PLEASE read September 29, 2025 City of Destin, et al. v. Kelly, et al. declaratory judgment action filed in Leon County Circuit CourtL
Filing # 232540167 E-Filed 09/29/2025 01:27:43 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND
FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE NO.
City of Destin, Florida;
City of Lake Alfred, Florida;
Town of Windermere, Florida;
City of Delray Beach, Florida;
City of Deltona, Florida;
City of Weston, Florida;
City of Alachua, Florida;
City of Stuart, Florida;
Orange County, Florida;
Manatee County, Florida;
Town of Mulberry, Florida;
City of Naples, Florida;
Miami Shores Village, Florida;
Town of Lake Park, Florida;
City of Fort Lauderdale, Florida;
Town of Jupiter, Florida;
City of Edgewater, Florida;
City of Pompano Beach, Florida;
Town of Dundee, Florida;
Town of Cutler Bay, Florida;
Village of North Palm Beach, Florida;
Village of Pinecrest, Florida;
City of Margate, Florida;
Town of Palm Beach, Florida; and
City of Homestead, Florida,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HONORABLE J. ALEX KELLY,
Secretary of Commerce, State of Florida;
HONORABLE KEVIN GUTHRIE,
Executive Director for the Florida Division of
Emergency Management;
HONORABLE WILTON SIMPSON,
Commissioner of Agriculture, State of Florida;
HONORABLE JIM ZINGALE,
Executive Director, Department of Revenue, State
of Florida;
HONORABLE BLAISE INGOGLIA,
Chief Financial Officer, State of Florida;
Defendants.
/
_______________________________
1
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Plaintiffs, collectively, the “Local Governments”, sue the following Defendants in their
official capacity: J. Alex Kelly, Florida’s Secretary of Commerce; Kevin Guthrie, Executive
Director for the Florida Division of Emergency Management; Wilton Simpson, Florida’s
Commissioner of Agriculture; Jim Zingale, Executive Director of Florida’s Department of
Revenue; and Blaise Ingoglia, Florida’s Chief Financial Officer; and state as follows:
OVERVIEW
This is an action by a large number of Florida municipalities and counties challenging
Senate Bill 180 (“SB 180”), a law that was enacted in the 2025 legislative session that represents
the largest incursion into local home rule authority in the history of Florida since the adoption of
the Florida Constitution in 1968. SB 180 purports to be “an act relating to emergencies”
supposedly designed to assist people rebuild properties that were damaged in hurricanes. But, as
the result of a last minute amendment (and in a classic example of log rolling and stealth
legislating), SB 180 goes much further, freezing all local land development regulations and
comprehensive plans in place on August 1, 2024, declaring that any “more restrictive or
burdensome” amendments to such regulations that were enacted by any of the 67 counties or 411
municipalities in Florida between August 1, 2024, and October 1, 2027, are “void ab initio.” SB
180 violates the Florida Constitution and Florida law because it contains more than “one subject
and matter properly connected therewith,” has a defective ballot title, is a general law that classifies
counties and municipalities on a basis not reasonably related to the subject of the law, constitutes
an improper unfunded mandate on the Local Governments, conflicts with Florida’s Community
Planning Act, and intrudes on Home Rule Powers. SB 180 should be declared invalid and the
defendants should be enjoined from enforcing it.
2
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.
JURIDICTION AND VENUE
1. The Court has jurisdiction over this action for declaratory relief. See § 86.011, Fla.
Stat.; Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167, 1170 (Fla. 1991).
2. Venue is proper in Leon County, which is the official residence of both Defendants.
THE PARTIES
3. The Local Governments are all municipalities or counties existing under the laws
of the State of Florida, and consist of:
a. The City of Destin, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Okaloosa County,
Florida;
b. The City of Lake Alfred, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Polk County,
Florida;
c. The Town of Windermere, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Orange
County, Florida;
d. The City of Delray Beach, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Palm Beach
County, Florida;
e. The City of Deltona, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Volusia County,
Florida;
f. The City of Weston, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Broward County,
Florida;
g. The City of Alachua, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Alachua County,
Florida;
h. The City of Stuart, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Martin County,
Florida;
i. Orange County, Florida, is a Florida charter County;
j. Manatee County, Florida is Florida non-charter County;
k. The Town of Mulberry, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Polk County,
Florida;
3
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.l. The City of Naples, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Collier County,
Florida;
m. Miami Shores Village, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Miami-Dade
County, Florida;
n. The Town of Lake Park, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Palm Beach
County, Florida;
o. The City of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Broward
County, Florida;
p. The Town of Jupiter, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Palm Beach
County, Florida;
q. The City of Edgewater, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Volusia
County, Florida;
r. The City of Pompano Beach, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Broward
County, Florida;
s. The Town of Dundee, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Polk County,
Florida;
t. The Town of Cutler Bay, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Miami-Dade
County, Florida;
u. The Village of North Palm Beach, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Palm
Beach County, Florida;
v. The Village of Pinecrest, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Miami-Dade
County, Florida;
w. The City of Margate, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Broward County,
Florida;
x. The Town of Palm Beach, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Palm Beach
County, Florida; and
y. The City of Homestead, Florida, is a Florida municipality located in Miami-Dade
County, Florida.
4
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.4. As more fully set forth below, each of the Local Governments is subject to and
must comply with the provisions of Chapters 163, Florida Statutes, and will be adversely affected
by SB 180 because SB 180:
a. requires each of the Local Governments to take certain actions;
b. prohibits each of the Local Governments from taking certain actions;
c. will result in substantial financial damage since each of the Local Governments will
be required to expend a material amount of funds (or to take actions requiring the
expenditure of a material amount of funds) and reduces the authority and ability of
each of the Local Governments to raise revenues.
5. The Honorable J. Alex Kelly is the Secretary of Commerce of the State of Florida
and is sued in his official capacity. Florida’s Department of Commerce (“Florida Commerce”) is
administering and enforcing SB 180 or portions thereof, and has rejected some proposed
comprehensive plan amendments and/or land use regulations from Local Governments (and other
unnamed counties and municipalities) because it concluded that the proposed changes violate
Section 28 of SB 180.
6. The Honorable Kevin Guthrie is the Executive Director for the Florida Division of
Emergency Management (FDEM) and is sued in his official capacity. FDEM is responsible for
planning for and responding to natural disasters (including hurricanes) and is Florida’s liaison to
federal and local agencies on emergencies of all kinds. FDEM is responsible for administering,
enforcing, and overseeing SB 180 or portions thereof.
7. The Honorable Wilton Simpson is the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of
Florida and is sued in his official capacity. Florida’s Department of Agriculture and Consumer
Services is administering and enforcing SB180 or portions thereof, including Section 1 regarding
landlord/tenant subjects, a field over which, generally, Florida’s Department of Agriculture and
Consumer Services oversees.
5
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.8. The Honorable Jim Zingale is the Executive Director of the Department of Revenue
of the State of Florida and is sued in his official capacity. SB 180 affects the Local Governments’
ability to collect revenue, including from expansion of Florida Homestead tax exemptions, and
expend public funds.
9. The Honorable Blaise Ingoglia is the Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida
and is sued in his official capacity. Florida’s Chief Financial Officer is empowered, in part, to
invest funds of any entity created by the State, giving him power over the funds of the Local
Governments. The Local Governments’ autonomy to collect and expend those funds is affected by
SB 180.
10. Defendants each have an actual, cognizable interest in the action, adverse to the
positions of the Local Governments.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
A. Legislative History of SB 180
11. On February 27, 2025, the first version of SB 180 was filed for consideration in the
Florida Senate. Initially titled on the Florida Senate website as “Emergency Preparedness and
Response,” the bill title within the proposed legislation stated it was an “act relating to emergency
preparedness and response,” followed by a one-and-a-half-page list summarizing each provision
therein.
12. In the ensuing months, SB 180 was subject to various revisions which in turn
brought along changes to the embedded, listed-summary-title of the bill.
13. On May 2, 2025, the final day of Florida’s legislative session, SB 180 was approved
by both the Senate and the House, including a last-minute amendment that added, among other
things, Section 28.
6
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.14. The final version of SB 180 is titled “Emergencies” on the Florida Senate website.
Similar to its first version, the bill’s title constitutes a long list (now seven-and-a-half-pages)
purporting to summarize each of the bill’s provisions, beginning with, “[a]n act related to
emergencies.
