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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 26-3287 (TJK)
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
On the afternoon of September 18, 2026, President Trump announced in a social media
post that, “effective immediately,” he was “banning” the news organizations CNN, MS NOW, and
POLITICO “from the White House.”1 And those news organizations allege that over the weekend
their reporters were denied access to the White House and had their “hard pass” press credentials
deactivated. See ECF No. 2-2 ¶ 6; ECF No. 2-3 ¶¶ 5–6, 12; ECF No. 2-4 ¶ 4; ECF No. 2-7 ¶ 18.
Plaintiffs—the three news organizations and three individual reporters—sue the President and sev-
eral White House officials and move for a temporary restraining order, asking the Court to order
the immediate reinstatement of their hard passes pending further proceedings. ECF Nos. 1, 2. The
Court’s resolution of their Motion is dictated by the application of well-known D.C. Circuit prec-
edent that this Court must faithfully apply. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant
the Motion.
To obtain a temporary restraining order, a plaintiff must show “that he is likely to succeed
on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that
1 See @realDonaldTrump, Truth Social (Sept. 18, 2026, 3:04 p.m.), https://truth-
social.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/117293599348325006.Case 1:26-cv-03287-TJK Document 24 Filed 09/24/26 Page 2 of 8
the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22, 20 (2008); see also Dellinger v. Bessent, No. 25-5028,
2025 WL 559669, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 15, 2025) (“The standard for obtaining either a TRO or a
preliminary injunction is identical.”). This is a high bar, but Plaintiffs have met it.
First, Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success, at least on their Fifth Amendment pro-
cedural due process claim. The merits of this claim are assessed in two steps: “the first asks
whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the
second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally
sufficient.” Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations omitted). Plain-
tiffs have shown they are likely to succeed at both steps. As for the first, the D.C. Circuit held in
Sherrill v. Knight that “the interest of a bona fide Washington correspondent in obtaining a White
House press pass . . . undoubtedly qualifies as [a] liberty [interest] which may not be denied with-
out due process of law under the fifth amendment.” 569 F.2d 124, 130–31 (D.C. Cir. 1977). And
if there were any doubt about what Sherill meant, the D.C. Circuit more recently reaffirmed this
conclusion in Karem v. Trump, holding that “a duly issued hard pass may not be suspended without
due process.” 960 F.3d 656, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
Plaintiffs are also likely to succeed in showing that their hard passes were revoked without
constitutionally adequate due process. The “general rule” is that “individuals must receive notice
and an opportunity to be heard before the Government deprives them” of a constitutionally pro-
tected interest. UDC Chairs Chapter, Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of
D.C., 56 F.3d 1469, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993)). Indeed, the Supreme Court has “described the root requirement
of the Due Process Clause as being that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before
2Case 1:26-cv-03287-TJK Document 24 Filed 09/24/26 Page 3 of 8
he is deprived of any significant property interest.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (citation omitted). Karem also holds that, because of the substantial interests
at stake, before the Government can revoke the White House-issued hard pass of a reporter it must
promulgate rules or standards governing the conduct that would lead to such revocation. See 960
F.3d at 665. And the reporter must “receive fair notice not only of the conduct that would subject
him to punishment, but also of the magnitude of the sanction that the White House might impose.”
Id. (cleaned up).
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs did not receive notice and an opportunity to be
heard before their hard passes were revoked. And, as in Karem, the record is bereft of any relevant
“formally articulated standards” in place before any of the conduct for which Defendants revoked
their hard passes. Karem, 960 F.3d at 665. One standard Defendants appear to offer—reflected
in letters they sent to Plaintiffs on September 22, 2026, identifying their objectionable reporting—
is so vague it hardly does the trick. See, e.g., ECF No. 16-1 (“[Y]our organization has exhibited
behavior in violation of the standards of professionalism and decorum expected of those given
access to the White House Complex.”). Moreover, Defendants renewed Plaintiff Betsy Klein’s
hard pass several months after she published some of the identified reporting, undercutting any
argument that she or her employer, for example, had the requisite notice that the conduct at issue
violated a relevant standard. See ECF No. 2-3 ¶ 4; ECF No. 16-1. Finally, nothing put Plaintiffs
on notice of the magnitude of the sanction Defendants imposed. Karem, 960 F.3d at 665.
None of Defendants’ arguments convince the Court that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed
on their due process claim. Defendants say that Sherrill and Karem were wrongly decided. ECF
No. 16 at 12. Maybe—but this Court is bound by D.C. Circuit precedent, full stop. Defendants
also point to the letters referenced above, which they assert afford Plaintiffs post-deprivation notice
3Case 1:26-cv-03287-TJK Document 24 Filed 09/24/26 Page 4 of 8
of the revocations and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 13; see ECF Nos. 16-1, 16-2, 16-3. And
Defendants cite cases that suggest that such a post-deprivation process suffices in “extraordinary
circumstances.
