Joseph McAnarney Subpoena by Developer was
"OVERBROAD."
That's what Senior U.S. District court Judge Timothy J, corrigan found about Joseph McAnarney Non-Party Subpoena, demanded by
Controversial "Agrihood" Developer Robinson Improvement Company's lawyers -- Defeated Former St. Johns County Commissioner JEREMIAH RAY BLOCKER, Who Earned A University Of Miami Master Of Laws In "Real Estate Development" & ZACHARY WATSON MILLER (Scion-Son Of Robinson Improvement Company's Special Magistrate Hearing Witness, England-Thimms & Miller Founder Douglas Miller).
From St. Johns Citizen:
Federal Judge Rules On Developer’s Push To Subpoena St. Johns County ‘Agrihood’ Critic
- By Rebecca Rosenberg
- on
- on
Updated on:
A federal judge last month sided with a St. Johns County resident who sought to block a subpoena tied to the “Agrihood” development lawsuit, finding the request too broad.
In a March 10 order, U.S. District Judge Timothy J. Corrigan granted non-party Joseph McAnarney’s motion to quash a subpoena issued by attorneys for Robinson Improvement Company, which is suing St. Johns County Board of County Commissioners over a denied rezoning application.
McAnarney, a retired architect who spoke publicly against the proposed development, had been asked to turn over wide-ranging communications, including emails, messages and other records related to his opposition.
“The Court is wary of requiring a non-party citizen to become embroiled in a dispute between plaintiff and St. Johns County,” Corrigan wrote, according to court paperts.
The judge also determined the subpoena was overbroad, pointing to its sweeping demand for personal communications.
Instead, the order directs the plaintiff to seek relevant information through the county during discovery, including any documents McAnarney may have provided or whether officials relied on his input.
At the same time, the ruling leaves open the possibility that McAnarney could be required to provide testimony or records later.
The motion to quash was granted without prejudice, allowing the developer to revisit the issue if it can show the information is necessary.
The order also signals caution regarding similar subpoenas issued to other residents who received subpoenas after speaking at public meetings.
The court indicated that the same concerns about scope and burden apply to those efforts.
Several of the recipients said they were served on Christmas Eve, while Agrihood lawyers said the timing was accidental.
The dispute stems from a federal lawsuit filed by Robinson Improvement Company, which argues the county wrongly denied its rezoning request despite clear long-range planning policies supporting residential development.
A status conference in the case is scheduled for April 15 at the federal courthouse in Jacksonville.
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Federal court order and filings from pacer.gov:
cv-01275-TJC-LLL Document 21 Filed 03/10/26 Page 1 of 3 PageID 406
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
ROBINSON IMPROVEMENT
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 3:25-cv-1275-TJC-LLL
ST. JOHNS COUNTY, FLORIDA,
Defendant.
O R D E R
This case is before the Court on non-party Joseph McAnarney’s Motion to
Quash Subpoena (Doc. 17) to which plaintiff has responded in opposition (Doc.
18).
The Court is wary of requiring a non-party citizen to become embroiled in
a dispute between plaintiff and St. Johns County. In addition, the subpoena is
overbroad. During discovery, plaintiff may inquire of St. Johns County
concerning Mr. McAnarney’s involvement, including documents he may have
provided to the County, conversations he may have had with County officials
and Board members, to what extent the County relied on Mr. McAnarney’s
testimony in its decision-making, etc. If it becomes clear later that Mr.
McAnarney’s testimony or production is necessary, plaintiff, after conferring
with Mr. McAnarney’s counsel, can seek relief. But for now, non-party JosephCase 3:25-cv-01275-TJC-LLL Document 21 Filed 03/10/26 Page 2 of 3 PageID 407
McAnarney’s Motion to Quash Subpoena (Doc. 17) is granted without
prejudice to plaintiff renewing its efforts to seek production or testimony from
Mr. McAnarney at a later stage.
Further, while the Court resolved on other grounds similar motions filed
by two other non-parties appearing pro se, to the extent those non-parties have
not yet responded to their subpoenas, the Court expects plaintiff to heed this
ruling with regard to them, as well as with regard to any additional non-party
citizens from whom plaintiff intends to seek discovery until the Court can
discuss it with the parties.
