IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
CAIR-FOUNDATION, INC., and
CAIR-FLORIDA, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v. Case No.: 4:25cv516-MW/MJF
RONALD DESANTIS, in his official
capacity as Governor, State of Florida,
Defendant.
__________________________/
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
The question before this Court is whether the Governor can, in a non-
emergency situation, unilaterally designate one of the largest Muslim civil rights
groups in America as a “terrorist organization” and withhold government benefits
from anyone providing material support or resources to the group.1 This Court finds
he cannot. The First Amendment bars the Governor from continuing the troubling
trend of using an executive office to make a political statement at the expense of
others’ constitutional rights. The Governor’s decree coerces third parties, under
threat of losing government benefits, to disassociate from the Council on American-
1 The October 7, 2023, terror attacks in Israel were horrific. Full stop. Hamas is a wicked
organization. Full stop. Antisemitism is abhorrent and has resulted in the greatest atrocities in
human history. Full stop. But this case does not turn on these indisputable facts. In this case, this
Court must answer only the narrow question of whether the Governor’s executive order violates
the First Amendment.Case 4:25-cv-00516-MW-MJF Document 43 Filed 03/04/26 Page 2 of 30
Islamic Relations (“CAIR”), thereby closing avenues of expression and suppressing
CAIR’s protected speech. Once again, Florida chooses political posturing over the
First Amendment. See, e.g., Floridians Protecting Freedom, Inc. v. Ladapo, 754 F.
Supp. 3d 1165 (N.D. Fla. 2024).
I
On December 8, 2025, Governor Desantis signed Executive Order 25-244
titled “Protecting Floridians from Radical Islamic Terrorist Organizations” (the
“EO”). ECF No. 24-4. The EO designates CAIR as a terrorist organization and
prevents CAIR or “any person known to have provided material support or
resources” to CAIR “from receiving any contract, employment, funds, or other
benefit or privilege” from executive or cabinet agencies or from any county or
municipality of the state.2 Id. at 4–5.
2 The EO follows in the wake of a November 18, 2025, proclamation issued by Texas
Governor Greg Abbott designating CAIR a foreign terrorist and transnational criminal
organization under Texas penal and property codes and subjecting persons aiding CAIR to
heightened civil penalties. Proclamation by the Governor of the State of Texas (Nov. 18, 2025),
https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/PROC_declaring_Muslim_Brotherhood_and_CAIR_Tr
ansnational_Criminal_Organizations_IMAGE_11-18-2025.pdf.
Texas branches of CAIR have moved to enjoin enforcement of the proclamation, however
a decision is not imminent in that action as the parties are engaged in discovery on the motion for
preliminary injunction and the briefing is incomplete. See Council on American-Islamic Relations
Texas Dallas Fort Worth et al v. Abbot et al, 1:25-cv-01878-ADA (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2026)
(scheduling order including discovery deadlines and noting plaintiffs’ reply in support of their
motion for preliminary injunction is not due until March 27, 2026). By contrast, in this case, the
parties chose not to engage in discovery, the matter is fully briefed, and the parties have opted to
dispense with a hearing to facilitate a quicker decision. See ECF No. 40 (order cancelling hearing).
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CAIR-Foundation, Inc., and CAIR-Florida, Inc., filed suit against the
Governor one week after the EO was issued.3 Thereafter, Plaintiff CAIR-
Foundation, Inc., moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendant from
enforcement of the EO, arguing the EO violates its First Amendment right to free
speech because the EO discriminates based on viewpoint, was issued in retaliation
for Plaintiff’s protected speech, and coerces third parties to disassociate from
Plaintiff. Plaintiff also argues the EO violates its First Amendment rights to petition
and association.
For the reasons below, this Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary
injunction on its coercion claim. Accordingly, this Court does not address Plaintiff’s
alternative theories for relief. See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985) (explaining
the Court need not reach constitutional issues if they are not necessary to the
disposition of the case).
II
A district court may grant a preliminary injunction if the movant shows: (1) it
has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) it will suffer irreparable
injury unless the injunction issues, (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs
whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party, and (4) if
3 While the initial complaint contained a prayer for injunctive relief, see ECF No. 1 at 33–
35, a formal motion for preliminary injunction was filed in January 2026. ECF No. 24.
3Case 4:25-cv-00516-MW-MJF Document 43 Filed 03/04/26 Page 4 of 30
issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Siegel v. LePore,
234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A “preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary and drastic remedy.” United States v. Jefferson Cnty., 720 F.2d 1511,
1519 (11th Cir. 1983). It should only be granted if “the movant ‘clearly carries the
burden of persuasion’ as to the four prerequisites.” Id. (quoting Canal Auth. v.
Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1974)).
This Court begins with whether Plaintiff has shown a substantial likelihood
of success on the merits. This Court addresses this factor first because typically, if a
plaintiff cannot “establish a likelihood of success on the merits,” this Court “need
not consider the remaining conditions prerequisite to injunctive relief.” Johnson &
Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir.
2002). Because standing is always “an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case,” this
Court begins its merits analysis with standing. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 561 (1992).
A
Over time, the Supreme Court has developed a three-part test for determining
when standing exists. Plaintiff must show (1) that it suffered an injury-in-fact that is
(2) traceable to the defendant and that (3) can likely be redressed by a favorable
ruling. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. And “where a plaintiff moves for a
preliminary injunction, the district court ... should normally evaluate standing ‘under
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the heightened standard for evaluating a motion for summary judgment.’ ” Waskul v.
Washtenaw Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health, 900 F.3d 250, 255 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 912 (D.C. Cir. 2015)); see also
Cacchillo v. Insmed, Inc., 638 F.3d 401, 404 (2d Cir. 2011). Thus, “a plaintiff cannot
‘rest on such mere allegations, [as would be appropriate at the pleading stage,] but
must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts, which for purposes of the
summary judgment motion will be taken to be true.’ ” Cacchillo, 638 F.3d at 404
(some alteration in original) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561).
This Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated standing on its coercion
claim.4 With respect to that claim, Plaintiff’s theory of standing is not based on direct
censorship of its speech, but rather on Defendant’s coercion of third parties to cut
ties with Plaintiff, thereby creating a prior restraint to Plaintiff’s future speech.5
4 This Court recognizes that standing is not “dispensed in gross,
” and “plaintiffs must
demonstrate standing for each claim that they press, against each defendant, and for each form of
relief that they seek.” Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 61 (2024) (quoting TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021)). But because this Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to
preliminary injunctive relief on its coercion claim, this Court need not address Plaintiff’s standing
to bring its other claims.
5 At the outset, this Court notes there is significant overlap between this Court’s standing
analysis and the merits discussion infra. This Court recognizes that, due to the overlap, the issues
relevant to standing may be addressed in the merits discussion. However, this Court has an
independent obligation to ensure that standing, as “perhaps the most important” judicial doctrine,
is established, and therefore addresses standing in full. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S.
215, 231 (1990) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)).
5Case 4:25-cv-00516-MW-MJF Document 43 Filed 03/04/26 Page 6 of 30
To start, Plaintiff has demonstrated that it suffered an injury-in-fact when a
Florida-based production company withdrew from an agreement to produce a
podcast with Plaintiff because of the EO. The podcast was “intended to support
CAIR’s public education and civil rights work through interviews, commentary, and
other expressive content.” ECF No. 24-2 ¶ 26. When the production company
withdrew from the agreement, Plaintiff lost both “more immediate and future speech
opportunities for CAIR’s advocacy.” ECF No. 24 at 11. As such, this injury to
Plaintiff’s free speech right is actual and ongoing. Moreover, this injury is both
traceable to Defendant and redressable by an injunction prohibiting Defendant from
taking action based on the EO as it applies to CAIR. Specifically, Plaintiff’s evidence
demonstrates that the production company withdrew from the proposed agreement
due to the EO and that it would reconsider associating with Plaintiff if the EO is
found unlawful. ECF No. 41-1 ¶ 7. In other words, Defendant’s threat convinced a
third party—the production company—to suppress Plaintiff’s future speech by
withdrawing from their proposed agreement. Inasmuch as the production company
will reconsider this withdrawal in the event the EO is deemed unlawful, an order
prohibiting the EO’s enforcement as to CAIR would redress Plaintiff’s ongoing
speech injury by permitting Plaintiff’s podcast agreement to move forward without
the specter of government consequences looming over those involved.
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To be clear, the production company did not act unreasonably in withdrawing
from its agreement with Plaintiff. To the contrary, it reacted to the EO in a predictable
manner. Indeed, Plaintiff’s evidence underscores that others have reacted in a similar
way. For example, the South Florida Muslim Conference was scheduled to take place
at the Coral Springs Center for the Arts in late January 2026. See ECF No. 41-4 at 3.
The annual conference is put on by the South Florida Muslim Federation, whose
membership includes Plaintiff’s affiliated chapter, CAIR-Florida, Inc. Id. However,
on January 23, 2026, Attorney General Uthmeier posted on social media that “Coral
Springs should remember that state and local resources cannot be used by any
organization affiliated with CAIR” and that “[t]he city commission is on notice.”
ECF No. 41-3. Thereafter, the South Florida Muslim Federation publicly
disassociated from Plaintiff’s affiliated chapter, explicitly citing the EO as the
reason:
The South Florida Muslim Federation takes pride in its role
representing the Muslim Community in South Florida. The Council on
American and Islamic Relations of Florida (CAIR-FL) has been a
member of the South Florida Muslim Federation (“SFMF”) since the
inception of SFMF.
CAIR-FL has always played an important role protecting the
civil rights of Muslims, and we have never observed any conduct on the
part of CAIR-FL that would remotely resemble terrorism. That being
said, we understand the Governor issued an Executive Order on
December 8, 2025 purporting to designate CAIR-FL a “foreign terrorist
organization.” We also understand that CAIR-FL has challenged this
designation in Federal Court.
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While the issue is still pending in Federal Court and in an
abundance of caution, we have removed all associations of SFMF with
CAIR-FL. And we look to our courts to provide guidance on this in the
future.
ECF No. 41-4 at 3.
While not determinative, this evidence further supports Plaintiff’s theory of
standing inasmuch as it “does not rest on mere speculation about the decisions of
third parties; it relies instead on the predictable effect of Government action on the
decisions of third parties.” Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 768 (2019).
Here, the EO predictably “deter[s] third parties from associating with CAIR,” ECF
No. 24 at 14. And, as this evidence demonstrates, they are deterred based on
reasonable fears concerning the reach of the EO’s prohibitions and the explicit threat
of consequences in the event they fail to heed Defendant’s EO. See, e.g., ECF No.
41-3 at 2 (AG Uthmeier’s post warning that the “city commission is on notice,” and
that “Coral Springs should remember that state and local resources cannot be used
by any organization affiliated with CAIR”); ECF No. 41-5 at 2 (AG Uthmeier’s post
warning that “Any entity that wants to do business or use state or local resources in
Florida would be wise to dissociate from CAIR.”)6
.
6 The Attorney General uses the term “dissociate,” while this Court employs the term
“disassociate.” Both terms arguably mean the same thing and can be used interchangeably.
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In short, Plaintiff has been publicly designated a terrorist organization from
Florida’s bully pulpit7 and continues to suffer for it. Plaintiff’s speech injury is
concrete and neither speculative nor conjectural. It is traceable to Defendant’s EO,
which explicitly threatens the loss of government benefits to third parties who run
afoul of its prohibitions and who have reliably heeded the State’s warning that it
“would be wise to dissociate from CAIR,” given the EO’s broad restrictions.8 An
7 The origin of the term “bully pulpit,
” as described by Merriam Webster, is enlightening:
Bully pulpit comes from the 26th U.S. president, Theodore Roosevelt, who
observed that his time in office at the White House was a bully pulpit when he said,
“I suppose my critics will call that preaching, but I have got such a bully pulpit!”
