58 Again, while Plaintiffs also include Donald J. Trump, Jr., Eric Trump, and The Trump
Organization, LLC, these individuals and entity are parenthetical to this analysis.
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recently, that have been directed to adhere to any interpretation of law advanced by him.
And while it is true that President Trump had a legal right to bring a suit for the unlawful
disclosure, any remedy would be circumscribed by the legal guardrails applicable to all
litigants: the statute of limitations, naming the appropriate defendant, and pleading special
recoverable damages. Notably, had President Trump (and his then-lawyers Alina Habba
and Todd Blanche) brought this lawsuit in a timely fashion while he was a private citizen,
this litigation understandably might have been resolved in a 109-day time span. But that
is not what happened. Instead, President Trump did not pursue his claims until he once
again occupied the White House and had appointed his former lawyer, and the former
lawyer of persons who are putative beneficiaries of the “Anti-Weaponization Fund” to
prominent positions in the DOJ. These officials then negotiated on behalf of the United
States, with his current lawyers, including his former White House Counsel to reach a
“settlement.” It is risible to suggest that there was ever adverseness between the Parties.
In dismissing the non-parties’ claims of collusion, Plaintiffs reveal the true position
of the Parties and say the quiet part out loud: “Regardless of whether Plaintiffs had ever
filed this action, the Government and Plaintiffs still had the power to resolve all disputes
between the parties.” (DE 89 at 15). The power to resolve was never a question before
this Court. Whether Executive Branch actors can privately agree to give themselves and
their former clients blanket immunities and billions of dollars in tax monies for legally
undefined grievances was never an issue advanced to this Court. The question is whether
the Parties could do so by claiming to be adverse and engaging the legitimacy of a court
proceeding. The answer is a resounding “no”: the Lead Plaintiff and the Government are
one, a fully realized unitary interest. Because “Plaintiffs have no answer for the fact that
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the [L]ead Plaintiff, President Trump, directs and controls the Defendants[,]” this “renders
this lawsuit non-adversarial, collusive, and jurisdictionally improper.” See DE 94 at 4.
And because this fact was so obvious and so insurmountable, the Court finds that
this matter was brought for an improper purpose—to gain the imprimatur of judicial
legitimacy for a “settlement” that had no viable basis in law or fact. As was observed in
another matter brought in this District, “this case is part of Mr. Trump’s pattern of misusing
the courts to serve political purposes.” Trump v. Clinton, 653 F. Supp. 3d 1198, 1219
(S.D. Fla. 2023).
Having concluded that this action was presented for an improper purpose, the
Court now turns to the question of sanctions. This inquiry proceeds under two
independent, but overlapping frameworks: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and the
Court’s inherent authority.
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1159
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (“Rule 11”) governs the filings of pleadings,
motions, and other papers with the Court. “The purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless
filings in [the] district court and thus streamline the administration and procedure of federal
59 As acknowledged by the non-party movants, Rule 60(d)(3) allows the Court to “set
aside a judgment for fraud on the Court.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(D)(3); see also Bevan v. Lee
Cnty. SO, 224 F. App’x 880, 882 (11th Cir. 2007) (“A federal court can vacate its own
judgment upon proof that a fraud has been perpetrated on the court.”) (citing Chambers
v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991)). The Court notes that it possesses the authority
to protect the integrity of these proceedings under Rule 11 and its inherent authority, and
so it need not invoke Rule 60(d)(3). However, this decision should not be understood as
a final determination regarding any fraud perpetrated on the court and does not foreclose
the possibility of future relief under Rule 60(d)(3). See SEC v. ESM Grp., Inc., 835 F.2d
270, 273 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Fraud that prevents the functioning of the judicial process does
not have to be brought within any specific period of time.”). Accordingly, the Court
expresses no view as to whether the requirements of Rule 60(d)(3) have been satisfied.
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courts.” Peer v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). As
relevant here, when an attorney files a pleading in federal court, he certifies that, among
other things, the pleading is not being presented for an improper purpose. FED. R. CIV. P.
