Monday, August 31, 2026

I am proud of leaders when they are willing to admit that they were wrong! (March 18, 2026)

Update; August 31, 2026:  Look forward to each County Commission meeting.
On August 18, 2026, We, the People re-elected Krista and we elected Martin, a former FBI agent.  Corrupters and snollygosters are unhappy.


Come speak out to St. Johns County Commission meetings on conflicts of interest and lack of oversight.

There needs to be an agonizing reappraisal of contracting out the County Attorney function. Pray for our leaders to reject the notion of contracting out the County Attorney function to a corporate law firm, whose co-owner is a registered lobbyist for a large international development corporation. Now we know that former Senator ROBERT MILNER BRADLEY, JR. has an entire lobbying firm in Tallahassee, working for FOUNTAINEBLEAU DEVELOPMENT a giant international development corporation (think casinos and gambling).  Our Commissioners need to answer the question that the late Tennessee Republican Senator Howard Henry Baker, Jr. asked about President Richard Milhous Nixon: "What did [they] know and when did [they know it?" Check out all of the hostile comments and threats from supporters of this contract!

On April 30, 2025, I requested a meeting with SJC BoCC Vice Chair Clay Murphy to discuss the Commission's hiring a. law firm headed by a developer lobbyist and casino developer.  Vice Chair Murphy was assigned the duty to negotiate a contract with BRADLEY, GARRISON & KOMANDO. No negotiation was held.  No documents exist on any research.  NO MEETING YET. 

I am proud of leaders when they are willing to admit that they were wrong, as JFK did on the Bay of Pigs Invasion "I'm the responsible officer of the Government,"' and as Bill Clinton did when he regretted saying "I never inhaled" ("I was dumb as a post to say that." Or St. Augustine City Commission when they voted April 28, 2025 to cancel the art sculpture planned for the center of our May & San Marco roundabout.

I am not proud of leaders who refuse to admit that they were wrong I am not proud of Commissioners who would not consider creating a Public Housing Authority, based on a naked appeal to prejudice about people who receive HUD Section 8 Housing Vouchers by then-Chair CHRISTIAN (sic) WHITEHURST.

I am not proud of four-then Commissioners who, lacking legal basis, voted in louche lockstep to censure reform Commissioner Krista Keating-Joseph for First Amendment protected activity and falsely claimed she committed a crime for expressing her opinion. She was recently re-elected by a landslide despite four misguided fellow Commissioners' fetid performance art. Senior U.S. District Court Judge Harvey Schlessinger ruled in her favor, finding her expression of her opinions about the 2024 election to be First Amendment protected activity. No apology. Sadly, my friend ISAAC HENRY DEAN made the bogus censure motion, which was not well grounded in law or fact. He was defeated for re-election in 2024. I told him that he was wrong, again and again. I advised him to apologize. He did not do so. I reckon he was defeated because of his appearing to be a developer lapdog, and amateur Cato the Censor. Also defeated for election in 2024 was DeSANTIS-appointed Commissioner ROY ALYRE ALAIMO, JR., a developer doormat. But two of the Commissioners who voted to censure her still encumber seats on SJC County Commission, CHRIStIAN WHITEHURST and SARAH ARNOLD. These two unjust stewards are an embarrassment to us all in St. Johns County.

I was proud indeed in 2007 when our Anastasia Mosquito Control District of St. Johns County cancelled an illegal no-bid $1.8 million helicopter contract in 2007. (It was not unlike Twelve Angry Men with mosquitos and helicopters, and the debate went on for nine months until AMCD decided lawbreaking was not an option.).  This was after AMCD Chair Barbara Bosanko abuse her office, stating "I'm calling the cops" while former U.S. Army Captain Donald Girvan was at the podium calling for cancellation of the helicopter contract. (She was the wife of former County Attorney Daniel Bosanko). The vote to cancel the no-bid Bell Jet Helicopter contract was unanimous, 5-0.

I will be proud whenever our misguided St. Johns County Board of County Commissioners admit that they were wrong when they voted to hire a corporate law firm as County Attorney.  

Commissioners delegated to Commissioner Murphy to "negotiate" a contract.  

JFK said, "let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate."

No "negotiation." 

No research.  

Sloppy staff and Commissioner work?

You tell me. 

To Commissioner Murphy, let me say what I said to County Commission Chairman Thomas Manuel the night in June 2008 when we learned he was arrested by the FBI for taking a bribe from a developer: "DON'T DO THAT AGAIN!"


Vice Chairman Clay Murphy and citizens were never provided with a conflicts check.  

No client list. 

No outside attorney to advise the SJC BoCC on a contract with the Interim County Attorney.

Instead, we got legal advice from BGK, which got the contract.  That's a conflict of interest.

No excuses.  