” ECF No. 16 at 13 (citing Zevallos v. Obama, 793 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
These are such circumstances, Defendants argue, because Plaintiffs have endangered national se-
curity through their reporting. E.g., ECF No. 16-1.
But the circumstances here are not so “extraordinary” as to permit deviation from the “es-
sential principle of due process” that a deprivation of liberty “be preceded by notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 470 U.S. at 542 (emphasis added). Zevallos holds
that post-deprivation due process may suffice in unusual situations, such as when “providing notice
before blocking the assets of international narcotics traffickers would create a substantial risk of
asset flight.” 793 F.3d at 116. But nothing in the record suggests the need for such urgency here.
Indeed, some of the reporting identified by Defendants in the letters to Plaintiffs stretches back
months or years. See ECF Nos. 16-1, 16-2, 16-3. The sorts of stories Defendants identify in the
letters to Plaintiffs are routine. And as discussed further below, the Court is skeptical—at least on
this record—that Defendants’ interest in safeguarding national security is the actual motivation
for, or is even advanced by, the revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes. Finally, even if the circum-
stances here allowed for post-deprivation process, Defendants are still left with the problem that,
before the reporting at issue, Plaintiffs still did not “receive fair notice” of either the “conduct”
that would lead to a sanction or of “the magnitude of the sanction that the White House might
impose.” Karem, 960 F.3d at 665 (cleaned up).2
2 At the hearing on the Motion, Defendants argued that an adequate standard relating to the
revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes had been promulgated because the public is generally on no-
tice that disclosure of classified information is unlawful. The Court is doubtful that the laws gov-
erning the retention, sharing, or mishandling of classified information provided Plaintiffs the sort
4Case 1:26-cv-03287-TJK Document 24 Filed 09/24/26 Page 5 of 8
Second, Plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm absent a tem-
porary restraining order. In the D.C. Circuit, it “has long been established that the loss of consti-
tutional freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable in-
jury.” Mills v. District of Columbia, 571 F.3d 1304, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
When constitutional harm is the basis for irreparable harm, the likelihood of success on the merits
overlaps heavily with the irreparable harm inquiry. See id. Thus, because Plaintiffs have shown
a likelihood of success on at least one of their constitutional claims, they have also met the irrep-
arable harm requirement.
The final two factors, the balance of the equities and the public interest, also favor Plain-
tiffs. These two factors “merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Pursuing Am.’s
Greatness v. FEC, 831 F.3d 500, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). As the Court has con-
cluded, the revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes likely violated their constitutional due process
rights, and “enforcement of an unconstitutional law is always contrary to the public interest.” Ka-
rem, 960 F.3d at 668 (citation omitted). Moreover, Plaintiffs—and the public—have an abiding
interest in maintaining the status quo ante given the importance of the free press, which “stands as
one of the great interpreters between the government and the people.” Grosjean v. Am. Press. Co.,
297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
On the other side, Defendants argue that revoking Plaintiffs’ hard passes and excluding
them from the White House serves an important national security purpose, citing Defendants’
of notice that satisfies Karem for several reasons, but especially given the lack of precedent for
applying those laws to reporters. Moreover, just as the record lacks factual support for Defendants’
contention that the revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes will in fact protect national security (as
discussed below), the record also lacks factual support for Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs
violated these statutes, at least at this stage.
5Case 1:26-cv-03287-TJK Document 24 Filed 09/24/26 Page 6 of 8
interest in “protecting classified and sensitive national security information.” ECF No. 16 at 14.
No doubt, protection of the national security is a weighty interest on the Executive’s part. And
true, “[c]ourts have limited competence in the area of national security,” and so review of the
Executive’s related factual determinations should be “highly deferential.” Busic v. Transp. Sec.
Admin., 62 F.4th 547, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2023). Still, on this record, Defendants offer little to back
up their asserted national security interest to justify revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes. So this
interest does not tilt these factors in their favor, especially given that Plaintiffs have shown a like-
lihood of success on the merits.
For one thing, nothing in the record that predates this suit suggests that the revocation of
Plaintiffs’ hard passes was motivated by national security concerns. Certainly, that is not what
President Trump said when he announced that he was “banning” Plaintiffs from the White
House—instead, he focused on the alleged lack of truthfulness and negativity of Plaintiffs’ report-
ing.3 And even the justifications provided to Plaintiffs after this case was filed are ambiguous
about the true purpose of the revocations: while Defendants’ letters to Plaintiffs mention national
security concerns, they purport to identify reporting that “threatened national security and/or
spread falsehoods,” leaving open the possibility that all the stories fall into the later bucket, rather
than the former. See, e.g., ECF No. 16-1.
For another—and simply put—the record lacks factual support for Defendants’ contention
that the revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes will in fact protect national security or that national
security will be endangered if the Court orders their passes reinstated while this litigation proceeds.