11(B); Spolter v. SunTrust Bank, 403 F. App’x 387, 391 (11th Cir. 2010). Because this
question strikes at the heart of the integrity of the judicial process, the Court may raise
the improper purpose inquiry sua sponte and at any time. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(3); see
also id. advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (“The time when sanctions are to
be imposed rests in the discretion of the trial judge.”).
An improper purpose under Rule 11 includes filing suit to force a settlement. See
e.g., Scott v. Vantage Corp., 64 F.4th 462, 472–73 (3d Cir. 2023) (discerning no abuse
of discretion in district court’s conclusion that plaintiffs violated Rule 11(b) where they filed
a lawsuit with no “eye toward settlement” and to force a settlement); Roe v Rivian Auto.
LLC, No. 20-998, 2020 WL 8812913, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2020) (determining that
case was presented for an improper purpose where plaintiff filed lawsuit to garner
publicity and force a settlement); Johnson v. 27th Ave. Caraf, Inc., 9 F.4th 1300, 1309
(11th Cir. 2021) (affirming sanctions against client whose “motivation [to file lawsuits] was
to obtain payment of legal fees, as opposed to compliance with the ADA.”). Even
seemingly viable claims can support the finding of improper purpose when presented in
such a way that subverts the rules or the Court’s authority. See In re Flynn, 139 F.R.D.
698, 699 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
“Rule 11 authorizes a court to sanction a party who submits a pleading for an
improper purpose.” Smith v. Psych. Sols., Inc., 750 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2014).
Such sanctions are discretionary and may be imposed on any party as the court deems
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appropriate. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1). “[T]he imposition of a Rule 11 sanction is not a
judgment on the merits of an action. Rather, it requires the determination of a collateral
issue: whether the attorney has abused the judicial process, and, if so, what sanction
would be appropriate.” Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 396.
“The standard for testing conduct under Rule 11 is ‘reasonableness under the
circumstances,’ an objective standard.” Laborers Local 938 Joint Health & Welfare Tr.
Fund v. B.R. Starnes Co. of Fla., 827 F.2d 1454, 1458 (11th Cir. 1987). “[A]s is almost
always the case, the district court is better situated than [the reviewing appellate court] to
marshal the pertinent facts and apply the fact-dependent legal standard mandated by
Rule 11.” Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 638 (11th Cir. 2010)
(citing Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 402) (quotation marks omitted). “Given the district court’s
familiarity with the case and the parties, the district court is in a better position ‘to make
these determinations in the first instance[.]’” Id.
The Eleventh Circuit has recognized three instances in which Rule 11 sanctions
are appropriate: where a pleading (1) “has no reasonable factual basis”; (2) “is based on
a legal theory that has no reasonable chance of success and that cannot be advanced
as a reasonable argument to change existing law”; or (3) is “in bad faith for an improper
purpose.” Massengale v. Ray, 267 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Worldwide
Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 87 F.3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 1996)). This Order discusses
whether Rule 11 sanctions are warranted under the improper purpose prong.60
60 The Court confines its analysis to Rule 11’s improper purpose prong. That said, this
election should not be construed as suggesting that the remaining Rule 11 grounds are
inapplicable.
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The Court divides its analysis in three parts. First, the Court considers whether
Plaintiffs’ Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) voluntary dismissal precludes consideration of Rule 11
sanctions. Second, the Court determines whether Plaintiffs’ conduct discussed supra
satisfies Rule 11’s improper purpose standard. Finally, the Court addresses what
sanctions, if any, are appropriate.
1. Plaintiffs’ Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) Voluntary Dismissal Does Not Preclude
Consideration of Rule 11 Sanctions.
