WHITE HOUSE BALLROOM CASE == READ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION IN NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION v. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE (August 7, 2026)

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued June 5, 2026 Decided August 7, 2026

No. 26-5123

NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN THE

UNITED STATES,

APPELLEE

v.

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

Consolidated with 26-5134

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:25-cv-04316)

Yaakov M. Roth, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney

General, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for

appellants/cross-appellees. With him on the briefs were Brett

A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, Brantley T. Mayers,

Attorney, and Adam R.F. Gustafson, Principal Deputy

Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural2

Resources Division. Steven A. Myers and Michael S. Raab,

Attorneys, entered appearances.

Richard Jaffe was on the brief for amicus curiae American

Conservative Union in support of appellants/cross-appellees.

Thaddeus A. Heuer argued the cause for appellee/cross-

appellant. With him on the brief were Matthew F. Casassa,

Kevin Y. Chen, Jack C. Smith, and Gregory B. Craig.

Philip Allen Lacovara, Andrea C. Ferster, and Paul W.

Edmondson were on the brief for amici curiae Various

Organizations Advancing Protection of National Parks,

Historic Preservation, and National Capital Planning in support

of appellee/cross-appellant.

Nikhel S. Sus, Christina Wentworth, and Daniel S. Lenz

were on the brief for amici curiae Campaign Legal Center and

Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington in

support of appellee/cross-appellant.

Elizabeth Wydra and Brianne J. Gorod were on the brief

for amici curiae Members of Congress in support of

appellee/cross-appellant.

Aditi Shah and Scott Michelman were on the brief for

amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of the District

of Columbia in support of appellee/cross-appellant.

Before: MILLETT, RAO, and GARCIA, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judges MILLETT and

GARCIA.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge RAO.3

MILLETT and GARCIA, Circuit Judges: The White House

is the People’s House, and under the Constitution’s Property

Clause, Congress exercises plenary control over the building

and its surrounding land. The White House is also the

centerpiece of President’s Park, a National Park stewarded by

the National Park Service. According to the government, as

the oldest public building in the District of Columbia, the

White House is the crown jewel not just of President’s Park,

but also of the Lafayette Square National Historic Landmark

District, a site listed for preservation in the National Register

of Historic Places. See Finding of No Significant Impact,

White House East Wing Modernization & State Ballroom

Environmental Assessment (“FONSI”), ECF No. 14-2, at 5.

The founding architect of the Nation’s capital, Pierre L’Enfant,

designed the capital city’s layout to focus on the towering

Capitol building—the gleaming palace of the people in the new

democracy—and to contrast it with the simple humility of the

White House. See SCOTT W. BERG, GRAND AVENUES: THE

STORY OF PIERRE CHARLES L’ENFANT 112 (2008) (“Where the

king’s bedroom was placed on the central axis of Versailles,

enshrining the rule of divine right transferred via

primogeniture, here in L’Enfant’s plan the home of Congress

took center stage.”); FONSI at 5 (“Situated on a high point

within the city, the White House is a focal point on the principal

north-south axis of L’Enfant’s plan.”).1

Each President is a temporary tenant, not the owner, of the

White House and its Executive Residence. The President has

no—and claims no—constitutionally assigned authority over

that property, which is designed and maintained for the use of

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to ECF numbers are

to the district court docket in this case, 25-CV-4316 (D.D.C., filed

Dec. 12, 2025). Citations to page numbers are to the electronically

generated numbers at the top of the page.4

all Presidents, current and future, and for the American people.

As the defendant National Park Service has explained, “[t]he

White House is owned by the American people and stewarded

by the National Park Service. It is more than the President’s

residence; it is a site for protests and national discourse about

what it means to be American.” The White House and

President’s Park, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://perma.cc/MJ7A-

2JSG.

Throughout history, Congress has appropriated funds both

for the White House’s maintenance and for necessary physical

improvements and additions. Congress, for example,

authorized the repair and reconstruction of the White House

after the British attempted to burn it down during the War of

1812. Act of Feb. 13, 1815, ch. 41, 3 Stat. 205, 205. Congress

also specifically appropriated the funds that were used to build

the original East and West Wings of the White House. Act of

June 28, 1902, ch. 1301, § 1, 32 Stat. 419, 460.

We are aware of no instance in American history in which

a President unilaterally and using privately collected funds

demolished substantial portions of the White House that

Congress authorized to be built and American taxpayers paid

for. Until now.

Over just three days in October 2025, without undertaking

promised consultations or obtaining Congress’s permission,

President Trump bulldozed the entire East Wing in order to

construct a massive, 90,000 square-foot ballroom paid for by

private funds with no congressional oversight. There is no

factual dispute at this juncture—in fact, the Defendants

admit—that the erection of this enormous ballroom will “have

permanent adverse impacts on the cultural landscape” of

President’s Park. White House East Wing Modernization &

State Ballroom Environmental Assessment (“Env’t5

Assessment”), ECF No. 14-3, at 11. The ballroom construction

also will “disrupt the historical continuity of the White House

grounds[,]” and will “adversely alter the design, setting, and

feeling of the White House and the grounds over the long-

term.” FONSI at 6–7.

