Thursday, July 22, 2021

GAY PRIDE PROCLAMATION LAWSUIT: Amended Complaint in Sara Bloomberg v. JEREMIAH RAY BLOCKER and St. Johns County Board of Commissioners

At a federal court hearing last month before United States District Court Chief Judge Judge Timothy J. Corrigan, St. Johns County was encouraged to settle and it was afforded until the end of July to respond to Sara Bloomberg's federal civil rights complaint filed to remedy St. Johns County Commission Chair JEREMIAH RAY BLOCKER's violating First and Fourteenth Amendment Constitutional Rights.  

Is Chairman BLOCKER is guilty of arrogantly refusing to allow Commissioners to vote, and refusing to allow a routine proclamation for LGBTQIA+ Pride like those issued by other cities, counties, states and our federal government?

"What rough beast slouches toward" St. Augustine to be boorish?

What manner of men break the law after repeatedly swearing a constitutional oath to uphold it?

Below are JEREMIAH RAY BLOCKER, et ux, both lawyers, with Sheriff Hardwick, et ux:

Let's hope the Hardwick's and the Blocker family talk some senate into Chairman Blocker, a Florida National Guard Major.



From pacer.gov

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

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SARA BLOOMBERG, Plaintiff,
v.

JEREMIAH RAY BLOCKER, in his personal and professional capacity as the chair of St. Johns County Board of County Commissioners, and as Commissioner for District 4; and the ST. JOHNS COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS;

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:21-cv-00575-TJC-JRK Timothy J. Corrigan, Judge
James R. Klindt, Magistrate Judge

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FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, INJUNCTIVE, AND OTHER RELIEF

Plaintiff, SARA BLOOMBERG (hereinafter, the “Plaintiff’), by and through the undersigned counsel and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the United States Constitution, the Florida Constitution, and the Florida Government in the Sunshine Law, Florida Statutes §§ 286.011 and 286.0114, sues Defendants, JEREMIAH RAY BLOCKER, in his personal and professional capacity as Chair of the St. Johns County Board of County Commissioners, and the ST. JOHNS COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, (hereinafter collectively, the “Defendants”), and alleges:

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1. This action is brought to enforce federal and Florida state laws regarding the Plaintiff’s rights and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief arising from the refusal to allow the discussion of an agenda item in regards to the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer (hereinafter, “LGBTQ”) community (hereinafter, the “LGBTQ community”) arising from a meeting on May 4, 2021 of the St. Johns County Board of County Commissioners and Chairman Jeremiah Ray Blocker’s unlawful violations of federal and Florida state law with respect thereof.

2. Plaintiff’s claims for relief are predicated, in part, on the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which authorizes injunctive relief and the award of attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff in actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983.

3. Plaintiffs also seek declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. Plaintiffs seek permanent injunctive relief pursuant to Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

4. This action is also brought to enforce Article I, Sections 2, 4, and 24, and Article III, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution, as well as Florida’s Government in the Sunshine Law, §§ 286.011 and 286.0114, Florida Statutes (hereinafter, the “Sunshine Law”).

VENUE AND JURISDICTION

5. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq. because

the instant case arises under federal law, specifically under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and under

the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Page of 20

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6. Also, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 C.S.C. § 1331 for civil actions arising under the laws of the United States; and for actions under laws providing for the protection of civil rights as per 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

7. On this matter, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over claims based in Florida State Law as stated in 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

8. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b)(2) as the Middle District of Florida is the judicial district in which a substantial portion of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims alleged herein occurred.

PARTIES

9. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff Sara Bloomberg was and is a citizen of this St. Johns County who has standing to bring this action.

10. Defendant Jeremiah Ray Blocker (hereinafter, “Chairman Blocker” or the “Chair”) was at all times material the Chair of the St. Johns County Board of County Commissioners, as well as Commissioner for District 4.

11. Defendant St. Johns County Board of County Commissioners (hereinafter, the “Board”) was at all times material the governing board of St. Johns County, Florida.

FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS

12. On or about March 8, 2021, the Plaintiff emailed St. Johns County Commissioner Henry Dean regarding a proclamation celebrating, among other things, celebrating LGTBQ civil rights progress and the contributions of LGBTQ individuals

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to the St. Johns County community (hereinafter, the “LGBTQ Pride Proclamation”). (attached hereto as Exhibit “A”).

13. About 30 minutes later Commissioner Henry Dean replied indicating his support for the proposed proclamation and indicated that he would be broaching the Chair and Administrator for the proclamation to be placed on the agenda for consideration before the St. Johns County Board of County Commissioners.

14. The Plaintiff then received a phone call from Michael Ryan, the St. Johns County Assistant Director of Public Affairs in the Office of the County Administrator (hereinafter, “Ryan”), stating that “the Chair of the St. Johns County Board of County Commissioners [Chairman Blocker] ultimately decides whether to place a proclamation on the agenda”. (See, Affidavit of Michael Ryan, attached hereto as Exhibit “B”, ¶ 4).

15. Around the 28th of April 2021, the Plaintiff received a second phone call from Ryan, stating that the request to put it on the agenda had been denied, as they would not consider proclamations that were “controversial” or “too far left or too far right”, and therefore that the proclamation would not come before the Board for consideration. (Ex. “B”, ¶ 7).

16. However, the definition of “far left” refers primarily to adherents of Communism, Anarchism, or other extreme revolutionary ideals.1

For example, Dictionary.com explains the differences between moderate left-wing politics and the far left by saying that regular or moderate left politics refers to “people and groups that have liberal views”, such as “seeking greater social and economic equality”, whereas far left refers to “what is considered more extreme, revolutionary views, such as communism and socialism.” Dictionary.com, “Why do ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ Mean Liberal and Conservative?”, retrieved July 4, 2021, from https://www.dictionary.com/e/leftright/.

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17. In fact, the largest city in St. Johns County, St. Augustine, as well as St. Augustine Beach, both issued LGBTQ proclamations nearly identical to the one presented to the Board without “controversy” or claims that they were “far left”. (attached hereto as Composite Exhibit “C”).

18. Furthermore, on June 1, 2021, President Joe Biden issued “A Proclamation on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Pride Month, 2021”, stating:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR., President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, do hereby proclaim June 2021 as Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Pride Month. I call upon the people of the United States to recognize the achievements of the LGBTQ+ community, to celebrate the great diversity of the American people, and to wave their flags of pride high.

(Briefing Room, The White House, June 01, 2021, Presidential Actions, attached hereto as Exhibit “D”).

19. Similarly, former Presidents Barack Obama and Bill Clinton also issued proclamations recognizing June as LGBT Pride Month, neither of those proclamations caused any “harm” to the United States of America. (attached hereto as Composite Exhibit “E”).

20. Ryan also suggested that the Board does not consider proclamations that are “national political topics” (Ex. “B”, ¶ 7), but this is contradicted by multiple proclamations that the Board has issued, such as a proclamation recognizing February 2021 as Black History Month, and a controversial proclamation recognizing

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Columbus Day in 2019 at a time when that holiday was the subject of multiple local news reports discussing the extreme controversy surrounding it. See ex., Lowery, M.M., “Why more places are abandoning Columbus Day in favor of Indigenous Peoples’ Day”; Ocala Star Banner; October 14, 2019; Royal, A., “'Columbus Day' name draws mixed reactions on social media: Some argue that the day should be renamed 'Indigenous Peoples' Day.'” News 3; October 14, 2019. (attached hereto as Composite Exhibit “F”).

21. In fact, in Tampa, in 2020, the protests against Columbus Day led to a “stand off” with law enforcement against approximately 100 protesters who argued that Columbus “brought genocide to this continent”. Burton, J.J., “Protest calls for the removal of Christopher Columbus statue in Tampa: Protest heated up when TPD showed up”; October 11, 2020 (attached hereto as Exhibit “G”).