As stated previously, and as the non-party movants correctly note, a voluntary
dismissal does not deprive a district court of jurisdiction to determine whether Rule 11
has been violated and, if so, what sanctions are appropriate. See, e.g., Fox v. Acadia
State Bank, 937 F.2d 1566, 1569 n.2 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[W]e hold that the stipulated
dismissal did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to impose Rule 11 sanctions.”);
Sussman v. Salem, Saxon & Nielsen, P.A., 818 F. Supp. 1510, 1516 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
(explaining “that voluntary dismissal of a claim under Rule 41(a)(1), if otherwise
sanctionable under Rule 11, does not preclude the assessment of sanctions.”). As the
Supreme Court has explained,
The filing of complaints, papers, or other motions without taking the
necessary care in their preparation is a separate abuse of the judicial
system, subject to separate sanction. As noted above, a voluntary dismissal
does not eliminate the Rule 11 violation. Baseless filing puts the machinery
of justice in motion, burdening courts and individuals alike with needless
expense and delay. Even if the careless litigant quickly dismisses the action,
the harm triggering Rule 11’s concerns has already occurred. Therefore, a
litigant who violates Rule 11 merits sanctions even after a dismissal.
Moreover, the imposition of such sanctions on abusive litigants is useful to
deter such misconduct. If a litigant could purge his violation of Rule 11
merely by taking a dismissal, he would lose all incentive to stop, think and
investigate more carefully before serving and filing papers.
Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 398 (citations omitted).
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That reasoning applies with equal force here. Adopting Plaintiffs’ position would
grant parties immunity from Rule 11 sanctions, incentivizing them to misuse the judicial
process and then moot the violation by voluntarily dismissing the case before the court
can act. See Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd., 998 F.3d at 1266 (“If we divested
the district court of jurisdiction over [sanctions] motions, an enterprising plaintiff could
abuse the judicial system but nevertheless get off scot free by voluntarily dismissing its
case under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i).”). Rule 11 does not permit such a result, and the Court
will not countenance such behavior. See id. Therefore, contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions,
the Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) voluntary dismissal does not foreclose the Court’s Rule 11 inquiry.
See Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 395 (noting that “the violation of Rule 11 is complete when
the paper is filed”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
2. Plaintiffs’ Conduct Satisfies Rule 11’s Improper Purpose Standard.
This case concerns whether Plaintiffs’ conduct, as described supra, satisfies Rule
11’s improper purpose standard. The Court concludes that it does. “[Plaintiffs] pursued
this lawsuit in bad faith for the improper purpose of dishonestly advancing a political
narrative.” Trump v. Clinton, No. 22-14102-CV, 2023 WL 1207842, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
15, 2023). These efforts cannot be allowed in this Court. See Procup v. Strickland, 792
F.2d 1069, 1073 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Federal courts have both the inherent power and the
constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability
to carry out Article III functions.”); Santana v. Frank Sufka Fam. Tr. Fund, No. 26-cv-1440,
2026 WL 1492775, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 28, 2026) (“If judges allow the court system to
be weaponized by any party for improper purposes, the public is not well-served. Judges
have a responsibility to ensure the courts remain open to all to pursue claims in good
faith. They have an equally important responsibility to ensure courts are not abused for
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improper purposes.”). Certainly, a court should not be a forum for a party that cynically
views a lawsuit as a vehicle to achieve a predetermined outcome: “I’m suing myself.”61
“Improper purpose [under Rule 11] is often inferred from circumstantial evidence.”
Thompson, 610 F.3d at 665 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Cohen
v. Burlington, Inc., No. 18-cv-81420, 2020 WL 1033349, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2020)
(same); Meide v. Pulse Evol. Corp., No. 18-cv-1037, 2021 WL 4459653, at *10 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 29, 2021) (relying on plaintiff’s persistence in pursuing factually and legally frivolous
claims as circumstantial evidence of an improper purpose under Rule 11). Here, the
record before the Court supports such an inference. As aptly summarized by the non-
party movants, Plaintiffs acted in bad faith and for an improper purpose by “collusively
filing a lawsuit with claims subject to multiple dispositive defenses solely to provide cover
for a collusive settlement.” (DE 94 at 12). The Court agrees. See Trocano v. Vivaldi, No.
25-11813, 2026 WL 446510, at *6–7 (11th Cir. Feb. 17, 2026) (explaining that the “district
court may in its discretion impose Rule 11 sanctions against a party or lawyer who
pursues a claim that is obviously barred by a waivable affirmative defense like the statute
of limitations.”). Accordingly, the Court must now determine what sanctions, if any, are
appropriate. See id. (noting that “Rule 11 sanctions are discretionary” and therefore “just
because a district court can impose sanctions does not mean that the court is required to
do so.”) (citation omitted).