For Roosevelt, bully was an adjective meaning “excellent” or “first-rate”—not
today’s familiar noun bully referring to an abusive meanie. Roosevelt understood
the modern presidency’s power of persuasion and recognized that it gave the
incumbent the opportunity to exhort, instruct, or inspire. He took full advantage of
his bully pulpit, speaking out about the danger of monopolies, the nation’s growing
role as a world power, and other issues important to him. Since the 1960s, bully
pulpit has been used as a term for a public position—especially a political office—
that provides one with the opportunity to widely share one’s views.
Bully pulpit, Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bully%20pulpit.
Unfortunately, in this instance, Defendant is choosing to be a bully—in the familiar sense
of the term—from his pulpit. While Defendant certainly has the right to speak for himself and his
office, to select the views he wishes to express, and to attempt to persuade the public to share his
views, the Supreme Court has drawn a line between permissible persuasion and unconstitutional
coercion. As explained in more detail below, Defendant has crossed that line.
8 Over the past decade, a cottage industry of crafting law—be it legislative action or
executive order—that has a very real effect on real people but is otherwise unreviewable for myriad
reasons has cropped up across this country. This Court has recognized multiple examples of this
trend in other cases. See, e.g., Link v. Diaz, 669 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1196 (N.D. Fla. 2023) (Walker,
C.J.) (“[A]ccording to Plaintiffs, Florida has created a statutory scheme of interrelated provisions
that creates a subjective fear of punishment and chills speech, that was designed to chill certain
speech, that is intentionally ambiguous in operation, and that lacks direct enforcement mechanisms
by state actors, such that Florida can avoid any pre-enforcement challenge by crafting the laws at
9Case 4:25-cv-00516-MW-MJF Document 43 Filed 03/04/26 Page 10 of 30
injunction prohibiting its enforcement as applied to CAIR is substantially likely to
redress Plaintiff’s ongoing speech injury. In short, Plaintiff has standing.
Having determined that Plaintiff has standing with respect to its First
Amendment coercion claim, this Court turns to the merits of that claim.
B
Plaintiff contends that preliminary injunctive relief is necessary to prevent
future harm and to remedy ongoing harm to its First Amendment right to free speech
due to Defendant’s coercion of third parties to suppress its speech. As evidence of
the coercive nature of Defendant’s EO, Plaintiff points to a Florida-based production
company that withdrew from a proposed podcast agreement to launch Plaintiff’s
civil rights podcast, citing its concerns about the EO, and notes that the company
would reconsider its withdrawal from the agreement in the event the EO was found
issue to avoid Article III’s standing requirements.”); id. (“This tactic has been employed to violate
once-recognized constitutional rights and is likely to be used again, aided by the ever-evolving
standing jurisprudence that binds this Court.”) (citing Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S.
30, 59 (2021) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part) (“Texas has employed an array of stratagems
designed to shield its unconstitutional law from judicial review . . . . The clear purpose and actual
effect of S.B. 8 has been to nullify this Court’s rulings.”))); see also Link, 669 F. Supp. 3d at 1203
n.9 (citing Support Working Animals, Inc. v. Moody, Case No. 4:19CV570-MW/MAF, 2020 WL
10728640, at *1 (N.D. Fla. June 12, 2020), aff’d sub nom. Support Working Animals, Inc. v.
Governor of Fla., 8 F.4th 1198 (11th Cir. 2021)) (dismissing action challenging state constitutional
amendment that eliminated an entire industry with no recourse due to lack of implementing
legislation identifying state actor with authority to enforce challenged law)). But here, Defendant
has been too clever by half in attempting to evade review and, instead, runs afoul of the prohibition
against doing indirectly what he cannot do directly. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175,
190 (2024) (“[A] government official cannot do indirectly what []he is barred from doing directly:
A government official cannot coerce a private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on
[his] behalf.”).
10Case 4:25-cv-00516-MW-MJF Document 43 Filed 03/04/26 Page 11 of 30
to be unlawful. See, e.g., ECF No. 41-1 ¶ 7. For the reasons set out below, this Court
finds Plaintiff is substantially likely to succeed on the merits of this claim.
Where a government uses the “threat of invoking legal sanctions and other
means of coercion . . . to achieve the suppression” of disfavored speech, it
functionally creates “a system of prior administrative restraints” that bears “a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity.” Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58, 67, 70 (1963). A government official “cannot do indirectly what [he] is
barred from doing directly: . . . coerce a private party to punish or suppress
disfavored speech on [his] behalf.” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175 (2024).
The present case bears all the hallmarks of unconstitutional coercion that the
Supreme Court identified in Bantam Books and Vullo.
In Vullo, the Court held that to state a claim for First Amendment coercion, a
plaintiff “must plausibly allege conduct that, viewed in context, could be reasonably
understood to convey a threat of adverse government action in order to punish or
suppress speech.” 602 U.S. at 191. Relevant factors for this Court’s consideration
include the power the government official wields, whether the communications in
question could reasonably be understood as a threat or inducement, and the reaction
from the recipient. Id.
First, Defendant’s authority. “Generally speaking, the greater and more direct
the government official’s authority, the less likely a person will feel free to disregard
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a directive from the official.” Id. at 192. This factor is at its zenith here where
Defendant is Florida’s head of government and controls Florida’s executive branch
and cabinet agencies.9
Second, the communication. Defendant’s EO designates Plaintiff by name as
a “terrorist organization[].” ECF No. 24-4 at 4. And it prohibits anyone who provides
material support or resources to Plaintiff from receiving any benefit or privilege from
any Executive or Cabinet Agency, any entity regulated by an Executive or Cabinet
Agency, or any county or municipality in Florida. Id. at 5 (citing § 775.33(1)(c), Fla.