”
15. SB 180 was signed into law by the Governor on June 26, 2025, and in relevant part,
became effective immediately. SB 180 can be found in Chapter 2025-190, Laws of Florida.
B. The Substance of SB 180
16. SB 180, through statutory and non-statutory provisions, imposes new obligations
on the Local Governments under the auspice of being related to emergencies, even though such
provisions far exceed, and do not apply only to, emergencies and their aftermath. SB 180 also
imposes new obligations on and limits the independent action of municipalities and counties across
the entire State of Florida, including each of the Local Governments.
17. Specifically, Section 1 of SB 180 amends Section 83.63, Florida Statutes, to ensure
that tenants are provided an opportunity to recover belongings from a premises rendered unusable
by casualty. While a property casualty could be caused by an emergency, property casualties are
also frequently caused by other non-emergencies. Thus, the scope of this addition is not limited to
emergencies.
18. Section 2 creates Section 163.31795, Florida Statutes, which affects participation
in the National Flood Insurance Program by providing that a local government cannot adopt a
cumulative substantial improvement period for purposes of determining whether compliance with
flood elevation requirements is required. This Section is not intrinsically triggered by emergency
events but rather is a prohibition on certain requirements that buildings be improved with flood
resistant development after being damaged or improved (regardless of whether the damage is the
7
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.reason for the improvement). This provision also goes beyond “emergencies” because damage
does not arise solely from an emergency, and improvements are often made for reasons other than
damage caused by emergencies.
19. Section 3 amends Section 163.31801, Florida Statutes, regarding impact fees by
adding a new provision providing that a local government, school district, or special district may
not assess an impact fee for the reconstruction or replacement of a previously existing structure if
the replacement structure is of the same land use as the original structure and does not increase the
impact on public facilities. Impact fees are assessed for a plethora of reasons that are not related
to emergencies. On the contrary, impact fees are assessed for non-emergencies, necessitated by
new growth that includes new development or replacement of buildings that have reached the end
of their useful life. This provision is broad and far exceeds the limited subject matter of
“emergencies.” The Florida Legislature has expressly found in Section 163.31801, Florida
Statutes, that impact fees are “an important source of revenue for a local government.” Therefore,
by limiting impact fees, Section 3 negatively impacts each of the Local Governments’ ability to
raise revenue.
20. Section 4 amends Section 193.155, Florida Statutes, by increasing the homestead
property tax exemption valuation threshold arising from changes, improvements, and additions
due to “misfortune or calamity”
. These changes are not limited to properties damaged by
“emergencies” because “misfortune or calamity” is not so limited. Section 4 also negatively
impacts each of the Local Governments’ abilities to raise revenue.
21. Section 7 amends Section 252.35, Florida Statutes, where existing law provides that
FDEM is responsible for ensuring a continuous training program for agencies and individuals who
8
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.will perform key roles in state and local post-disaster response and recovery efforts, by adding new
requirements:
a. minimum number of training hours that must be satisfied by county or municipal
administrators or managers, emergency management directors, and public works
directors or other officials responsible for construction and maintenance of public
infrastructure;
b. The new training requirement must now be completed biannually.
In this manner, Section 7 requires each of the Local Governments to expend public funds.
22. Section 16 creates Section 252.381, Florida Statutes, which imposes numerous new
pre- and post-storm event recovery requirements, all of which require significant initial
expenditures and impose continuing expenditure obligations on counties and municipalities,
including the Local Governments. To wit, Section 16 requires all counties and municipalities to:
a. post on their websites frequently asked questions about natural emergency
preparedness, supply and emergency shelter lists, information regarding flood
zones, and other preparedness related items; and
b. create and implement a “poststorm permitting plan,” which must:
(i) Provide for sufficient personnel to expedite post-disaster inspections,
permitting, and enforcement, even if it must be accomplished by mutual aid
agreements and private sector contracting;
(ii) Create and operate training programs and protocols to implement expedited
inspection, permitting, and enforcement programs;
(iii) Establish multiple or alternative building permit service locations to
implement the plan in-person;
(iv) Operate permitting offices for at least 40 hours per week during post-storm
recovery; and
(v) Prepare and publish post-storm event recovery permitting guides.
In this manner, Section 16 requires each of the Local Governments to expend public funds.
9
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.23. Section 18 creates Section 252.422, Florida Statutes, which creates a new
classification, “impacted local government”, and places restrictions on impacted local
governments’ abilities to act in accordance with their Home Rule Powers. If a county listed in a
federal disaster declaration of a hurricane is at least partially within 100 miles of the track of the
hurricane, it is an “impacted local government”, and likewise so is every municipality within that
county (even if parts of the county and certain municipalities themselves are not within 100 miles
of the track of the hurricane). These newly classified impacted local governments may not propose
or adopt (a) “a moratorium on construction, reconstruction, or redevelopment of any property”, (b)
“a more restrictive or burdensome amendment to its comprehensive plan or land development
regulation”, or (c) “a more restrictive or burdensome procedure concerning review, approval, or
issuance of a site plan, development permit, or permit order, to the extend those terms are defined
by s. 163.3164, Florida Statutes”, hereinafter collectively referred to as “Planning and Zoning
Regulations”.
24. Section 18 also creates a cause of action for people to file suit against any impacted
local government for declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce this section, and provides that
prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs. Such lawsuits are subject to
summary procedure pursuant to Section 51.011, Florida Statutes. Accordingly, Section 18 requires
each of the Local Governments to expend public funds, and is also not limited to emergencies
because though its created classification is triggered by hurricanes, that classification bans
Planning and Zoning Regulations in a certain time period regardless of whether those Planning
and Zoning Regulations are related to emergencies and regardless of if the Local Government was
actually impacted by a hurricane.
10
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.25. Section 24 amends Section 403.7071, Florida Statutes, to mandate that all counties
and municipalities apply for and maintain an approved debris management site, which creates
initial and ongoing expenditure obligations in order to operate and maintain. In this manner,
Section 24 requires each of the Local Governments to expend public funds.
26. Section 28 neither creates nor amends any section of Florida Statutes. It states:
Each county listed in the Federal Disaster Declaration for Hurricane Debby (DR-
4806), Hurricane Helene (DR-4828), or Hurricane Milton (DR-4834), and each
municipality within one of those counties, may not propose or adopt any
moratorium on construction, reconstruction, or redevelopment of any property
damaged by such hurricanes; propose or adopt more restrictive or burdensome
amendments to its comprehensive plan or land development regulations; or propose
or adopt more restrictive or burdensome procedures concerning review, approval,
or issuance of a siteplan, development permit, or development order, to the extent
that those terms are defined by s. 163.3164, Florida Statutes, before October 1,
2027, and any such moratorium or restrictive or burdensome comprehensive plan
amendment, land development regulation, or procedure shall be null and void ab
initio. This subsection applies retroactively to August 1, 2024.
27. As the text makes clear, Section 28 not only applies retroactively, but purports to
declare “null and void ab initio” any prohibited actions taken back to August 1, 2024.
28. And although Section 28 forbids amendments to comprehensive plans or land
development regulations, or the adoption of procedures that ate “more restrictive or burdensome,”
SB 180 does not purport to define those terms or explain (a) more restrictive or burdensome than
what? or (b) more restrictive or burdensome to whom?
29. Although Section 28 purports to limit its applicability only to certain counties (and
all municipalities therein) listed in one of three Federal Disaster Declarations arising from certain
past hurricanes, it effectively applies to all counties and cities in the State of Florida because every
single county in the State of Florida (and thus every municipality) is listed in at least one of the
three Federal Disaster Declarations.
11
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.30. Section 28 also creates a cause of action enabling any resident or owner of a
business to file suit against any county or municipality for declaratory and injunctive relief to
enforce this section, and provides that prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs.
31. Section 28 requires each of the Local Governments to expend public funds, and is
not limited to emergencies because it applies to “more restrictive or burdensome” Planning and
Zoning Regulations in a certain time period, regardless of whether those Planning and Zoning
Regulations are related to emergencies or redevelopment after an emergency and regardless of
whether the Local Government was actually impacted by a hurricane.
C. The Local Governments Are Being Impacted And Damaged By SB 180.
32. SB 180 is in effect and thus the Local Governments are required to comply with
the provisions thereof.
33. As a result of Section 28, the Local Governments have begun undertaking the task
of reviewing comprehensive plan and land development changes and review and approval
procedures enacted after August 1, 2024, despite that such changes and procedures were
constitutional and not violative of Florida law when they were enacted.