The National Trust for Historic Preservation brought suit

challenging the planned construction. The district court

preliminarily enjoined the above-ground construction of the

ballroom. At the same time, the injunction expressly excepts

from its scope all below-ground construction, including

construction of bunkers, bomb-shelters, and military and

medical infrastructure, as well as above-ground construction

“strictly necessary to cover, secure, and protect” such facilities,

“to provide for the personal safety of the President and his

staff[,]” and “to ensure the safety, security, and structural

integrity of the White House, the White House grounds, and

the below-ground construction site[.]” Am. P.I. Order, ECF

No. 73, at 2–3.

The Defendants have appealed that preliminary injunction

and requested a stay pending appeal. We affirm the grant of

the preliminary injunction, with its safety-and-security

exception, and deny the motion for a stay as moot. The

Defendants disclaim any explicit or implicit constitutional

authority for their actions. And they very likely lack statutory

authority to construct the ballroom given (i) Congress’s full

constitutional control over federal property and the funding of

its maintenance and development, (ii) the absence of any

express or implied authorization for the ballroom construction,

and (iii) express statutory limitations that the ballroom

construction violates. Absent the injunction, construction of

the ballroom will inflict permanent and irreversible harm to the

historic, architectural, and aesthetic interests of the National

Trust’s members, as well as the design of President’s Park, the6

White House, and the surrounding area. The Defendants

themselves agree those irreversible harms will occur. As for

the Defendants’ safety and security concerns, the district

court’s modified preliminary injunction will protect them

during the pendency of litigation. In addition, the Constitution

assigns Congress—not the Executive—the responsibility to

decide whether proposed changes to the physical design of the

White House may proceed, even where those changes are said

to serve security interests. The Defendants have not shown that

Congress delegated that authority to either the President or the

National Park Service. Whether or not a massive ballroom

should be constructed is for Congress to decide and is not a

matter for Executive self-help.

This holding has nothing at all to do with whether the

proposed ballroom is desirable, or not, as a matter of policy.

This ruling does not even necessarily mean that the Defendants

may not ultimately construct the ballroom. What it does mean

is that the Defendants may not do so during the district court’s

expeditious litigation without securing Congress’s

authorization, as the Constitution and laws require. At this

preliminary stage, the National Trust has shown, compellingly,

that Congress has not ceded unfettered authority to the

Executive Branch to dramatically redesign, reshape, and

reconstruct the White House—the People’s House—to fit a

particular President’s desires.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment

issuing the modified preliminary injunction and vacate this

court’s administrative stay entered on April 17, 2026. We will

stay this decision for fourteen days to allow the Defendants, if

they choose, to seek Supreme Court review.7

I

A

1

Congress has exclusive authority to regulate the

construction and demolition of White House structures. The

Constitution’s Property Clause vests Congress with plenary

control over all real property that belongs to the United States.

U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have

Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and

Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property

belonging to the United States[.]”); see Ashwander v.

Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 331 (1936) (The

Clause’s “broad terms” encompass “the due regulation of all

* * * personal and real property rightfully belonging to the

United States.”) (quotation marks omitted). In addition, the

Constitution’s District Clause confers on Congress

comprehensive legislative authority over the District of

Columbia as “the Seat of Government of the United States[.]”

U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 17.

In 1912, Congress placed a statutory exclamation point on

its exclusive powers by providing that “there shall not be

erected on any reservation, park, or public grounds[] of the

United States within the District of Columbia, any building or

structure without express authority of Congress.” Act of Aug.

24, 1912, ch. 355, 37 Stat. 417, 444. More than a hundred years

later, that prohibition remains in effect: “A building or

structure shall not be erected on any reservation, park, or public

grounds of the Federal Government in the District of Columbia

without express authority of Congress.” 40 U.S.C. § 8106.8

As long as the White House has existed, Congress has

authorized and funded its upkeep, maintenance, updates, and

renovations large and small. See, e.g., Residence Act, ch. 28,

§ 3, 1 Stat. 130, 130 (1790) (creating a commission to “provide

suitable buildings for the accommodation * * * of the

President”); Act of Feb. 13, 1815, ch. 41, 3 Stat. 205, 205

(authorizing the President to borrow up to $500,000 to “cause

to be repaired or rebuilt forthwith, the President’s House”

following its destruction in the War of 1812); An Act making

appropriations for the public buildings, ch. 62, § 1, 3 Stat. 784,

784 (1823) (appropriating $19,000 to “finish[] the south

portico to the President’s house”); An Act making

appropriations for the public buildings, and for other purposes,

ch. 51, § 1, 4 Stat. 362, 362 (1829) (appropriating $24,769.25

to “complete the north front of the President’s house, according

to the original plan, by erecting a portico”); Act of March 3,

1853, ch. 97, § 1, 10 Stat. 189, 207 (providing $6,250 for

“cleaning, painting, and whitewashing inside of the house;

extending east wing of offices for carriage-house, blinds for the

west front of the house, flooring large room in basement,

purchasing trees and plants for garden, and for making hot-beds

therein”); Act of June 28, 1902, ch. 1301, § 1, 32 Stat. 419, 460

(providing $65,196 for the building of the West Wing,

“constructed with sufficient foundation and walls suitable for a

durable, permanent building,” and $475,445 “[f]or

extraordinary repairs and refurnishing of the Executive

Mansion * * * including all necessary alterations and

additions”); Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 299, § 1, 35 Stat. 945,

