Read full text of the August 25, 2026 final order denying writ of certiorari signed by St. Johns County Circuit Court Judge Howard Ogle McGillan, Jr.:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1TNfJvpv-8RFBBV9BgtJtkFglnuesUlYB/view
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, SEVENTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, INAND FOR
ST. JOHNS COUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE NO.: AP25-6
DIVISION: 55
ROBINSON IMPROVEMENT
COMPANY, a Florida corporation,
Petitioner,
vs.
ST. JOHNS COUNTY, FLORIDA,
Political subdivision of the State of
Florida,
Respondent.
/
ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
This matter is before this Court pursuant to Petitioner’s Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, filed on October 3, 2025. Petitioner seeks a Writ of Certiorari
quashing the “Order Denying PUD 2024-09 Robinson Improvement
Company PUD,” rendered by the St. Johns County Board of County
Commissioners (‘the Commission’) on November 7, 2024.' Petitioner
alleges that in denying the PUD, the Commission failed to afford Petitioner
due process; failed to follow the essential requirements of law; and the
1 On November 18, 2024, Petitioner filed a request for initiation of the special magistrate processes set
forth in the Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act, s. 70.51, Fla. Stat., which
Petitioner asserts tolls the time to seek any judicial action on a denial of a development order, such as a
rezoning.
1
Filed 08/25/2026 04:10 PM with the Clerk of the Circuit Court, St. Johns County, Florida, DIN: 17Commission’s findings were not supported by competent substantial
evidence.
Certiorari Standard of Review
A request to change the zoning of a property is considered by the
governmental body with jurisdiction in a quasi-judicial proceeding, and such
decisions are reviewable by petition for certiorari in this Court. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 474 (Fla. 1993). In reviewing quasi-
judicial orders of local agencies and boards, the Court must consider: (i)
whether procedural due process was afforded to the parties; (ii) whether the
essential requirements of law were observed; and (ili) whether the
administrative findings and judgment are supported by competent
substantial evidence. Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530
(Fla. 1995) (citing City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624, 626
(Fla. 1982)). The Court is not entitled to reweigh evidence or substitute its
judgment for that of the agency or board. See Dep’t. of Highway Safety and
Motor Vehicles v. Trimble, 821 So. 2d 1084, 1085 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). The
Court is restricted solely to the record of the proceedings below and can only
consider facts presented therein. Battaglia Fruit Co. v. City of Maitland, 530
So. 2d 940, 943 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988).
2The standard of review for certiorari cases involving rezoning
applications was addressed by the Florida Supreme Court in Snyder, supra,
in which the Court held that a landowner seeking to rezone property has the
[initial] burden of proving that the proposal is consistent with the
comprehensive plan and complies with all procedural requirements of the
zoning ordinance. 627 So.2d at 476. Fla. Stat. § 163.3194(3)(a) defines
“consistency” with a governmental comprehensive plan as follows:
A development order or land development regulation shall be
consistent with the comprehensive plan if the land uses,
densities or intensities, and other aspects of development
permitted by such order or regulation are compatible with and
further the objectives, policies, land uses, and densities or
intensities in the comprehensive plan and if it meets all other
criteria enumerated by the local government.
Under Snyder, however, consistency with a local government's
comprehensive plan is insufficient alone to entitle an applicant to rezoning
where the local agency’s decision to deny a rezoning application is also
consistent with the comprehensive plan. 627 So.2d at 475; see also Fla.
Power & Light Co. v. City of Dania, 761 So. 2d 1089, 1093 (Fla. 2000). If any
of several zoning classifications is consistent with the comprehensive plan,
“the applicant seeking a change from one to the other is not entitled to
judicial relief absent proof the sfafus quo is no longer reasonable.” /d.
(quoting Lee Cnty. v. Sunbelt Equities II, Ltd., 619 So. 2d 996, 1005-06 (Fla.
32d DCA 1993)). Snyder applies to rezoning requests relating to proposed
PUDs. See, e.g., Martin Cnty. v. Section 28 P'’ship, Ltd., 676 So. 2d 532, 536
(Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Once the applicant satisfies its initial burden of proving
that its proposed rezoning is consistent with the comprehensive plan and
with all procedural requirements of the zoning ordinance, the burden shifts
to the local agency “to demonstrate that maintaining the existing zoning
classification with respect to the property accomplishes a legitimate public
purpose.” Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 476. A refusal to rezone property may be
upheld so long as the government shows that its refusal is not arbitrary,
discriminatory, or unreasonable. /d.