22. At the October 1, 2019 meeting, representatives from the Knights of Columbus, a right wing, anti-LGBTQ, religious organization, spoke in favor of the Columbus Day resolution, and may have even requested and/or authored it. See, Agenda of October 1, 2019 Meeting, attached hereto as Exhibit “H”, p. 2.

23. Generally, protests relating to Columbus Day are led by “left-leaning” groups, whereas only “right-leaning” groups would protest the LGBTQ minority community.

24. The Columbus Day proclamation is particularly problematic for the Defendants, given that that organization behind it has spent well over $15 million

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dollars to fight LGBTQ rights. (See ex., McElwee, J. J., “Knights of Columbus key contributor against same-sex marriage”, National Catholic Reporter, October 19, 2012, attached hereto as Exhibit “I”).

25. Chairman Blocker’s official St. Johns County biography notes that he is affiliation with the Knights of Columbus (SeeComposite Exhibit “J”, p. 2); and he himself stated that in 2019, he served on the board of Knights of Columbus Council #16492 (Ex. “J”, p. 3), and his official website also notes his continuing affiliation with the Knights of Columbus. (Ex. “J”, p. 6)

26. Similarly, to the Knights of Columbus, Chairman Blocker holds beliefs antithetical to the fair and equal protection of LGBTQ Americans and their rights and seeks to impose these beliefs upon St. Johns County residents through his personal power as Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners.

27. And it is Chairman Blocker, as the Chair of the St. Johns County Board of County Commissioners ultimately decides whether to place a proclamation on the agenda, so in light of the Ryan Affidavit, there is no question that Chairman Blocker made the decision to decline to put the LGBTQ Proclamation on the agenda.

28. Additionally, the Board’s Vice-Chair Henry Dean stated to a local news affiliate, “Let me put it this way, I certainly support their cause and I would vote for it if it was on the agenda, but I don’t have the authority to put it on the agenda.” See, Boles, S., “St. Johns County Board Of Commissioners Won’t Consider Pride

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Month Proclamation”; WJCT News, April 30, 2021 (emphasis added); attached hereto as Exhibit “K”).

29. Further attempts by other individuals to convince Chairman Blocker to at least discuss or bring the measure to a vote have been met with silence.

COUNT I: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
42 U.S.C. § 1983; First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; and Article I, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution

30. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 29 above as if fully set forth herein.

31. This count addresses the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. See, U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech[.]”); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931) (“[T]he conception of liberty under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the right of free speech.”).

32. It also addresses the Florida Constitution’s Article I, Section 4. (“Every person may speak, write and publish sentiments on all subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.”).

33. The Defendants refused to publicly hear or put to a vote the Plaintiff’s request for the LGBTQ Pride Proclamation.

34. The Defendants described the reasoning for the denial of the LGBTQ Proclamation by suggesting that it was too “controversial” and/or “far left”.

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35. While the decision as to whether the Board would or would not not issue a proclamation contemplates “government speech”, the content-based restriction to refuse to even put the LGBTQ Proclamation on the agenda was an unlawful restraint.

36. Putting the LGBTQ Proclamation up for a vote is no more “government speech” than a ballot initiative being placed on a ballot is “government speech” or an “endorsement” of that initiative.

37. The Eleventh Circuit has stated that, “certain First Amendment principles can be applied with reasonable consistency, and one of them is that, subject to limited exceptions, ‘[c]ontent-based regulations [of speech] are presumptively invalid.’” Wollschlaeger v. Governor, Florida, 848 F.3d 1293, 1300 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S.Ct. 2538 (1992)).

38. The Supreme Court has said that government regulation of speech is “content-based” if a law “applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015).

39. The Supreme Court has also recognized a separate and additional category of laws that, though facially content neutral, will be considered content-based regulations of speech: laws that cannot be “‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,’ or that were adopted by the government ‘because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys,’” Reed, 576 U.S. at 164 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989)).

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40. Here, it is unquestionable that the restriction communicated to the Plaintiff by Ryan was content-based.