34. Such review, in many instances, has required the hiring of outside consultants,
which has required expending public funds.
35. Moving past review, some of the Local Governments have drafted and/or adopted
ordinances amending or repealing certain of their Planning and Zoning Regulations to comply with
Section 28, which has required additional expenditure of public funds. For example, the City of
Stuart had to expend public funds to pay for public notices regarding public hearings rescinding
12
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.an ordinance as a result of Section 28. Additionally, Lake Park, Jupiter, and Jupiter Island
expended public funds to analyze the impact of SB 180 on Planning and Zoning Regulations.
36. Some of the Local Governments have received letters from Florida Commerce
advising them that certain Planning and Zoning Regulations are in direct conflict with Section 28.
37. For example, Orange County received such a letter on July 18, 2025, regarding the
comprehensive plan amendment that it submitted for review based on the State’s review process
mandated in Section 163.3184, Fla. Stat., stating that it is null and void ab initio because is “more
restrictive or burdensome”
—without purporting to identify what it was more restrictive or
burdensome than, or to whom it was more restrictive or burdensome.
38. Manatee County also received such a letter on April 15, 2025, regarding two
proposed comprehensive plan amendments, in which Florida Commerce states it previously
declared the proposed comprehensive plan amendments “null and void” and that Mantee County,
nonetheless, thereafter continued to move toward final adoption. The letter states the proposed
ordinances may be violative of Section 28 for being a “restrictive or burdensome” procedure for
obtaining a development permit after a disaster—without purporting to identify what it was more
restrictive or burdensome than, or to whom it was more restrictive or burdensome. The letter also
states the proposed amendments may violate Section 3 of SB 180 regarding impact fees.
39. Some of the Local Governments have also had to pause moving forward with
Planning and Zoning Regulations that have been years in development even if those regulations
are unrelated to emergencies or rebuilding after emergencies, amounting to a waste of the public
funds expended in effort to pass said regulations and expanding the reach of SB 180 past
emergencies.
13
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.40. For example, the Town of Windermere paused moving forward an ordinance to
provide further tree protection and require additional mitigation by developers.
41. Additionally, Lake Park expended public funds to complete a study pertaining to
its Historic Downtown, and now there is uncertainty about how to proceed with potential actions
following the study because of SB 180.
42. In addition, private actors who are empowered by Section 28 to bring causes of
action for non-compliance with SB 180 have already done so against some of the Local
Governments.
43. For example, Orange County is currently defending itself from two lawsuits
brought by private plaintiffs pursuant to Section 28 (Ninth Judicial Circuit Case Nos.: 2025-CA-
007326-O, 2025-CA-007327-O). Manatee County is also defending itself from such a lawsuit
(Twelfth Judicial Circuit Case No. 25-CA-1549).
44. Likewise, the City of Stuart has received multiple notices from residents and
business owners giving the City the 14-day notice required under Section 28, though the City has
not yet been served with a lawsuit. Naples, Lake Park and Jupiter Island have also been threatened
with lawsuits.
45. The Local Governments that have been forced to defend themselves from these
lawsuits are being forced to expend public funds. Any judgment rendered against those Local
Governments would result in additional public expenditure because Section 28 establishes a local
government’s obligation to pay attorney’s fees and costs to prevailing plaintiffs. By contrast, if the
Local Governments are successful, they are not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs from
unsuccessful plaintiffs, further exacerbating the impact of these unfunded expenditures. Win or
lose, these legal fees are ultimately paid by the taxpayers.
14
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.46. The same expenditure of public funds for litigation is required for potential lawsuits
arising from the cause of action created by Section 18, including the Local Governments’ defense
costs and statutorily mandated payment of attorneys’ fees and costs to prevailing plaintiffs.
47. Sections 18 and 28, individually and in conjunction, strip all municipalities and
counties of the long-existing and codified Home Rule Powers granted thereto by nullifying and
voiding their ability to enact Planning and Zoning Regulations, a cornerstone Home Rule power
and one of their core functions as legal entities in service to their constituents.
48. Sections 18 and 28 impede the Local Governments’ ability to exercise the very
functions they are constitutionally vested the right to exercise by the Florida Constitution.
49. Likewise, Section 28’s retroactive application deeming any such Planning and
Zoning Regulation “null and void ab initio” ignores that when such regulations were enacted, the
Local Governments possessed the constitutional authority to enact same based on their Home Rule
Powers, further emphasizing and stripping the Local Governments of their constitutionally vested
functions.
50. Additionally, the Local Governments now must comply with all other provisions
of SB 180, including:
• Being unable to “adopt or enforce” a cumulative substantial improvement period if it wants
to continue its participation in the National Flood Insurance Program;
• Being unable to assess or increase certain impact fees, thereby reducing available public
funds;
• Increasing the homestead exemption, thereby reducing available public funds;
• Providing additional training and participating in annual conferences, which requires the
expenditure of public funds;
• Providing additional emergency resources, which requires the expenditure of public funds;
15
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.• Operating permitting offices following a storm, which requires the expenditure of public
funds amidst a 180-day freeze on certain ways to raise funds to pay for such operations;
• Applying for and operating debris management sites, which requires the expenditure of
public funds.
51. In all, compliance with SB 180 will necessarily require the expenditure of public
funds (paid by the taxpayers), including the need to comply with provisions triggered by future
hurricanes. And SB 180 places the Local Governments in reasonable fear of enforcement,
including being sued pursuant to Sections 18 or 28 by some private plaintiff (and expending public
funds in defense of such action while being statutorily required to expend additional public funds
to pay prevailing plaintiff attorneys’ fees and costs, which the tax payers will pay).
52. In addition to the inevitable incurring of public funds, SB 180 creates a chilling
effect against the Local Governments’ exercise of their constitutionally granted rights and the
ability to defend same.
53. This imminent fear and chilling effect arise from unreasonably applied and defined
characteristics, i.e., a county being just partially within 100 miles of the track of a storm and using
three unassociated hurricanes as the litmus test to blanket the entire state with burdens and
preemptions against all counties’ and municipalities’, including the Local Governments’,
autonomy.
D. Review of SB 180 should be expedited.
54. Pursuant to SB 180’s Section 28, Planning and Zoning Regulations that were valid
when enacted are null and void or are at risk of being deemed null and void. Likewise, Planning
and Zoning Regulations that were soon to be enacted now will not be. These include Planning and
Zoning Regulations that increase resiliency in advance of and response to emergencies and other
Planning and Zoning Regulations completely unrelated to emergencies.
16
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.55. Additionally, pursuant to the cause of action created in Section 28, counties and
municipalities, including certain of the Local Governments, are currently being forced to defend
lawsuits relating to Planning and Zoning Regulations that were legal when enacted, solely because
Section 28 provides that such regulations are “null and void ab initio.
”
56. From this, the constitutionality of this act must be decided in an expedited manner
before counties and municipalities, including the Local Governments, continue to expend public
funds in defense of such suits, judgments are rendered in pending lawsuits (triggering additional
expenditure of public funds), additional lawsuits are filed, Planning and Zoning Regulations that
were valid when enacted are repealed, and development permits are issued based upon the
assumption that certain Planning and Zoning Regulations are void under SB 180.
57. Likewise, pursuant to the cause of action created under Section 18, counties and
municipalities face the same risk of expending funds, including for costs and attorneys’ fees,
following the landfall of the first hurricane (and all subsequent hurricanes) applicable thereto.
Section 18 further provides such a suit is subject to summary procedure, which accelerates the
timeline of a case, further emphasizing and exacerbating the need for expedited review in this case.
58. Upon the date of the filing of this lawsuit, the Local Governments—and the entire
global region, including the State of Florida—are in the midst of hurricane season, meaning that
with the imminent and impending risk of hurricanes comes the immediate implication of all the
new obligations imposed onto the Local Governments that arise from storms (e.g., Section 18 and
certain portions of Section 16), the constitutionality of which must be determined in an expedited
manner before a potential storm, or set of storms, triggers these obligations.
17
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.59. Likewise, the Local Governments must comply with all of SB 180’s provisions,
including those which limit or mandate action now and require the expenditure of public funds and
reduce the ability to collect funds.
60. In all, there is a present, expedited need to evaluate and determine the validity of
SB 180 because the Local Governments must comply with all of SB 180’s obligations throughout,
which has already and will continue to have consequences, including the expenditure of public
funds.