Defendants offer no declarations or other support—classified or unclassified—explaining how any
3 See @realDonaldTrump, Truth Social (Sept. 18, 2026, 3:04 p.m.), https://truth-
social.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/117293599348325006.
6Case 1:26-cv-03287-TJK Document 24 Filed 09/24/26 Page 7 of 8
of the reporting they identified in their letters to Plaintiffs damaged the national security. The
declarations they do provide include general background about classified information, but the de-
clarants are senior officials in the Department of Defense who have no direct knowledge of how
reporters operate in the White House, or about any of the facts at issue here. See ECF Nos. 16-4,
16-5. And supplemental declarations filed by Plaintiffs show that, in most cases, the reporters who
authored the stories Defendants identify in their letters did not even hold hard passes. ECF Nos.
21, 22. In the remaining cases, Defendants afford no reason to believe that the reporter’s posses-
sion of the hard pass was integral to the stories identified.
For these reasons, Plaintiffs have satisfied the four Winter factors and shown they are en-
titled to a temporary restraining order.
Two final points. First, the Court declines to stay this Temporary Restraining Order’s entry
or effective date, as Defendants request. Doing so runs against the purpose of such an order, which
is to immediately—but temporarily—preserve the last uncontested status quo while the litigation
proceeds. Pippenger v. U.S. Doge Serv., No. 25-cv-1090 (BAH), 2025 WL 1148345, at *2 (D.D.C.
Apr. 17, 2025). And in any event, temporary restraining orders are generally unappealable. See
Dellinger, 2025 WL 559669, at *1. This Temporary Restraining Order shall remain in effect for
fourteen days, and the Court will set a schedule for expedited briefing on a motion for a preliminary
injunction during that time. The Court will then be able to consider such a motion with additional
time and on a fuller record.
Second, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) provides that a “court may issue a prelimi-
nary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount
that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have
been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” The D.C. Circuit has observed the “widely recognized
7Case 1:26-cv-03287-TJK Document 24 Filed 09/24/26 Page 8 of 8
discretion” of a district court “not only to set the amount of security but to dispense with any
security requirement whatsoever.” Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. Ass’n, 636 F.2d
755, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1980). So given the lack of representation from Defendants that they will
sustain any economic injury from an injunction and the important rights Plaintiffs seek to vindi-
cate, the Court will impose a nominal bond of $1.00. See N. Am.’s Bldg. Trades Unions v. DOD,
783 F. Supp. 3d 290, 315 (D.D.C. 2025) (finding that the defendants had “not sufficiently demon-
strated any likelihood of suffering costs or damages if they are later found to have been wrongfully
enjoined”).
For all these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, ECF No. 2, is GRANTED.
2. It is further ORDERED that Defendants (except for President Trump) and their agents,
representatives, and all persons or entities acting in concert with them shall immedi-
ately return, reinstate, and restore the White House “hard pass” press credentials held
by employees of CNN, MS NOW, and POLITICO that were revoked on or about Sep-
tember 18, 2026, until further Order of the Court or the expiration of this Temporary
Restraining Order.
3. It is further ORDERED that this Temporary Restraining Order shall remain in effect
for 14 days.
4. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall post a $1.00 bond in accordance with Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) by October 1, 2026.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly
TIMOTHY J. KELLY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 26-3287 (TJK)
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
On the afternoon of September 18, 2026, President Trump announced in a social media
post that, “effective immediately,” he was “banning” the news organizations CNN, MS NOW, and
POLITICO “from the White House.”1 And those news organizations allege that over the weekend
their reporters were denied access to the White House and had their “hard pass” press credentials
deactivated. See ECF No. 2-2 ¶ 6; ECF No. 2-3 ¶¶ 5–6, 12; ECF No. 2-4 ¶ 4; ECF No. 2-7 ¶ 18.
Plaintiffs—the three news organizations and three individual reporters—sue the President and sev-
eral White House officials and move for a temporary restraining order, asking the Court to order
the immediate reinstatement of their hard passes pending further proceedings. ECF Nos. 1, 2. The
Court’s resolution of their Motion is dictated by the application of well-known D.C. Circuit prec-
edent that this Court must faithfully apply. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant
the Motion.
To obtain a temporary restraining order, a plaintiff must show “that he is likely to succeed
on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that
1 See @realDonaldTrump, Truth Social (Sept. 18, 2026, 3:04 p.m.), https://truth-
social.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/117293599348325006.Case 1:26-cv-03287-TJK Document 24 Filed 09/24/26 Page 2 of 8
the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22, 20 (2008); see also Dellinger v. Bessent, No. 25-5028,
2025 WL 559669, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 15, 2025) (“The standard for obtaining either a TRO or a
preliminary injunction is identical.”). This is a high bar, but Plaintiffs have met it.
First, Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success, at least on their Fifth Amendment pro-
cedural due process claim. The merits of this claim are assessed in two steps: “the first asks
whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the
second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally
sufficient.” Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations omitted). Plain-
tiffs have shown they are likely to succeed at both steps. As for the first, the D.C. Circuit held in
Sherrill v. Knight that “the interest of a bona fide Washington correspondent in obtaining a White
House press pass . . . undoubtedly qualifies as [a] liberty [interest] which may not be denied with-
out due process of law under the fifth amendment.” 569 F.2d 124, 130–31 (D.C. Cir. 1977). And
if there were any doubt about what Sherill meant, the D.C. Circuit more recently reaffirmed this
conclusion in Karem v. Trump, holding that “a duly issued hard pass may not be suspended without
due process.” 960 F.3d 656, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
Plaintiffs are also likely to succeed in showing that their hard passes were revoked without
constitutionally adequate due process. The “general rule” is that “individuals must receive notice
and an opportunity to be heard before the Government deprives them” of a constitutionally pro-
tected interest. UDC Chairs Chapter, Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of
D.C., 56 F.3d 1469, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993)). Indeed, the Supreme Court has “described the root requirement
of the Due Process Clause as being that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before
2Case 1:26-cv-03287-TJK Document 24 Filed 09/24/26 Page 3 of 8
he is deprived of any significant property interest.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (citation omitted). Karem also holds that, because of the substantial interests
at stake, before the Government can revoke the White House-issued hard pass of a reporter it must
promulgate rules or standards governing the conduct that would lead to such revocation. See 960
F.3d at 665. And the reporter must “receive fair notice not only of the conduct that would subject
him to punishment, but also of the magnitude of the sanction that the White House might impose.”
Id. (cleaned up).
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs did not receive notice and an opportunity to be
heard before their hard passes were revoked. And, as in Karem, the record is bereft of any relevant
“formally articulated standards” in place before any of the conduct for which Defendants revoked
their hard passes. Karem, 960 F.3d at 665. One standard Defendants appear to offer—reflected
in letters they sent to Plaintiffs on September 22, 2026, identifying their objectionable reporting—
is so vague it hardly does the trick. See, e.g., ECF No. 16-1 (“[Y]our organization has exhibited
behavior in violation of the standards of professionalism and decorum expected of those given
access to the White House Complex.”). Moreover, Defendants renewed Plaintiff Betsy Klein’s
hard pass several months after she published some of the identified reporting, undercutting any
argument that she or her employer, for example, had the requisite notice that the conduct at issue
violated a relevant standard. See ECF No. 2-3 ¶ 4; ECF No. 16-1. Finally, nothing put Plaintiffs
on notice of the magnitude of the sanction Defendants imposed. Karem, 960 F.3d at 665.
None of Defendants’ arguments convince the Court that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed
on their due process claim. Defendants say that Sherrill and Karem were wrongly decided. ECF
No. 16 at 12. Maybe—but this Court is bound by D.C. Circuit precedent, full stop. Defendants
also point to the letters referenced above, which they assert afford Plaintiffs post-deprivation notice
3Case 1:26-cv-03287-TJK Document 24 Filed 09/24/26 Page 4 of 8
of the revocations and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 13; see ECF Nos. 16-1, 16-2, 16-3. And
Defendants cite cases that suggest that such a post-deprivation process suffices in “extraordinary
circumstances.
” ECF No. 16 at 13 (citing Zevallos v. Obama, 793 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
These are such circumstances, Defendants argue, because Plaintiffs have endangered national se-
curity through their reporting. E.g., ECF No. 16-1.
But the circumstances here are not so “extraordinary” as to permit deviation from the “es-
sential principle of due process” that a deprivation of liberty “be preceded by notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 470 U.S. at 542 (emphasis added). Zevallos holds
that post-deprivation due process may suffice in unusual situations, such as when “providing notice
before blocking the assets of international narcotics traffickers would create a substantial risk of
asset flight.” 793 F.3d at 116. But nothing in the record suggests the need for such urgency here.
Indeed, some of the reporting identified by Defendants in the letters to Plaintiffs stretches back
months or years. See ECF Nos. 16-1, 16-2, 16-3. The sorts of stories Defendants identify in the
letters to Plaintiffs are routine. And as discussed further below, the Court is skeptical—at least on
this record—that Defendants’ interest in safeguarding national security is the actual motivation
for, or is even advanced by, the revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes. Finally, even if the circum-
stances here allowed for post-deprivation process, Defendants are still left with the problem that,
before the reporting at issue, Plaintiffs still did not “receive fair notice” of either the “conduct”
that would lead to a sanction or of “the magnitude of the sanction that the White House might
impose.” Karem, 960 F.3d at 665 (cleaned up).2
2 At the hearing on the Motion, Defendants argued that an adequate standard relating to the
revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes had been promulgated because the public is generally on no-
tice that disclosure of classified information is unlawful. The Court is doubtful that the laws gov-
erning the retention, sharing, or mishandling of classified information provided Plaintiffs the sort
4Case 1:26-cv-03287-TJK Document 24 Filed 09/24/26 Page 5 of 8
Second, Plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm absent a tem-
porary restraining order. In the D.C. Circuit, it “has long been established that the loss of consti-
tutional freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable in-
jury.” Mills v. District of Columbia, 571 F.3d 1304, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
When constitutional harm is the basis for irreparable harm, the likelihood of success on the merits
overlaps heavily with the irreparable harm inquiry. See id. Thus, because Plaintiffs have shown
a likelihood of success on at least one of their constitutional claims, they have also met the irrep-
arable harm requirement.