As I wrote our St. Johns County Board of County Commissioners on March 17, 2025 (items renumbered):

1. Conflicts of interest  must be scrupulously guarded against. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 548 (1961)("the 'Dixon-Yates' case," involving TVA rivals' conflicts of interest in a proposed Memphis, Tennessee government-owned coal-fired powerplant), citing Matthew 6:24 -- "no [person] can serve two masters," holding that laws and rules preventing conflicts of interest are aimed "not only at dishonor but at conduct that tempts dishonor."   
2. All conflict of interest laws are based upon Matthew 6:24 ("A man cannot serve two masters"), which the unanimous Supreme Court decision by Chief Justice Earl Warren deemed to be both a "moral principle" and a "maxim which is especially pertinent if one of the masters happens to be economic self-interest." 
3. {Speaker-elect SAM GARRISON's law partner] Mr. [RICHARD CHRISTIAN] KOMANDO unilaterally refuses to disclose the identity of his law firm clients, not client confidences. His overbearing assertion of privilege is unadorned by any citation to any court or ethics opinions on lawyers who are government employees.  This flunks the "laugh test."  It also flunks the "smell test." Mr. KOMANDO said he would not apply for the permanent County attorney position.  Now, aving applied for the permanent position, Mr. KOMANDO is in no position to withhold information that is materially relevant to his suitability to be our St. Johns County Attorney. Mr. KOMANDO is acting as if he were the judge in his own case.  This is so wrong.
4. James Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 10: "No [person] is allowed to be a judge in [his/her] own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time . . . ."
5. The United States Supreme Court held in In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (Black, J.), "[O]ur system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome."  See also TWA v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 102U.S. App. D.C. 391, 392, 254 F.2d 90, 91 (1958). Spencer v. Lapsley, 20 How. 264, 266 (1858); Publius Syrus, Moral Sayings 51 (D. Lyman transl. 1856) ("No one should be judge in his own cause."); Blaise Pascal, Thoughts, Letters and Opuscules 182 (Wight transl. 1859) ("It is not permitted to the most equitable of men to be a judge in his own cause."). As William Blackstone wrote, "[I]t is unreasonable that any man should determine his own quarrel," 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 91 citing Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Rep. 114a (C.P. 1610); see also City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 669, 687 (1701)(Lord Holt)(invalidating fine for refusal to serve as sheriff recovered by the city in its own court of Mayor and Aldermen). See also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986)(overruling case where Chief Justice of Alabama Supreme Court wrongfully sat in judgment of case that would set precedent for his own pending case); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); Cinderella Career and Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970); American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966); SCA Services, Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110 (7th Cir.1977). 
6.  Being a secretive developer "team player" is not a bona fide occupational qualification in hiring a County Attorney. 



"I hate shallowness," as the FBI Deputy Director Mark Felt told Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward in the movie, All the President's Men. 


Bullheaded bullshit artists in control of our governments sure do make a lot of "mistakes."  


It was an unjust war. 

The late heroic Senator J. Wiliam Fulbright (D-Ark.), Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair, wrote The Arrogance of Power about our foreign policy.  In his 1971 Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony, Vietnam veteran John Forbes Kerry, later a U.S. Senator, eloquently asked, "How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?"

It was a breath of fresh air in 2006 when Nancy Sikes-Kline (now our Mayor) was elected to St. Augustine City Commission; she admitted when I asked her at the Tasting Room, "oh, it was a mistake." Eventually the 40,000 cubic yards of contaminated solid waste was removed and sent to a landfill.  HARRISS and the other Commissioners never apologized for the environmental injustices of dumping a landfill in a lake in West Augustine.  No one was ever indicted or charged for their environmental crimes against nature.

"They will say and do anything." So saith my late friend and mentor, the late photojournalist James David Pleasant.  If City Commissioners got away with their feculent City Manager dumping a landfill in a lake and blasting me for exposing it, do some misguided County Commissioners must figure they can hire a conflicted corporate law firm as County Attorney?  That's as subtle as a rubber crutch. 

On May 6, 2025, will the man who defeated ROY ALAIMO own up to his mistake in duking in duking in RICHARD CHRISTIAN KOMANDO as St. Johns County Attorney?  

Will SJC BoCC Vice Chairman Clay Murphy own up to his big fat mistake in moving to hire a conflicted corporate law firm as County Attorney?  

Will SJC BoCC Vice Chair Murphy & Co, admit error?  

Or will SJC BoCC Vice Chair Murphy compound Commission's hiring of ALAIMO's "friend" as County Attorney on recommendation of ROY ALYRE ALAIMO, JR.?

Rebarbarbative ROY ALAIMO was a former Congressional staffer for RONALD DeSANTIS.  As a PZA member, ALAIMO was a developer doormat.  As REC Chair, he issued a Gay-bashing fundraising letter.  As a County Commissioner, ALAIMO had delusions of adequacy.  DeSANTIS named ALAIMO to the Commission seat that was vacated after the COVID death of Commissioner Paul Waldron. 

No application. No background check.  No other applicants were considered. 