Stat.). The threat here is sweeping and clear. Any relationship with Plaintiff will be
punished by cutting off access to all benefits even peripherally within Defendant’s
control.10
9 A coercion claim does not require the source of the coercive [threats] to actually have the
“power to apply formal legal sanctions.” Bantam, 372 U.S. at 67. Informal censorship, that is, “the
threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion, persuasion, and intimidation,”
“may sufficiently inhibit the circulation of publications to warrant injunctive relief.” Id.
10 The threat applies directly to state agencies, counties, municipalities and private
parties—namely, “any entity regulated” by such state agencies. And the threat extends to any
individual or entity that wishes to receive a contract, employment, funds, or other benefit or
privilege from such agencies, counties, municipalities, or regulated entities.
Moreover, while not determinative here, the EO intimates that providing material support
to CAIR is, itself, a crime under Florida law. See ECF No. 24-4 at 5 (citing Fla. Stat. §
775.33(1)(c)). Likewise, in purporting to name CAIR a “terrorist organization,” the EO arguably
amounts to a criminal accusation against CAIR and any member thereof. See § 874.03(7), Fla.
Stat. (defining “terrorist organization”); § 775.34, Fla. Stat. (criminalizing willful membership in
a designated foreign terrorist organization).
Of course, Defendant lacks the authority to unilaterally amend the Florida Statutes to create
a new criminal offense or to designate CAIR as a foreign terrorist organization independent of the
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Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, ECF No. 37 at 33, the threat need not be
personalized to be actionable. Although a number of cases discussing
unconstitutional coercion do so in the context of a specific, personalized
communication directed at an individual third party—say, a letter to a credit card
company, see Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229 (7th Cir. 2015)—courts
have also found unconstitutional coercion when the threat is addressed to the public
more broadly in the form of an Executive Order. See Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale
and Dorr LLP v. Executive Office of President, 784 F. Supp. 3d 127, 153 (D.D.C.
2025) (finding executive order violated First Amendment because, among other
things, it “attempts to suppress WilmerHale’s speech indirectly by pressuring the
firm’s federal contractor clients to terminate their relationship with the firm or face
cancellation of their contracts”). What matters is whether Defendant, a public
official, has made “oral or written statements,” which “can reasonably be interpreted
as intimating that some form of punishment or adverse regulatory action will follow
the failure to accede to the official’s request.” Okwedy v. Molinari, 333 F.3d 339 (2d
laws the Florida Legislature has put in place for such designations. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. §§
775.32(1)(b) and 775.33(1)(a). Even so, the language of the EO raises the specter of criminal
penalties and arguably contributes to some confusion about its force and effect with respect to
potential criminal penalties. See ECF No. 24-4 at 5 (“The Florida Department of Law Enforcement
and the Florida Highway Patrol are directed to undertake all lawful measures to prevent unlawful
activities in Florida by the terrorist organizations designated in Section 1.”). Unsurprisingly, even
the Attorney General of Florida appears to be confused. See, e.g., ECF No. 41-6 at 2 (Post by AG
Uthmeier referring to CAIR as a “designated foreign terrorist organization under state law”
(emphasis added)).
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Cir. 2003) (quoting Hammerhead Enters., Inc. v. Brezenoff, 707 F.2d 33, 39 (2d Cir.
1983)). Here, Defendant has acted by issuing a written statement, the EO, which in
no uncertain terms threatens to cut off “any contract, employment, funds, or other
benefit or privilege” to third parties who wish to provide resources to Plaintiff.
Defendant’s mode of communication in the form of an Executive Order, with all the
trappings of official state action, and the explicit prohibition on benefits for those
who provide material support or resources to Plaintiff leave no room for doubt as to
the consequences the podcast producers—or any other third party that wished to
work with Plaintiff in Florida—will face in the event they violate the EO.
Third, the reaction from the coerced party. Plaintiff attests that the production
company withdrew from the parties’ agreement, citing concern for consequences it
might face for associating with Plaintiff. ECF No. 24-2 ¶ 26; ECF No. 41-1 ¶ 7. In
other words, the production company interpreted the EO as a threat to disassociate
from Plaintiff and responded accordingly. The fact that the company indicated to
Plaintiff that it would reconsider its decision were the EO found unlawful, ECF No.
41-1 ¶ 7, further suggests that it views the EO as the sole impediment to the parties’
agreement to platform Plaintiff’s speech.
11
11 The Supreme Court has also noted other facts that, when “viewed in context, reinforce”
a First Amendment coercion claim. Vullo, 602 U.S. at 193. For example, in Vullo, the Supreme
Court pointed to a press release, “issued on official letterhead,” that “singled out the NRA and
other gun-promotion organizations as the targets of her call to action.” Id. at 194. Likewise, the
Court noted “[a] follow-on tweet from [Governor] Cuomo [that] reaffirmed the message:
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Defendant’s EO threatens those who platform, collaborate with, or otherwise
provide support to Plaintiff. The “vice of the system” here is the same one the
Supreme Court proscribed in Bantam Books. 372 U.S. at 69. There, threats and
coercion subjected the distribution of publications “to a system of prior
administrative restraints” untethered from any procedural safeguards. Id. at 70. By
imposing the specter of punishment on intermediary book distributors, the state
“directly and designedly stopped the circulation of publications in many parts of”
the state. Id. at 68. This case is no different. Much like the distributors in Bantam
Books, the production company is an intermediary intending to platform Plaintiff’s
speech. By threatening the production company—indeed, by broadly threatening
anyone who wishes to do business in Florida—Defendant stifles Plaintiff’s speech.
Businesses in New York should ‘consider their reputations and revisit any ties they have to the
NRA, which he called an extremist organization.’ ” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, too, Plaintiff points to a subsequent post on X.com by Attorney General Uthmeier,
which doubles down on the terrorist designation in Defendant’s EO, warns the city of Coral
Springs that it “should remember that state and local resources cannot be used by any organization
affiliated with CAIR” and purports to place the city commission “on notice.” ECF No. 41-3 at 2.