61 Even in the context of the Mar-a-Lago lawsuit, which became part of the “settlement,”
President Trump recognized the unique dynamics of his position and commented: “I'm
suing myself.” Joseph Gedeon, Trump Says He Has Final Say on Paying Himself $230m
for Past Investigations, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2025, 10:30 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/oct/22/donald-trump-damages-federal-
investigations.
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3. Sanctions are Appropriate.
District courts have broad discretion to tailor appropriate and reasonable sanctions
under Rule 11. See Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co Am., 307 F.3d 1277, 1295 (11th Cir.
2002) (citing Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1987)). A court may
impose both monetary and non-monetary sanctions. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(C)(4). When
assessing sua sponte Rule 11 sanctions, “[t]he initiating court must employ[:] (1) a show
cause order to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard; and (2) a higher standard
(akin to contempt) than in the case of party-initiated sanctions.” Kaplan v.
DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted).62
The Eleventh Circuit considers several factors in determining an appropriate
sanction under Rule 11, including: “whether the person has engaged in similar conduct in
other litigation,” “what effect it had on the litigation process in time or expense,
” and
“whether the person responsible is trained in the law.” See Thomas v. Early Cnty, Ga.,
518 F. App’x 645, 646 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note
to 1993 amendment).
Plaintiffs maintain that monetary sanctions are unavailable because their voluntary
dismissal preceded any order to show cause. (DE 89 at 13–14). This argument relies on
a faulty premise: that the Court’s authority under Rule 11 is limited to monetary sanctions.
62 In assessing the adequacy of a show cause order under Rule 11, the Eleventh Circuit
applies a “flexible standard.” DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d at 1257. Therefore, “in
many cases substantial compliance may suffice.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs received notice of
the conduct at issue and a full opportunity to respond. See Johnson, 9 F.4th at 1311 (“Due
process requires that the attorney (or party) be given fair notice that his conduct may
warrant sanctions and the reasons why.”) (quoting In re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th
Cir. 1995)). And Plaintiffs briefed the applicability of Rule 11 sanctions, indicating that
they understood its relevance.
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The Court recognizes that Rule 11(c)(5)(B) limits a court’s ability to impose monetary
sanctions on its own initiative where the show cause order follows a voluntary dismissal
or settlement. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(C)(5)(B); see also Capital Corp. Merch. Banking, Inc. v.
Norwich, No. 6:07-cv-1626, 2009 WL 10671309, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 2, 2009)
(recommending that sanctions not be awarded to defendant where they were sought
following plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal), report and recommendation adopted, No. 07-cv-
1626, DE 97 (M.D. Fla. June 23, 2009). The non-party movants do not contest this settled
proposition. (DE 94 at 13) (explaining that Rule 11(c)(5)(B)’s limitation is “narrow” and
does not foreclose “non-monetary sanctions”) (emphasis in original).
However, this case presents unusual circumstances that distinguish it from the
ordinary Rule 11 dispute. Plaintiffs do not identify at what point during the abbreviated
procedural history of this case the Court realistically could have raised the issue of Rule
11 monetary sanctions. Had the Court done so before ordering briefing on the Court’s
subject matter jurisdiction, or after briefing was ordered but before the Parties responded,
Plaintiffs undoubtedly would have protested that the discussion was both unmerited and
premature. Moreover, the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 11 explain that the reason
monetary sanctions should be raised before a settlement is that a monetary resolution
could be impaired by the threat of sanctions. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note
to 1993 amendment (“Parties settling a case should not be subsequently faced with an
unexpected order from the court leading to monetary sanctions that might have affected
their willingness to settle or voluntarily dismiss a case.”). That concern is not implicated
here.