This compounded the reckless and fecklessness of hiring HUNTER SINCLAIR CONRAD as County Administrator in 2019.  CONRAD was an unindicted co-conspirator ("Clerk E") in federal bribery case in Chicago. Commissioners hired him without know that.

No application.  No background check. No other applicants were considered. 

To borrow a line from the Jesuit poet, Gerard Manley Hopkins, our County is "smeared, teared and bleared" with overdevelopment. 

Our County politics is dominated by Big Money. 

Our Commissioners reward deforestation and sink at the ambitious power-hungry losers and posers.

They allow retaliation against ethical employees. 

In the words of the late courageous FBI Deputy Director Mark Felt to Bob Woodward: "Just follow the money."







Until the Times-Union reported the federal criminal conviction of the SLAUGHTER BROTHERS, We, the People never knew that the law firm of BRADLEY, GARRISON & KOMANDO represented corporate criminal defendants (convicted of tax fraud and workers compensation fraud) during the year that he encumbered the position of Interim County Attorney.  

Interim County Attorney RICHARD CHRISTIAN KOMANDO stiffed Commissioner Ann Taylor, refusing to list any of his firm's clients.  

Since February 17, 2025, the gentleman in quo has  avoided and evaded my records requests. 

He's no scholar and no gentleman.  

Character counts. 

Now we know that the Chair of the St. Johns County Water Management District, head of the law firm hired as St. Johns County Attorney, former Senator ROBERT MILNER BRADLEY, Jr. has an entire lobbying firm in Tallahassee, with clients that include FOUNTAINEBLEAU DEVELOPMENT, a giant international development corporation (think casinos and gambling). 


What's next?

Casino gambling in St. Johns County, brought to you by one-party rule?

President DONALD JOHN TRUMP's Chief of Staff, SUSAN SUMMERALL WILES, was a lobbyist for gambling interests that tried to foist off an illegal referendum on St. Johns County ballots. Thanks to Commission Chair Jeb Smith, now had of the Florida Farm Bureau, for stopping them in their tracks.

https://cleanupcityofstaugustine.blogspot.com/2016/07/louche-lobbyist-wiles-demands-slot.html

Now, the lobbying firm for FONTAINEBLEAU DEVELOPMENT, a multinational corporate casino developer, has its co-owner ROBERT MILNER BRADLEY's corporate law firm serving as County Attorney for St. Johjns County.

What's next?

You tell me. 

Will County Commissioners vote to correct their April 15, 2025 "mistake" at our May 6, 2025 County Commission meeting?

Quo vobis videtor?  (What do ya'all reckon?) 

Posted by at 21 comments:

Under RICO, is St. Johns County government an "enterprise?" You tell me,




Our St. Johns County Commission appears to be owned and controlled by clearcutting "developers" who fund the campaigns of Commissioners.  Commissioners voted 3-2 on April 15, 2025 to hire the Florida House Speaker-elect's corporate law firm as County Attorney.  Is our St. Johns County Board of County Commissioners an "enterprise" covered by the criminal and civil provisions of the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).  The Tennessee Governor's office was found to be an "enterprise" as it existed under corrupt bribe-taking Democratic Governor Leonard Ray Blanton. See United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1982)(en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1972 (1983) Tennessee Governor Ray Blanton was convicted of selling liquor licenses.  Blanton also pardoned convicted murderers for bribes and he was removed from office early as a result.  Fun fact: On January 17, 1979, the day of Blanton's removal from office, I was in Nashville investigating Tennessee Valley Authority coal procurement corruption, visiting one of my mentors, the indefatigable Pulitzer Prize winning investigative reporter, Nat Caldwell. Tennessee's culture of corruption: Upon Blanton's eventual release from federal prison, several sitting justices of the Tennessee Supreme Court reportedly shook his hand at the State Capitol.   Read the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's en banc decision, upheld by the United States Supreme Court in denying the writ of certiorari:


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Annotate this Case
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 669 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1982)Argued Oct. 23, 1981. Decided Feb. 8, 1982

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. William Aubrey Thompson, Thomas Edward Sisk and CharlesFrederick Taylor, Defendants-appellants, 685 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1982)

Argued April 26, 1982. Decided Aug. 4, 1982

-----
This three-judge panel decision was reversed yesterday the full Sixth Circuit, finding the Governor's office was an "enterprise" under RICO.

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. William Aubrey Thompson, Thomas Edward Sisk, Charlesfrederick Taylor, Defendants-appellants, 669 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1982)

Annotate this Case
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 669 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1982)Argued Oct. 23, 1981. Decided Feb. 8, 1982

Henry A. Martin, Haile & Martin, W. Gary Blackburn, Robert C. Watson, Nashville, Tenn., court appointed, for defendants-appellants.

Joe B. Brown, U. S. Atty., William M. Cohen, Asst. U. S. Atty., Nashville, Tenn., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before LIVELY and JONES, Circuit Judges, and PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.

JOHN W. PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.