The final two factors, the balance of the equities and the public interest, also favor Plain-
tiffs. These two factors “merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Pursuing Am.’s
Greatness v. FEC, 831 F.3d 500, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). As the Court has con-
cluded, the revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes likely violated their constitutional due process
rights, and “enforcement of an unconstitutional law is always contrary to the public interest.” Ka-
rem, 960 F.3d at 668 (citation omitted). Moreover, Plaintiffs—and the public—have an abiding
interest in maintaining the status quo ante given the importance of the free press, which “stands as
one of the great interpreters between the government and the people.” Grosjean v. Am. Press. Co.,
297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
On the other side, Defendants argue that revoking Plaintiffs’ hard passes and excluding
them from the White House serves an important national security purpose, citing Defendants’
of notice that satisfies Karem for several reasons, but especially given the lack of precedent for
applying those laws to reporters. Moreover, just as the record lacks factual support for Defendants’
contention that the revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes will in fact protect national security (as
discussed below), the record also lacks factual support for Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs
violated these statutes, at least at this stage.
5Case 1:26-cv-03287-TJK Document 24 Filed 09/24/26 Page 6 of 8
interest in “protecting classified and sensitive national security information.” ECF No. 16 at 14.
No doubt, protection of the national security is a weighty interest on the Executive’s part. And
true, “[c]ourts have limited competence in the area of national security,” and so review of the
Executive’s related factual determinations should be “highly deferential.” Busic v. Transp. Sec.
Admin., 62 F.4th 547, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2023). Still, on this record, Defendants offer little to back
up their asserted national security interest to justify revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes. So this
interest does not tilt these factors in their favor, especially given that Plaintiffs have shown a like-
lihood of success on the merits.
For one thing, nothing in the record that predates this suit suggests that the revocation of
Plaintiffs’ hard passes was motivated by national security concerns. Certainly, that is not what
President Trump said when he announced that he was “banning” Plaintiffs from the White
House—instead, he focused on the alleged lack of truthfulness and negativity of Plaintiffs’ report-
ing.3 And even the justifications provided to Plaintiffs after this case was filed are ambiguous
about the true purpose of the revocations: while Defendants’ letters to Plaintiffs mention national
security concerns, they purport to identify reporting that “threatened national security and/or
spread falsehoods,” leaving open the possibility that all the stories fall into the later bucket, rather
than the former. See, e.g., ECF No. 16-1.
For another—and simply put—the record lacks factual support for Defendants’ contention
that the revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes will in fact protect national security or that national
security will be endangered if the Court orders their passes reinstated while this litigation proceeds.
Defendants offer no declarations or other support—classified or unclassified—explaining how any
3 See @realDonaldTrump, Truth Social (Sept. 18, 2026, 3:04 p.m.), https://truth-
social.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/117293599348325006.
6Case 1:26-cv-03287-TJK Document 24 Filed 09/24/26 Page 7 of 8
of the reporting they identified in their letters to Plaintiffs damaged the national security. The
declarations they do provide include general background about classified information, but the de-
clarants are senior officials in the Department of Defense who have no direct knowledge of how
reporters operate in the White House, or about any of the facts at issue here. See ECF Nos. 16-4,
16-5. And supplemental declarations filed by Plaintiffs show that, in most cases, the reporters who
authored the stories Defendants identify in their letters did not even hold hard passes. ECF Nos.
21, 22. In the remaining cases, Defendants afford no reason to believe that the reporter’s posses-
sion of the hard pass was integral to the stories identified.
For these reasons, Plaintiffs have satisfied the four Winter factors and shown they are en-
titled to a temporary restraining order.
Two final points. First, the Court declines to stay this Temporary Restraining Order’s entry
or effective date, as Defendants request. Doing so runs against the purpose of such an order, which
is to immediately—but temporarily—preserve the last uncontested status quo while the litigation
proceeds. Pippenger v. U.S. Doge Serv., No. 25-cv-1090 (BAH), 2025 WL 1148345, at *2 (D.D.C.
Apr. 17, 2025). And in any event, temporary restraining orders are generally unappealable. See
Dellinger, 2025 WL 559669, at *1. This Temporary Restraining Order shall remain in effect for
fourteen days, and the Court will set a schedule for expedited briefing on a motion for a preliminary
injunction during that time. The Court will then be able to consider such a motion with additional
time and on a fuller record.