41. As there is nothing remotely “far left” in the LGBTQ Proclamation, and that there is nothing “controversial” therein except that it concerns the LGBTQ population of St. Johns County, it is also unquestionable that it was denied because it deals with LGBTQ people, a protected minority.

42. There is a “need to prevent the government from picking ideological winners and losers”. Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1328.

43. However, it is clear that under Chairman Blocker, the LGBTQ community of St. Johns County will always be the ideological “losers”, while anti- LGBTQ organizations like the Knights of Columbus will be the ideological “winners”.

44. By refusing to even publicly hear or put to a vote the Plaintiff’s request for the LGBTQ Pride Proclamation, the Defendants, acting under color of state law, have deprived the Plaintiff of the rights to freedom of speech in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Article I, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands the following relief:
(1) A declaratory judgment that the Defendants violated the First and

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution, by refusing to hear or allow a public vote on the LGBTQ Pride Proclamation, based upon the content

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(2)

(3) (4) (5)

45.
as if fully set

and Chairman Blocker’s personal animus towards the LGBTQ Community;
A permanent injunction restraining Defendants from refusing to place an item on the agenda simply because it deals with the local LGBTQ community;

Nominal monetary relief;
An award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and Such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.

COUNT II: EQUAL PROTECTION
42 U.S.C. § 1983; Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and Article I, Section 2 of the Florida Constitution

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Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 29 above forth herein.
The Defendants refused to publicly hear or put to a vote the Plaintiff’s

46.
request for the LGBTQ Pride Proclamation.

47. The Defendants described the reasoning for the denial of the LGBTQ Proclamation by suggesting that it was too “controversial” and/or “far left”.

48. While the decision as to whether the Board would or would not not issue a proclamation contemplates “government speech”, the content-based restriction to refuse to even put the LGBTQ Proclamation on the agenda was an unlawful restraint.

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49. Putting the LGBTQ Proclamation up for a vote is no more “government speech” than a ballot initiative being placed on a ballot is “government speech” or an “endorsement” of that initiative.

50. Notably, the United States Supreme Court, in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), concluded that discrimination against the LGBTQ Community is discrimination on the basis of sex. See also, Adams by & through Kasper v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns County, 968 F.3d 1286, 1310 (11th Cir. 2020).

51. As there is nothing remotely “far left” in the LGBTQ Proclamation, and that there is nothing “controversial” therein except that it concerns the LGBTQ population of St. Johns County, it is also unquestionable that it was denied because it deals with LGBTQ people, a protected minority.

52. By refusing to even publicly hear or put to a vote the Plaintiff’s request for the LGBTQ Pride Proclamation because it deals with the LGBTQ community of St. Johns County, the Defendants, acting under color of state law, have treated the Plaintiff differently from all other similarly situated individuals or organizations because the Plaintiff is a member of the LGBTQ Community and because Chairman Blocker disagrees with the idea that LGBTQ persons have the same rights as non- LGBTQ persons.

53. In short, the Defendants, acting under color of state law, have deprived the Plaintiff of the right to equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 2 of the Florida Constitution.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands the following relief: Page 12 of 20

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(2)

(3) (4) (5)

54. as if fully

set

(1)

A declaratory judgment that the Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 2 of the Florida Constitution, by refusing to hear or allow a public vote on the LGBTQ Pride Proclamation solely due to the fact that it was being sought by and on behalf of the LGBTQ Community;

A permanent injunction restraining Defendants from refusing to place an item on the agenda simply because it deals with the local LGBTQ community;
Nominal monetary relief;

An award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and Such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.

COUNT III: SUNSHINE LAW Florida Statute § 286.011;
Article I, Section 24 and Article III, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 29 above forth herein.
The Florida State Constitution requires that all meetings at which public

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55.
business is to be transacted or discussed be open and noticed to the public, requiring, where official acts are to be taken or at which public business of such body is to be transacted or discussed, them to be open and noticed as provided in Article III, Section 4(6). Art. I, § 24(b), Fla. Const.