The defendants-appellants, through motions in arrest of judgment following guilty pleas, raise the issue whether the office of the Governor of the State of Tennessee may be an "enterprise" under Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). This Title, one of twelve within the Act, is commonly known by the acronym RICO, from the chapter heading "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations." 18 U.S.C. ch. 96.

The pertinent facts are as follows. Each of the appellants was connected in the mid-to-late 1970's with the office of the Governor of Tennessee. In an indictment alleging that that office "was an 'enterprise' as defined by Title 18, United States Code, Section 1961(4)," the appellants were charged with violating RICO by "selling" executive clemency and immunity from extradition through the governor's office.1 

The appellants argue that Congress did not intend the application of RICO to such enterprises, or that if Congress did so intend, then RICO is unconstitutional. As will become clear from this opinion, it is unnecessary for us to reach the constitutional question posed by the appellants.

INTERPRETING RICO

A. RICO's "Plain Language."

The meaning of the term "enterprise" within RICO has been often and hotly litigated. The Supreme Court has recently laid to rest the dispute whether wholly illegitimate concerns can be RICO enterprises. They can. United States v. Turkette, --- U.S. ----, ----, 101 S. Ct. 2524, 2527-34, 69 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1981).

We follow the method of interpreting statutes laid down in Turkette. In that case, the Court looked first to the statutory definition of "enterprise." See --- U.S. at ----, 101 S. Ct. at 2527. The statutory definition is on its face clear and broad. " '(E)nterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity ...." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). The Court noted that this language is unambiguous in including legitimate as well as illegitimate enterprises. The statutory language itself was therefore regarded as conclusive. See --- U.S. at ----, 101 S. Ct. at 2527. Accord, United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001, 1006 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S. Ct. 3144, 69 L. Ed. 2d 995 (1981). The Court in Turkette recognized, however, that "there is no errorless test for identifying or recognizing 'plain' or 'unambiguous' language," and that in construing statutes "absurd results are to be avoided and internal inconsistencies in the statute must be dealt with." --- U.S. at ----, 101 S. Ct. at 2527. See also Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 643, 98 S. Ct. 2053, 2061, 56 L. Ed. 2d 591 (1978); Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571, 85 S. Ct. 1162, 1166, 14 L. Ed. 2d 75 (1965). In short, courts in construing statutes must look beyond the statutes' words not only if the words themselves are unclear, but also if a discrete statutory provision is anomalous in effect. It is, therefore, "fundamental that a section of a statute should not be read in isolation from the context of the whole Act, and that in fulfilling our responsibility in interpreting legislation, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but (should) look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy." Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11, 82 S. Ct. 585, 591, 7 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1962).

Application of RICO's civil remedies to state government enterprises would result in anomalous results: district courts would not only be authorized to "prohibit any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in ...," but also to order "dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise ...." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (emphasis added). To hold that Congress has authorized federal district courts to dissolve or reorganize the offices of the governors of the states, and that it did so sub silentio,2  is shocking and absurd.

Although the Court in Turkette stated that "(e)ven if one or more of the civil remedies (in RICO) might be inapplicable to a particular illegitimate enterprise, this fact would not serve to limit the enterprise concept," --- U.S. at ----, 101 S. Ct. at 2530, that remark must be read in proper context. Given the patent concern with organized crime's economic power that engendered RICO's enactment, application of that statute to wholly illegitimate, as well as legitimate enterprises, was a fortiori. Such application yields no startling results. In these appeals we are not presented, as was the Supreme Court in Turkette, with cases in which various of RICO's civil remedies would be merely impracticable. Dissolution or reorganization of a governmental entity would certainly not be impracticable; the question is whether these remedies were placed within district court's authority. If Congress may grant such authority sub silentio, then we have witnessed in our times the destruction of the states as sovereign political entities. Cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842-52, 96 S. Ct. 2465, 2470-2474, 49 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1976) (Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to force upon the states essential choices regarding conduct of integral government functions.)

B. The Legislative History of the Organized Crime Control Act.

Having decided that the application of RICO to government "enterprises" yields anomalous consequences, we proceed to examine the history of the Organized Crime Control Act to see if the legislature clearly intended these consequences. With the highest degree of certainty by which an historical "fact" can be known, it can be said that Congress did not envision the present application of RICO in passing the Organized Crime Control Act.

In arguing to the contrary, the government points out that Title IX of the Act "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Pub. L. 91-452, § 904, reprinted in (1970) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1073, at 1104. This language has led some courts to what we feel to be erroneous constructions of Title IX, for to determine these "broad remedial purposes" (on which Title IX itself is silent) courts have looked to the stated purposes of the entire Act.3  The Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose that precedes the Act reads:

The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes ; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens ; and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.

It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.