Days later, AG Uthmeier again posted that “[a]ny entity that wants to do business or use state or
local resources in Florida would be wise to dissociate from CAIR.” ECF No. 41-5 at 2.
Of course, AG Uthmeier is not a Defendant in this action, nor is he responsible for the EO.
However, he is a member of the Domestic Security Oversight Council, subject to Defendant’s
directives in the EO, see ECF No. 24-4 at 4–5; § 943.0313(1)(a)3., Fla. Stat., the chief state legal
officer, see Art. IV, § 4(b), Fla. Const., and Defendant’s favorite familiar. While not determinative,
AG Uthmeier’s interpretation of and public statements concerning the EO lend further support to
Plaintiff’s evidence that the production company reasonably believed that compliance with the EO
was not voluntary and that it “would be wise to dissociate from CAIR.” Id.
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See Backpage.com, LLC, 807 F.3d at 231 (noting that a sheriff’s attempt to
“suffocate[e]” Backpage by “depriving the company of ad revenues by scaring off
its payment-service providers” is akin to “killing a person by cutting off his oxygen
supply rather than by shooting him”). This violates the First Amendment. Vullo, 602
U.S. at 194.
This Court recognizes, as it has before, that the Supreme Court has provided
no clear standard of review once First Amendment coercion is identified. See
Floridians Protecting Freedom, Inc. v. Ladapo, 754 F. Supp. 3d 1165, 1176 n.6
(N.D. Fla. 2024) (Walker, C.J.). In Bantam Books, the Court held that coercive
threats created a system of prior restraints, which carried a “a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity.” 372 U.S. at 69. Vullo, considered at the motion to
dismiss stage, found that the plaintiff “state[d] a claim that the government violated
the First Amendment through coercion of a third party,” but did not provide a
framework for analyzing such a violation. 602 U.S. at 191.
But here, inasmuch as the Supreme Court has suggested some heightened
review applies given the “heavy presumption” against the constitutional validity of
coercive threats, Defendant fails to justify his action with respect to Plaintiff.
12
12 In arguing that the EO is constitutional inasmuch as it touches only third parties’ conduct
and not speech, Defendant is mixing apples and oranges. With respect to a First Amendment
coercion claim, the inquiry focuses on the would-be speaker’s speech that is suppressed via
government coercion of a third party. The focus is not on the coerced third party’s speech. See
Vullo, 602 U.S. at 191 (“Bantam Books provides the right analytical framework for claims that the
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Defendant resorts to proclamations that “Florida is entitled to attempt to stamp out
terror,” ECF No. 37 at 32, and that he “made an informed judgment about terrorist
government has coerced a third party to violate the First Amendment rights of another.”). This
framework, as articulated by the United States Supreme Court, binds this Court and all other courts
in this country, and this Court rejects Defendant’s attempt to distort the analysis.
Take Vullo, for example, where the head of New York’s insurance regulator sought to
“combat the availability of firearms [in New York], including specifically by weakening the
NRA.” 602 U.S. at 183. To do so, the regulator targeted insurance companies doing business with
the National Rifle Association and urged them to cut ties with the pro-2nd Amendment group. The
state regulator was not targeting the insurance companies’ speech, but rather, the insurance
companies’ conduct of underwriting policies for the NRA. Given these facts, the Supreme Court
held that the NRA had stated a plausible claim for relief based on the regulator’s alleged coercion
of insurance companies to suppress the NRA’s speech in the state of New York.
Defendant also argues that the EO addresses conduct, not speech, and therefore “does not
implicate the First Amendment at all.” ECF No. 37 at 32–33. This argument is disingenuous at
best. Even if one is distracted by Defendant’s suggestion that the focus should be on whether the
EO implicates the third party’s speech, and not Plaintiff’s speech, the EO does just that. The terms
of the EO cut off the provision of essentially any government benefit—and, indeed, any benefit
from private regulated entities—for anyone providing material support to CAIR—which includes
the provision of “expert advice or assistance.” See ECF No. 24-4 at 5; see also § 775.33(1)(c), Fla.
Stat. A third party who sought to provide such expert advice or assistance—for example, a lawyer
who would otherwise provide CAIR with legal advice—could arguably have their own claim for
relief based on this EO. See, e.g., Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury,
686 F.3d 965, 1001 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that content-based prohibition on speech violated First
Amendment rights of third-party organization that wished to engage in, among other things,
coordinated press releases and press conferences with Oregon chapter of international non-profit
promoting greater understanding of Islam that had been deemed a “specially designated global
terrorist” pursuant to executive order issued in the wake of September 11, 2001). But that is not
the claim before me now and this Court is not conflating such a scenario with the coercion claim
at issue in Plaintiff’s motion.
In short, this case presents the quintessential First Amendment coercion claim analogous
to the book publishers who sued to stop the Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in
Youth from coercing book distributers to stop distributing the publisher’s books in Bantam Books,
and the National Rifle Association who sued to stop the state of New York from coercing insurance
companies to stop underwriting policies for the NRA in Vullo. Neither the book distributers nor
the insurance companies sued to stop the coercion—the publishers and the NRA sued because the
suppressed speech at issue belonged to the publishers and the NRA, as the suppressed speech, here,
belongs to CAIR.
17Case 4:25-cv-00516-MW-MJF Document 43 Filed 03/04/26 Page 18 of 30
organizations and how to best protect the citizens of Florida,” id. at 34. But without
explaining why this matters to overcome the “heavy presumption against [the EO’s]
constitutional validity,
” Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 69, such statements are mere
ipse dixit.