Second, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) provides that a “court may issue a prelimi-
nary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount
that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have
been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” The D.C. Circuit has observed the “widely recognized
7Case 1:26-cv-03287-TJK Document 24 Filed 09/24/26 Page 8 of 8
discretion” of a district court “not only to set the amount of security but to dispense with any
security requirement whatsoever.” Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. Ass’n, 636 F.2d
755, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1980). So given the lack of representation from Defendants that they will
sustain any economic injury from an injunction and the important rights Plaintiffs seek to vindi-
cate, the Court will impose a nominal bond of $1.00. See N. Am.’s Bldg. Trades Unions v. DOD,
783 F. Supp. 3d 290, 315 (D.D.C. 2025) (finding that the defendants had “not sufficiently demon-
strated any likelihood of suffering costs or damages if they are later found to have been wrongfully
enjoined”).
For all these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, ECF No. 2, is GRANTED.
2. It is further ORDERED that Defendants (except for President Trump) and their agents,
representatives, and all persons or entities acting in concert with them shall immedi-
ately return, reinstate, and restore the White House “hard pass” press credentials held
by employees of CNN, MS NOW, and POLITICO that were revoked on or about Sep-
tember 18, 2026, until further Order of the Court or the expiration of this Temporary
Restraining Order.
3. It is further ORDERED that this Temporary Restraining Order shall remain in effect
for 14 days.
4. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall post a $1.00 bond in accordance with Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) by October 1, 2026.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly
TIMOTHY J. KELLY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 26-3287 (TJK)
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
On the afternoon of September 18, 2026, President Trump announced in a social media
post that, “effective immediately,” he was “banning” the news organizations CNN, MS NOW, and
POLITICO “from the White House.”1 And those news organizations allege that over the weekend
their reporters were denied access to the White House and had their “hard pass” press credentials
deactivated. See ECF No. 2-2 ¶ 6; ECF No. 2-3 ¶¶ 5–6, 12; ECF No. 2-4 ¶ 4; ECF No. 2-7 ¶ 18.
Plaintiffs—the three news organizations and three individual reporters—sue the President and sev-
eral White House officials and move for a temporary restraining order, asking the Court to order
the immediate reinstatement of their hard passes pending further proceedings. ECF Nos. 1, 2. The
Court’s resolution of their Motion is dictated by the application of well-known D.C. Circuit prec-
edent that this Court must faithfully apply. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant
the Motion.
To obtain a temporary restraining order, a plaintiff must show “that he is likely to succeed
on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that
1 See @realDonaldTrump, Truth Social (Sept. 18, 2026, 3:04 p.m.), https://truth-
social.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/117293599348325006.Case 1:26-cv-03287-TJK Document 24 Filed 09/24/26 Page 2 of 8
the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22, 20 (2008); see also Dellinger v. Bessent, No. 25-5028,
2025 WL 559669, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 15, 2025) (“The standard for obtaining either a TRO or a
preliminary injunction is identical.”). This is a high bar, but Plaintiffs have met it.
First, Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success, at least on their Fifth Amendment pro-
cedural due process claim. The merits of this claim are assessed in two steps: “the first asks
whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the
second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally
sufficient.” Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations omitted). Plain-
tiffs have shown they are likely to succeed at both steps. As for the first, the D.C. Circuit held in
Sherrill v. Knight that “the interest of a bona fide Washington correspondent in obtaining a White
House press pass . . . undoubtedly qualifies as [a] liberty [interest] which may not be denied with-
out due process of law under the fifth amendment.” 569 F.2d 124, 130–31 (D.C. Cir. 1977). And
if there were any doubt about what Sherill meant, the D.C. Circuit more recently reaffirmed this
conclusion in Karem v. Trump, holding that “a duly issued hard pass may not be suspended without
due process.” 960 F.3d 656, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
Plaintiffs are also likely to succeed in showing that their hard passes were revoked without
constitutionally adequate due process. The “general rule” is that “individuals must receive notice
and an opportunity to be heard before the Government deprives them” of a constitutionally pro-
tected interest. UDC Chairs Chapter, Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of
D.C., 56 F.3d 1469, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993)). Indeed, the Supreme Court has “described the root requirement
of the Due Process Clause as being that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before
2Case 1:26-cv-03287-TJK Document 24 Filed 09/24/26 Page 3 of 8
he is deprived of any significant property interest.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (citation omitted). Karem also holds that, because of the substantial interests
at stake, before the Government can revoke the White House-issued hard pass of a reporter it must
promulgate rules or standards governing the conduct that would lead to such revocation. See 960
F.3d at 665. And the reporter must “receive fair notice not only of the conduct that would subject
him to punishment, but also of the magnitude of the sanction that the White House might impose.”
Id. (cleaned up).