995 (providing $40,000 for construction of the Oval Office as

“additional accommodations to the building erected for the

offices of the President”); Act of July 3, 1926, ch. 771, § 1, 44

Stat. 841, 844 (“For reconstructing the roof, attic, and ceilings

of the second story of the Executive Mansion, including all

necessary work in connection therewith, to be prosecuted, by

contract or otherwise as the President may determine, under the9

supervision of the Director of Public Buildings and Public

Parks of the National Capital, fiscal years 1927 and 1928,

$375,000[.]”); Act of April 28, 1942, ch. 247, 56 Stat. 226, 236

(“For an additional amount for salaries and expenses, public

buildings and grounds in the District of Columbia and adjacent

area, fiscal year 1942, including the objects specified under this

head in the Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 1942,

$3,413,394[.]”); Act of Dec. 28, 1945, ch. 589, 59 Stat. 632,

634 (providing $1.65 million “[f]or an addition to the

Executive Mansion” and “for alterations, improvements, and

furnishings”); An Act To provide for a Commission on

Renovation of the Executive Mansion, ch. 51, §§ 1–5, 63 Stat.

45, 45–47 (1949) (creating a Commission on Renovation of the

Executive Mansion to oversee President Truman’s

renovations); Act of June 23, 1949, ch. 236, 63 Stat. 231, 235

(providing $2 million “[f]or all expenses necessary for and

incident to the renovation, repair, and modernization * * * of

the Executive Mansion”).

Congress also has separately authorized the President to

make discretionary expenditures to pay for needed staff within

the White House. In 1948, Congress passed a modest provision

setting the annual compensation for the President’s personal

secretary at $10,000. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 644, § 105, 62

Stat. 672, 678. Over the next thirty years, Congress

occasionally tweaked that provision, codified at 3 U.S.C.

§ 105, to create new salaried positions for a growing cadre of

administrative aides.2

2 See Act of Oct. 15, 1949, ch. 695, § 2(a), 63 Stat. 880, 880

(adding positions for “six administrative assistants[,]” an “Executive

Secretary of the National Security Council,” and “five other

secretaries or other immediate staff assistants”); Act of July 31, 1956,

ch. 804, § 109, 70 Stat. 736, 740 (adjusting salaries and adding three

more secretaries and staff assistants); Act of Oct. 4, 1961, Pub. L.10

In 1978, Congress reorganized Section 105 into its current

form. See Act of Nov. 2, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-570, 92 Stat.

2445, 2445–2446. As amended, Section 105 provides for

“Assistance and [S]ervices for the President” in five

subsections. 3 U.S.C. § 105. Sections 105(a) and (b) provide

that “the President is authorized” to hire and pay employees “in

the White House Office” and “in the Executive Residence at

the White House” under the General Schedule pay-grade

system. Id. § 105(a)–(b). Section 105(c) provides that the

“President is authorized” to procure, “as provided in

appropriation Acts, temporary or intermittent services of

experts and consultants” for the White House Office and the

Executive Residence. Id. § 105(c). And Section 105(e) allows

the President’s spouse to enjoy the assistance and services of

the employees and consultants authorized above. Id. § 105(e).

This case concerns Section 105(d), which amid those staff

funding authorizations provides:

(d) There are authorized to be appropriated each fiscal

year to the President such sums as may be necessary

for—

(1) the care, maintenance, repair, alteration,

refurnishing, improvement, air-conditioning,

heating, and lighting (including electric power

fixtures) of the Executive Residence at the White

House;

No. 87-367, § 303(h), 75 Stat. 785, 794 (adjusting salaries); Act of

Aug. 14, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-426, § 304(b), 78 Stat. 400, 422

(adding position for an “Executive Secretary of the National

Aeronautics and Space Council”); Act of Dec. 23, 1967, Pub. L.

No. 90-222, § 111(c), 81 Stat. 672, 726 (adding position for an

“Executive Secretary of the Economic Opportunity Council”).11

(2) the official expenses of the White House

Office;

(3) the official entertainment expenses of the

President;

(4) the official entertainment expenses for

allocation within the Executive Office of the

President; and

(5) the subsistence expenses of persons in the

Government service while traveling on official

business in connection with the travel of the

President.

3 U.S.C. § 105(d).

The phrase “[t]here are authorized to be appropriated” in

Section 105(d) sharply distinguishes that provision from the

rest of Section 105, which speaks in terms of what “the

President is authorized” to do. 3 U.S.C. § 105(a)–(c)

(emphasis added). Section 105(d), in contrast, is an

appropriation “authorization act” that Congress can choose to

fund or not going forward. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL,

GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL

APPROPRIATIONS LAW 2-56 (“GAO REDBOOK”) (4th ed. 2016);

see also id. at 2-54. “The expression ‘authorized to be

appropriated’ * * * clearly indicates that no appropriation is

made or intended to be made, but the bill when enacted

becomes the authority of law for an expected appropriation in

the future[.]” Id. at 2-54–2-55 (quoting 27 Comp. Dec. 923

(1921)).12

Said more simply, an “authorization act is basically a

directive to Congress itself, which Congress is free to follow or

alter * * * in the subsequent appropriation act.” GAO

REDBOOK 2-56; cf. CFPB v. Community Fin. Servs. Ass’n of

America, Ltd., 144 S. Ct. 1474, 1481 (2024) (“[T]o satisfy the

Appropriations Clause,” an appropriation “need only identify a

source of public funds and authorize the expenditure of those

funds for designated purposes[.]”).