Finally, this case is SET for a status conference before the undersigned
on APRIL 15, 2026 at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom 10D, Bryan Simpson United
States Courthouse, 300 North Hogan Street, Jacksonville, Florida.1
DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida this 10th day of March,
2026.
1 All persons entering the Courthouse must present photo identification to
Court Security Officers. Although cell phones, laptop computers, and similar
electronic devices generally are not permitted in the building, attorneys may bring
those items with them to the extent permitted by Local Rule 7.02.
2Case 3:25-cv-01275-TJC-LLL Document 21 Filed 03/10/26 Page 3 of 3 PageID 408
s.
Copies:
Counsel of record
William Bradley Russell, Jr.
---------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
ROBINSON IMPROVEMENT
COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 3:25-cv-1275-TJC-LLL
ST. JOHNS COUNTY, FLORIDA,
Defendant.
/
MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA
COMES NOW Joseph McAnarney, a nonparty, and moves to quash the
subpoena served upon him by Robinson Improvement Company, Inc., which
subpoena is dated December 23, 2025. Robinson Improvement’s subpoena
should be quashed because it was issued prior to the opening of discovery in
this action, because it requires disclosure of the political opinions and
associations of McAnarney, which are protected by the First Amendment, and
because it is unduly burdensome. McAnarney makes this motion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) and (d) and under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 45(d)(3).
This case involves a dispute over St. Johns County’s decision not to
approve a property development favored by Robinson Improvement. Joseph
1Case 3:25-cv-01275-TJC-LLL Document 17 Filed 02/04/26 Page 2 of 7 PageID 161
McAnarney is a private citizen and retiree and has no official role whatsoever
in this matter or in any other decision by St. Johns County. He is, however,
an outspoken member of the slow-the-growth political movement in St. Johns
County, which movement is generally skeptical of large property
developments. He frequently attends meetings of the St. Johns County Board
of County Commissioners, and he frequently shares his slow-the-growth
political views. He shared his views on the development at issue in this case
during the public comment portion of a meeting of the board of county
commissioners on November 5, 2024.
Robinson Improvement served a subpoena on McAnarney on the
afternoon of January 19, 2026. The subpoena demanded that he produce all
communications with any person regarding the property development at issue
in this case. It also demanded that he produce any entries in his personal
calendar reflecting meetings or appointments related to the development. And
it requested any other information related to the development—irrespective,
apparently, of whether such information was communicated to any other
person. It appears this last request was meant to capture any personal
thoughts McAnarney might have committed to paper, perhaps in a diary entry.
The subpoena demanded that McAnarney produce such information on the
2Case 3:25-cv-01275-TJC-LLL Document 17 Filed 02/04/26 Page 3 of 7 PageID 162
morning of January 5—i.e., two weeks prior to service of the subpoena.1 A copy
of the subpoena at issue is attached as Exhibit A.
I. The subpoena should be quashed because it was issued
prior to the opening of discovery.
The subpoena was issued on December 23, 2025, prior to the appearance
of the defendant in this action. The docket in this case suggests the subpoena
was issued prior to the opening of discovery under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(d)(1). Rule 26(d)(1) specifies that “[a] party may not seek
discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule
26(f)” with certain exceptions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). Rule 26(f)(2) generally
requires the parties to submit a report of their meeting within fourteen days.
Local Rule 3.02(b) requires that this report be filed. The docket does not reflect
the filing of a report in this case. This suggests the parties did not conduct a
Rule 26(f) meeting prior to December 23, 2025, when Robinson Improvement
sought discovery from McAnarney by issuing the subpoena that is the subject
of this motion.2 Thus, it appears discovery was not yet open when the subpoena
was issued. The subpoena should be quashed for that reason.
1 The subpoena should be quashed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
45(d)(3) to the extent it purports to require compliance prior to the time it was served
on McAnarney.
2 During counsel’s Rule 3.01(g) conference, counsel for Robinson Improvement
explained that he previously consulted with counsel for St. Johns County, and counsel
for St. Johns County stated the county had no objection to the subpoena being issued
to McAnarney. Thus, while a full Rule 26(f) conference has not been conducted,
3Case 3:25-cv-01275-TJC-LLL Document 17 Filed 02/04/26 Page 4 of 7 PageID 163
II. The subpoena should be quashed because it requires
disclosure of information protected by the First
Amendment.