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56. Furthermore, the Florida legislature has further implemented this mandate through the Sunshine Law, which broadly requires all formal municipal action to be taken at a public meeting, as follows:

All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or authority or of any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, including meetings with or attended by any person elected to such board or commission, but who has not yet taken office, at which official acts are to be taken are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times, and no resolution, rule, or formal action shall be considered binding except as taken or made at such meeting. The board or commission must provide reasonable notice of all such meetings.

Fla. Stat. § 286.011(1).

57. The purpose of the Sunshine Law is the protection of the public’s right to be present and to be heard during all phases of enactments by governmental boards and commissions, School Bd. 0f Duval Cty. v. Florida Publishing C0., 670 So.2d 99, 101 (Fla. lst DCA 1996), and “to prevent at non-public meetings the crystallization of secret decisions to a point just short of ceremonial acceptance.” SeeMonroe County v. Pigeon Key Historical Park, Inc., 647 So.2d 857, 860 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (quoting, Town 0f Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So.2d 473 (F1a.1974)).

58. The Sunshine Law was enacted in the public interest to protect the public from "closed door" politics. In addition, it should be construed so as to frustrate all evasive devices. Board 0f Public Instr. Of Broward C0. v. Doran, 224 So.2d 693, 699 (Fla. 1969).

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59. In Herrin v. City of Deltona, 121 So. 3d 1094, 1097 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), the court acknowledged the enactment of section 286.0114, Florida Statutes, stating that the statute "specifically provides, with limited exceptions, that the public be allowed a reasonable opportunity to be heard on a proposition before a board or commission.”

60. The Office of the Florida Attorney general has even given very specific guidance on this subject, stating:

Given that the Government in the Sunshine Law applies to all meetings of a board or commission at which official acts are to be taken, it would be advisable to adhere to the mandates of section 286.0114, Florida Statutes, when a board or commission is taking official action on a proposition regardless of the formality of the meeting.

2014 WL 4100151, at *2 (Fla.A.G. Apr. 25, 2014) (internal citations omitted).

61. The Florida Attorney General explains in the 2021 Sunshine Manual as follows:

It is the how and the why officials decided to so act which interests the public, not merely the final decision. As the court recognized in Times Publishing Company v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470, 473 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969), disapproved in part on other grounds, Neu v. Miami Herald Publishing Company, 462 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1985):

Every thought, as well as every affirmative act, of a public official as it relates to and is within the scope of his official duties, is a matter of public concern; and it is the entire decision-making process that the legislature intended to affect by the enactment of the statute before us.

Office of the Attorney General, “Government-in-the-Sunshine Manual”, 2021 Edition, Vol. 43, p. 25, attached hereto as Exhibit “L”.

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62. The Florida Attorney General further states therein:

The courts have recognized that the Sunshine Law should be construed so as to frustrate all evasive devices. City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971); Blackford v. School Board of Orange County, 375 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979); Wolfson v. State, 344 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). As the Florida Supreme Court stated in Canney v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County, 278 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1973):

Various boards and agencies have obviously attempted to read exceptions into the Government in the Sunshine Law which do not exist. Even though their intentions may be sincere, such boards and agencies should not be allowed to circumvent the plain provisions of the statute. The benefit to the public far outweighs the inconvenience of the board or agency. If the board or agency feels aggrieved, then the remedy lies in the halls of the Legislature and not in efforts to circumvent the plain provisions of the statute by devious ways in the hope that the judiciary will read some exception into the law.

Office of the Attorney General, supra, p. 50.

63. While the Defendants may wish to keep that knowledge secret, the Florida Sunshine Law says that it cannot be.

64. By making a decision to deny or even publicly hear or put to a vote the Plaintiff’s request for the LGBTQ Pride Proclamation, the Defendants, acting under color of state law, violated Florida Statute § 286.011(1), having made that decision outside of any public meeting or forum, and without any records, transcripts, or other records of the deliberations of that secret meeting.