This Court need not determine whether intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny
applies in this case because, under either standard, Defendant fails to point to any
evidence justifying his indirect censorship of Plaintiff’s speech. Instead, assuming
some form of heightened scrutiny applies, Defendant merely pays lip service to
heightened review in declaring, in conclusory fashion, that “[t]he EO’s denial of
government benefits to entities that materially support designated terrorist
organizations is the least restrictive means of achieving,” Defendant’s “compelling
interest” in “protection of public health and safety.” ECF No. 37 at 34. But
Defendant offers no evidence to show how cutting off benefits to third parties who
engage with Plaintiff in any way furthers an interest in protecting public health and
safety.
Lastly, Defendant contends that to the extent “any speech is involved, . . . the
EO nevertheless passes muster.” ECF No. 37 at 33. Defendant relies heavily on
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010), to suggest this Court must
defer to Defendant’s unilateral decision to name Plaintiff a “terrorist organization.”
But Defendant is wrong to suggest that his independent decision to call Plaintiff a
18Case 4:25-cv-00516-MW-MJF Document 43 Filed 03/04/26 Page 19 of 30
“terrorist organization” in an Executive Order is entitled to the same deference
afforded to the United States Secretary of State’s designation in Holder. Defendant
cites no precedent to support his contention that he has absolute authority to name
any individual or entity a terrorist or terrorist organization and direct others to
withhold any government benefit from them based on his unilateral decision to
designate them as such.
Holder offers no help here either, as the authority to designate a foreign
terrorist organization under federal law is subject to procedural safeguards that are
absent from Defendant’s decision to name Plaintiff a terrorist organization. See 561
U.S. at 9 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1189(a)(1), (d)(4), (c)(1)). Here, Defendant essentially
insists on a presumption of regularity as to his designation without the process that
accompanies such a designation under federal law. In short, Defendant has
unilaterally declared via executive order that Plaintiff is a terrorist organization, with
no substantive explanation of his authority to do so, no legislative involvement, and
no mechanism for judicial review. Further, even if this Court looked beyond these
glaring distinctions, the Court in Holder explicitly “[did] not suggest that Congress
could extend the same prohibition on material support at issue here to domestic
organizations,” such as Plaintiff. Id. at 39.13
13 Likewise, Defendant relies on other cases discussing the federal Executive’s authority in
matters of national security and immigration to support his contention that his EO is entitled to
19Case 4:25-cv-00516-MW-MJF Document 43 Filed 03/04/26 Page 20 of 30
To be clear, this Court recognizes that Defendant, as Governor, has the
authority to issue Executive Orders in myriad circumstances, and his judgment in
doing so is often entitled to deference. See, e.g., Art. IV, § 7(a), Fla. Const.
(authorizing Governor to issue an executive order suspending from office any state
officer not subject to impeachment for any number of enumerated grounds); see also
League of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Inc. v. Whitmer, 81 F. App’x
125, 126–29 (6th Cir. 2020) (describing deferential review of challenged executive
order closing fitness facilities during COVID-19 pandemic). The Florida Legislature
has even authorized the Governor to issue executive orders as part of the Governor’s
emergency management powers. See § 252.36(1)(b), Fla. Stat. During an
emergency, such executive orders “must be limited to a duration of not more than
60 days,” but “may be renewed as necessary during the duration of the emergency.”
Id. “A state of emergency must be declared by executive order or proclamation of
the Governor if she or he finds an emergency has occurred or that the occurrence or
deference. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667 (2018). But these cases involve the power of
the federal executive—the President of the United States—in a context uniquely within the federal
government’s control. See Estrada v. Becker, 917 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he
Constitution itself preempts any state effort to regulate immigration, even if Congress has not
expressly or impliedly preempted the state regulation.” (citation omitted)); see also Arizona Dream
Act Coalition v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014) (directing district court to issue preliminary
injunction against enforcement of Arizona’s policy, in accord with Arizona Governor’s executive
order, targeting DACA recipients). While he gave it the good ol’ college try, Defendant is not the
president. Nor has he cited any authority to suggest this Court must defer to his judgment as a state
governor in matters of national security for the same or similar reasons articulated in Trump v.
Hawaii or TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 605 U.S. 56 (2025).
20Case 4:25-cv-00516-MW-MJF Document 43 Filed 03/04/26 Page 21 of 30
the threat thereof is imminent.” § 252.36(2), Fla. Stat. Executive orders issued
pursuant to the Governor’s statutorily authorized emergency management powers
are subject to certain requirements and may be terminated by the Legislature at any
time. See id.; §§ 252.36(3)–(4), Fla. Stat.
And while caselaw counsels this Court not to second guess the “difficult line-
drawing” elected officials undertake during emergencies, Whitmer, 814 F. App’x at
129, such deference is not unlimited. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that “just
as constitutional rights have limits, so too does a state’s power to issue executive
orders limiting such rights in times of emergency.” Robinson v. Attorney General,
957 F.3d 1171, 1179 (11th Cir. 2020). “So, while states and the federal government
have wide latitude in issuing emergency orders to protect public safety or health,
they do not have carte blanche to impose any measure without justification or
judicial review.” Id.
But here, Defendant’s EO was not issued pursuant to Defendant’s statutorily
authorized emergency management powers. There has been no suggestion that
Defendant has declared an emergency in the state of Florida with respect to CAIR’s
activities or alleged connections to the Muslim Brotherhood. Instead, Defendant
simply urges this Court to give blind deference to his judgment in naming CAIR a
“terrorist organization,” while broadly gesturing to distinguishable cases that
implicated emergency situations and afforded procedural safeguards that are not
21Case 4:25-cv-00516-MW-MJF Document 43 Filed 03/04/26 Page 22 of 30
present here. ECF No. 37 at 34–35 (citing Holder and Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining
Reclamation Ass’n., 452 U.S. 264 (1981)14). Political grandstanding does not an
emergency make. Defendant’s EO amounts to unconstitutional First Amendment
coercion and Defendant has provided nothing to overcome the presumption of
unconstitutionality.