84 Stat. 922-23 (emphasis added).

The emphasized phrases certainly indicate a Congressional concern over corruption of government by organized crime. See, e.g., United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 32 (2d Cir. 1981). There is, however, no cause to equate the aims of the entire Act with those of one part of it. See United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 690 n.1 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935, 100 S. Ct. 2152, 64 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1980). The Second Circuit, although holding that RICO enterprises included government entities, was obliged to note that "the congressional discussion devoted expressly to Title IX did not state that government entities were to be the beneficiaries of RICO's substantive provisions ...." Angelilli, supra, 660 F.2d at 33. In other words, even though RICO is supposed to be a part of Congress's attack on organized crime's corruption of government, such corruption was never mentioned in the Congressional debate on RICO itself. Rather, corruption of government surfaced most often in the legislature's discussion of Title I of the bill, which provided for the creation of special grand juries authorized to report on the misconduct of public officers or employees. See 18 U.S.C. § 3333(a) (1). The remarks of Senator Byrd concerning the two titles of the bill illustrate where the legislative concern over corruption of government was expressed in the statutory scheme:

I am especially optimistic about title I of S. 30-the special grand jury provisions. Time and time again in our history, aroused citizens have demonstrated their devotion to law and order in the face of official timidity and inaction. Prosecutors and judges may be scared or bought off, but citizens, properly empowered, can step in and do the job which their officials fail to do. I believe that title I represents the best opportunity for the average citizen to play a significant role in the war against organized crime.

It is encouraging that title I absolutely requires the convening of special grand juries in our major metropolitan areas at least once every 18 months and assures them sufficient longevity to probe deeply into organized crime. Perhaps this provision can overcome some of the official dilly-dallying which, I believe, is partly responsible for some of the public apathy which we have witnessed toward this problem.

These special grand juries would have the power to inquire into the violation of Federal laws and dig deeply into the activities and operations of organized crime, including whether appropriate law enforcement officials have been properly carrying out their jobs.

Significantly, these grand juries would be empowered to issue special reports concerning noncriminal misconduct, malfeasance, or misfeasance, by a public officer or employee as a basis for a recommendation of removal or disciplinary action.

Another section of the bill which merits special attention, Mr. President, is title IX.

Recent studies of the phenomenon of organized crime, including that of the National Crime Commission, have identified its alarming expansion into the field of legitimate business as a major threat to our institutions. This penetration of legitimate business by organized crime poses two distinct but related dangers:

First, the economic strength of the underlying illegal operations of organized crime is perpetuated and made more profitable if tainted proceeds can be safely invested in legitimate enterprises, even if those enterprises are operated in a lawful manner.

Second, the free channels of trade are threatened by organized crime's propensity to obtain for itself monopoly control of its areas by whatever means are available, including brutal and strongarm tactics.

The techniques and methods used in such infiltration of legitimate business enterprises are many and varied. A few case histories will demonstrate how easily a business can fall captive to its awesome power.

The legislative proposals contained in title IX of this act, entitled "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations," constitute a carefully structured program which can drastically curtail-and eventually eradicate-the vast expansion of organized crime's economic power which operates outside the rules of fair competition of the American marketplace. Broadly speaking, this title would create strict criminal penalties for using the proceeds of racketeering activity characteristic of organized crime to acquire an interest in businesses engaged in interstate commerce, or to acquire or operate such businesses by racketeering methods.

In addition, this title, by utilizing remedies heretofore applicable in the antitrust field-the remedies of injunction, dissolution, divestiture, and reorganization-would forge a powerful new weapon for putting the syndicate out of business. By removing its leaders from positions of ownership, by preventing them and their associates from regaining control, and by visiting heavy economic sanctions on their predatory business practices this legislation should prove to be a mighty deterrent to any further expansion of organized crime's economic power.

The civil remedies of this legislation patterned after the time-tested antitrust remedies, coupled with its heavy criminal penalties, should enable the Government to take effective action to eliminate the serious threat posed to the safety and well-being of our democratic institutions by the totalitarian dictators of organized crime's closed society.

116 Cong.Rec. 606-07 (emphasis added).

Many other examples from the legislative history can be cited to show that although Congress was concerned with corruption of government by organized crime (as who is not?), RICO was aimed at organized crime's economic power. See, e.g., Remarks of Sen. McClellan, 116 Cong.Rec. 591-92; Remarks of Sen. Hruska, id. at 602; Remarks of Sen. McClellan, id. at 8670; Remarks of Sen. Dole, id. at 36296; Remarks of Rep. Cellar, id. at 35196; Remarks of Rep. St. Germain, id. at 35200; Remarks of Sen. McClellan, 155 Cong.Rec. 9566-71 (introduction of S. 1861, predecessor of RICO's). See also McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties? 46 Notre Dame Law. 55, 140-42 (1970).