COUNT I – VIOLATION OF THE SINGLE SUBJECT PROVISION
61. The Local Governments reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 60 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
62. Article III, Section 6 of the Florida Constitution states, in part:
Every law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly
connected therewith. . .
Art. III, § 6, Fla. Const.
63. The Florida Supreme Court observed in State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643
(Fla.1999) that the underlying purpose of the single subject provision is to: (1) prevent hodge-
podge or “log rolling” legislation (i.e. putting two unrelated matters in one act, and thus forcing
legislators to vote for one item in order to get another); (2) prevent surprise or fraud by means of
provisions in bills of which the titles gave no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked
and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) apprise the people fairly of the subjects of
legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have an opportunity of being heard
thereon.
64. The Thompson Court also observed the most common single-subject-provision
violations occur when a bill is amended several times, the title of the bill is changed, and the bill
18
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.is passed near the end of the legislative session. All of these indicators occurred with the enactment
of SB 180.
65. Here, while SB 180 purports to be “[a]n act relating to emergencies”, SB 180 is not
limited to the single subject of “emergencies” and matters properly connected therewith.
66. Section 1 regarding tenants’ right to recover is related to casualty losses and is not
limited nor primarily related to losses caused by emergencies.
67. Section 2 regarding the National Flood Insurance Program affects cumulative
substantial improvements, even when such improvements are not the result of repairing damages
caused by emergencies.
68. Section 3 limits the ability to assess or raise impact fees, and impact fees have no
relation to emergencies.
69. Section 4 increases the thresholds that trigger reassessments of homestead property
values due to changes, additions, or improvements that replace all or a portion of a homestead
property, even in situations unrelated to emergencies.
70. Sections 18 and 28 are also not limited to emergencies because they prohibit all
“more restrictive or burdensome” Planning and Zoning Regulations regardless of whether those
regulations, or the properties being regulated, relate in any way to emergencies.
71. Therefore, SB 180 addresses multiple subjects beyond the single subject of
emergencies, some of which were improperly combined in the last moments of the legislative
session, a classic example of “logrolling.” This amounts to a clear violation of the single subject
provision of the Florida Constitution.
72. All elements necessary to support a cause of action for declaratory relief are
present:
19
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.a. There is a bona fide, actual, present need for a declaration of whether the enactment
of SB 180 violated Art. III, § 6 of the Florida Constitution.
b. The declaration sought deals with a present controversy as to an ascertainable set
of facts.
c. Constitutionally provided rights and privileges of the Local Governments are
dependent upon the law applicable to the facts.
d. The Local Governments and the defendants have an actual, present, adverse and
antagonistic interest in the subject matter of this Complaint.
e. The antagonistic and adverse interests are all before this Court.
f. The relief sought is not merely the giving of legal advice or providing the answer
to a question propounded from curiosity, but stems from an actual controversy.
WHEREFORE, the Local Governments respectfully request that judgment be entered in
their favor:
A. B. C. Declaring the enactment of SB 180 violated Art. III, § 6 of the Florida Constitution;
Enjoining the enforcement of SB 180; and
Granting such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT II – VIOLATION OF THE TITLE PROVISION
73. The Local Governments reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 60 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
74. Article III, Section 6 of the Florida Constitution states, in part:
Every law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly
connected therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in
the title.
Art. III, § 6, Fla. Const. (emphasis added).
75. Thus, in addition to a bill being limited to only one subject, see supra, the bill must
also briefly express that subject in the title.
20
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.76. “This provision imposes two related but distinct requirements. First, the title of the
bill should be fair notice of its contents. Second, the various provisions of the bill must be germane
to the subject as expressed in the title.” Alterman Transp. Lines, Inc. v. State, 405 So. 2d 456, 461
(Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
77. “These requirements are designed to prevent surprise or fraud that would spring
from hidden provisions not indicated in the title.” Id.
78. SB 180’s title is a seven-and-a-half-page list summarizing each provision therein,
beginning with the purported single subject, “[a]n act relating to emergencies.”
79. Although the Constitution requires that the single subject be “briefly expressed in
the title,” the title of SB180 is certainly not “brief,” and instead constitutes a table-of-contents-
type summary of the Bill’s 28 Sections (which themselves are not limited to one subject).
80. SB 180 is not limited to one subject, and thus it cannot be contained within a briefly
expressed title of one subject.
81. Even more, the title does not provide fair notice of the contents of Section 28 of SB
180. The portion of the title of SB 180 relating to Section 28 advises the public that it applies to
“certain counties”:
“prohibiting certain counties from proposing or adopting certain
moratoriums, amendments, or procedures for a specified
timeframe.”
82. The statement that Section 28 applies only to “certain counties” is misleading
because, in fact, the text of Section 28 applies to all (not just certain) 67 counties and 411
municipalities in Florida. Strikingly, municipalities were not referenced in the title. Thus, the title
hides the ball and misleads the public.
21
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.83. requirements and applicability.
84. Florida Constitution.
85. Thus, the presumptive “title” of Section 28 does not give fair notice of its
All of these factors amount to a clear violation of the brief title provision of the
All elements necessary to support a cause of action for declaratory relief are
present:
a. There is a bona fide, actual, present need for a declaration of whether the enactment
of SB 180 violated Art. III, § 6 of the Florida Constitution.
b. The declaration sought deals with a present controversy as to an ascertainable set
of facts.
c. Constitutionally provided rights and privileges of the Local Governments are
dependent upon the law applicable to the facts.
d. The Local Governments and the defendants have an actual, present, adverse and
antagonistic interest in the subject matter of this Complaint.
e. The antagonistic and adverse interests are all before this Court.
f. The relief sought is not merely the giving of legal advice or providing the answer
to a question propounded from curiosity, but stems from an actual controversy.
WHEREFORE, the Local Governments respectfully request that judgment be entered in
their favor:
A. B. C. Declaring the enactment of SB 180 violated Art. III, § 6 of the Florida Constitution;
Enjoining the enforcement of SB 180; and
Granting such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT III – VIOLATION OF THE REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION PROVISION
86. The Local Governments reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 60 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
87. Article III, Section 11(b) of the Florida Constitution states:
22
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.In the enactment of general laws on other subjects, political
subdivisions or other governmental entities may be classified only
on a basis reasonably related to the subject of the law.
Art. III, sec. 11(b), Fla. Const.
88. Notably, “other subjects” here refers to 21 enumerated subjects outlined in Article
III, Section 11(a). SB 180 does not trigger any of the kinds of laws in subsection (a). Thus, SB 180
falls under subsection (b) and therefore it is subject to the restriction that it must not classify
political subdivisions of other governmental entities on any basis other than one reasonably related
to the subject law.
89. “The legislature may set classifications within a general law, but any such
classification must bear a reasonable relationship to the primary purpose of the law.” Ocala
Breeders' Sales Co., Inc. v. Florida Gaming Centers, Inc., 731 So. 2d 21, 26 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999),
aff'd, 793 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2001). “A statutory criterion is not valid merely because it appears to
promote the objective of the law.” Id.
90. Further, the Florida Supreme Court has made clear that “[s]tatutes that employ
arbitrary classification schemes are not valid as general laws.” Dep't of Bus. Regulation v. Classic
Mile, Inc., 541 So. 2d 1155, 1157 (Fla. 1989); License Acquisitions, LLC v. Debary Real Estate
Holdings, LLC, 155 So. 3d 1137, 1143 (Fla. 2014).
91. SB 180 is a general law that makes unreasonable classifications in multiple
provisions, including in Sections 18 and 28.
92. Section 18, albeit not retroactive like Section 28, creates the term “impacted local
government,” which is “a county listed in a federal disaster declaration located entirely or partially
within 100 miles of the track of a storm declared to be a hurricane by the National Hurricane Center
while the storm was categorized as a hurricane or a municipality located within such a county.”
23
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.93. If just part of a county is within this range, the entire county and all of its
municipalities are precluded from acting in certain ways regarding their own Planning and Zoning
Regulations, even if they are not impacted by a hurricane.
94. Thus, Section 18 plainly creates a classification by creating the term “impacted
local governments”—some counties and municipalities are classified as “impacted local
governments” and others are not. That classification is unreasonable, on several grounds.
