Friday, November 20, 2026

ANNALS OF DeSANTISTAN: DeSantis, Florida Cabinet Approve 55,000 Acres of Conservation Land (Michael Costeines, The Floridian, November 20, 2026)

From The Floridian:

DeSantis, Florida Cabinet Approve 55,000 Acres of Conservation Land

DeSantis, Florida Cabinet Approve 55,000 Acres of Conservation Land

Michael Costeines
MICHAEL COSTEINES
NOVEMBER 20, 2026

Gov. Ron DeSantis and the Florida Cabinet approved the conservation of over 55,00 acres of land to support critical landscapes within the Florida Wildlife Corridor and Pinellas County Aquatic Preserve through a press release this week.

“When I came into office, I made a commitment to leave Florida better to God than we found it,” DeSantis said. “These acquisitions represent an investment in Florida’s future, protecting our natural resources and wild spaces for future generations of Floridians.”
The Florida Cabinet includes Gov. DeSantis, Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier, Chief Financial Officer Blaise Ingoglia, and Florida Agricultural Commissioner Wilton Simpson.
Florida's Wildlife Corridor began in 2010 and became state law under the Florida Wildlife Corridor Act in 2021 to encourage and promote
investments in areas that protect state conservation.
The acquisitions include.
Caladesi Island State Park in Pinellas County (30 acres) - The acquisition will protect Florida’s coastal shoreline and dune system, as well as prevent development and maintain one of the county's last remaining undeveloped coastal areas. It also will protect the park's nesting habitat for marine turtles, shorebirds and coastal area to include its beach dune, coastal strand, coastal grassland and mangrove swamp.
Star Lake Connector Florida Forever Project in Putnam County (4,763 acres) - The acquisition will connect existing lands from southern Alachua County eastward to the Ocala National Forest and protect wetlands that support water retention and storage functions. It also will protect the wildlife habitat of Orange Creek.
Florida has committed $1.5 billion to Florida forever, a state conservation and land acquisition program within the Florida Wildlife Corridor, of which $950 million has gone, since 2019. Florida has also invested over one billion to its Rural and Family Lands Protection Program, an agricultural land preservation program,since 2022.
As a result, 510,000 acres have been protected through Florida Forever and 243,000 acres for Rural and Family Lands since 2019.
“Today’s approvals reflect the importance of taking a thoughtful approach to protecting Florida’s land and recognizing the different ways it serves our state. I’m particularly proud of the more than 50,000 acres of working agricultural land approved to be preserved through the Rural and Family Lands Protection Program,” Wilton Simpson added. “This is exactly why we have invested in building this program: to permanently protect Florida’s agricultural lands while allowing them to remain productive and contribute to our state’s economy.”
Michael Costeines

Michael Costeines

Michael Costeines: Florida Political Correspondent/Capitol Reporter for The Floridian (2024-Present) Over 1000 stories written covering Gov. Gon DeSantis, Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier, the Florida GOP, State Legislature, and others Shared by Gov. Ron DeSantis, the White House, Florida GOP Chairman Evan Power, James Uthmeier and others 


Under RICO, is St. Johns County government an "enterprise?" You tell me.




Our St. Johns County Commission appears to be owned and controlled by clearcutting "developers" who fund the campaigns of Commissioners.  Commissioners voted 3-2 on April 15, 2025 to hire the Florida House Speaker-elect's corporate law firm as County Attorney.  Is our St. Johns County Board of County Commissioners an "enterprise" covered by the criminal and civil provisions of the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).  The Tennessee Governor's office was found to be an "enterprise" as it existed under corrupt bribe-taking Democratic Governor Leonard Ray Blanton. See United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1982)(en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1972 (1983) Tennessee Governor Ray Blanton was convicted of selling liquor licenses.  Blanton also pardoned convicted murderers for bribes and he was removed from office early as a result.  HELP IS ON THE WAY: DEVELOPERS SEETHE. ON AUGUST 18, 2026, IN A UNIVERSAL PRIMARY WHERE ALL COULD VOTE, WE, THE PEOPLE, ELECTED MARTIN PYSCZYMUKA, A RETIRED FBI AGENT SPECIALIZING IN WHITE COLLAR CRIME AND CORRUPTION  TO ST. JOHNS COUNTY COMMISSIONER FROM DISTRICT 2, AND RE-ELECTED KRISTA KEATING-JOSEPH, A GOLD STAR MOTHER.  Fun fact: On January 17, 1979, the day of Blanton's removal from office, I was in Nashville investigating Tennessee Valley Authority coal procurement corruption, visiting one of my mentors, the indefatigable Pulitzer Prize winning investigative reporter, Nat Caldwell. Tennessee's culture of corruption: Upon Blanton's eventual release from federal prison, several sitting justices of the Tennessee Supreme Court reportedly shook his hand at the State Capitol.   Read the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's en banc decision, upheld by the United States Supreme Court in denying the writ of certiorari:


US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 669 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1982)Argued Oct. 23, 1981. Decided Feb. 8, 1982

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. William Aubrey Thompson, Thomas Edward Sisk and CharlesFrederick Taylor, Defendants-appellants, 685 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1982)

Argued April 26, 1982. Decided Aug. 4, 1982

-----
This three-judge panel decision was reversed yesterday the full Sixth Circuit, finding the Governor's office was an "enterprise" under RICO.

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. William Aubrey Thompson, Thomas Edward Sisk, Charlesfrederick Taylor, Defendants-appellants, 669 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1982)

Annotate this Case
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 669 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1982)Argued Oct. 23, 1981. Decided Feb. 8, 1982

Henry A. Martin, Haile & Martin, W. Gary Blackburn, Robert C. Watson, Nashville, Tenn., court appointed, for defendants-appellants.

Joe B. Brown, U. S. Atty., William M. Cohen, Asst. U. S. Atty., Nashville, Tenn., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before LIVELY and JONES, Circuit Judges, and PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.

JOHN W. PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.


The defendants-appellants, through motions in arrest of judgment following guilty pleas, raise the issue whether the office of the Governor of the State of Tennessee may be an "enterprise" under Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). This Title, one of twelve within the Act, is commonly known by the acronym RICO, from the chapter heading "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations." 18 U.S.C. ch. 96.

The pertinent facts are as follows. Each of the appellants was connected in the mid-to-late 1970's with the office of the Governor of Tennessee. In an indictment alleging that that office "was an 'enterprise' as defined by Title 18, United States Code, Section 1961(4)," the appellants were charged with violating RICO by "selling" executive clemency and immunity from extradition through the governor's office.1 

The appellants argue that Congress did not intend the application of RICO to such enterprises, or that if Congress did so intend, then RICO is unconstitutional. As will become clear from this opinion, it is unnecessary for us to reach the constitutional question posed by the appellants.

INTERPRETING RICO

A. RICO's "Plain Language."

The meaning of the term "enterprise" within RICO has been often and hotly litigated. The Supreme Court has recently laid to rest the dispute whether wholly illegitimate concerns can be RICO enterprises. They can. United States v. Turkette, --- U.S. ----, ----, 101 S. Ct. 2524, 2527-34, 69 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1981).

We follow the method of interpreting statutes laid down in Turkette. In that case, the Court looked first to the statutory definition of "enterprise." See --- U.S. at ----, 101 S. Ct. at 2527. The statutory definition is on its face clear and broad. " '(E)nterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity ...." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). The Court noted that this language is unambiguous in including legitimate as well as illegitimate enterprises. The statutory language itself was therefore regarded as conclusive. See --- U.S. at ----, 101 S. Ct. at 2527. Accord, United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001, 1006 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S. Ct. 3144, 69 L. Ed. 2d 995 (1981). The Court in Turkette recognized, however, that "there is no errorless test for identifying or recognizing 'plain' or 'unambiguous' language," and that in construing statutes "absurd results are to be avoided and internal inconsistencies in the statute must be dealt with." --- U.S. at ----, 101 S. Ct. at 2527. See also Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 643, 98 S. Ct. 2053, 2061, 56 L. Ed. 2d 591 (1978); Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571, 85 S. Ct. 1162, 1166, 14 L. Ed. 2d 75 (1965). In short, courts in construing statutes must look beyond the statutes' words not only if the words themselves are unclear, but also if a discrete statutory provision is anomalous in effect. It is, therefore, "fundamental that a section of a statute should not be read in isolation from the context of the whole Act, and that in fulfilling our responsibility in interpreting legislation, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but (should) look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy." Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11, 82 S. Ct. 585, 591, 7 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1962).