Congress has regularly exercised its appropriation

authority under Section 105(d), often continuing its historical

pattern of regulating the President’s use of the funds. See, e.g.,

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447,

118 Stat. 2809, 3246 (2004) (appropriating $12.76 million

“[f]or the care, maintenance, repair and alteration, refurnishing,

improvement, heating, and lighting, including electric power

and fixtures, of the Executive Residence at the White House

and official entertainment expenses of the President * * * to be

expended and accounted for as provided by 3 U.S.C. 105, 109,

110, and 112–114”); id. at 3247 (appropriating $1.9 million

“[f]or the repair, alteration, and improvement of the Executive

Residence at the White House * * * to remain available until

expended, for required maintenance, safety and health issues,

and continued preventative maintenance”); Consolidated

Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1182,

1392 (2020) (appropriating $2.5 million “[f]or the repair,

alteration, and improvement of the Executive Residence at the

White House pursuant to 3 U.S.C. 105(d) * * * to remain

available until expended, for required maintenance, resolution

of safety and health issues, and continued preventative

maintenance”).

In 2024, 2025, and 2026, Congress appropriated $2.475

million under Section 105(d) to be used for “required

maintenance, resolution of safety and health issues, and13

continued preventative maintenance.” Further Consolidated

Appropriations Act, 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-47, 138 Stat. 460,

532 (under the heading “White House Repair and

Restoration”); Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and

Extensions Act, 2025, Pub. L. No. 119-4, §§ 1101(a)(5), 1102,

139 Stat. 9, 11–12 (continuing 2024 funding levels);

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, Pub. L. No. 119-75,

140 Stat. 173, 451 (same as 2024).

When Congress appropriates funds for the purposes

described in Subsections 105(d)(1), (3), or (5), such sums “may

be expended as the President may determine, notwithstanding

the provisions of any other law,” as long as the expenditures

remain within the confines of the appropriation act’s

denominated purposes. 3 U.S.C. § 105(d). At the same time,

those expenditures are expressly subject to oversight by the

Comptroller General, who “may inspect all necessary * * *

records” to verify that the President’s spending was confined

to “expenses in paragraph (1), (3), or (5).” Id. The Comptroller

General must “certify to Congress the fact of such verification,

and shall report any such expenses not expended for such

purpose.” Id.

Section 105’s statutory neighbors similarly reflect

Congress’s close control over and provision for maintenance of

the White House on legislatively specified terms. For example,

Congress closely regulates the acquisition of furniture for the

Executive Residence, 3 U.S.C. §§ 109–110, requiring that

purchased furniture be, “as far as practicable, of domestic

manufacture” and that any donated furniture “maintain[] the

interior of the Executive Residence at the White House in

keeping with its original design,” id. § 110. Congress further

required the Director of the National Park Service to establish

a committee that includes representatives of the American

Federation of Arts, the National Commission of Fine Arts, the14

National Academy of Design, and the American Institute of

Architects to “select” and “recommend” the acceptance or not

of any donated furniture pieces. Id.; see id. § 109 (requiring

annually a “complete inventory, in proper books” of “all the

public property in and belonging to the Executive Residence at

the White House”).

2

The 1916 National Park Service Organic Act established

the Park Service and charged it with

promot[ing] and regulat[ing] the use of the National

Park System by means and measures that conform to

the fundamental purpose of the System units, which

purpose is to conserve the scenery, natural and

historic objects, and wild life in the System units and

to provide for the enjoyment of the scenery, natural

and historic objects, and wild life in such manner and

by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the

enjoyment of future generations.

54 U.S.C. § 100101(a); Act of Aug. 25, 1916, ch. 408, § 1, 39

Stat. 535, 535.

Later, in the 1978 Redwood Amendment, Congress

doubled down on its requirement that the “protection,

management, and administration” of the National Park System

“shall not be exercised in derogation of the values and purposes

for which the System units have been established” and

requiring that any authority to depart from those purposes be

“directly and specifically provided by Congress.” 54 U.S.C.

§ 100101(b)(2) (emphasis added); Act of March 27, 1978, Pub.

L. No. 95-250, § 101(b), 92 Stat. 163, 166.15

The Organic Act separately authorizes the Park Service to

accept “money that may be donated for the purposes of the

System.” 54 U.S.C. § 101101(2). The congressionally

chartered National Park Foundation “accept[s] and

administer[s] those gifts” to “further the conservation of

natural, scenic, historic, scientific, educational, inspirational,

or recreational resources for future generations of

Americans[.]” Id. § 101111. All donations to the Park Service

must be placed in a federal trust. See 31 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(17),

(b)(1). Congress has appropriated those funds to be used only

“for the benefit of, or in connection with,” the Park Service,

“its activities, or its services.” 54 U.S.C. § 101113; see 31

U.S.C. § 1321(a)(17), (b)(1).

3

Under the Economy Act, the “head of an agency or major

organizational unit within an agency may place an order with a

major organizational unit within the same agency or another

agency for goods or services if”:

(1) amounts are available;

(2) the head of the ordering agency or unit [that is, the

agency making the request] decides the order is in

the best interest of the United States Government;

(3) the agency or unit to fill the order is able to

provide or get by contract the ordered goods or

services; and

(4) the head of the agency decides ordered goods or

services cannot be provided by contract as

conveniently or cheaply by a commercial

enterprise.16

31 U.S.C. § 1535(a).3

Importantly, “the Economy Act does not authorize an

agency to use another agency to do anything it could not

lawfully do itself.” GAO REDBOOK 12-26 (3d ed. 2008); see

also 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (“Appropriations shall be applied

only to the objects for which the appropriations were made

except as otherwise provided by law.”); cf. Department of Navy

v. Federal Lab. Rels. Auth., 665 F.3d 1339, 1348 (D.C. Cir.