C. Internal Evidence of RICO's Scope.

At an earlier stage of these prosecutions, the district court (under another presiding judge) held that the enterprise element of RICO must cover government entities because two of the "racketeering activities" enumerated in § 1961 of RICO-bribery under state and federal law, and extortion under color of state law-"can only be committed in the context of governmental activity." United States v. Sisk, 476 F. Supp. 1061, 1062 (M.D. Tenn. 1979). However, under both federal and Tennessee law, bribery can be committed by those outside of government. See 18 U.S.C. § 201; T.C.A. §§ 39-801, 39-803, 39-805, 39-809, 39-812, 39-816, 39-821, 39-824. Moreover, RICO does not contain the phrase "extortion under color of state law," but rather refers to acts indictable under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. The Hobbs Act covers far more than extortion "under color of state law." See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (2). The inclusion of bribery and Hobbs Act violations in RICO's long list of "racketeering activities" therefore does not even suggest that Congress intended "enterprises" to include government entities.

Our holding today does not mean that RICO cannot be used to reach corruption of government by organized outside forces. Nor do we suggest that public officials are immune from RICO actions. Rather, we hold that RICO's remedial provisions show that government entities are neither appropriate nor intended RICO "enterprises." See Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 Ford.L.Rev. 165, 206 (1980). Following Turkette, the corrupting organizations may themselves be charged as RICO enterprises, and the evils Congress feared and legislated against can be fought. See, e.g., United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 525 n.1 (4th Cir. 1980) (enterprise was prostitution ring protected by bribed prosecutor); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1194 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913, 99 S. Ct. 2014, 60 L. Ed. 2d 386 (1979) (enterprise was bail bonding firm that bribed magistrates).4  It would, however, be a perversion of Congress's intent to continue to allow the potent weapons created in RICO to be lifted casually against every instance of venality in state and local governments.

UNDER THE AVALANCHE, OR, THE VOYAGES OF "ENTERPRISE"

The district court, although inclined to grant the defendants' motions in arrest of judgment, was deterred by the "judicial momentum" toward classing government entities as RICO enterprises. The government refers to an "avalanche" of precedent adopting this rule: United States v. Angelilli, supra, 660 F.2d at 30-35 (2nd Cir. 1981); United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1198 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Lee Stoller Enterprises, Inc., supra, 652 F.2d at 1316-19 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Clark, 646 F.2d 1259, 1261-67 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 829 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7-8 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Karas, 624 F.2d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078, 101 S. Ct. 857, 66 L. Ed. 2d 800 (1981); United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bacheler, 611 F.2d 443, 450 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Grzywacz, supra, 603 F.2d at 685-87 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Frumento, supra, 563 F.2d at 1089-92 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Brown, supra, 555 F.2d at 415-16 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Dozier, 493 F. Supp. 554 (M.D. La. 1980); United States v. Barber, supra, 476 F. Supp. at 184-85 (S.D.W. Va. 1979); United States v. Sisk, supra, 476 F. Supp. at 1062 (M.D. Tenn. 1979); United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1095-96 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd mem., 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979); cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072, 100 S. Ct. 1015, 62 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1980); United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 588 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1978).

The sheer number of these cases is imposing, and the metaphor of an avalanche is apt, for the practice of construing "enterprise" to include government entities has truly snowballed. Many of the cases above5  simply cite earlier precedent without further considering the enterprise issue.

More important, in most of these cases the implications of RICO's remedies were either not raised or not considered. Two exceptions to this rule are Angelilli, supra, and Barber, supra. As noted above, we believe Angelilli misapplies the Supreme Court's statement in Turkette that "(i)t is untenable to argue that (the existence of RICO's remedies) limits the scope of the criminal provisions." See 600 F.2d at 34 (quoting --- U.S. at ----, 101 S. Ct. at 2530). This is not, like Turkette, a case where certain remedial provisions are simply not feasible, but one where their application would raise grave constitutional questions. As the Supreme Court has often counseled us to do, we adopt a narrower reading of the statute in order to avoid these constitutional doubts. See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 99 S. Ct. 2545, 61 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1979); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 82 S. Ct. 1063, 8 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1962).

An alternative would be to follow the lead of the other court that expressly addressed the implications of RICO's remedies and hold that because these remedies are discretionary, "(t)here is no binding correlation between Title IX's remedial options and the question of whether Congress intended to omit public entities from the meaning of enterprise." Barber, supra, 476 F. Supp. at 189. Yet the grant of an "unthinkable" (id.) remedial power cannot be ignored because its exercise is discretionary. There is an anomaly within RICO, and it must be dealt with: either RICO's definition of enterprise or its remedial provisions must be modified if each is to accommodate the other in this case.

The legislative history convinces us that it is the definition of enterprise that should yield. Congressional debates clearly indicate that what was considered important and novel in Title IX was the provision of new remedies for dealing with organized crime. See Remarks of Sen. McClellan, 116 Cong.Rec. 591; Remarks of Sen. Hruska, id. at 602 ("(T)he principal value of this legislation may well be found to exist in its civil provisions which employ the time-tested antitrust remedies of injunction, divestiture, dissolution, and reorganization ...."); Remarks of Sen. Byrd, id. at 607. See also McClellan, supra, 46 Notre Dame Law. at 191.

It is the existence of these novel remedies that distinguishes RICO from more traditional means of attacking corruption in government (such as the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951) and that renders RICO's application to a government entity inappropriate.