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs did not receive notice and an opportunity to be
heard before their hard passes were revoked. And, as in Karem, the record is bereft of any relevant
“formally articulated standards” in place before any of the conduct for which Defendants revoked
their hard passes. Karem, 960 F.3d at 665. One standard Defendants appear to offer—reflected
in letters they sent to Plaintiffs on September 22, 2026, identifying their objectionable reporting—
is so vague it hardly does the trick. See, e.g., ECF No. 16-1 (“[Y]our organization has exhibited
behavior in violation of the standards of professionalism and decorum expected of those given
access to the White House Complex.”). Moreover, Defendants renewed Plaintiff Betsy Klein’s
hard pass several months after she published some of the identified reporting, undercutting any
argument that she or her employer, for example, had the requisite notice that the conduct at issue
violated a relevant standard. See ECF No. 2-3 ¶ 4; ECF No. 16-1. Finally, nothing put Plaintiffs
on notice of the magnitude of the sanction Defendants imposed. Karem, 960 F.3d at 665.
None of Defendants’ arguments convince the Court that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed
on their due process claim. Defendants say that Sherrill and Karem were wrongly decided. ECF
No. 16 at 12. Maybe—but this Court is bound by D.C. Circuit precedent, full stop. Defendants
also point to the letters referenced above, which they assert afford Plaintiffs post-deprivation notice
3Case 1:26-cv-03287-TJK Document 24 Filed 09/24/26 Page 4 of 8
of the revocations and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 13; see ECF Nos. 16-1, 16-2, 16-3. And
Defendants cite cases that suggest that such a post-deprivation process suffices in “extraordinary
circumstances.
” ECF No. 16 at 13 (citing Zevallos v. Obama, 793 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
These are such circumstances, Defendants argue, because Plaintiffs have endangered national se-
curity through their reporting. E.g., ECF No. 16-1.
But the circumstances here are not so “extraordinary” as to permit deviation from the “es-
sential principle of due process” that a deprivation of liberty “be preceded by notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 470 U.S. at 542 (emphasis added). Zevallos holds
that post-deprivation due process may suffice in unusual situations, such as when “providing notice
before blocking the assets of international narcotics traffickers would create a substantial risk of
asset flight.” 793 F.3d at 116. But nothing in the record suggests the need for such urgency here.
Indeed, some of the reporting identified by Defendants in the letters to Plaintiffs stretches back
months or years. See ECF Nos. 16-1, 16-2, 16-3. The sorts of stories Defendants identify in the
letters to Plaintiffs are routine. And as discussed further below, the Court is skeptical—at least on
this record—that Defendants’ interest in safeguarding national security is the actual motivation
for, or is even advanced by, the revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes. Finally, even if the circum-
stances here allowed for post-deprivation process, Defendants are still left with the problem that,
before the reporting at issue, Plaintiffs still did not “receive fair notice” of either the “conduct”
that would lead to a sanction or of “the magnitude of the sanction that the White House might
impose.” Karem, 960 F.3d at 665 (cleaned up).2
2 At the hearing on the Motion, Defendants argued that an adequate standard relating to the
revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes had been promulgated because the public is generally on no-
tice that disclosure of classified information is unlawful. The Court is doubtful that the laws gov-
erning the retention, sharing, or mishandling of classified information provided Plaintiffs the sort
4Case 1:26-cv-03287-TJK Document 24 Filed 09/24/26 Page 5 of 8
Second, Plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm absent a tem-
porary restraining order. In the D.C. Circuit, it “has long been established that the loss of consti-
tutional freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable in-
jury.” Mills v. District of Columbia, 571 F.3d 1304, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
When constitutional harm is the basis for irreparable harm, the likelihood of success on the merits
overlaps heavily with the irreparable harm inquiry. See id. Thus, because Plaintiffs have shown
a likelihood of success on at least one of their constitutional claims, they have also met the irrep-
arable harm requirement.
The final two factors, the balance of the equities and the public interest, also favor Plain-
tiffs. These two factors “merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Pursuing Am.’s
Greatness v. FEC, 831 F.3d 500, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). As the Court has con-
cluded, the revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes likely violated their constitutional due process
rights, and “enforcement of an unconstitutional law is always contrary to the public interest.” Ka-
rem, 960 F.3d at 668 (citation omitted). Moreover, Plaintiffs—and the public—have an abiding
interest in maintaining the status quo ante given the importance of the free press, which “stands as
one of the great interpreters between the government and the people.” Grosjean v. Am. Press. Co.,
297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
On the other side, Defendants argue that revoking Plaintiffs’ hard passes and excluding
them from the White House serves an important national security purpose, citing Defendants’
of notice that satisfies Karem for several reasons, but especially given the lack of precedent for
applying those laws to reporters. Moreover, just as the record lacks factual support for Defendants’
contention that the revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes will in fact protect national security (as
discussed below), the record also lacks factual support for Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs
violated these statutes, at least at this stage.