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Nonetheless, the Court need not decide whether the circumstances of this case
permit monetary sanctions notwithstanding the language of Rule 11(c)(5)(B). That
limitation applies only to monetary sanctions and does not prevent the Court from
determining whether Rule 11 has been violated or whether appropriate non-monetary
sanctions are appropriate. See generally Goldenberg v. Indel, Inc., No. 09-5202, 2011
WL 1134454, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2011) (“But [Rule 11(c)(5)(B)’s] restriction is explicitly
limited to monetary sanctions. The [c]ourt is empowered to issue a number of other
sanctions against malfeasant parties, including censure, educational requirements, or
referral to disciplinary authorities.”).
Thus, after considering the totality of the circumstances, including the record, the
relevant law, the written submissions, and the factors identified by the Eleventh Circuit,
the Court concludes that Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate here. See Trump v. Clinton,
640 F. Supp. 3d at 1332, 1334 (awarding sanctions under Rule 11’s improper purpose
and concluding that “courts are not intended for performative litigation” as this “is harmful
to the rule of law, portrays judges as partisans, and diverts resources that should be
directed to real harms and legitimate legal claims.”). In fashioning an appropriate
sanction, the Court is guided by Rule 11’s deterrent purpose. See Baker, 158 F.3d at 528
(explaining that “deterrence remains the touchstone of the Rule 11 inquiry.”). The Court
therefore imposes non-monetary sanctions under Rule 11 as follows:
1. Plaintiffs’ Attorney Alejandro Brito is REFERRED to The Florida Bar for
its consideration, review, and determination as to whether any
disciplinary action is appropriate in light of the findings and rulings made
in this Order. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this
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Order to The Florida Bar, of which Attorney Alejandro Brito is a member
(No. 98442).
2. All future applications by Daniel Z. Epstein for admission pro hac vice in
the Southern District of Florida will be DENIED for one year or until
further order of this Court.
3. The Parties are prohibited from referring to the purported “settlement
agreement,” or using, offering, admitting, or citing any of its provisions
in any judicial, administrative, regulatory, arbitration, or any other official
proceeding as evidence of a “settlement” reached in this matter, Case
No. 26-cv-20609-KMW (S.D. Fla. 2026).
63 “Plaintiffs” means the named
Plaintiffs in this lawsuit: President Donald J. Trump, Donald J. Trump,
Jr., Eric Trump, the Trump Organization, LLC and includes any of their
agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners,
corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in
concert with the party or under the party’s control, whether directly or
indirectly. “Defendants” means the Internal Revenue Service and the
United States Department of the Treasury.
C. Inherent Authority
Having concluded that sanctions are warranted under Rule 11, the Court will now
address whether sanctions are likewise appropriate under the Court’s inherent authority.
63 Again, as noted by Plaintiffs in their brief, whether a private agreement between the
Parties—as if “there is no judge”—is valid and enforceable or is a depredation of the
Judgment Fund and an illegal conferral of immunity is not before this Court. (DE 89 at 15)
(“Regardless of whether Plaintiffs had ever filed this action, the Government and the
Plaintiff still had the power to resolve all disputes between the parties.”).
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Although Rule 11 limits imposing monetary sanctions following a voluntary dismissal, the
Court’s inherent authority remains available to address conduct that abuses the judicial
process. Trump v. Clinton, 161 F.4th 671, 688 (11th Cir. 2025) (“Federal courts have the
inherent authority to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial
process.”); Peer, 571 F. App’x at 844 (“And the inherent power of a court can be invoked
even if procedural rules exist which sanction the same conduct . . . for these rules are not
substitutes for the inherent power.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Independent of Rule 11, federal courts possess inherent authority to protect the
integrity of judicial proceedings. See Kleiner v. First Nat’l Bank of Atl., 751 F.2d 1193,
1209 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Courts possess the inherent power to protect the orderly
administration of justice and to preserve the dignity of the tribunal.”) (citing Roadway Ex.,
Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764–65 (1980)). “The inherent power of a court to manage its
affairs necessarily includes the authority to impose reasonable and appropriate sanctions
upon errant lawyers practicing before it.” Id. (citations omitted). “These powers are
governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage
their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 (citations and quotation marks omitted). “A court’s inherent
power is both broader and narrower than other means of imposing sanctions . . . .