95. Section 18 fails to consider the actual impact that a hurricane has on a specific
county or municipality. Instead, Section 18 merely classifies counties and municipalities based
upon the arbitrary standard of whether even just a portion of a county was within 100 miles of a
hurricane track, regardless of the actual size and impact of a storm. Thus, for example, some
counties and municipalities (e.g., those that are located 80 miles from the track) would be
misclassified as “impacted local governments” where a storm was very small and only actually
impacted properties that were very close to the track (e.g., within 25 miles). To the contrary, there
could be a very large storm that impacts properties more than 100 miles from the track, in which
case some counties and municipalities could be significantly impacted but would be misclassified
as not being “impacted local governments.” Thus, in certain instances, counties and municipalities
not impacted by a small hurricane (one that does not fulfill the bounds of the 100 miles of the track
of the storm, regardless of how calculated or defined) will be roped into Section 18’s preclusions,
while in other instances counties and municipalities that are impacted by a large storm (one that
exceeds the 100 miles of the track of the storm, regardless of how calculated or defined) will not
be roped into Section 18’s preclusions.
96. Moreover, using county lines as the demarcation for determining whether a
municipality is an “impacted local government” is itself arbitrary. For example, in South Florida,
24
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.a storm could track 90 miles north of Palm Beach County. The arbitrary classification system of
Section 18 would classify the southern-most Palm Beach County municipality (Boca Raton) as an
“impacted local government” (because the northern part of Palm Beach Count is within 100 miles
of the track), but would classify its neighbor to the south (Deerfield Beach, the northernmost
Broward County municipality) as not being an “impacted local government” (because the storm
did not track within 100 miles of Broward County). But, most likely, as neighboring
municipalities, Boca Raton and Deerfield Beach would have suffered roughly the same amount of
impacts from the storm. Storms do not recognize county boundaries and thus the use of such lines
to classify counties and municipalities is wholly arbitrary.
97. The classification of counties and municipalities created by Section 18 is clearly
unreasonable because in some instances it will not include counties and municipalities that should
be included (because they were, in fact, impacted), and in other instances will include some
counties and municipalities that should not be included (because they were, in fact, not impacted).
98. For a classification to be reasonable, it must treat similarly situated counties and
municipalities the same. The classification of counties and municipalities in Section 18 fails that
basic test.
99. Section 18 also creates an unreasonable classification by failing to properly define
the methodologies for determining which counties (and the municipalities therein) will be
categorized this way because “track of the storm” and the “100 mile” terms are ambiguous, not
defined, and open to multiple interpretations.
100. Notably, Section 18 fails to define how the 100-mile designation is calculated or
applied. For example, is 100 miles calculated in all directions from the track of a hurricane, in
effect creating a 200-mile diameter? Or is the 100-mile designation meant to be the limits of a
25
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.diameter from the track of a hurricane? Such clarity does not exist in Section 18, leaving it vague
as to whether it implicates a zone radiating from a hurricane track that is either double or half of
what the legislature intended.
101. Section 28 also creates an unreasonable classification.
102. Section 28 sets out that each county (and the municipalities therein) listed in one of
three Federal Disaster Declarations across the state cannot propose or adopt “more restrictive or
burdensome” Planning and Zoning Regulations.
103. Each of the three Declarations creates a classification, and taken together as listed
in Section 28 creates another, new classification.
104. Taken in conjunction, the new classification combines these three Declarations to
blanket the entire state.
105. In this instance, a classification which appears narrow on its face is unreasonably
applied to the entire state.
106. Section 28 also fails to describe why those three specific Federal Disaster
Declarations are the standard bearers, as opposed to referencing Federal Disaster Declarations
from other hurricanes that have impacted Florida in the same time frame.
107. Likewise, Section 28 fails to provide any methodology for the timeframe applied
therein. There is no explanation as to why Section 28 applies retroactively generally and back to
the specific date, August 1, 2024. If that August 1, 2024, date had some meaning based upon a
given storm, then only those counties (and municipalities within those counties) that were actually
impacted by that specific storm should be referenced by Section 28. However, that is not the case
here, because, while the incident period for Hurricane Debby began August 1, 2024, the incident
period for Hurricane Helene began on September 23, 2024, and the incident period for Hurricane
26
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.Milton began on October 5, 2024. It is arbitrary to classify all counties and municipalities in one
class subject to the August 1, 2024, date if only some were impacted by a subject storm on that
date but others were not. There is also no explanation as to why Section 28 applies prospectively
to October 1, 2027.
108. In all, Sections 18 and 28 amount to clear violations of the unreasonable
classification provision of the Florida Constitution.
109. All elements necessary to support a cause of action for declaratory relief are
present:
a. There is a bona fide, actual, present need for a declaration of whether the enactment
of SB 180 violated Art. III, § 11(b) of the Florida Constitution.
b. The declaration sought deals with a present controversy as to an ascertainable set
of facts.
c. Constitutionally provided rights and privileges of the Local Governments are
dependent upon the law applicable to the facts.
d. The Local Governments and the defendants have an actual, present, adverse and
antagonistic interest in the subject matter of this Complaint.
e. The antagonistic and adverse interests are all before this Court.
f. The relief sought is not merely the giving of legal advice or providing the answer
to a question propounded from curiosity, but stems from an actual controversy.
WHEREFORE, the Local Governments respectfully request that judgment be entered in
their favor:
A. B. C. Declaring the enactment of SB 180 violated Art. III, § 11(b) of the Florida Constitution;
Enjoining the enforcement of SB 180; and
Granting such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
27
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.COUNT IV – VIOLATION OF THE UNFUNDED MANDATE PROVISION
110. The Local Governments reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 60 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
111. Article VII, Section 18(a) of the Florida Constitution states, in part:
No county or municipality shall be bound by any general law
requiring such county or municipality to spend funds or to take an
action requiring the expenditure of funds[.]
Art. VII, § 18(a), Fla. Const. The Section then lists exceptions to this rule, stating that this
provision does not apply if (1) “the legislature has determined that such law fulfills an important
state interest”, and (2) one of the following items is also fulfilled:
• funds have been appropriated that have been estimated at the time of enactment to be
sufficient to fund such expenditure;
• the legislature authorizes or has authorized a county or municipality to enact a funding
source not available for such county or municipality on February 1, 1989, that can be used
to generate the amount of funds estimated to be sufficient to fund such expenditure by a
simple majority vote of the governing body of such county or municipality;
• the law requiring such expenditure is approved by two-thirds of the membership in each
house of the legislature;
• the expenditure is required to comply with a law that applies to all persons similarly
situated, including the state and counties and municipalities; or
• the law is either required to comply with a federal requirement or required for eligibility
for a federal entitlement, which federal requirement specifically contemplates actions by
counties or municipalities for compliance.
112. Additionally, Article VII, Section 18 of the Florida Constitution contains a further
exception, stating that “. . . laws having insignificant fiscal impact . . . are exempt from the
requirements of this section.” Art. VII, § 18(d), Fla. Const. A “insignificant fiscal impact” is the
amount not greater than the average statewide population for the applicable fiscal year multiplied
28
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.by $0.10; for the fiscal year 2025-26, this is estimated to be approximately $2.4 million.1 This
amount is determined on an aggregate basis for all municipalities and counties in the state.2
113. Article VII, Section 18 was added to the Florida Constitution to protect counties
and municipalities from unfunded mandates after the Florida Legislature repeatedly adopted
general laws that imposed costly requirements on local governments without providing funds for,
or methods for funding, compliance with said requirements.
114. Sections 7, 16, 18, 24, and 28 of SB 180 require the expenditure of public funds, as
previously set forth above. The aggregate amount of these forced expenditures for all
municipalities and counties in the state will far exceed $2.4 million.
115. Importantly, nowhere in SB 180 is there a finding that the law fulfills an important
state interest. Even if SB 180 does, in fact, fulfill an important state interest (which would be
contested), the failure to expressly make that determination within the four corners of SB 180 is
fatal to its constitutionality.
116. This is true despite that SB 180 was approved by a 2/3rd vote of each house of the
legislature because SB 180 does not contain the constitutionally required finding that that the law
fulfills an important state interest.
117. Thus, SB 180 is an unfunded mandate in violation of Article VII, Section 18 of the
Florida Constitution.
118. All elements necessary to support a cause of action for declaratory relief are
present:
a. There is a bona fide, actual, present need for a declaration of whether the enactment
of SB 180 violated Art. VII, § 18 of the Florida Constitution.