Application of RICO's civil remedies to state government enterprises would result in anomalous results: district courts would not only be authorized to "prohibit any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in ...," but also to order "dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise ...." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (emphasis added). To hold that Congress has authorized federal district courts to dissolve or reorganize the offices of the governors of the states, and that it did so sub silentio,2  is shocking and absurd.

Although the Court in Turkette stated that "(e)ven if one or more of the civil remedies (in RICO) might be inapplicable to a particular illegitimate enterprise, this fact would not serve to limit the enterprise concept," --- U.S. at ----, 101 S. Ct. at 2530, that remark must be read in proper context. Given the patent concern with organized crime's economic power that engendered RICO's enactment, application of that statute to wholly illegitimate, as well as legitimate enterprises, was a fortiori. Such application yields no startling results. In these appeals we are not presented, as was the Supreme Court in Turkette, with cases in which various of RICO's civil remedies would be merely impracticable. Dissolution or reorganization of a governmental entity would certainly not be impracticable; the question is whether these remedies were placed within district court's authority. If Congress may grant such authority sub silentio, then we have witnessed in our times the destruction of the states as sovereign political entities. Cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842-52, 96 S. Ct. 2465, 2470-2474, 49 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1976) (Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to force upon the states essential choices regarding conduct of integral government functions.)

B. The Legislative History of the Organized Crime Control Act.

Having decided that the application of RICO to government "enterprises" yields anomalous consequences, we proceed to examine the history of the Organized Crime Control Act to see if the legislature clearly intended these consequences. With the highest degree of certainty by which an historical "fact" can be known, it can be said that Congress did not envision the present application of RICO in passing the Organized Crime Control Act.

In arguing to the contrary, the government points out that Title IX of the Act "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Pub. L. 91-452, § 904, reprinted in (1970) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1073, at 1104. This language has led some courts to what we feel to be erroneous constructions of Title IX, for to determine these "broad remedial purposes" (on which Title IX itself is silent) courts have looked to the stated purposes of the entire Act.3  The Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose that precedes the Act reads:

The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes ; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens ; and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.

It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.

84 Stat. 922-23 (emphasis added).

The emphasized phrases certainly indicate a Congressional concern over corruption of government by organized crime. See, e.g., United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 32 (2d Cir. 1981). There is, however, no cause to equate the aims of the entire Act with those of one part of it. See United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 690 n.1 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935, 100 S. Ct. 2152, 64 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1980). The Second Circuit, although holding that RICO enterprises included government entities, was obliged to note that "the congressional discussion devoted expressly to Title IX did not state that government entities were to be the beneficiaries of RICO's substantive provisions ...." Angelilli, supra, 660 F.2d at 33. In other words, even though RICO is supposed to be a part of Congress's attack on organized crime's corruption of government, such corruption was never mentioned in the Congressional debate on RICO itself. Rather, corruption of government surfaced most often in the legislature's discussion of Title I of the bill, which provided for the creation of special grand juries authorized to report on the misconduct of public officers or employees. See 18 U.S.C. § 3333(a) (1). The remarks of Senator Byrd concerning the two titles of the bill illustrate where the legislative concern over corruption of government was expressed in the statutory scheme:

I am especially optimistic about title I of S. 30-the special grand jury provisions. Time and time again in our history, aroused citizens have demonstrated their devotion to law and order in the face of official timidity and inaction. Prosecutors and judges may be scared or bought off, but citizens, properly empowered, can step in and do the job which their officials fail to do. I believe that title I represents the best opportunity for the average citizen to play a significant role in the war against organized crime.

It is encouraging that title I absolutely requires the convening of special grand juries in our major metropolitan areas at least once every 18 months and assures them sufficient longevity to probe deeply into organized crime. Perhaps this provision can overcome some of the official dilly-dallying which, I believe, is partly responsible for some of the public apathy which we have witnessed toward this problem.

These special grand juries would have the power to inquire into the violation of Federal laws and dig deeply into the activities and operations of organized crime, including whether appropriate law enforcement officials have been properly carrying out their jobs.

Significantly, these grand juries would be empowered to issue special reports concerning noncriminal misconduct, malfeasance, or misfeasance, by a public officer or employee as a basis for a recommendation of removal or disciplinary action.