2012) (“[A]n agency cannot use the device of a contract, grant,

or agreement to accomplish a purpose it could not do by direct

expenditure[.]”) (quoting GAO REDBOOK 4-9 (3d ed. 2004)).

The Defendants agree. Oral Arg. Tr. 32:18–19 (The ordering

agency “has to be able to do the project.”); id. at 35:6–9

(agreeing that the ordering agency must “have the legal

authority so that they could * * * do th[e] job themselves”).

B

1

The White House sits at the heart of President’s Park.

President’s Park began as “Federal Reservation 1” in Pierre

L’Enfant’s 1791 plan for the nascent capital city. See Nat’l

Park Serv., Comprehensive Design Plan: The White House &

President’s Park 143 (2000) (“2000 Design Plan”). The

National Park Service assumed responsibility for the property

in 1933. Id. at 40; see also Exec. Order No. 6166 § 2 (1933).

Congress later formally directed that the White House building

3 Title 31 broadly defines “agency” as “a department, agency,

or instrumentality of the United States Government.” 31 U.S.C.

§ 101.17

complex itself be administered as a national park. See Act of

Sept. 22, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-286, § 1, 75 Stat. 586, 586.

Today, President’s Park extends north from Constitution

Avenue, across Pennsylvania Avenue, to H Street Northwest.

The White House and President’s Park: Explore President’s

Park, Nat’l Park Serv., https://perma.cc/3CB3-VSDD. It

comprises about 82 acres, including the Ellipse, the White

House complex and its grounds, and Lafayette Square. Id.;

2000 Design Plan at 6; FONSI at 5. The Park’s northern edge

is embraced by the Lafayette Square Historic District, which

itself boasts paradigms of 19th century American architecture

like St. John’s Church, the Blair House, the Dolley Madison

House, and the Stephen Decatur House. See The White House

and President’s Park: Explore President’s Park. The White

House is the centerpiece of President’s Park. FONSI at 5.

2

On July 31, 2025, the White House announced plans to

build a 90,000 square-foot ballroom in President’s Park using

privately donated funds. Press Release, The White House, The

White House Announces White House Ballroom Construction

to Begin (July 31, 2025), https://perma.cc/6N2H-RLE9. The

announcement explained that the ballroom would be

“substantially separated from the main building of the White

House” and constructed where the “East Wing currently sits.”

Id. The press release represented that the President was “fully

committed to working with the appropriate organizations to

preserv[e] the special history of the White House[.]” Id.

In August 2025, the National Park Service conducted an

environmental assessment of the proposed construction. The

Park Service determined that the project “would have

permanent adverse impacts on the cultural landscape” of18

President’s Park because the proposed ballroom would

“depart[] from the traditional aesthetic values and architectural

integrity” of the White House complex. Env’t Assessment at

11.

The government’s Environmental Assessment also found

that the ballroom “would disrupt the historical continuity of the

White House grounds” because the “new building’s larger

footprint and height would dominate the eastern portion of the

site, creating a visual imbalance with the more modestly scaled

West Wing and Executive Mansion.” Env’t Assessment at 14.

The planned second-story addition to the East Colonnade

would exacerbate the asymmetry. Id. According to the

assessment, this discrepancy would “chang[e] the traditional

spatial organization and sightlines of the grounds[.]” Id. In

combination, the proposed construction would “adversely alter

the design, setting, and feeling of the White House and the

grounds over the long-term.” FONSI at 7.

The Environmental Assessment further concluded that the

proposed ballroom’s size would permanently alter the views of

President’s Park for visitors in “certain locations, particularly

Lafayette Square and portions of the Ellipse[.]” Env’t

Assessment at 19. The Park Service added that “[t]he removal

of the current East Wing” to build the ballroom “will result in

a permanent adverse impact for those who value the experience

of this specific space.” FONSI at 8.

Nevertheless, the Park Service found that the ballroom

project would have no “significant” impact on the White House

complex because the White House would retain

“photograph[s]” of what the East Wing previously looked like

and would “salvage and stor[e] * * * select historic building

materials[.]” FONSI at 6, 16. In the Park Service’s view, those

two steps sufficed to “preserve important elements of the19

historic fabric” of the East Wing and the formerly cohesive

White House complex. Id. at 16. In so finding, the Park

Service briefly considered “a no action alternative[,]” but the

ballroom project “was selected for implementation[] because

the Executive Office of the President identified the selected

action as the only alternative that meets its functional goals and

operational needs.” Id. at 13.

The Park Service chose, without any explanation, not to

publish either its Environmental Assessment or its Finding of

No Significant Impact. Contrast 42 U.S.C. § 4336(b)(2)

(“[An] environmental assessment shall be a concise public

document prepared by a Federal agency[.]”) (emphasis added);

NAT’L PARK SERV., NPS NEPA HANDBOOK 69 (2015) (“The

NPS must notify the public of the availability of a FONSI once

it is signed. The standard NPS practice to meet this

requirement is to announce its availability on [the NPS’s online

platform for public comment] and through a press release,

direct or electronic mailings, or other effective means of

communication.”) (citations omitted).