1 https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2025/176/Analyses/2025s00176.ap.PDF at page 10.
2 https://www.flsenate.gov/PublishedContent/Session/2012/InterimReports/2012-115ca.pdf at page 2.
29
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.b. The declaration sought deals with a present controversy as to an ascertainable set
of facts.
c. Constitutionally provided rights and privileges of the Local Governments are
dependent upon the law applicable to the facts.
d. e. f. The Local Governments and the defendants have an actual, present, adverse and
antagonistic interest in the subject matter of this Complaint.
The antagonistic and adverse interests are all before this Court.
The relief sought is not merely the giving of legal advice or providing the answer
to a question propounded from curiosity, but stems from an actual controversy.
WHEREFORE, the Local Governments respectfully request that judgment be entered in
their favor:
A. B. C. Declaring the enactment of SB 180 violated Art. VII, § 18 of the Florida Constitution;
Enjoining the enforcement of SB 180; and
Granting such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT V – SB 180 CONFLICTS WITH THE COMMUNITY PLANNING ACT
119. The Local Governments reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 60 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
120. Seven years after the 1968 Florida Constitution provided local governments with
home rule powers over land use and zoning, Florida’s comprehensive planning regime was first
established by the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975, which “was intended
to provide a uniform method for local governments to use in establishing and implementing
comprehensive planning programs to guide and control future development in the state.”3 It
applied to “cities and counties and other local governmental entities[.]” 4
3 Local government comprehensive planning act | My Florida Legal
4 Id.
30
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.121. The 1975 Act was strengthened in 1985, and Chapter 163 was given a more
expansive and descriptive name: “The Comprehensive Planning and Land Development
Regulation Act”, popularly known as the Growth Management Act. This iteration sought to ensure
that the comprehensive planning process would enable counties and municipalities to do more than
just plan.
122. In 2011, Chapter 163 Part II was again rewritten and renamed, this time as the
“Community Planning Act”.
123. Florida’s Community Planning Act (the “Act”) is enshrined in Florida law as
Sections 163.3161 through 163.3248, Florida Statutes. The Legislature clearly stated its multi-
prong intentions and purposes of the Act:
(2) It is the purpose of this act to utilize and strengthen the existing
role, processes, and powers of local governments in the
establishment and implementation of comprehensive planning
programs to guide and manage future development consistent with
the proper role of local government.
. . . .
(4) It is the intent of this act that local governments have the ability
to preserve and enhance present advantages; encourage the most
appropriate use of land, water, and resources, consistent with the
public interest; overcome present handicaps; and deal effectively
with future problems that may result from the use and
development of land within their jurisdictions. Through the process
of comprehensive planning, it is intended that units of local
government can preserve, promote, protect, and improve the public
health, safety, comfort, good order, appearance, convenience, law
enforcement and fire prevention, and general welfare; facilitate the
adequate and efficient provision of transportation, water, sewerage,
schools, parks, recreational facilities, housing, and other
requirements and services; and conserve, develop, utilize, and
protect natural resources within their jurisdictions.
. . . .
(8) The provisions of this act in their interpretation and application
are declared to be the minimum requirements necessary to
accomplish the stated intent, purposes, and objectives of this act; to
protect human, environmental, social, and economic resources; and
to maintain, through orderly growth and development, the character
31
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.and stability of present and future land use and development in this
state.
(9) It is the intent of the Legislature that [its effects], not be
interpreted to limit or restrict the powers of municipal or county
officials, but be interpreted as a recognition of their broad statutory
and constitutional powers to plan for and regulate the use of
land. It is, further, the intent of the Legislature to reconfirm that ss.
163.3161-163.3248 have provided and do provide the necessary
statutory direction and basis for municipal and county officials to
carry out their comprehensive planning and land development
regulation powers, duties, and responsibilities.
§ 163.3161, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).
124. From these intentions, and in recognition of the “broad statutory and constitutional
powers to plan for and regulate the use of land”, the Act makes clear that municipalities and
counties have the power and responsibility to:
(a) Plan for their future development and growth.
(b) Adopt and amend comprehensive plans, or elements or
portions thereof, to guide their future development and growth.
(c) Implement adopted or amended comprehensive plans by the
adoption of appropriate land development regulations or elements
thereof.
(d) Establish, support, and maintain administrative instruments
and procedures to carry out the provisions and purposes of this act.
§ 163.3167, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). And, “[e]ach local government shall maintain a
comprehensive plan of the type and in the manner set out in this part or prepare amendments to its
existing comprehensive plan to conform it to the requirements of this part and in the manner set
out in this part.” Id. (emphasis added). The emphasized terms indicate the Legislature’s intent that
the Local Governments prospectively uphold their comprehensive plans as a continuing and
unending obligation amending, supporting, and maintaining those plans.
32
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.125. In furtherance of this responsibility, the Act also mandates that every seven years,
each local government shall evaluate its comprehensive plan to update data and analysis on which
it was based, and based on that data and analysis determine if amendments are necessary to reflect
certain statutory requirements or changed conditions, and if such a determination is made then
such changes must be made within one year. § 163.3191, Fla. Stat. In turn, such plans are subject
to the review process detailed in Section 163.3184, Florida Statutes.
126. Further, within one year after submission of a comprehensive plan, the counties
and municipalities must adopt or amend their local land development regulations to ensure they
are consistent with the comprehensive plan. § 163.3202, Fla. Stat.
127. Likewise, the Act also mandates that if a land development regulation is
inconsistent with the comprehensive plan, the land development regulation must be brought in
conformance with the comprehensive plan. § 163.3194, Fla. Stat.
128. Critically, the Act also makes clear that in the event the Act conflicts with any other
provision of law related to land use regulations, it is the Act that shall prevail:
Where this act may be in conflict with any other provision or
provisions of law relating to local governments having authority to
regulate the development of land, the provisions of this act shall
govern unless the provisions of this act are met or exceeded by such
other provision or provisions of law relating to local government[.]
§ 163.3211, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).
129. The Act, in its current and all prior forms, outlines the 50-year history of Florida’s
municipalities and counties having the constitutional and statutory power and mandate to adopt
and enforce their own Planning and Zoning Regulations. It is the sole statutory basis for the
comprehensive planning process and is therefore superior to any other enactment related to that
process.
33
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.130. The Act makes clear that counties and municipalities are simultaneously mandated
and empowered to enact and maintain comprehensive plans and ensuing amendments to same,
ensure that local land development regulations are consistent with the comprehensive plans and
amendments, and that the mandate and power regarding comprehensive plan amendments and land
development regulations is not limited to passing same but is also prospective in terms of
amending, supporting, and maintaining same. The Act creates a continuing obligation to adjust the
comprehensive plan and land development regulations as required by statutory changes and
changed conditions.
131. In its current form, Chapter 163 is the sole and exclusive means for local regulation
of land use. The Community Planning Act specifically recognizes the “broad statutory and
constitutional powers to plan for and regulate the use of land “ vested in counties and
municipalities. The Community Planning Act went on to map out how that constitutional authority
should be exercised in the comprehensive planning process that is now the hallmark of Florida
land use planning. The Community Planning Act sets forth the entire process for land use
regulation in the State of Florida. It creates a comprehensive planning process, it provides the tools
by which planning shall occur (i.e. adoption and amendment of comprehensive plans and land
development regulations), and creates a detailed and exclusive process through which the two shall
be adopted. It is exhaustive and all inclusive. Recognizing the importance of that authority, and
tracing it the “constitutional powers” of counties and municipalities over land use regulation, the
legislature sought to insure that it would remain inviolate and therefore superior to any conflicting
statute.
34
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.132. To wit, the Act is definitive in its declaration that the rights, authority, and
responsibilities conferred upon counties and municipalities under the Act supersede any other
conflicting provisions of law.
133. SB 180 directly conflicts with the Act, and thus the Act makes clear that upon such
a conflict, the Act governs. One way in which this conflict exists is due to the statutorily mandated
review to occur every seven years, a period which could fall at any point in the preclusion for one
year after a hurricane pursuant to Section 18 or at any point in the preclusion between August 1,
2024, and October 1, 2027, pursuant to Section 28. For the same reasons, the one-year deadline to
amend local land development regulations after the submission of a comprehensive plan is also
affected.