Another section of the bill which merits special attention, Mr. President, is title IX.

Recent studies of the phenomenon of organized crime, including that of the National Crime Commission, have identified its alarming expansion into the field of legitimate business as a major threat to our institutions. This penetration of legitimate business by organized crime poses two distinct but related dangers:

First, the economic strength of the underlying illegal operations of organized crime is perpetuated and made more profitable if tainted proceeds can be safely invested in legitimate enterprises, even if those enterprises are operated in a lawful manner.

Second, the free channels of trade are threatened by organized crime's propensity to obtain for itself monopoly control of its areas by whatever means are available, including brutal and strongarm tactics.

The techniques and methods used in such infiltration of legitimate business enterprises are many and varied. A few case histories will demonstrate how easily a business can fall captive to its awesome power.

The legislative proposals contained in title IX of this act, entitled "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations," constitute a carefully structured program which can drastically curtail-and eventually eradicate-the vast expansion of organized crime's economic power which operates outside the rules of fair competition of the American marketplace. Broadly speaking, this title would create strict criminal penalties for using the proceeds of racketeering activity characteristic of organized crime to acquire an interest in businesses engaged in interstate commerce, or to acquire or operate such businesses by racketeering methods.

In addition, this title, by utilizing remedies heretofore applicable in the antitrust field-the remedies of injunction, dissolution, divestiture, and reorganization-would forge a powerful new weapon for putting the syndicate out of business. By removing its leaders from positions of ownership, by preventing them and their associates from regaining control, and by visiting heavy economic sanctions on their predatory business practices this legislation should prove to be a mighty deterrent to any further expansion of organized crime's economic power.

The civil remedies of this legislation patterned after the time-tested antitrust remedies, coupled with its heavy criminal penalties, should enable the Government to take effective action to eliminate the serious threat posed to the safety and well-being of our democratic institutions by the totalitarian dictators of organized crime's closed society.

116 Cong.Rec. 606-07 (emphasis added).

Many other examples from the legislative history can be cited to show that although Congress was concerned with corruption of government by organized crime (as who is not?), RICO was aimed at organized crime's economic power. See, e.g., Remarks of Sen. McClellan, 116 Cong.Rec. 591-92; Remarks of Sen. Hruska, id. at 602; Remarks of Sen. McClellan, id. at 8670; Remarks of Sen. Dole, id. at 36296; Remarks of Rep. Cellar, id. at 35196; Remarks of Rep. St. Germain, id. at 35200; Remarks of Sen. McClellan, 155 Cong.Rec. 9566-71 (introduction of S. 1861, predecessor of RICO's). See also McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties? 46 Notre Dame Law. 55, 140-42 (1970).

C. Internal Evidence of RICO's Scope.

At an earlier stage of these prosecutions, the district court (under another presiding judge) held that the enterprise element of RICO must cover government entities because two of the "racketeering activities" enumerated in § 1961 of RICO-bribery under state and federal law, and extortion under color of state law-"can only be committed in the context of governmental activity." United States v. Sisk, 476 F. Supp. 1061, 1062 (M.D. Tenn. 1979). However, under both federal and Tennessee law, bribery can be committed by those outside of government. See 18 U.S.C. § 201; T.C.A. §§ 39-801, 39-803, 39-805, 39-809, 39-812, 39-816, 39-821, 39-824. Moreover, RICO does not contain the phrase "extortion under color of state law," but rather refers to acts indictable under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. The Hobbs Act covers far more than extortion "under color of state law." See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (2). The inclusion of bribery and Hobbs Act violations in RICO's long list of "racketeering activities" therefore does not even suggest that Congress intended "enterprises" to include government entities.

Our holding today does not mean that RICO cannot be used to reach corruption of government by organized outside forces. Nor do we suggest that public officials are immune from RICO actions. Rather, we hold that RICO's remedial provisions show that government entities are neither appropriate nor intended RICO "enterprises." See Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 Ford.L.Rev. 165, 206 (1980). Following Turkette, the corrupting organizations may themselves be charged as RICO enterprises, and the evils Congress feared and legislated against can be fought. See, e.g., United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 525 n.1 (4th Cir. 1980) (enterprise was prostitution ring protected by bribed prosecutor); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1194 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913, 99 S. Ct. 2014, 60 L. Ed. 2d 386 (1979) (enterprise was bail bonding firm that bribed magistrates).4  It would, however, be a perversion of Congress's intent to continue to allow the potent weapons created in RICO to be lifted casually against every instance of venality in state and local governments.