Procedural History
Petitioner owns 2,673 acres in St. Johns County (the “property”’). (P.
Appx. B at 10). The property is located north of County Road 214 (“CR 214”),
south of County Road 208 (“CR 208”), and between I-95 and County Road
13A. (P. Appx. B at 10). The property has historically been used for timber
harvesting with some portions remaining as wooded wetlands. (P. Appx. B
at 10). The property is surrounded by agricultural and residential uses. (P.
Appx. B at 10). In 2019, the Commission approved a Comprehensive Plan
Amendment establishing a Future Land Use designation (“FLU”) of
Residential-B for the property. (P. Appx. B at 29). The zoning was not
4changed. The amendment also limited development on the property to “a
maximum of 3,332 dwelling units,” with no development occurring prior to
2026. (P. Appx. B at 29). At the same time, the Commission approveda right-
of-way agreement with Petitioner. (P. Appx. B at 29). “This Agreement
donated to the County a minimum of 250-foot-wide right-of-way corridor of
approximately 7.4 miles, along with corresponding and necessary
Stormwater Sites, for the proposed County Road 2209 (“CR 2209”) from
County Road 208 to County Road 305.” (P. Appx. B at 29). Petitioner’s
segment of CR 2209 would run north-south with the goal of connecting CR
208 to CR 214. (P. Appx. B at 26). The property is currently zoned Open
Rural (OR). (P. Appx. B at 11). Surrounding properties are also zoned OR.
(P. Appx. B at 11). These properties largely have FLU designations of Rural
Silviculture (R/S) with additional neighboring properties having FLU
designations of Res-B and Agriculture (Al). (P. Appx. B at 11).
Petitioner applied to rezone the property from OR to Planned Unit
Development (the “PUD” or “proposed PUD”) with a maximum of 3,332
residential dwelling units. (P. Appx. B at 12). According to its application,
Petitioner would develop the PUD in two phases consisting of 2,077 single-
family residential units, 340 townhomes, and 915 age-restricted single-family
residential units. (P. Appx. B at 12). The PUD authorizes residential uses
5throughout the property. (P. Appx. B at 12). The PUD would preserve a
minimum of 885.7 acres of wetlands and dedicate 46 acres to community or
neighborhood park areas. (P. Appx. B at 12). Petitioner also proposed a
development agreement to provide mitigation for the PUD’s transportation
impacts. (P. Appx. | at 238). County Staff prepared a report analyzing
Petitioners PUD proposal (the “Staff Report’). (P. Appx. B at 8-39). In the
Staff Report, the County’s Transportation/Concurrency Division provided a
traffic impact analysis. (P. Appx. B at 23). The Transportation/Concurrency
Division found that the PUD would generate 22,587 daily trips, including
1,515 AM peak hour trips and 2,136 PM peak hour trips. (P. Appx. B at 23).
The Transportation/Concurrency Division also conducted a transportation
proportionate fair share analysis (P. Appx. B at 23), and found that PUD
traffic would increase utilized total committed traffic on eight already
adversely impacted roadway segments within the study area. (P. Appx. B at
23). This analysis resulted in a proportionate fair share calculation of
$46,877 ,922.00. (P. Appx. B at 24). The County’s Planning and Zoning
Division also reviewed the PUD. (P. Appx. B at 29-32). The Planning and
Zoning Division noted the “overwhelmingly rural’ nature of the land
surrounding the property, “with many miles of property boundary adjacent to
silviculture and undeveloped lands.” (P. Appx. B at 30). The Planning and
6Zoning Division further commented on the lack of any commercial facilities
near the PUD’s northern or southern ends: “There appear to be no existing
commercial facilities located near the CR 208 and future CR 2209
intersection to the north of the project. Likewise, no commercial facilities exist
at the southern end of the project along the CR214 and the future CR 2209
intersection.” (P. Appx. B at 30). Additionally, Petitioner requested sixteen
waivers to the Land Development Code. (P. Appx. B at 15-20).
The St. Johns County Planning and Zoning Agency (the “PZA”)
considered Petitioner's PUD rezoning request on October 17, 2024. (P.