134. In furtherance of this responsibility, the Act also mandates that every seven years,
each local government shall evaluate its comprehensive plan to update data and analysis on which
it was based, and based on that data and analysis determine if amendments are necessary to reflect
certain statutory requirements or changed conditions, and if such a determination is made then
such changes must be made within one year. § 163.3191, Fla. Stat. In turn, such plans are subject
to the review process detailed in Section 163.3184, Florida Statutes.
135. Further, within one year after submission of a comprehensive plan, the counties
and municipalities must adopt or amend their local land development regulations to ensure they
are consistent with the comprehensive plan. § 163.3202, Fla. Stat.
136. The conflict between the Act and SB 180 arises from Sections 18 and 28, the latter
of which is a non-statutory provision set to expire in 2027. The restriction on the comprehensive
planning and land development regulation authority and responsibility of counties and
municipalities contained in SB 180 is incompatible with the authority granted and obligations
35
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.imposed under the Act. Thus, SB 180 is ineffective to the extent that it conflicts with any provision
of the Act.
137. As a result of the conflicts between the obligations and prohibitions in SB 180 and
the obligations and prohibitions in the Act, the Local Governments are caught between a rock and
a hard place: they must either fulfill their mandates in acting from the power granted to them by
the Act and violate SB 180, or follow SB 180 and violate the Act.
138. In turn, this conflict places the Local Governments in imminent fear of being acted
against by the State for non-compliance with SB 180 even though the Act should prevail over SB
180.
139. The Local Governments must know their rights and obligations in order to act in
accord with them. This clear statutory conflict obscures those rights and obligations, and thus
clarity must be given.
140. All elements necessary to support a cause of action for declaratory relief are
present:
a. There is a bona fide, actual, present need for a declaration of whether the enactment
of SB 180 violated and conflicts with the Community Planning Act.
b. The declaration sought deals with a present controversy as to an ascertainable set
of facts.
c. Constitutionally provided rights and privileges of the Local Governments are
dependent upon the law applicable to the facts.
d. The Local Governments and the defendants have an actual, present, adverse and
antagonistic interest in the subject matter of this Complaint.
e. The antagonistic and adverse interests are all before this Court.
f. The relief sought is not merely the giving of legal advice or providing the answer
to a question propounded from curiosity, but stems from an actual controversy.
36
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.WHEREFORE, the Local Governments respectfully request that judgment be entered in
their favor:
A. Declaring that portions of SB 180 conflict with the Community Planning Act, and that
conflict cannot be harmonized;
B. Enjoining the enforcement of those portions of SB 180 that in any way conflict with
the Act or restrict the powers and authority of counties or municipalities relating to the
adoption and enforcement of comprehensive plan and land development regulations
amendments to the fullest extent as granted under the Act; and
C. Granting such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT VI – VIOLATION OF HOME RULE POWERS
141. The Local Governments reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 60 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
142. As to counties, Article VIII, Section 1 of the Florida Constitution provides:
(f) NON-CHARTER GOVERNMENT. Counties not operating
under county charters shall have such power of self-government as
is provided by general or special law. The board of county
commissioners of a county not operating under a charter may enact,
in a manner prescribed by general law, county ordinances not
inconsistent with general or special law, but an ordinance in conflict
with a municipal ordinance shall not be effective within the
municipality to the extent of such conflict.
(g) CHARTER GOVERNMENT. Counties operating under
county charters shall have all powers of local self-government not
inconsistent with general law, or with special law approved by vote
of the electors. The governing body of a county operating under a
charter may enact county ordinances not inconsistent with general
law. The charter shall provide which shall prevail in the event of
conflict between county and municipal ordinances.
Art. VIII, § 1(f), (g), Fla. Const.
143. As to municipalities, Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution provides:
37
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.POWERS. Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and
proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal
government, perform municipal functions and render municipal
services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes except
as otherwise provided by law…
Art. VIII, § 2(b), Fla. Const.
144. Recognizing this constitutional grant of home rule authority to counties, the Florida
Legislature created Section 163.410, Florida Statutes, regarding counties with home rule charters.
Section 163.410 states, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny power not specifically delegated shall be
reserved exclusively to the governing body of the county.”
145. Section 125.01(3)(b), Florida Statutes implemented home rule powers for non-
charter counties. Section 125.01(3)(b) states, in part,
The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed in order to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section and to secure for the
counties the broad exercise of home rule powers authorized by the
State Constitution.
§ 125.01(3)(b), Fla. Stat.
146. Likewise, recognizing this constitutional grant of home rule authority to
municipalities, the Florida Legislature created Section 166.021(3), Florida Statutes, which sets
forth that “the legislative body of each municipality has the power to enact legislation concerning
any subject matter upon which the Florida Legislature may act, except”, among other subjects,
“…any subject expressly preempted to state or county government by the constitution or by
general law…”
147. Florida Courts recognize two types of preemptions: express and implied
preemptions. Statutory express preemptions must be clear as to the particular subject that local
governments are precluded from regulating. See Masone v. City of Aventura, 147 So. 3d 492, 495
(Fla. 2014) (“Preemption of local ordinances by state law may, of course, be accomplished by
38
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.express preemption—that is, by a statutory provision stating that a particular subject is preempted
by state law or that local ordinances on a particular subject are precluded.”); Hillsborough County
v. Florida Restaurant Ass’n, Inc., 603 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2d DCA) (“To find a subject matter
expressly preempted to the state, the express preemption language must be a specific statement;
express preemption cannot be implied or inferred.”).
148. In this way, SB 180 violates the Florida Constitution in two ways: (1) Section 28 is
an impermissible express preemption, purporting to declare void ab initio prior actions of Local
Governments taken under their (at the time not preempted) Constitutional home rule authority; and
(2) the purported express preemptions under Sections 18 and 28 are impermissible because they
are vague and ambiguous as to the particular subject and scope. For these reasons, Sections 18 and
28 attempt to vitiate the Home Rule Authority granted under Sections 1 and 2(b) of Article VIII
of the Florida Constitution and further codified at law.
SB 180 is an impermissible express preemption of past regulations that the Local
Governments had authority to propose and adopt when proposed and adopted.
149. The Florida Legislature impermissibly enacted the express preemption provided
under Section 28 because it attempts to render ordinances “null and void ab initio” even if they
were duly enacted at a time when the Local Governments were not preempted.
150. The Local Governments enacted Planning and Zoning Regulations between August
1, 2024, and the enactment date of SB 180 pursuant to a clear grant of constitutional and/or
statutory Home Rule Authority. By retroactively rendering legally enacted Planning and Zoning
Regulations “null and void ab initio” (thereby invalidating the very enactment of such regulations
and implementation while valid), Section 28 violates the plain meaning of the Florida Constitution
because it removes the grant of Home Rule Power that existed at the time of the regulation’s
enactment pursuant to Sections 1 and 2(b) of Article VIII of the Florida Constitution, as applicable.
39
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.In this manner, the purported preemption in Section 28 is unlike the other preemptions found in
Florida Statutes, none of which made previously enacted laws “void ab initio.” See e.g.,
§ 790.33(1), Fla. Stat. (declaring any existing ordinances, rules, or regulations regulating firearms
and ammunition “null and void” prospectively); § 509.032(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (precluding the
adoption of local laws, ordinances, or regulations prohibiting vacation rentals or regulating
duration or frequency of rentals of vacation rentals prospectively and grandfathering such laws
adopted on or before June 1, 2011); § 386.209, Fla. Stat. (preempting regulation of smoking to the
state and “supersed[ing] county or municipal ordinance[s] on the subject” prospectively); § 500.90,
Fla. Stat. (preempting the use or sale of polystyrene products prospectively and providing for a
limited grandfathering of local ordinances enacted before January 1, 2016).
151. Likewise, where Section 28 creates a private cause of action for Planning and
Zoning Regulations proposed or adopted during this period, it potentially (and impermissibly)
opens the Local Governments to liability for acts that were legally proposed or adopted at the time.
Thus, Section 28 does not just preempt, and then create, a private right of action for violation of
such a preemption for prospective acts, but does so for acts already taken under a grant of
Constitutional authority that existed at the time. This could allow private landowners to pursue
their grievances of past Planning and Zoning Regulations in court, forcing the taxpayers to pay to
defend such grievances.