UNDER THE AVALANCHE, OR, THE VOYAGES OF "ENTERPRISE"

The district court, although inclined to grant the defendants' motions in arrest of judgment, was deterred by the "judicial momentum" toward classing government entities as RICO enterprises. The government refers to an "avalanche" of precedent adopting this rule: United States v. Angelilli, supra, 660 F.2d at 30-35 (2nd Cir. 1981); United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1198 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Lee Stoller Enterprises, Inc., supra, 652 F.2d at 1316-19 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Clark, 646 F.2d 1259, 1261-67 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 829 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7-8 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Karas, 624 F.2d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078, 101 S. Ct. 857, 66 L. Ed. 2d 800 (1981); United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bacheler, 611 F.2d 443, 450 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Grzywacz, supra, 603 F.2d at 685-87 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Frumento, supra, 563 F.2d at 1089-92 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Brown, supra, 555 F.2d at 415-16 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Dozier, 493 F. Supp. 554 (M.D. La. 1980); United States v. Barber, supra, 476 F. Supp. at 184-85 (S.D.W. Va. 1979); United States v. Sisk, supra, 476 F. Supp. at 1062 (M.D. Tenn. 1979); United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1095-96 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd mem., 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979); cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072, 100 S. Ct. 1015, 62 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1980); United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 588 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1978).

The sheer number of these cases is imposing, and the metaphor of an avalanche is apt, for the practice of construing "enterprise" to include government entities has truly snowballed. Many of the cases above5  simply cite earlier precedent without further considering the enterprise issue.

More important, in most of these cases the implications of RICO's remedies were either not raised or not considered. Two exceptions to this rule are Angelilli, supra, and Barber, supra. As noted above, we believe Angelilli misapplies the Supreme Court's statement in Turkette that "(i)t is untenable to argue that (the existence of RICO's remedies) limits the scope of the criminal provisions." See 600 F.2d at 34 (quoting --- U.S. at ----, 101 S. Ct. at 2530). This is not, like Turkette, a case where certain remedial provisions are simply not feasible, but one where their application would raise grave constitutional questions. As the Supreme Court has often counseled us to do, we adopt a narrower reading of the statute in order to avoid these constitutional doubts. See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 99 S. Ct. 2545, 61 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1979); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 82 S. Ct. 1063, 8 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1962).

An alternative would be to follow the lead of the other court that expressly addressed the implications of RICO's remedies and hold that because these remedies are discretionary, "(t)here is no binding correlation between Title IX's remedial options and the question of whether Congress intended to omit public entities from the meaning of enterprise." Barber, supra, 476 F. Supp. at 189. Yet the grant of an "unthinkable" (id.) remedial power cannot be ignored because its exercise is discretionary. There is an anomaly within RICO, and it must be dealt with: either RICO's definition of enterprise or its remedial provisions must be modified if each is to accommodate the other in this case.

The legislative history convinces us that it is the definition of enterprise that should yield. Congressional debates clearly indicate that what was considered important and novel in Title IX was the provision of new remedies for dealing with organized crime. See Remarks of Sen. McClellan, 116 Cong.Rec. 591; Remarks of Sen. Hruska, id. at 602 ("(T)he principal value of this legislation may well be found to exist in its civil provisions which employ the time-tested antitrust remedies of injunction, divestiture, dissolution, and reorganization ...."); Remarks of Sen. Byrd, id. at 607. See also McClellan, supra, 46 Notre Dame Law. at 191.

It is the existence of these novel remedies that distinguishes RICO from more traditional means of attacking corruption in government (such as the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951) and that renders RICO's application to a government entity inappropriate.

After the avalanche, it is time for the spring thaw. The judgments of conviction are vacated.

 1

The provisions of RICO allegedly violated in this case state:

(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.