Two months later, “without advance notice” and without

first undertaking the promised consultations, President Trump

posted on social media that “ground ha[d] been broken on the

White House grounds to build the new, big, beautiful White

House Ballroom.” National Trust for Historic Pres. in the U.S.

v. National Park Serv., 827 F. Supp. 3d 93, 100 (D.D.C. 2026)

(“National Trust III”). Within three days, “the East Wing had

been demolished in its entirety.” Id.20

C

1

The National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United

States is a congressionally chartered membership organization

that seeks to preserve and promote the United States’

architectural and cultural heritage. See Decl. of Elizabeth S.

Merritt, ECF No. 2-2, at ¶¶ 2–4. The National Trust was

created in 1949 to, among other things, “facilitate public

participation in the preservation of sites, buildings, and objects

of national significance or interest[.]” 54 U.S.C. § 312102(a).

The National Trust has a long history of involvement in

President’s Park. Since 1956, the National Trust has owned the

historic home of Commodore Stephen Decatur, the first private

residence built in the Lafayette Square Historic District. See

Merritt Decl. ¶ 9. The Decatur House, which the famed Naval

Commodore enjoyed only briefly before his death in an honor

duel, sits on the northwest corner of Lafayette Square and looks

out onto President’s Park. Id.; Decl. of Alison K. Hoagland,

ECF No. 2-3, at ¶ 12. The National Trust “frequently” holds

board meetings at the Decatur House, Merritt Decl. ¶ 9, since

the District of Columbia is the National Trust’s “principal”

location, 54 U.S.C. § 312103.

When the National Trust learned about the sudden

demolition of the East Wing, it warned the Park Service that

the “massing and height of the proposed new construction”

would “permanently disrupt the carefully balanced classical

design of the White House[.]” Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶ 51.

The National Trust urged the National Park Service to “pause”

demolition and construction until the proposal for the ballroom

could be publicly reviewed. Id. ¶ 52. The Park Service did not

respond. Id. ¶ 53.21

In December 2025, the National Trust filed this suit and

moved for a temporary restraining order halting further

construction. See Compl.; TRO Mot., ECF No. 2-1. As

relevant here, the National Trust argued that the Park Service

and its officers had acted contrary to law by starting the

ballroom project without Congress’s express authorization and

without statutorily required consultations, in violation of the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). See Compl.

¶¶ 105–134, 154–160; TRO Mot. at 25–32. The National Trust

contended that if the Park Service continued with the ballroom

project, the National Trust and its members would suffer

“aesthetic, cultural, and historic harms” because “the historical

significance of [the White House’s] design will be physically

overcome” by the proposed ballroom. TRO Mot. at 45.

On the merits, the Defendants responded that the National

Trust’s claims were misdirected “[b]ecause [the Executive

Office of the President (EOP)] is managing this project” and

the relevant consultation statutes have “no application to the

President.” TRO Opp’n, ECF No. 14, at 22–26. At a hearing

on the National Trust’s motion, the Defendants doubled down:

Because the project “is being planned, directed, and executed

by the Executive Office of the President” and the Office of the

Executive Residence (EXR), and because neither of those

entities is an agency within the meaning of the APA, “there is

no agency action for [the] Court to enjoin[,]” so the Trust’s

APA claims necessarily fail. TRO Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 18, 22:2–

6, 24:17–20. In addition, the Defendants argued that EOP and

EXR have independent statutory authority to construct the

ballroom under Section 105(d)(1). TRO Opp’n at 23.

The Defendants further argued that the National Trust’s

claims were “unripe” because EOP and EXR would

“commence the statutory consultation process” shortly,

“architectural design for the above-grade elements is still in22

progress[,]” and “above-grade structural work will not occur

until April 2026, at the earliest.” TRO Opp’n at 18–19. When

pressed by the district court on whether the below-ground

work, which had already begun, would “dictate the height and

the width” of the ballroom itself, the Defendants assured the

district court that “[t]here’s nothing here to suggest” that

changes to the ballroom “would be impossible” or that

“anything irreversible” would occur during underground

construction. TRO Hr’g Tr. 21:9–20; see also id. 20:22–24

(“[T]he below-ground work that’s occurring now has nothing

to do with Plaintiff’s asserted aesthetic injury” from above-

ground construction of the ballroom.); Decl. of Professional

Engineer, ECF No. 30-4, at ¶ 9 (Defendants’ submission of a

declaration from a professional engineer stating that the

“primary foundation system for the structure can accommodate

potential design changes to the configuration of the above-

grade structure”).

The district court denied the National Trust’s request for a

temporary restraining order on the ground that there was “no

sufficiently imminent risk of irreparable aesthetic harm” tied to

above-ground construction that required immediate relief.

National Trust for Historic Pres. in the U.S. v. National Park

Serv., 813 F. Supp. 3d 42, 44 (D.D.C. 2025) (“National

Trust I”). The court expressly rested its ruling on “the

Government’s representations” that the above-ground designs

were not yet finalized, and added that “[i]f there is any below-

grade construction that dictates the size or scale of the proposed

ballroom * * *, then the Government should be prepared to

take it down” if required by a future ruling. Id.; see also id.

(“The Court will hold the Government to its word.”).