65. Furthermore, by communicating this decision through a phone call and

deliberately avoiding any “paper trail” of this unlawful decision, whether by transcript,

video recording, or minutes, the Defendants, acting under color of state law, violated Page 16 of 20

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Florida Statute § 286.011(2), by failing to keep proper public records of official decisions.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands the following relief:

  1. (1)  A declaratory judgment that the Defendants violated Florida Statute §

    286.011, and Article I, Section 24 and Article III, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution by privately refusing to hear or allow a public vote on the LGBTQ Pride Proclamation, by communicating this refusal privately and without any public record or transcript;

  2. (2)  Nominal monetary relief;

  3. (3)  An award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to § 286.011(4), Florida

    Statutes; and

  4. (4)  Such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.

    COUNT IV: SUNSHINE LAW
    Florida Statute § 286.0114; and Article I, Section 24 of the Florida Constitution

66. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 29 and 55 through 65 above as if fully set forth herein.

67. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the Defendants violated Art. I, § 24(b) of the Florida Constitution and Florida Statute § 286.0114, by removing the proposed proclamation from the Board agenda and refusing to allow members of the public, or even other commissioners to discuss or vote on it.

68. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to address the Defendants’

violation of Florida Statutes § 286.0114, which required the Committee to afford Page 17 of 20

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members of the public a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the LGBTQ Pride Proclamation before taking action on same, since the decision was made in secret and without any record or transcript of the proceedings.

69. Section 286.0114(2) requires that “[m]embers of the public shall be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on a proposition before a board or commission.”

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands the following relief:

(1)

(2) (3)

(4)

70.
as if fully set

A declaratory judgment that the Defendants violated Florida Statute § 286.0114, and Article I, Section 24 of the Florida Constitution by privately refusing the public a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the issue of the LGBTQ Pride Proclamation;

Nominal monetary relief;
An award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to § 286.0114(7)(a), Florida Statutes; and
Such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.

COUNT V: VIOLATION OF ST. JOHNS COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS RULES
Rule 4.303

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Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 29 above forth herein.
The Rules and Policies of the St. Johns County Board of County

71.
Commissioners (Hereinafter, the “Rules”) vests governmental and legislative authority of the county in the Board, consisting of a Chair, Vice-Chair and three Commissioners.

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72. The Rules provide for the chair to set a proposed agenda and provides other policy mechanisms by which other commissioners can propose and add agenda items with a majority vote of the Board.

  1. According to Rule 4.303 of the Board’s Board Rules and Policies:

    Changes to the Regular Agenda may be proposed by any Commissioner, the County Administrator or the County Attorney. Changes to the Regular Agenda must be approved by majority vote.

  2. Essentially, if a commissioner wishes to have an item on the agenda, the

Board should take a vote and a majority vote in favor would add the proposed item to the current meeting agenda.

75. While the Court should never usurp the discretionary decisions of elected officials, it is certainly within the Court’s power to compel the Board to follow its own ordinances and adopted procedures. This is especially true when a decision purportedly within the scope of that discretionary authority violates or potentially runs contrary to existing law.

76. Upon determining that the Defendants violated this section, the Court should assess reasonable attorneys’ fees against the Defendants.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands the following relief:

  1. (1)  A declaratory judgment that the Defendants violated Rule 4.303 of the

    Board’s Board Rules and Policies by privately refusing to hear or allow a

    public vote on the LGBTQ Pride Proclamation;

  2. (2)  Nominal monetary relief;

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  1. (3)  An award of attorney’s fees and costs; and

  2. (4)  Such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.

    JURY DEMAND

Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff demands trial by jury on all triable matters of the instant case.

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Dated: Amended:

June 3, 2021 July 4, 2021

Respectfully Submitted,

ROOK ELIZABETH RINGER, ESQ. Florida Bar No. 1015698
LENTO LAW GROUP, P.A.
222 San Marco Ave., Ste. C

St. Augustine, FL 32084 904.602.9400 (Office) 904.299.5400 (Fax) reringer@lentolawgroup.com Attorney for Plaintiff

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