Having determined that Plaintiff has demonstrated standing with respect to its
First Amendment coercion claim and is substantially likely to succeed on the merits
of that claim, this Court considers the remaining factors for preliminary injunctive
relief.
C
Plaintiff has also satisfied the remaining requirements for preliminary relief.
Plaintiff faces irreparable injury because the EO coerces third parties into
14 As noted above, the federal statute under review in Holder allowed for judicial review
of the Secretary of State’s foreign terrorist designation. And in Hodel, the Court upheld the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, which allowed for summary administrative action
in the form of “immediate cessation orders” to prevent mining disasters and protect public health
and safety in emergencies. The Court held that the Act comported with the requirements of due
process as it afforded mine operators “prompt and adequate post-deprivation administrative
hearings and an opportunity for judicial review.” 452 U.S. at 303. Although the Court noted that
protection of public health and safety “is a paramount governmental interest,” id. at 300, this
interest justified summary administrative action in emergency cases “where only property rights
are concerned.” Id. at 302–03.
Insofar as Defendant simply cherry picks this language from Hodel to justify his own
action, this Court is not persuaded that protecting public health and safety justifies singling out
and de-platforming one of America’s largest Muslim civil rights organizations based on some
strained guilt-by-association theory in the same way that preventing an imminent mining disaster
justifies pre-hearing deprivation of property.
22Case 4:25-cv-00516-MW-MJF Document 43 Filed 03/04/26 Page 23 of 30
suppressing Plaintiff’s speech and, thus, curtails Plaintiff’s First Amendment right
to free speech. “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of
time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
373 (1976) (plurality opinion); accord Honeyfund.com v. Governor of Fla., 94 F.4th
1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 2024); see also Backpage.com, LLC, 807 F.3d at 238–39.
Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s “delay” in moving for injunctive relief
undercuts its claim of irreparable harm is unavailing. Plaintiff initiated the present
challenge within a week of Defendant’s issuance of the EO and subsequently moved
for a preliminary injunction less than six weeks later. During that time, Plaintiff
assembled a legal team and amended its claims in preparation for filing the instant
motion. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 4, 7, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 21. As Plaintiff explains, this
time also allowed for Plaintiff to “meaningfully evaluate the actual consequences of
the Executive Order, rather than merely speculate about potential injuries at the
outset,” and to “prepare the record necessary to support this motion.” ECF No. 41 at
19. As this Court has previously explained, plaintiffs are allowed some time to
consider their options and prepare their lawsuit and motion. See Wood v. Fla. Dep’t
of Educ., 729 F. Supp. 3d 1255, 1286 (N.D. Fla. 2024). Under the unique facts of
this case, Plaintiff’s limited delay in filing for relief, similar to the one-month delay
at issue in another case before this Court, “is akin to no delay.” See Austin v. Univ.
of Fla. Bd. of Trustees, 580 F. Supp. 3d 1137, 1174 (N.D. Fla. 2022) (Walker, C.J.),
23Case 4:25-cv-00516-MW-MJF Document 43 Filed 03/04/26 Page 24 of 30
vacated and appeal dismissed, No. 22-10448-GG, 2023 WL 5051221 (11th Cir. Mar.
20, 2023).
The balance of the equities and the public interest also favor preliminary
relief. The irreparable injury faced by Plaintiff is “not outweighed by any threatened
harm to Florida because the government has no legitimate interest in enforcing an
unconstitutional law,” and “an injunction is not contrary to the public interest
because it is in the public interest to protect First Amendment rights.”
Honeyfund.com, 94 F.4th at 1283 (internal quotation marks omitted).
True, the State has a compelling interest in protecting public safety. And the
State remains free to advance that interest by designating foreign terrorist
organizations and prosecuting terrorism-related offenses in accordance with Florida
Statutes, notwithstanding any injunction directed at the EO. Moreover, Defendant
retains his emergency management powers to declare a state of emergency and issue
executive orders and proclamations consistent with that authority. However, the
asserted interest in protecting public safety, in the abstract and absent any indication
that an emergency is imminent, does not give license to the Governor to threaten
anyone wishing to do business in this state from giving a platform to Plaintiff’s
24Case 4:25-cv-00516-MW-MJF Document 43 Filed 03/04/26 Page 25 of 30
speech.15 Accordingly, Plaintiff has carried its burden on all four prerequisites to
preliminary relief.
III
This Court next considers whether Plaintiff must secure a bond in furtherance
of the preliminary injunction. Rule 65(c) provides that a “court may issue a
preliminary injunction . . . only if the movant gives security in an amount that the
court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to
15 Defendant ends with the conclusory assertion that “blocking contracts and other
government benefits to terrorist organizations and those who provide them material support . .
furthers the health and safety of Floridians,” ECF No. 37 at 37, to suggest that the public interest
and balance of equities favor Defendant in this case. But this fails to take cognizance of the finding
that Defendant’s EO, as directed at CAIR and those who provide CAIR material support or
resources, constitutes unconstitutional coercion in violation of the First Amendment.
Moreover, Defendant’s unilateral decision to name CAIR a “terrorist organization,” as
explained above, is not entitled to the same deference as other such designations, given the
complete lack of procedural safeguards giving rise to Defendant’s designation. Indeed, even in
emergency situations, which this case does not appear to involve, Defendant does not have carte
blanche to so limit the constitutional rights of individuals and domestic organizations without
justification.
And, finally, to the extent Defendant’s conclusory assertion may be construed as an
allusion to the government’s right to choose what speech it wishes to subsidize, see, e.g., Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), Defendant has neither developed such an argument in response to
Plaintiff’s motion, nor is such an argument persuasive in this case. This is not a case where the
State has simply determined not to fund CAIR’s activities. Instead, the EO applies to anyone who
wishes to receive a contract, employment, funds, or any other benefit or privilege, from the named
state agencies, local governments, and regulated entities. The EO sweeps far broader than merely
limiting the expenditure of public funds and arguably includes restrictions on the use of public
spaces and facilities otherwise made available to the public, etc. See id. at 199 (“[T]his Court has
recognized that the existence of a Government ‘subsidy,’ in the form of Government-owned
property, does not justify the restriction of speech in areas that have ‘been traditionally open to the
public for expressive activity,’ or have been ‘expressly dedicated to speech activity.’ ”).