152. As a hypothetical example, assume that, in September 2024, a municipality passed
an ordinance reducing the allowable height in a zoning district from 120 feet to 100 feet. In
October 2024, based upon this ordinance, a developer’s application for a 120 foot high building
was denied and the developer had no choice but to submit an application for a 100 foot high
building, which was approved. After construction commenced on the less high (and less
40
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.profitable) building and it was too late to change the plans, SB 180 was enacted, meaning that the
ordinance that resulted in the municipality’s denial of the 120 foot high building was void at the
time the 120 foot high building was denied. It is unclear what the implication of this would mean,
but it could potentially result in municipal liability or other consequences.
153. Thus, SB 180 could result in chaos or liability for projects that were considered
under Planning and Zoning Regulations that were valid when applied but were later declared “void
ab initio” by SB 180.
154. There is no language in the Florida Constitution or precedent in other statutory
preemptions enacted by the legislature for local regulations to be declared “void ab initio,” and
thus the law should be declared invalid.
SB 180 is an impermissible express preemption because it is ambiguous and vague.
155. Sections 18 and 28 of SB 180 violate the Florida Constitution because they attempt
to preempt Planning and Zoning Regulations that are “more restrictive or burdensome,” but fail to
clearly and unambiguously articulate the particular subject that is preempted.
156. The vague and undefined “more restrictive or burdensome standard” will wreak
havoc with many of the modern planning tools that the Local Governments now lawfully employ
because the Local Governments have no way of determining whether a Planning and Zoning
Regulation is “more burdensome or restrictive.” SB 180 simply does not purport to define the
terms or explain: (a) “more burdensome or restrictive” than what? and (b) “more burdensome or
restrictive” to whom?
157. For example, in determining whether Planning and Zoning Regulations increasing
a setback requirement, should Local Governments determine whether the regulation is “more
burdensome or restrictive” based on its impact on neighboring properties? Or is a Planning and
41
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.Zoning Regulation “more burdensome or restrictive” if it is projected to impose additional costs
on developers seeking to maximize the intensity and density of a development? Should Local
Governments determine whether a Planning and Zoning Regulation is “more burdensome or
restrictive” based on its projected impact on concurrency requirements, such as the availability of
water, sewer, solid waste, and other infrastructure capacity levels? Are Planning and Zoning
Regulations that create new zoning schemes “more restrictive or burdensome” if they implement
various more stringent development parameters but increase permissible development intensity
and density as a whole? If a Planning and Zoning Regulation with multiple subparts has one
provision that could be considered “more restrictive or burdensome” while all other provisions
increase permissible development, is the regulation viewed as a whole or must each individual
provision be evaluated? The Local Governments have no answer to these questions because the
attempted preemptions under Sections 18 and 28 are ambiguous and fail to clearly articulate the
particular subject that the Legislature sought to preclude.
158. As another example, a vital tool for urban planning are zones which contain a
variety of uses, sometimes referred to as “regional activity centers”. To reduce vehicular traffic,
encourage shared use of infrastructure, reduce urban sprawl, and create vibrate urban areas, these
land use/zoning categories permit a variety of uses of varying densities and intensities. These
centers contain specific allotments of residential units (of varying types) and commercial buildings
of varying intensity. Thus, one may find allotments for single family detached units, townhomes,
and condominium/apartments along with a specific square footage of permissible commercial
spaces. There may also be regulations on how these uses will be arranged. If a local government
wished to rearrange the mix of units and commercial density—for example, increasing single
family and commercial but decreasing multi-family and industrial,—would that be considered
42
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.“more restrictive or burdensome” even though the overall density remains the same, with some
uses being increased and others decreased?
159. More generally, with no definition, there is no understanding as to who and what
the Planning and Zoning Regulation cannot restrict or burden.
160. The “more restrictive or burdensome” language is hopelessly vague and
unworkable and could be creatively applied to almost any change because it is an undefined term.
It is of note that when the legislature adopted The Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private Property Rights
Protection Act which uses the term “inordinate burden” to trigger compensation under certain
circumstances, it included a two-paragraph definition of the term including an analysis of
investment backed expectations. It also provided for a process to determine whether such a burden
existed, which process required the services of appraisers. A similar definition was necessary with
SB 180, however, there is none; rather, the triggering term “more restrictive or burdensome”
appears with no explanation, no context, and no commonly understood meaning.
161. This undefined term improperly preempts the Constitutional powers of the Local
Governments with a standard that has no meaning.
SB 180 unlawfully infringes on the Home Rule Authority of the Local Governments.
162. Sections 18 and 28 preempt the Local Governments from exercising Home Rule
Authority in one of the most fundamental functions of local government: planning and zoning.
Sections 18 and 28 are the largest infringement of Home Rule Power in the history of Florida and
strip the Local Governments’ ability to enact the very Powers they have been empowered with
under the Florida Constitution and statutory law. In doing so, the Florida Legislature circumvents
and renders meaningless the grants of Home Rule Authority provided in the Florida Constitution
by legislative act.
43
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.163. In all, though SB 180 does not state plainly that it expressly preempts, nor in effect
impliedly preempts, all Planning and Zoning Regulations, it does plainly preempt many, if not
most, ways all local governments can act in their own best interests pursuant to such regulations.
SB 180 (1) makes certain actions that were allowed at the time null and void ab initio pursuant to
Section 28, (2) prohibits certain prospective changes pursuant to Section 28 up until October 1,
2027, and (3) provides that prospective changes are not allowed for a period of one year following
landfall of all future hurricane pursuant to Section 18.
164. From this, it is not clear when and/or what Planning and Zoning Regulations are
permitted, therefore frustrating, confusing, and obfuscating the Local Governments’ abilities to
operate (1) in ways expressly preempted by SB 180, which are ways they should otherwise be able
to act if not for their Home Rule Powers being intruded upon, and (2) in the spaces left between
SB 180 and Florida general law because of SB 180’s conflicts thereto.
165. The prospective application has also had its intended chilling effect, pausing certain
of the Local Governments from finalizing Local Regulations that have been years in the making
and were mere moments away from crossing the finish line. This is the case even where those
Local Regulations would serve the public good and strengthen resiliency necessary for the
emergencies SB 180 seeks to address.
166. Likewise, and as discussed in Count V, see supra, Sections 18 and 28 of SB 180
plainly conflict with Chapter 163. That conflict exists because while Chapter 163 allows and
requires local governments to respond to changing circumstances and conditions by enaction Local
Regulations, Sections 18 and 28 prohibit them from doing so.
44
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.167. For the foregoing reasons, Sections 18 and 28 of SB 180 represent a violation of
the Home Rule Authority provided under Sections 1 and 2(b) of Article VIII of the Florida
Constitution and further codified at law.
168. All elements necessary to support a cause of action for declaratory relief are
present:
a. There is a bona fide, actual, present need for a declaration of whether the enactment
of SB 180 violated Art. VIII, §§1(f), 1(g), 2(b) of the Florida Constitution, and all
Florida Statutes codifying home rule powers.
b. The declaration sought deals with a present controversy as to an ascertainable set
of facts.
c. Constitutionally provided rights and privileges of the Local Governments are
dependent upon the law applicable to the facts.
d. The Local Governments and the defendants have an actual, present, adverse and
antagonistic interest in the subject matter of this Complaint.
e. The antagonistic and adverse interests are all before this Court.
f. The relief sought is not merely the giving of legal advice or providing the answer
to a question propounded from curiosity, but stems from an actual controversy.
WHEREFORE, the Local Governments respectfully request that judgment be entered in
their favor:
A. Declaring the enactment of SB 180 violated Art. VIII, §§1(f), 1(g), 2(b) of the Florida
B. C. D. Constitution and all Florida Statutes codifying Home Rule Powers;
In addition or in the alternative, declaring the purported preemptions in SB 180 invalid
as impermissibly vague.
Enjoining the enforcement of SB 180; and
Granting such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
45
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.Dated September 29, 2025.
WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN
COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, the Local
Governments
200 East Broward Boulevard, Ste. 1900
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
Telephone: (954) 763-4242
Facsimile: (954) 764-7770
By: /s/ Jamie A. Cole
JAMIE A. COLE
Florida Bar No.: 767573
Primary: jcole@wsh-law.com
Secondary: msarraff@wsh-law.com
RICHARD B. ROSENGARTEN
Florida Bar No.: 0106169
Primary: rrosengarten@wsh-law.com
Secondary: szavala@wsh-law.com
AARON L. GRAUBERT
Florida Bar No. 1028119
Primary: agraubert@wsh-law.com
Secondary: jvasquez@wsh-law.com
1 comment:
After they just voted for the people who would sign this bill into law?
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