Appx. B at 33). Over a dozen members of the public spoke in opposition to
the rezoning. (P. Appx. B at 33). The public and PZA’s concerns included
wetland and environmental impacts, open unresolved staff comments at the
time of review, the lack of community amenities, the impact on surrounding
residential neighborhoods, and the PUD’s “incompatibility with the existing
rural and agricultural character of the area.” (P. Appx. B at 33). The PZA
recommended denial of the rezoning by a 7-0 vote. (P. Appx. B at 33). The
Commission then heard Petitioner’s rezoning request on November 5, 2024.
(P. Appx. J at 269). The Commission denied the rezoning request by a 5-0
7vote. (P. Appx. A at 2-3; J at 306).2 In its Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Petitioner alleges that in denying the PUD, the Commission: 1) failed to
afford Petitioner due process; 2) failed to follow the essential requirements
of law; and 3) failed to cite to record competent substantial evidence.
Analysis
Due Process
Petitioner alleges it was not afforded procedural due process because
the Commission demonstrated “a clear bias against the Petitioner’ and
provided “their own evidence and desired legal standards as a basis for
denial.” Both the United States and Florida Constitutions protect individuals
from arbitrary and unreasonable governmental interference with their right to
life, liberty, and property. State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205, 1212 (Fla.
2004). Procedural due process affords notice of a possible government
deprivation and a meaningful opportunity to contest it, usually before it is
imposed. /d. The extent of procedural due process afforded to a party ina
quasi-judicial hearing is not as great as that afforded to a party in a full judicial
hearing. Carillon Cmty. Residential v. Seminole County, 45 So. 3d 7, 10 (Fla.
5th DCA 2010). Quasi-judicial proceedings, for example, “are not controlled
> On November 18, 2024, Petitioner filed with the County a request for initiation of the special magistrate
processes set forth in the Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act, s. 70.51, Fla. Stat.
The special magistrate hearing was held in July 2025.
8by strict rules of evidence and procedure.” Jennings v. Dade County, 589
So. 2d 1337, 1341 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (citing Astore v. Florida Real Estate
Comm'n, 374 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) and Woodham v. Williams, 207
So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)). However, “certain standards of basic
fairness must be adhered to in order to afford due process.” /d. (citing Hadley
v. Dep't of Admin., 411 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1982) and City of Miami v. Jervis,
139 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)). Generally, a quasi-judicial hearing
meets such standards of basic fairness where “the parties are provided
notice of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard”; and with respect to
quasi-judicial zoning proceedings, where the parties are permitted “to
present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and be informed of all the facts
upon which the commission acts.” /d.; see also Bush v. City of Mexico Beach,
71 So. 3d 147, 149-50 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Carillon, 45 So. 3d at 10. There
is no single unchanging test which may be applied to determine whether the
requirements of procedural due process have been met; rather, courts
consider the facts of the particular case to determine whether the parties
have been accorded that which the state and federal constitutions demand.
Carillon, 45 So. 3d at 10.
It is apparent from the record that Petitioner was afforded notice anda
meaningful opportunity to be heard at all hearings. The PZA and the
9Commission heard argument from Petitioner and his expert witnesses.
Petitioner was able to fully present evidence to the Commission. Further,
upon reviewing the record, the Court finds that the Commission based its
decision upon evidence submitted at the hearing. (P. Appx. J.) The Court
concludes that Petitioner was afforded procedural due process.
Essential Requirement of Law
Petitioner next asserts that the Commission’s denial of his application
departed from the essential requirements of law because it based its decision
on its members’ own opinions regarding perceived existing traffic
deficiencies on segments miles away from the Property. Petitioner asserts
that in Florida, a development cannot be denied due to existing
transportation deficiencies so long as a developer agrees to pay mitigation
for their own impacts.
A ruling constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law
when it amounts to a violation of a clearly established principle of law
resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Clay County v. Kendale Land
Development, Inc., 969 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (citing Combs v.
State, 436 So.2d 93, 96 (Fla.1983)). In Heggs, supra, the Florida Supreme
Court concluded that the term “applied the correct law” is synonymous with
“observing the essential requirements of law.” 658 So. 2d at 530. Municipal
10zoning ordinances are subject to the same rules of construction as are state
statutes. Shamrock-Shamrock, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 169 So. 3d
1253, 1256 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). The only criteria upon which a local
government can legally base its quasi-judicial decisions is its local criteria
No comments:
Post a Comment