5Case 1:26-cv-03287-TJK Document 24 Filed 09/24/26 Page 6 of 8
interest in “protecting classified and sensitive national security information.” ECF No. 16 at 14.
No doubt, protection of the national security is a weighty interest on the Executive’s part. And
true, “[c]ourts have limited competence in the area of national security,” and so review of the
Executive’s related factual determinations should be “highly deferential.” Busic v. Transp. Sec.
Admin., 62 F.4th 547, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2023). Still, on this record, Defendants offer little to back
up their asserted national security interest to justify revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes. So this
interest does not tilt these factors in their favor, especially given that Plaintiffs have shown a like-
lihood of success on the merits.
For one thing, nothing in the record that predates this suit suggests that the revocation of
Plaintiffs’ hard passes was motivated by national security concerns. Certainly, that is not what
President Trump said when he announced that he was “banning” Plaintiffs from the White
House—instead, he focused on the alleged lack of truthfulness and negativity of Plaintiffs’ report-
ing.3 And even the justifications provided to Plaintiffs after this case was filed are ambiguous
about the true purpose of the revocations: while Defendants’ letters to Plaintiffs mention national
security concerns, they purport to identify reporting that “threatened national security and/or
spread falsehoods,” leaving open the possibility that all the stories fall into the later bucket, rather
than the former. See, e.g., ECF No. 16-1.
For another—and simply put—the record lacks factual support for Defendants’ contention
that the revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes will in fact protect national security or that national
security will be endangered if the Court orders their passes reinstated while this litigation proceeds.
Defendants offer no declarations or other support—classified or unclassified—explaining how any
3 See @realDonaldTrump, Truth Social (Sept. 18, 2026, 3:04 p.m.), https://truth-
social.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/117293599348325006.
6Case 1:26-cv-03287-TJK Document 24 Filed 09/24/26 Page 7 of 8
of the reporting they identified in their letters to Plaintiffs damaged the national security. The
declarations they do provide include general background about classified information, but the de-
clarants are senior officials in the Department of Defense who have no direct knowledge of how
reporters operate in the White House, or about any of the facts at issue here. See ECF Nos. 16-4,
16-5. And supplemental declarations filed by Plaintiffs show that, in most cases, the reporters who
authored the stories Defendants identify in their letters did not even hold hard passes. ECF Nos.
21, 22. In the remaining cases, Defendants afford no reason to believe that the reporter’s posses-
sion of the hard pass was integral to the stories identified.
For these reasons, Plaintiffs have satisfied the four Winter factors and shown they are en-
titled to a temporary restraining order.
Two final points. First, the Court declines to stay this Temporary Restraining Order’s entry
or effective date, as Defendants request. Doing so runs against the purpose of such an order, which
is to immediately—but temporarily—preserve the last uncontested status quo while the litigation
proceeds. Pippenger v. U.S. Doge Serv., No. 25-cv-1090 (BAH), 2025 WL 1148345, at *2 (D.D.C.
Apr. 17, 2025). And in any event, temporary restraining orders are generally unappealable. See
Dellinger, 2025 WL 559669, at *1. This Temporary Restraining Order shall remain in effect for
fourteen days, and the Court will set a schedule for expedited briefing on a motion for a preliminary
injunction during that time. The Court will then be able to consider such a motion with additional
time and on a fuller record.
Second, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) provides that a “court may issue a prelimi-
nary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount
that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have
been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” The D.C. Circuit has observed the “widely recognized
7Case 1:26-cv-03287-TJK Document 24 Filed 09/24/26 Page 8 of 8
discretion” of a district court “not only to set the amount of security but to dispense with any
security requirement whatsoever.” Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. Ass’n, 636 F.2d
755, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1980). So given the lack of representation from Defendants that they will
sustain any economic injury from an injunction and the important rights Plaintiffs seek to vindi-
cate, the Court will impose a nominal bond of $1.00. See N. Am.’s Bldg. Trades Unions v. DOD,
783 F. Supp. 3d 290, 315 (D.D.C. 2025) (finding that the defendants had “not sufficiently demon-
strated any likelihood of suffering costs or damages if they are later found to have been wrongfully
enjoined”).
For all these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, ECF No. 2, is GRANTED.
2. It is further ORDERED that Defendants (except for President Trump) and their agents,
representatives, and all persons or entities acting in concert with them shall immedi-
ately return, reinstate, and restore the White House “hard pass” press credentials held
by employees of CNN, MS NOW, and POLITICO that were revoked on or about Sep-
tember 18, 2026, until further Order of the Court or the expiration of this Temporary
Restraining Order.
3. It is further ORDERED that this Temporary Restraining Order shall remain in effect
for 14 days.
4. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall post a $1.00 bond in accordance with Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) by October 1, 2026.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly
TIMOTHY J. KELLY
United States District Court Judge
September 24, 2026
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