Two weeks later, the National Trust amended its complaint

and sought a preliminary injunction. See Am. Compl., ECF

No. 19; P.I. Mot., ECF No. 20. As relevant here, the National23

Trust added EOP and EXR as defendants based on the

Defendants’ representation that those entities were in charge of

the project. See P.I. Mot. at 10. The National Trust argued that

EXR was an agency for purposes of its APA claims and that

both EOP and EXR could be enjoined from constructing the

ballroom under the APA. Id. at 26–30. Alternatively, the

National Trust argued that EOP’s and EXR’s unilateral

direction of the project would violate the constitutional

separation of powers by usurping Congress’s authority under

the Property Clause. Id. at 32–35.

In January 2026, the Defendants opposed the National

Trust’s preliminary injunction motion. P.I. Opp’n, ECF

No. 30. The Defendants argued the National Trust was not

likely to succeed on the merits of its APA claim because “the

entity directing the project”—EXR—“is not subject to the

APA.” Id. at 22 (capitalization altered). The Defendants added

that an APA claim could not lie against the Park Service

because the Park Service “is indisputably not directing” the

project and that there was “no [Park Service] action that the

Court could set aside under the APA[.]” Id. at 26 n.7.

In February, the district court denied the National Trust’s

request for a preliminary injunction. National Trust for

Historic Pres. in the U.S. v. National Park Serv., 821 F. Supp.

3d 62, 65 (D.D.C. 2026) (“National Trust II”). The district

court concluded that the National Trust had shown a substantial

likelihood of associational standing to vindicate cognizable

harms to its members’ aesthetic, historic, and cultural interests

in the White House and President’s Park. Id. at 68–71. But, in

reliance on the Defendants’ representation that EXR was “the

entity managing the East Wing project[,]” the district court

concluded that the Trust’s APA claims were unlikely to

succeed because “EXR is likely not an ‘agency’ under the

APA.” Id. at 71. The court further ruled that the National24

Trust’s claims were “properly characterized as statutory,” so it

lacked “a freestanding constitutional claim for injunctive

relief.” Id. at 73–74 (first quoting Global Health Council v.

Trump, 153 F.4th 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2025)). The district court

noted that the National Trust had not pleaded a statutory ultra

vires claim. Id. at 76.

A week later, the National Trust amended its complaint to

add the claims that the Park Service, EOP, and EXR had acted

ultra vires and without statutory (or other) authority to erect a

ballroom on the White House grounds. 2d Am. Compl., ECF

No. 50, ¶¶ 197–224. The National Trust also repeated its

allegation that the Park Service had acted contrary to law in

violation of the APA and 40 U.S.C. § 8106 by beginning

construction of a whole new building on the White House

grounds without Congress’s express authorization. 2d Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 172–178. The National Trust then renewed its

request for a preliminary injunction. See generally 2d P.I.

Mot., ECF No. 51-1.

In response, the Defendants added a new defense that the

project was lawful because the Park Service had independent

authority to construct the ballroom on White House grounds

under its organic statute. 2d P.I. Opp’n, ECF No. 52, at 21–27

(citing 54 U.S.C. § 100101). That argument “came as a

surprise” to the district court, National Trust III, 827 F. Supp.

3d at 113, because the Defendants had previously argued—and

won the denial of a preliminary injunction by arguing—that the

Park Service had “no role” in the project and had taken no

action reviewable under the APA, P.I. Opp’n at 26 n.7, 32.

On March 31st, the district court preliminarily enjoined the

above-ground construction of the ballroom. See National Trust

III, 827 F. Supp. 3d at 99. The district court concluded that, to

the extent EXR or EOP had ordered the construction, that25

action was likely ultra vires because (i) Congress has exclusive

constitutional authority over federal property like the White

House, (ii) 3 U.S.C. § 105(d)(1) does not authorize the

President to demolish an entire publicly funded Wing of the

White House and replace it with a privately funded ballroom,

and (iii) 40 U.S.C. § 8106 separately requires Congress’s

express approval for such an endeavor. See National Trust III,

827 F. Supp. 3d at 104–112. In addition, to the extent the Park

Service had a role in directing and funding the construction, the

district court concluded that such action was likely contrary to

law in violation of the APA because nothing in the Park

Service’s organic statute overrode the requirement of

congressional approval in 40 U.S.C. § 8106. See National

Trust III, 827 F. Supp. 3d at 112–114.

The district court enjoined the Park Service, EXR, EOP,

and related entities, officers, and agents “from taking any

action in furtherance of the physical development of the

proposed ballroom * * *, including but not limited to any

further demolition, site preparation work, landscape alteration,

excavation, foundation work, or other construction or related

work[.]” P.I. Order, ECF No. 61, at 1–2. The injunction did

not extend to the President himself. See generally id. At the

same time, the court exempted from the preliminary injunction

those “actions strictly necessary to ensure the safety and

security of the White House and its grounds, including the

ballroom construction site, and provide for the personal safety

of the President and his staff[.]” Id. at 2.

At the Defendants’ request, the district court stayed the

effect of its order for fourteen days to allow them time to seek

a stay pending appeal from this court. See P.I. Order at 2. The

Defendants noticed their appeal and moved this court for a stay

pending appeal.26

2

On April 11th, we extended the stay for an additional

week, remanded the case to the district court, and dismissed the

Defendants’ motion as moot. Per Curiam Order, No. 26-5101,

Dkt. 2168165 (April 11, 2026) (“Remand Order”). We did so

because the Defendants’ claimed irreparable harms—a

prerequisite for the issuance of a stay pending appeal—were

difficult to square with the limited record. See id. at 3 (citing

Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)).