[w]hereas each of the other mechanisms reach only certain individuals or conduct, the
inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses. At the very least, the inherent
power must continue to exist to fill in the interstices.” JTR Enter., LLC v. An Unknown
Entity, 93 F. Supp. 3d 1331, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2015); see also Peer, 571 F. App’x at 844
(“Whereas rule-based sanctions can reach only ‘certain individuals or conduct, the
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inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses’ and serves to fill [in] the gaps
left by rule-based sanctions.”) (quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46).
As the Supreme Court discussed in Chambers, “[N]othing in the other sanctioning
mechanisms or prior cases interpreting them that warrants a conclusion that a federal
court may not, as a matter of law, resort to its inherent power to impose attorney’s fees
as a sanction for bad-faith conduct.” 501 U.S. at 50. Furthermore, “[N]either is a federal
court forbidden to sanction bad-faith conduct by means of the inherent power simply
because that conduct could also be sanctioned under the statute or the Rules.” Id. Thus,
while “the court ordinarily should rely on the Rules rather than the inherent power . . . if in
the informed discretion of the court, neither the statute nor the Rules are up to the task,
the court may safely rely on its inherent power.” Id. The Court does so here. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (“Rule 11 is not the exclusive
source for control of improper presentations of claims . . . [and therefore] does not inhibit
the court . . . in exercising its inherent powers[.]”).
“The key to unlocking a court’s inherent power is a finding of bad faith.” Barnes v.
Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). This is a subjective
standard. Purchasing Power, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., 851 F.3d 1218, 1223 (11th
Cir. 2017) (“As a starting point, the inherent-powers standard is a subjective bad-faith
standard.”). “Once unlocked, the power carries with it the authority to assess attorney’s
fees as a sanction for bad faith conduct.” Sciarretta v. Lincoln Nat’l. Life Ins. Co., 778 F.3d
1205, 1212 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45–46). Bad faith is present if
a court determines “that fraud has been practiced upon it, or that the very temple of justice
has been defiled,” or where a party is responsible for “delaying or disrupting the
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litigation[.]” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46 (citations and quotation marks omitted); Barash v.
Kates, 585 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2006). “Because of their very potency,
inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at
44. (citations omitted).
“When the court uses its inherent powers to punish a party with attorneys’ fees,
there must be a direct causal link between the condemned conduct and the resulting
costs.” ByoPlanet Int’l, LLC v. Johansson, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1341, 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2025)
(citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 108 (2017)). “Sanctions
under the Court’s inherent powers are compensatory, not punitive.” Id.
The conduct of the Parties triggers the Court’s inherent authority. As to Plaintiffs,
they filed a multibillion-dollar lawsuit asserting claims that they knew, or should have
known, were time-barred and for an amount of damages unsupported by facts or law.
64
Plaintiffs could make no connection between the billions of dollars they sought, and the
recovery authorized under the governing statute. See 26 U.S.C. § 7431(c)(1) (providing
for damages in the amount of “$1,000 for each act of unauthorized inspection or
disclosure.”). Generally, the “central purpose” of a lawsuit must be to “vindicate rights
through the judicial process.” In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 520 (4th Cir. 1990). This
lawsuit was not brought to vindicate rights; it was brought to manipulate the judicial
process to pursue benefits unavailable in litigation because the Parties were not adverse.
Defendants’ conduct is equally untenable. It is telling that the DOJ, which is tasked
with enforcement of United States law, has remained conspicuously absent and silent
64 Even the Fund amount—$1.776 billion—speaks of a “branding” effort rather than a
deliberate and thoughtful calculation of damages.
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when serious questions about this matter have been raised. See generally Ponzi v.
Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922) (explaining that the Attorney General is the head
of the DOJ and that he, acting through United States Attorneys, “is the hand of the
President in taking care that the laws of the United States in protection of the interests of
the United States in legal proceedings . . . be faithfully executed.”) (citations omitted). And
when representatives did choose to expound on the Department’s conduct, they offered
misleading explanations of the facts and the law.65 In abdicating its responsibility to
zealously defend the interests of the United States, the Government entered into a
“settlement” that deviated from its litigation posture in similar actions, disregarded DOJ
policies, and accomplished objectives beyond those authorized, as well as those
specifically prohibited, by law. Under these circumstances, the Court may reasonably
infer that the Government failed to defend this lawsuit or to respond to the Court’s
jurisdictional inquiry because its position would not withstand judicial scrutiny and
because resolution of the threshold issues identified by the Court would not have favored
its preferred outcome to this case.66
65 See supra pp 7–8.
66 See generally Callahan v. Schultz, 783 F.2d 1543, 1545 (11th Cir. 1986) (“The adverse
inference rule provides that when a party has relevant evidence within his control which
he fails to produce, that failure gives rise to an inference that the evidence is unfavorable
to him.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted); In re Bailey, 451 B.R. 640, 645 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 2011) (“This Court draws an adverse inference from [d]efendants’ concealment
and assumes that truthful answers to those questions and production of documents would
have been unfavorable to [d]efendants” and ultimately concluding that “the concealment
of that information was intentional . . . and possibly motivated by a desire to perpetrate
fraud on the [c]ourt.”); see also In re Mart, 75 B.R. 808, 810 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987)
(“Furthermore, the failure of a party to provide evidence peculiarly available to that party
supports the inference that the truth revealed by that evidence would be damaging to the
party.”) (citations omitted).
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The Parties used the existence of federal litigation as a means of conferring
legitimacy upon a course of action that they were unwilling to subject to judicial review.
The context of the “settlement,” the relationships of the people involved in negotiating and
approving it, the ethical implications of their conduct, and the Parties’ swift efforts to
dismiss this case after the Court raised fundamental jurisdictional questions all support
this conclusion. Accordingly, the Court expressly finds that Plaintiffs acted in bad faith.
See Sofaly v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 155 F.4th 289, 295 (3d Cir. 2025)
(monetary sanctions were proper under the court’s inherent power where the lawyers
acted in bad faith and committed fraud on the court by using “their clients to bring
contrived lawsuits”). That finding is enough to invoke the Court’s inherent authority. See
JTR Enter., LLC v. Columbian Emeralds, 697 F. App’x 976, 986 (11th Cir. 2017) (“The
key to invoking a court’s inherent power to sanction is a finding of bad faith.”) (citation
omitted).
The Court finds monetary sanctions appropriate under its inherent authority and
prerogative to police the matters and litigants who avail themselves of its jurisdiction. See
Purchasing Power, LLC, 851 F.3d at 1223 (“Courts have the inherent power to police
those appearing before them.”) (citing Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46).67 These monetary
sanctions would include the attorneys’ fees incurred by Court-appointed amici68 in
67 Although the Court’s inherent authority extends to sanctioning all parties and counsel
who engaged in bad-faith conduct, see Spolter, 403. F. App’x at 390 (noting that district
“courts have the inherent power to impose sanctions on parties and lawyers”), the Court
assesses monetary sanctions only against Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel.
68 Court-appointed amici include John Gleeson and David A. O’Neil of Debevoise &
Plimpton LLP; Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. of Munger Tolles & Olson LLP; and Faith E. Gay,
Philippe Z. Selendy, and Corey Stoughton of Selendy Gay PLLC, who were all appointed
by the Court on April 29, 2026. (DE 43).
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appearing before the Court and briefing the jurisdictional questions identified by the Court.
See Barnes v. Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212, 1215 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Where, as here, the district
court fashions a sanction which is a direct response to the harm that the bad faith conduct
of the attorney causes, it is clearly acting within its discretion.”).
As one leading treatise has explained:
Ordinarily, an amicus curiae who participates in a proceeding by leave of
court or by court appointment is not entitled to compensation when he or
she serves the interests of litigants, witnesses or any other private party . .
. However, where the court appoints an amicus curiae who renders
services which prove beneficial to a resolution of the questions
presented, the court may properly award compensation and direct it
to be paid by the party responsible for the situation which prompted
the court to make the appointment.