Accordingly, to the extent Defendant is implying that this is merely a government-subsidy case,
that dog won’t hunt.
25Case 4:25-cv-00516-MW-MJF Document 43 Filed 03/04/26 Page 26 of 30
have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). But “it is well-
established that ‘the amount of security required by the rule is a matter within the
discretion of the trial court . . . [, and] the court may elect to require no security at
all.’ ” BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. MCImetro Access Transmission Servs., 425 F.
3d 964, 971 (11th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting City of Atlanta v. Metro.
Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 636 F.2d 1084, 1094 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)). Moreover,
“[w]aiving the bond requirement is particularly appropriate where a plaintiff alleges
the infringement of a fundamental constitutional right.” Curling v. Raffensperger,
491 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1326 n.25 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (quoting Complete Angler, LLC v.
City of Clearwater, 607 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1335 (M.D. Fla. 2009)). Here, the EO’s
unlawful impact on Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights weighs against requiring a
bond, so this Court waives the bond requirement.
IV
Next, having determined a preliminary injunction is warranted, this Court next
addresses whether it will stay that injunction pending appeal. Stays pending appeal
are governed by a four-part test: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong
showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially
injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest
lies.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987); see also Venues Lines Agency
26Case 4:25-cv-00516-MW-MJF Document 43 Filed 03/04/26 Page 27 of 30
v. CVG Industria Venezolana De Aluminio, C.A., 210 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir.
2000) (applying the same test). Considering that this test is so similar to that applied
when considering a preliminary injunction, courts rarely stay a preliminary
injunction pending appeal. That rings true here. Because no exceptional
circumstances justify staying this Order pending appeal, see Brenner v. Scott, 999 F.
Supp. 2d 1278, 1292 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (Hinkle, J.) (issuing a rare stay of a
preliminary injunction given the public interest in stable marriage laws across the
country), this Court refuses to do so. Defendant has every right to appeal, and this
Court sees no reason to delay Defendant in seeking an appeal by requiring him to
file a motion to stay with this Court under Rule 62.
V
This Court acknowledges that equitable relief may not be “broader than
necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue.” Trump
v. CASA, 606 U.S. 831, 861 (2025). The injunctive relief here is limited accordingly.
It only prevents the Defendant from enforcing the EO as to Plaintiff CAIR. It is not
a universal injunction. It does not even enjoin Defendant’s actions as to the other
Plaintiff in this case, CAIR-FL, or the other organization named in the EO. It is
therefore within the scope of this Court’s authority and does not run afoul of CASA.
27Case 4:25-cv-00516-MW-MJF Document 43 Filed 03/04/26 Page 28 of 30
VI
It should be lost on no one that Defendant’s EO targets one of America’s
largest Muslim civil rights organization for indirect suppression of speech. But, as
we all know, it is easy for those in power to target minority groups with little
pushback. Sadly, history teaches that it is often minority religious groups who find
themselves in the crosshairs. And here, the Muslim community presents an
especially easy target for Defendant, inasmuch as they make up less than 1% of
Florida’s population.16
Despite this troubling history and present circumstances, this Court is
reminded of one of the most prominent expressions of religious tolerance by one of
our Founders in George Washington’s letter to the Hebrew Congregation in
Newport, Rhode Island. See “George Washington to the Hebrew Congregation in
Newport, Rhode Island, 18 August 1790,” Founders Online, National Archives,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-06-02-0135. Washington
praised the nascent United States government, which he said, “gives to bigotry no
sanction.” Id. And quoting his favorite Bible verse, Washington invited the Hebrew
Congregation—“the Children of the stock of Abraham, who dwell in this land, to
16 Pew Research Center, 2025, “2023-24 U.S. Religious Landscape Study Interactive
Database,” https://www.pewresearch.org/religious-landscape-study/state/florida/ (last visited
March 4, 2026).
It also pains this Court to have to point out that not all Muslims are terrorists.
28Case 4:25-cv-00516-MW-MJF Document 43 Filed 03/04/26 Page 29 of 30
continue to merit and enjoy the good will of the other Inhabitants; while every one
shall sit in safety under his own vine and figtree, and there shall be none to make
him afraid.” Id.
Channeling Washington’s clear expression of American hope, conservative
columnist David French perhaps says it best. “Our nation is not a place—it never
will be a place—where we all agree with one another, much less look like one
another, or even come from a common culture. But we can live together as neighbors
so long as we recognize one another’s inherent dignity and worth.” David French, A
Movie About America Broke My Heart, New York Times (Feb. 8, 2026),
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/08/opinion/shakers-quakers-testament-ann-
lee.html.
The Constitution protects Plaintiff’s speech just as it protects any other
organization’s lawful speech from suppression by governmental coercion of third
parties. And Defendant has violated Plaintiff’s rights by targeting it in his EO and
threatening any who wish to provide material support or resources to Plaintiff with
government consequences. This the First Amendment does not permit.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, ECF No. 24, is GRANTED.
29Case 4:25-cv-00516-MW-MJF Document 43 Filed 03/04/26 Page 30 of 30
2. Defendant must take no steps to enforce Executive Order Number 25-244 as
it applies to Plaintiff CAIR until otherwise ordered. This preliminary
injunction binds Defendant and his officers, agents, servants, employees, and
attorneys—and others in active concert or participation with any of them—
who receive actual notice of this injunction by personal service or otherwise.
3. This injunction is effective immediately, without the posting of security, but
Defendants may seek an order requiring the posting of security.
SO ORDERED on March 4, 2026.
s/Mark E. Walker
United States District Judge
30