After the avalanche, it is time for the spring thaw. The judgments of conviction are vacated.

 1

The provisions of RICO allegedly violated in this case state:

(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.

(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)-(d). The relevant statutory definitions provide:

As used in this chapter-

(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States;

(2) "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any territory or possession of the United States, any political subdivision, or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof;

(3) "person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property;

(4) "enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity;

(5) "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity;

(6) "unlawful debt" means a debt (A) incurred or contracted in gambling activity which was in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or which is unenforceable under State or Federal law in whole or in part as to principal or interest because of the laws relating to usury, and (B) which was incurred in connection with the business of gambling in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or the business of lending money or a thing of value at a rate usurious under State or Federal law, where the usurious rate is at least twice the enforceable rate;

18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)-(6).

 2

There is no mention in RICO or in its legislative history of application to government entities

 3

This was the practice in the following cases: United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 686-87 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935, 100 S. Ct. 2152, 64 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1980); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1091 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Millhouse v. United States, 434 U.S. 1072, 98 S. Ct. 1256, 55 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1978); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 415-16 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Seymour v. United States, 435 U.S. 904, 98 S. Ct. 1448, 55 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1978); United States v. Barber, 476 F. Supp. 182, 184-85 (S.D.W. Va. 1979)

 4

This distinction between government and private enterprises in cases involving government officials has been overlooked by courts that cite Whitehead and Herman as "government-enterprise" cases. See United States v. Lee Stoller Enterprises, Inc., 652 F.2d 1313, 1318 n.9 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S. Ct. 636, --- L. Ed. 2d ---- (1981) (so citing Herman); Angelilli, supra, 660 F.2d at 33 (so citing Whitehead) 

 5

E.g., Sutherland, Stratton, Altomare, Karas, Baker, Bacheler, Dozier and Vignola. One of the earliest cases in the Court of Appeals that applied RICO to government entities, and one on which many of the later cases rely, is Frumento. On its facts, Frumento is arguably limited to "state operated commercial ventures engaged in interstate commerce, or other governmental agencies regulating commercial and utility operations affecting interstate commerce." 563 F.2d at 1091 (footnote omitted). It is a considerable leap from Frumento to apply RICO indiscriminately to every government enterprise



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BAYVIEW TAKEOVER ARTISTS: Naftali Zanziper and Simcha Hyman: The Dynamic Duo Behind Portopiccolo Group’s Expanding Empire (Business Broadcaster, September 12, 2024)

It happened in America in 2021.  

Five years ago, under one-party rule in St. Johns County, Florida, where I've lived since November 5, 1999. 

On July 20, 2021, our all-Republican St. Johns County Commission approved, by unanimous 5-0 vote, without proper background investigation after a one hour and six minute discussion, a questionable private equity takeover of a local non-profit's lease of valuable riverfront St. Johns County property. 

Who did it?

Incurious County Commissioners led by Chair JEREMIAH RAY BLOCKER, Vice Chair ISAAC HENRY DEAN and Commissioners JEB S. SMITH, CHRISTIAN GREGORY WHITEHURST and the late PAUL WALDRON, under influence or guidance of County Administrator HUNTER SINCLAIR CONRAD and County Attorney PATRICK FRANCIS McCORMACK.  

They approved a louche lease assignment, for 60 years, allowing takeover of non-profit BAYVIEW skilled nursing facility, with no change in sweetheart lease terms.  I am one of the victims, here for physical therapy after a shoulder fracture.  Private equity has made BAYVIEW a shadow of its former self, when it was beloved in St. Augustine.  Here's the minutes and video of SJC's shallow deliberations.

https://stjohnsclerk.com/2021-sjc-bocc-agendas/#docaccess-42fc45d507e0eb7284fbd67fe16bd15b

One-party ruling St. Johns County Commissioners on July 20, 2021 expressed their fondest wish that private equity would "make a profit," with no expressed concerns about patients or staff.  

 Wonder why?

Where are they now?  

The five injurious Republican Commissioners and two injurious officials responsible for lax injuries about billionaires' private equity takeover of BAYVIEW:

County Commission Chair JEREMIAH RAY BLOCKER was defeated for re-election by reformer Krista Joseph, a Gold Star Mother, by 175 votes.  He earned a Master of Laws in Real Estate Development from the University of Miami, is currently serving developers as their mouthpiece, serving former constituents with harassing subpoenas.  He is married to a Judge LAUREN BLOCKER, a DeSANTIS appointee to County Court and Circuit Court posts.  Blocker is pictured (above) with his wife, Judge LAUREN BLOCKER, with Sheriff Robert Hardwick, et ux. 


St. Johns County sales tax: Final referendum vote to come March 15

County Commissioner ISAAC HENRY DEAN, defeated for re-election in 2024 by Ann Taylor DEAN is  now a lawyer and lobbyist, working as Of Counsel where one of his fellow lawyers is the father of St. Augustine Beach City Commissioner DYLAN RUMRELL, where former Sheriff DAVID SHOAR is the investigator. 