The subpoena requires McAnarney to produce his communications
regarding the property development, a contentious issue in local St. Johns
County politics. Compelled disclosure of such communications implicates
McAnarney’s First Amendment right to expressive association because it
would identify other individuals with whom he affiliated regarding this
political issue. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (“It is hardly
a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged
in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as
[other noted unconstitutional government actions].”). “[A] higher degree of
scrutiny must attach before courts can compel disclosure of information that
may impinge upon these first amendment associational rights.” FEC v. Florida
for Kennedy Cmte., 681 F.2d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 1982).
While McAnarney may be able to assert an evidentiary privilege
protecting his communications regarding this matter of local politics, the Court
should quash the subpoena even in the absence of a privilege. Jordan v. Miss.
Dep’t of Corrections, 947 F.3d 1322, 1336 (11th Cir. 2020). Privacy and
McAnarney understands Robinson Improvement contends something akin to an
abbreviated conference has been conducted.
4Case 3:25-cv-01275-TJC-LLL Document 17 Filed 02/04/26 Page 5 of 7 PageID 164
confidentiality interests may justify quashal of a subpoena even where such
interests are not protected by a privilege. Id. Here, McAnarney’s interest in
the privacy of his political associations warrants quashal in the absence of a
strong interest in the production of the information sought in the subpoena.
III. The subpoena should be quashed because it imposes an
undue burden on a non-party.
The subpoena should also be quashed because it imposes an undue
burden on McAnarney in light of the issues involved in this case and the
likelihood that any relevant information could be obtained from St. Johns
County. McAnarney’s thoughts on the property development at issue—
whether recorded in his diary or communicated to other private citizens
without an official role in St. Johns County decisionmaking—appear entirely
irrelevant to this case.3 Moreover, such information is private, and compelled
disclosure of private information imposes a great burden on a non-party.
Castleberry v. Camden County, 331 F.R.D. 559, 563 (S.D. Ga. 2019). This
burden is undue where the information at issue is irrelevant or of only minimal
relevance.
3 The subpoena should be quashed to the extent it calls for entirely irrelevant matters
such as McAnarney’s personal thoughts or private communications. See Jordan v.
Comm’r, Miss. Dep’t of Corrections, 947 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[A]
subpoena issued under Rule 45 should be quashed to the extent it seeks irrelevant
information.”).
5Case 3:25-cv-01275-TJC-LLL Document 17 Filed 02/04/26 Page 6 of 7 PageID 165
As to any communications McAnarney may have had with St. Johns
County officials—if such communications are relevant at all—they should be
sought from St. Johns County instead of McAnarney. It is unduly burdensome
on McAnarney, a third party, to subpoena from him communications that could
be obtained instead from St. Johns County, the defendant in this case. See
Castleberry, 331 F.R.D. at 564–65 (explaining that party should have sought
materials from other party instead of attempting to obtain them through
subpoena to non-party.)
LOCAL RULE 3.01(g) CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I conferred with counsel for the plaintiff by
telephone on January 23, 2026, and by email on February 3, 2026, and that
counsel for the plaintiff agrees in part and opposes in part the relief requested
in this motion. Counsel for the plaintiff agrees to the relief requested in this
motion with respect to the subpoena’s request for correspondence with public
officials. Counsel for the plaintiff opposes the relief requested in this motion
to the extent the subpoena demands communications between McAnarney and
other private citizens and to the extent the subpoena demands McAnarney’s
private notes, diary entries, or other matters not communicated to any other
person.
6Case 3:25-cv-01275-TJC-LLL Document 17 Filed 02/04/26 Page 7 of 7 PageID 166
WHEREFORE, Joseph McAnarney, a non-party to this action,
respectfully prays that the Court quash the subpoena served upon him by
Robinson Improvement Company Inc., which subpoena is dated December 23,
2025.
DATED: February 4, 2026.
/s/ W. Bradley Russell
W. Bradley Russell
Florida Bar No. 29492
Russell & Russell, Attorneys at Law, P.A.
300 West Adams Street, Suite 400
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Tel. 904-527-8813
Fax 904-212-0220
Email: brad@russellandrussell.law
Lead counsel for nonparty Joseph
McAnarney
-------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
ROBINSON IMPROVEMENT COMPANY
INC,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 3:25-cv-01275-TJC-LLL
v.