(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)-(d). The relevant statutory definitions provide:

As used in this chapter-

(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States;

(2) "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any territory or possession of the United States, any political subdivision, or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof;

(3) "person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property;

(4) "enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity;

(5) "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity;

(6) "unlawful debt" means a debt (A) incurred or contracted in gambling activity which was in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or which is unenforceable under State or Federal law in whole or in part as to principal or interest because of the laws relating to usury, and (B) which was incurred in connection with the business of gambling in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or the business of lending money or a thing of value at a rate usurious under State or Federal law, where the usurious rate is at least twice the enforceable rate;

18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)-(6).

 2

There is no mention in RICO or in its legislative history of application to government entities

 3

This was the practice in the following cases: United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 686-87 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935, 100 S. Ct. 2152, 64 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1980); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1091 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Millhouse v. United States, 434 U.S. 1072, 98 S. Ct. 1256, 55 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1978); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 415-16 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Seymour v. United States, 435 U.S. 904, 98 S. Ct. 1448, 55 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1978); United States v. Barber, 476 F. Supp. 182, 184-85 (S.D.W. Va. 1979)

 4

This distinction between government and private enterprises in cases involving government officials has been overlooked by courts that cite Whitehead and Herman as "government-enterprise" cases. See United States v. Lee Stoller Enterprises, Inc., 652 F.2d 1313, 1318 n.9 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S. Ct. 636, --- L. Ed. 2d ---- (1981) (so citing Herman); Angelilli, supra, 660 F.2d at 33 (so citing Whitehead) 

 5

E.g., Sutherland, Stratton, Altomare, Karas, Baker, Bacheler, Dozier and Vignola. One of the earliest cases in the Court of Appeals that applied RICO to government entities, and one on which many of the later cases rely, is Frumento. On its facts, Frumento is arguably limited to "state operated commercial ventures engaged in interstate commerce, or other governmental agencies regulating commercial and utility operations affecting interstate commerce." 563 F.2d at 1091 (footnote omitted). It is a considerable leap from Frumento to apply RICO indiscriminately to every government enterprise



Thursday, November 19, 2026

November 20: Happy heavenly birthday, RFK, Sr. and Dr. Robert B. Hayling, DDS

St. Augustine's civil rights hero, Dr. Robert B. Hayling, DDS and Senator Robert F. Kennedy share a birthday, and it is today, November 20. Happy Heavenly birthday, Senator Kenedy. Happy Heavenly birthday, Dr. Hayling. From Wikipedia: 

Robert Hayling

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Robert Bagner Hayling (November 20, 1929 – December 20, 2015) was an American dentist and civil rights activist.

Early life

Robert Bagner Hayling was born in Tallahassee, Florida, to Charles C. Hayling Sr., an academic who had a 33-year career at Florida A&M University, and Cleo Bagner Hayling. He and his three siblings all attended Florida A&M, in addition to receiving graduate education. In 1951, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the US Air Force, serving for four years, before moving to Nashville, Tennessee, to study dentistry. He received a Doctor of Dental Surgery degree from Meharry Medical College School of Dentistry in 1960, where he first became involved in civil rights by participating in marches and lunch counter sit-ins.[1]

Career

He began his dental practice in St. Augustine[2] becoming the first African-American dentist to be elected to the local, regional, and national components of the American Dental Association. He actively embraced the growing cause of civil rights, becoming the adult advisor to the Youth Council of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).

He led the group in protests against plans to celebrate St. Augustine's 400th birthday as the nation's oldest European settlement on an all-white basis. When Vice President Lyndon Johnson came to the city in 1963 to dedicate the first of the restored buildings on St. George Street, it was to be followed by a banquet for whites only at the city's famous Ponce de Leon Hotel. In tense negotiations, a small number of blacks were invited in return for a promise not to picket the event. However, an agreement to have city officials listen to the concerns of the black community was not honored, leaving Hayling skeptical of promises from Washington politicians.

Hayling encouraged members of the youth council to participate in lunch counter sit-ins, which led to a group of them, known as The "St. Augustine Four" spending six months in jail and reform school. Parents of the students were promised a reprieve if they signed documents stating that Hayling had "contributed to the delinquency of minors" and if they agreed that their children would not participate in further civil rights activities. They all refused.