4 Am. Jur. 2d Amicus Curiae § 12 (emphasis added); see also Morales v. Turman, 820
F.2d 728, 731 (5th Cir. 1987) (attorneys’ fees may be awarded to appointed amici if the
amici’s services were highly beneficial and defendants were properly considered the
parties who made the services necessary). Nonetheless, the Court-appointed amici have
declined any reimbursement for their important service to the Court. 69
There remain the initial amici—whose appearance was not contested by any
Party—and the thirty-five former Federal Judges, whose briefing precipitated this Order.
Accordingly, these amici, if they wish, may file, within fourteen (14) days of this Order, a
memorandum regarding any appropriate reimbursement. Plaintiffs may file any response
seven (7) days thereafter. Finally, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this
69 The Court acknowledges and thanks Court-appointed amici and their firms for their
willingness to review the unprecedented jurisdictional questions presented by this case.
Their thorough and well-reasoned scholarship, and uncompromising commitment to the
rule of law—along with those of the organizations and lawyers referenced supra—are
hallmarks of a vigorous, independent legal profession critical to sustaining a vigorous,
independent judiciary.
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Order to the State Bar of New York, of which Acting Attorney General Blanche is a
member (No. 4192456), AND to the District of Columbia Bar, of which Associate Attorney
General Woodward is a member (No. 997320), where disciplinary proceedings are
currently ongoing.70
III. CONCLUSION
John Adams warned, “Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes,
our inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they cannot alter the state of facts and
evidence.” Thus, whatever may be the Parties’ wishes, inclinations, or the dictates of their
passion, they cannot alter the state of the facts or evade the rule of law. Contrary to
Plaintiffs’ concern, the Court did not have to “sally forth” to look for a wrong to right. See
DE 89 at 17 (citing Margolin v. Nat’l Ass’n of Immig. Judges, 608 U.S. __ (2026)). The
Court need only look to the uncontroverted facts here:
1. Donald Trump is President.
2. President Trump controls the actions of the Secretary of the Treasury
Department Scott Bessent, IRS CEO Frank Bisignano, and all Executive
Branch actors.
70 Ethics complaints have been filed in New York and the District of Colombia against
Acting Attorney General Blanche and Associate Attorney General Woodward. See Letter
to Attorney Grievance Committee Re: Ethics Complaint Against Todd Blanche,
https://dea5edf3-e27d-4adc-a42a-
b9c082bc3167.usrfiles.com/ugd/dea5ed_b024aad49d1049c1ab03f01e8f1aa7fc.pdf; see
also Request for Investigation of Stanley E. Woodward, Jr. D.C. Bar No. 997320,
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28264896-cfa-dc-bar-complaint-stanley-
woodward/.
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3. President Trump, through Executive Order § 7, also controls the litigation
strategy and interpretation of the laws guiding the Department of Justice. See
supra note 28.
4. For the 109 days that this case was pending, no attorney representing the
United States filed a notice of appearance or any document indicating the
government’s position, interest, or awareness of this matter.
5. Defendants’ actions are consonant with the dictates of Executive Order § 7.
These facts lead to the inexorable conclusion that the “settlement” terms, the
individuals who signed the “settlement” as well as the putative beneficiaries of the
“settlement,” demonstrate a shared, unitary interest. And the unilateral revision and
renunciation of the “Fund” component of the “settlement” demonstrate the fact that all
Parties were aligned, and ultimately, undifferentiated. This action was never about a party
seeking judicial resolution of a legal issue or a factual dispute. The nature of the suit itself
and the conduct of the Parties and counsel from its filing make plain that this was an
attempt to use the Court to provide some legitimacy to an agreement to confer immunity
to people and entities affiliated with the President and to earmark billions of dollars from
American taxpayers to redress grievances not defined in the law. The President may be
the functional “dominus litus” of the Executive Branch, but as a party to a civil suit, he, as
well as all the parties and lawyers before a court, are bound by the rules. Ensuring that
our courts are used only for the express purpose created by the Constitution is the
obligation of every judge and an obligation that this Court must discharge in light of the
matter before it.
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In sum, the facts before this Court demonstrate there was never adverseness
between the Parties; there was never a case or controversy; and there was never a
question as to who would prevail.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Miami, Florida, on this 13th day of July,
2026.
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