ST. JOHNS COUNTY, FLORIDA
Defendant.
_______________________________
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA
Plaintiff, by and through the undersigned counsel, hereby files its Response in
Opposition to the Motion to Quash Subpoena served upon nonparty Joseph
McAnarney pursuant to Rule 45, Fed R. Civ. Pro. As more fully set forth herein, the
Nonparty’s Motion falls far short of establishing the requisite threshold for quashing
the duly issued subpoena for production of documents.
BACKGROUND FACTS
On October 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed the initial complaint in this matter (the
“Complaint”), which concerns the denial of Plaintiff’s rezoning request by Defendant,
St. Johns County, Florida (the “County”) with respect to real property owned by
1Case 3:25-cv-01275-TJC-LLL Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 2 of 14 PageID 178
Plaintiff. [Dkt. 1]. The County agreed to accept service of the Complaint pursuant to
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and counsel for the parties thereafter
conferred and agreed that the County’s response to the Complaint would not be due
until thirty (30) days after being served with Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (which
will be filed upon the County’s response to the pre-suit notice served on the County
pursuant to so as to allow the which will include allegations regarding Section 70.001,
Florida Statutes).
On December 5, 2025, Plaintiff prepared Rule 45 subpoenas directed to
nonparties for the production of documents relevant to the instant lawsuit and served
same upon the County, as per the requirements of Rule 45, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Counsel
for the parties then conferred and stipulated as to the initiation of this portion of
discovery prior to their Rule 26 conference, which counsel agreed to defer until after
filing and service of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (to include additional allegations
regarding the County’s forthcoming response to Plaintiff’s Section 70.001 pre-suit
notice)
Plaintiff thereafter served a Rule 45 subpoena for production of documents to
Mr. Joseph McAnarney (“McAnarney”), who had previously testified in opposition
to Plaintiff’s rezoning application (on behalf of himself and others) at the quasi-judicial
hearing before the St. Johns County Board of County Commissioner ( the “BOCC”).
2Case 3:25-cv-01275-TJC-LLL Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 3 of 14 PageID 179
A hearing transcript for those quasi-judicial proceedings is attached as Exhibit 1. The
testimony proffered by McAnarney at the quasi-judicial hearing before the County’s
BOCC in opposition to the Plaintiff’s rezoning application included his proffered
interpretation of the County’s Comprehensive Plan (the “Plan”), his analysis of
specific Plan policies, his opinion on transportation concurrency, his analysis of
Section 163.3180, Florida Statutes (regarding transportation concurrency and existing
transportation deficiencies), his analysis on road capacity near the Property, his
analysis on Defendant’s staff report, his analysis on zoning consistency and his “Joe
Mac math” on how he calculated how many trips he believed the PUD would
generate.
All of the documents requested in the nonparty subpoena to McAnarney
concerned matters directly related to his testimony at the quasi-judicial hearing before
the County’s BOCC, including his communications with third parties regarding same.
On January 19, 2026, after effectuating service of the subpoena on McAnarney,
the undersigned conferred with McAnarney’s legal counsel and inquired as to how
much additional time McAnarney might need to comply with the subpoena; in
response, McAnarney’s counsel stated that he would be filing a motion to quash the
subpoena, which he filed with this Court on February 4, 2026.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
3Case 3:25-cv-01275-TJC-LLL Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 4 of 14 PageID 180
McAnarney’s Motion to Quash the Rule 45 subpoena asserts three separate
arguments in support of same; namely, according to McAnarney:
1. The subpoena should be quashed because it was issued prior to the
filing of a Rule 26 written report with this Court regarding an agreed-
upon written discovery plan (notwithstanding the stipulation of the
actual parties to this lawsuit to commence discovery prior to a “formal”
Rule 26 conference and written report of same);
2. The subpoena should be quashed because it compels disclosure of
communications that purportedly, “implicate McAnarney’s First
Amendment right to expressive association because it would identify
other individuals with whom he affiliated regarding this political
issue”; and
3. The subpoena should be quashed because it purportedly imposes an
undue burden on McAnarney because his, “thoughts on the property
development at issue . . . appear entirely irrelevant to this case.”.
Neither the facts nor the law support any of the bases advanced by
McAnarney’s Motion to Quash the Rule 45 subpoena issued by Plaintiff.