Paul Waldron remembered after his death

County Commissioner PAUL MICHAEL WALDRON died in October 2022 of complications from COVID-19, after Commissioners cussed and discussed mask requirements.  (PAUL WALDRON was the son of longtime Commissioner Harry Waldron.)

Commissioner Christian Whitehurst

County Commissioner CHRISTIAN GREGORY WHITEHURST is currently charged by FDLE and an Alachua County prosecutor with misdemeanor election fraud, involving phony official 2024 SJC GOP ballot endorsements.

County Attorney PATRICK FRANCIS McCORMACK retired in December 2022.

County Administrator HUNTER SINCLAIR CONRAD resigned or was fired, and became a minister of the Gospel in his father's church.

Here's an unsigned hagiography of Messrs. Zanziper and Hyman:

https://business-broadcaster.com/naftali-zanziper-and-simcha-hyman-the-dynamic-duo-behind-portopiccolo-groups-expanding-empire.html

From Business Broadcaster:

Naftali Zanziper and Simcha Hyman: The Dynamic Duo Behind Portopiccolo Group’s Expanding Empire

September 12, 2024
 
in Business
Naftali Zanziper and Simcha Hyman: The Dynamic Duo Behind Portopiccolo Group’s Expanding Empire

Few names resonate as powerfully in strategic investments and real estate acquisitions as Naftali Zanziper and Simcha Hyman. As the driving forces behind the Portopiccolo Group, these visionary leaders have orchestrated a remarkable transformation of their company from its initial focus on healthcare services to a diversified powerhouse spanning multiple industries and real estate ventures.

The Portopiccolo Group, headquartered in Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, has become synonymous with astute investment strategies and hands-on management. Under the guidance of Zanziper and Hyman, the firm has cultivated a reputation for identifying high-potential assets and nurturing them to reach their total market value.

A recent acquisition in Tarpon Springs, Florida, is a prime example of the group’s strategic acumen. The purchase of a substantial multifamily property at 1589 Starlight Drive for $41,570,000 demonstrates their ability to pinpoint lucrative opportunities in competitive markets. With 304 units acquired at approximately $136,743 per unit, this transaction underscores the Portopiccolo Group’s commitment to expanding its real estate portfolio with calculated precision.

Naftali Zanziper and Simcha Hyman’s success extends far beyond individual property acquisitions. Their 980 Investments entity, a cornerstone of the Portopiccolo family of companies, boasts an impressive\ portfolio encompassing over 200 facilities and 22,500 beds across at least 13 states. This extensive network managed through 16 distinct management companies, showcases the duo’s capacity to scale operations while maintaining a high standard of quality and efficiency.

What sets the Portopiccolo Group apart is its hands-on investment approach. Zanziper and Hyman are not content with merely providing financial backing; they actively overhaul operations, invest in facility improvements, and build professional teams from the ground up. This comprehensive strategy ensures that each asset in its portfolio receives the attention and resources necessary to thrive in today’s competitive landscape.

Naftali Zanziper and Simcha Hyman’s financial prowess is nothing short of impressive. With a combined net worth of $1.45 billion, liquidity of $81.9 million, and total assets amounting to $3.42 billion, they bring substantial financial clout to every venture. These figures reflect their success and instill confidence in partners, lenders, and stakeholders involved in their projects.

As the Portopiccolo Group expands, it has attracted top-tier talent to support its growth trajectory. Key figures such as Joseph Neiman, the Chief Financial Officer, and Jean Stiles, the Chief Compliance Officer, bring valuable expertise to the organization. Recent additions to the team, including Rachel Hyman, the Design and Branding Consultant, and Andrew Pagnozzi, the VP of Construction, further enhance the group’s capabilities across various domains.

The investment philosophy championed by Zanziper and Hyman emphasizes realizing the growth potential of all companies within their portfolio. This commitment permeates every firm level, guiding strategic decisions and day-to-day operations. The Portopiccolo Group empowers its portfolio companies to navigate challenges and capitalize on growth opportunities by providing critical resources, dedicated counsel, and ongoing support.

The future appears bright for Naftali Zanziper, Simcha Hyman, and the Portopiccolo Group. Their proven track record of success, coupled with a diverse portfolio spanning healthcare services, real estate, and various other industries, positions them for continued growth and influence in the investment world.

As they forge ahead, industry observers and competitors will watch closely to see what strategic moves the Portopiccolo Group makes next. With their finger on the pulse of market trends and a keen eye for undervalued assets, Zanziper and Hyman are well-equipped to identify and capitalize on emerging opportunities across multiple sectors.

In an ever-evolving business landscape, the Portopiccolo Group stands as a testament to the power of visionary leadership, strategic diversification, and hands-on management. As Naftali Zanziper and Simcha Hyman continue to guide their organization to new heights, they are not just building a business empire but reshaping industries and setting new standards for investment excellence.



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