Hayling and three companions (James Jackson, Clyde Jenkins, and James Hauser) were kidnapped and taken to a Ku Klux Klan rally in September 1963, where they were seriously beaten and narrowly escaped death. They were then charged with assaulting the Ku Klux Klan. As he gained a reputation for militance, Hayling was threatened with the revocation of the group's charter by NAACP Executive Secretary Roy Wilkins during a phone conversation. Hayling replied, "I will mail you your charter" and vowed to continue his activities without the support of the NAACP.

During a conference in Orlando, Rev. Charles Kenzie Steele introduced Hayling to civil rights movement leader Martin Luther King Jr.; Hayling soon became President of the Florida Branch of King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference. He invited King to St Augustine in the spring of 1964, which was chosen as the battle ground for forcing the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Hayling issued a call to college students throughout the United States to come St. Augustine for spring break, not to go to the beach but to take part in the demonstrations.[3] Mary Parkman Peabody, the mother of sitting Massachusetts Governor Endicott Peabody came with three other prominent Boston women at Easter 1964, including Esther Burgess, to aid of the activists. Peabody, Burgess and Hayling were arrested for trying food at the segregated Ponce de Leon Motor Lodge Restaurant. Photographs of Peabody being arrested made international news and let the world know what was happening in St. Augustine.

Hayling's dental practice in St. Augustine was adversely affected by his civil rights leadership, and in 1965, he moved south along the Florida Coast to Cocoa, Florida. There were many reasons underlying his decision - especially as the Brevard County area was rapidly expanding with an influx of new residents because of the Apollo Space Program. He could help find good positions for other St. Augustine activists. Perhaps most significantly, Hayling could help organize civil rights activities in the county. His office in the Elks Lodge in Cocoa became the home for the ACLU of Brevard County. In December 1968, he hosted the annual chapter meeting and fundraiser, inviting his SCLC colleague Hosea Williams as the speaker. 

Dr. Robert Hayling address the attendees of the 7 Dec 1968 ACLU of Brevard County annual meeting in Cocoa, Florida, and introducing the speaker, the Rev. Hosea Williams.

The event, coupled with Hayling's leadership, and with the assistance of local attorney Stanley Wolfman and Cape Canaveral activist Anthony M. Rutkowski, helped make the County Chapter one of the most active in the State as it undertook several noted civil right cases.

In the 1970s, Dr. Hayling moved to Fort Lauderdale with his family, and he practiced dentistry there until his retirement.

Later life

In 2003, the street on which his home had been shot up in 1964 was renamed Dr. R. B. Hayling Place. In later years, he was given the two highest awards of the city of St. Augustine: the De Aviles Award and the Order of La Florida, making him the most honored citizen in St. Augustine's history. He returned frequently to St. Augustine: to participate in the groundbreaking for a museum at Fort Mose, to dedicate the monument in the downtown plaza to the Foot Soldiers of the Civil Rights Movement, and to cut the ribbon for the opening of the first civil rights museum in Florida on the 50th anniversary of the signing of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 (in his old dental office at 79 Bridge Street). He was senior adviser to ACCORD, an organization founded in 2002 to honor the participants in the St. Augustine movement, and he participated in the creation of a Freedom Trail of historic sites of the movement.

In 2014, he was inducted into the Florida Civil Rights Hall of Fame, along with A. Philip Randolph and James Weldon Johnson. A plaque honoring Hayling is on the wall, just outside the governor's office in the Florida state capitol building in Tallahassee. During the induction ceremony, Hayling noted that as a youngster, he used to mow the lawn at the Capitol.

Legacy

His early and steadfast leadership in the cause of civil rights in St. Augustine has been recognized in many ways. He was a 2012 Recipient of the Florida A&M University Distinguished Alumni Award; received a Doctor of Humane Letters from Florida Memorial University and that school's Nathan W. Collier Meritorious Service Award "recognizing his courage, vision, fortitude, and service on behalf of mankind;" and was honored at the Florida Dental Association's convention in 2015. After his death, a memorial tribute was held in the rotunda of the state capitol building. The largest park in St. Augustine was named in his honor: Dr. Robert B. Hayling Freedom Park.

Hayling has been written about in many books of civil rights history: by Taylor Branch, David Colburn, Deric Gilliard, Andrew Young, Ralph Abernathy, Dan Warren, and others. Before his death, he was one of the outstanding surviving grassroots leaders of the civil rights movement of the 1960s.

References