A. Rule 26 Stipulation Between the Parties as to Discovery
McAnarney argues that the Subpoena can be quashed because there has not
been a conferral pursuant to Rule 26(f) and cites to Rule 26(d). While McAnarney
concedes there are exceptions to the rule, he fails to provide the full rule which
provides,
(1) Timing. A party may not seek discovery from any source before
the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), except in a
proceeding exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or
4Case 3:25-cv-01275-TJC-LLL Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 5 of 14 PageID 181
when authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by court order.
(emphasis added)
As explained to McAnarney’s counsel during the met and confer on the Motion,
Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendant’s counsel conferred regarding the non-party
subpoenas and, subject to some changes, stipulated to Plaintiff moving forward with
these subpoenas. Per the above cited rule, McAnarney’s argument to quash the
Subpoena has no basis.
B. First Amendment Associational Privilege/Privacy Rights
The Motion’s next argument is that the documents requested by the Rule 45
subpoena are somehow protected from disclosure by the First Amendment and/or
some type of privacy interest. [Dkt. 17 at 4]. In particular, McAnarney argues that the
subpoena would compel the production of documents that may impinge upon his (1)
First Amendment associational rights, and (2) “interest in the privacy of his political
associations.” These assertions, however, are legally indefensible.
First, one who seeks to invoke a First Amendment association privilege,
“bears
the burden of making a prima facie showing of infringement on the right by the
requested discovery. Fla. State Conf. of Branches & Youth Units of the NAACP v. Lee, 568
F. Supp. 3d 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74, (1976)). This
requires establishing a “reasonable probability” that the compelled disclosure,
“will
5Case 3:25-cv-01275-TJC-LLL Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 6 of 14 PageID 182
subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or
private parties.” Id.
The Motion fails to make a prima facie showing that disclosure of the documents
requested will subject McAnarney to threats, harassment or reprisals from anyone. On
this basis alone, the Motion should be denied.
McAnarney further argues that,
“the Court should quash the subpoena even in
the absence of a [recognized] privilege” due to some type of privacy and
confidentiality, “interest in the privacy of his political associations.” [Dkt. 17 at 4-5].
He then attempts to support this bold assertion by citing to the Eleventh Circuit’s
opinion in Jordan v. Miss. Dep’t of Corrections, 947 F. 1322 (11th Cir. 2020). The facts
in Jordan, however, concerned whether a subpoena for the formula of a lethal injection
drug should be quashed based on the “other protected matter” provision in Rule
45(d)(3)(A)(iii). Id. at 1336. In upholding the order quashing the subpoena on other
grounds (undue burden), the circuit court opined that because the formula was
protected by both (1) a confidentiality agreement between the supplier and the State of
Georgia and (2) a state statute, there was “sound argument” for the “other protected
matters argument.” Id.
McAnarney fails in the Motion to identify anything that would qualify
invocation of the “other protected matters” provision. Unlike the situation in Jordan,
6Case 3:25-cv-01275-TJC-LLL Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 7 of 14 PageID 183
McAnarney has not cited to any type of confidentiality agreement or statutory
provision that might possibly protect disclosure of the documents requested by
Plaintiff’s Rule 45 subpoena (i.e., documents in McAnarney’s possession which
concern Plaintiff ’s real property and/or Plaintiff’s zoning application). Similarly,
McAnarney fails to even attempt an explanation as to why he believes such documents
and communications are related to any particular “political associations.”
Further, McAnarney’s claim that his documents and communications
concerning his opinions, analysis and conclusions on the Plaintiff’s zoning application
are protected by privacy concerns is flatly contradicted by the fact that he voluntarily
made a ten-minute presentation – in a public forum – in opposition to Plaintiff’s zoning
application and met with individual BOCC members regarding same. In short,
McAnarney fails to explain what privacy interests he possesses when he voluntarily
chose to participate in a public hearing process (on behalf of other individuals) in
opposition to Plaintiff’s efforts to secure development rights for its private property.
C. Undue Burden
Finally, McAnarney claims that producing the documents requested by
Plaintiff’s subpoena would purportedly cause him to suffer some type of undue burden.
McAnarney cites to Castleberry v. Camden Cty., 331 F.R.D. 559 (S.D. Ga. 2019)
as support for this assertion. In Castleberry, the federal district court denied a motion to
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compel compliance with a subpoena filed a year and a half after the subpoena was
served on a reporter. The subpoena sought communications the reporter had with the
plaintiff. The basis for the denial by the district court was the delay in the request and
that the communications sought could be obtained from the plaintiff. Id at 564-565.
During the phone conference with McAnarney’s counsel to explore potential
resolutions of his stated objections, the undersigned agreed that McAnarney would
not have to turn over email communications to or from the government email accounts
of BOCC members, Planning and Zoning Agency members and County staff. This
concession is acknowledged in a Local Rule 3.01(g) certification signed by
McAnarney’s counsel, but said acknowledgment appears to contradict the very
arguments made in his Motion to Quash. [Dkt 17 at 6].
The burden of showing that compliance with a subpoena would impose an
undue burden is with the party moving to quash. Tropical Mktg. & Consulting, LLC v.
Glock, Inc., No. 6:12-cv-1388-Orl-36TBS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159697 (M.D. Fla.
Nov. 7, 2012). Moreover, a “generalized assertion of undue burden is not enough as
‘a more particularized argument’ is required, such as providing the ‘money, time,
work-hours, or other cost that [the party] faced in complying with the subpoena.’.”
Smartmatic USA Corp. v. Montgomery, No. 2:23-mc-5-JLB-KCD, 2023 U.S. Dist.
8Case 3:25-cv-01275-TJC-LLL Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 9 of 14 PageID 185
LEXIS 125423 (M.D. Fla. July 20, 2023) (citing ML Healthcare Servs., LLC v. Publix
Super Markets, Inc., 881 F.3d 1293, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2018)).
McAnarney has failed to specify how compliance with Plaintiff’s subpoena
would impose a significant amount of money, time, work hours or other costs. On this
basis alone, McAnarney’s claim for undue burden fails.
McAnarney’s remaining argument that compliance with the subpoena imposes
an undue burden is that the documents requested are irrelevant. [Dkt. 17 at 5]. This
assertion is equally uncompelling, as “[g]iven that ‘[r]elevant information need not be
admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence,’ Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b)(1), the burden of
establishing relevance has been described as ‘low.’.” Ala. Educ. v. Bentley, No. CV-11-
S-761-NE, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203614 at *8 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 29, 2013) (citations
omitted).
Here, McAnarney spoke at a quasi-judicial hearing – in a public forum – as a
designated speaker/representative on a matter that solely concerned the future of
Plaintiff’s property and the zoning entitlements that the County promised to Plaintiff
in exchange for the donation of hundreds of acres of land that the County needed for
a new road. McAnarney met with BOCC members prior to the hearing. Exhibit 1 at 4-
5. McAnarney prepared and gave a presentation in opposition to Plaintiff’s plan to
9Case 3:25-cv-01275-TJC-LLL Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 10 of 14 PageID 186
effectuate the promised entitlements and spoke on behalf of multiple individuals.
Exhibit 1 at 46. This was not a public hearing on legislation; it was a quasi-judicial
hearing where Plaintiff was entitled to due process and the BOCC was required to make
its decision based on competent substantial evidence as to the codified criteria in its
Land Development Code. See Board of County Commissioners of Brevard v. Snyder, 627
So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
McAnarney, as a designated speaker on behalf of unnamed individuals who
purportedly acceded their time to him, represented that his proffered analysis was
competent substantial evidence for denying Plaintiff’s zoning application. Specifically,
McAnarney advocated denial of the Plaintiff’s rezoning application, in part, based on
his analysis of existing transportation deficiencies and consistency with the County’s
Comprehensive Plan (two items that Plaintiff addressed via a professional engineer
Exhibit 1 at 10, and a certified planner, Exhibit 1 at 25). McAnarney further advocated
that the entitlements given to Plaintiff by the County in exchange for Plaintiff agreeing
to donate land for the extension of CR2209 should not be considered in approving
Plaintiff’s zoning application. Ultimately, the BOCC denied Plaintiff’s zoning
application based on the same concerns expressed by McAnarney in his presentation
and in his individual meetings with BOCC members.
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As McAnarney is a retired architect with no known training in law,
transportation, engineering, statutory interpretation, land development, agriculture or
planning, and given the fact that he represented his analysis on the Plaintiff’s zoning
application was “competent substantial evidence” for denying the same, it is clearly
relevant for Plaintiff to discover how McAnarney developed said analysis (and the
identities of those with whom he shared it).
Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts a cause of action alleging denial of equal protection
under 42 U.S.C. §1983, in part, based upon the BOCC using existing deficiencies to
deny Plaintiff’s zoning application, while nevertheless approving other planned unit
development rezoning applications where there were also existing transportation
deficiencies. [Dkt. 1 at 32, 36-39]. Plaintiff has also brought a state substantive due
process claim under Florida Constitution, Art. I, §9, in part, based upon the BOCC
using existing deficiencies to deny Plaintiff’s rezoning application. [Dkt. 1 at 45].
Plaintiff has also asserted causes of actions based upon the County’s approval of
specific entitlements for its property in 2019 and then denying the Plaintiff’s rezoning
application to effectuate said entitlements. [Dkt. 1 at 25, 29, 39, 46 and 55]. Further,
Plaintiff has alleged that denial of its rezoning application was based on improper
political considerations, and not any objective state-law compliant criteria. [Dkt. 1 at
45]. McAnarney testified as to these very same matters. Thus, the basis behind his
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testimony and communications related thereto are both very much relevant to the
claims asserted in Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Documents from a non- party concerning their efforts to influence a decision by
a board are clearly calculated to lead to discovery. In Ala. Educ. v. Bentley, the district
court compelled production of communications and documents in possession of a
third-party organization which concerned passage of legislation which had a direct
impact on the plaintiff. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203614 at *10 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 29,
2013).
Similarly, in Fla. State Conf. of Branches & Youth Units of the NAACP v. Lee, 568 F.
Supp. 3d 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2021), the district court denied a motion to quash a subpoena
which sought documents prepared by a non-party which influenced or are otherwise
were related to the passage of legislation which was subject to constitutional challenge.
The district court reasoned that the plaintiff satisfied the “very low bar” because the
documents requested could constitute circumstantial evidence. Id. at 1305-1306. In the
case sub judice, the documents are direct evidence of McAnarney’s publicly presented
and privately lobbied analysis on Plaintiff’s property rights.
If there is no privilege or undue burden which prevents a subpoena of
documents concerning a third party’s efforts on legislation which effects the general
public, logically there is no privilege or undue burden which prevents a subpoena of
12Case 3:25-cv-01275-TJC-LLL Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 13 of 14 PageID 189
documents which concerns a third party’s efforts to prevent a single party (in this case
the Plaintiff) from effectuating their land use entitlements especially when the analysis
from the third party is cited by the decision maker as a basis for denial.
In this case, the issue concerns a quasi-judicial hearing concerning Plaintiff’s
efforts to secure zoning entitlements for its private property. As such, the documents
requested in Plaintiff’s subpoena are clearly relevant to the causes of actions presented,
as they concern the statements and opinions of McAnarney (and other unnamed
individuals whom he purported to represent) in opposition to Plaintiff’s entitlements.
CONCLUSION
Discovery was properly sought after conferring with Defendant’s counsel and
stipulating to the issuance of Rule 45 subpoenas. McAnarney has failed to present a
prima facie basis for an associational privilege. McAnarney has failed to provide any
basis that the documents sought qualify as “other protected matters.” McAnarney has
failed to provide any basis that compliance with the subpoena will cause an undue
burden.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court deny the Motion
to Quash.
13Case 3:25-cv-01275-TJC-LLL Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 14 of 14 PageID 190
DATED: February 12, 2026
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/Zachary Miller, Esq.
Florida Bar No. 0059331
3203 Old Barn Court
Ponte Vedra Beach, FL 32082
Telephone: (904) 651-8958
Email: zwmillerlaw@gmail.com
Counsel for Plaintiff
LOCAL RULE 3.01(g) CERTIFICATION
In compliance with Local Rule 3.01(g), the undersigned certifies that he has
conferred with Mr. McAnarney’s counsel over the phone in a good-faith effort to
resolve the issues raised in the instant motion to quash without Court intervention, but
the parties have been unable to fully agree on a resolution of same.
/s/ Zachary Miller
ZACHARY MILLER, ESQ.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that the foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of Court via the
CM/ECF online portal, which will automatically send notification of such filing to all
counsel of record on this 12th day of February 2026.
/s/ Zachary Miller
ZACHARY MILLER, ESQ.
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