The Defendants argued that the district court’s preliminary

injunction interfered with the construction of security fixtures

beneath the proposed ballroom. See Remand Order at 3. But

the injunction’s language prohibited only “physical

development of the proposed ballroom[.]” P.I. Order at 2

(emphasis added). It expressly exempted those “actions strictly

necessary to ensure the safety and security of the White House

and its grounds[.]” Id.

The Defendants also argued that the injunction would

jeopardize national security by delaying the realization of

security upgrades and the closure of the open construction site

on White House grounds. See Remand Order at 3–4. But the

Defendants had not explained how, if at all, the injunction

interfered with their plans to secure the grounds during a

project their own planning documents showed would not be

completed for more than two years at the earliest. See id.

(citing FONSI at 8).

We remanded the case to give the Defendants an

opportunity to develop a record of their claimed irreparable

harms and to allow the district court to resolve a then-pending

motion to clarify the injunction given the parties’ sharp27

disagreement over the scope of the injunction’s safety-and-

security exception. Remand Order at 4.

3

On remand, the Defendants told the district court that their

plans for below-ground security upgrades were “inseparable”

from the original ballroom design itself and that the two

“cannot exist in isolation.” See Resp. to Mot. to Clarify, ECF

No. 69, at 2–3. On that basis, the Defendants reasoned that the

court’s preliminary injunction had no effect and all

construction could proceed under the “‘safety-and-security’

exception” because “the entire project advances critical

national-security objectives as an integrated whole.” Id. at 1.

The district court strongly disagreed. See National Trust

for Historic Pres. in the U.S. v. National Park Serv., No. 25-

CV-4316, 2026 WL 1027744, at *1 (D.D.C. April 16, 2026)

(“National Trust IV”).

The court first pointed out that, through all previous stages

of the litigation, the Defendants had repeatedly represented that

the project’s “underground elements”—not anything above

ground—impacted national security, National Trust IV, 2026

WL 1027744, at *2, and that construction of the security

bunker below ground and the ballroom above were

“independent” of each other, id. at *3 (quoting P.I. Opp’n at

48). Further, the Defendants had assured the district court in

January that “the project’s below-ground elements do not ‘lock

in’ the design of the above-ground ballroom.” Id. at *2

(quoting P.I. Opp’n at 13). The district court found that the

Defendants’ current claim that the ballroom and below-ground

bunker construction have been an inseparable and integral

whole all along is “in direct conflict with Defendants’ prior

representations” to the court. Id. at *3.28

With that procedural background in mind, the district court

explained that its order enjoined “the above-ground, visible

construction of the ballroom,” but not below-ground

construction. National Trust IV, 2026 WL 1027744, at *2. In

the court’s judgment, that division both prevented the National

Trust’s threatened irreparable harms and respected the

“discrete national security concerns about construction of

underground elements” that the Defendants had raised

“throughout this case[.]” Id. The court further clarified that its

order did not affect the Secret Service’s plans to implement

“measures to ensure the security and safety of the President, the

First Family, and the White House complex[,]” id. at *3

(quotation marks omitted), or the Defendants’ plans “to

preserve and protect the structural integrity of the White House

and to protect the construction site itself from deterioration due

to the elements[,]” id. at *4. “Both categories of construction

activities may proceed.” Id.

The district court then modified its earlier preliminary

injunction to clarify that the order prohibits the Park Service,

EOP, EXR, and related officers, entities, and agents “from

taking any action in furtherance of the above-ground physical

construction of the proposed ballroom[.]” Am. P.I. Order, ECF

No. 73, at 1–2. At the same time—as long as the actions “will

not lock in the above-ground size and scale of the ballroom”—

the preliminary injunction “does not prohibit”:

 “[B]elow-ground construction, including below-

ground construction of national security

facilities”;

 “[A]bove-ground construction * * * that is strictly

necessary to cover, secure, and protect such

national security facilities”;29

 “[M]easures strictly necessary to provide for the

personal safety of the President and his staff short

of constructing the proposed above-ground

ballroom”; or

 “[C]onstruction strictly necessary to ensure the

safety, security, and structural integrity of the

White House, the White House grounds, and the

below-ground construction site—including

waterproofing, water management, structural

reinforcement, and sealing off exposed

construction areas—short of constructing the

proposed above-ground ballroom[.]”

Id. at 2–3.

The district court crafted each of those exceptions in

response to the specific national-security concerns the

Defendants had raised. National Trust IV, 2026 WL 1027744,

at *4. The court added that, having demarcated the lines

between prohibited and permissible construction, it would not

require the Defendants “to request and receive written approval

before proceeding” under those exceptions. Id. at *5 (quotation

marks omitted); see also id. (“I have no desire or intention to

be dragooned into the role of construction manager.”).

The district court stayed the effect of its amended

preliminary injunction until April 23, 2026, to allow the

Defendants to seek appellate relief. See Am. P.I. Order at 3;

National Trust IV, 2026 WL 1027744, at *5.

On the Defendants’ renewed motion for a stay pending

appeal, this court issued an administrative stay, consolidated

the stay motion and merits appeal from the preliminary30

injunction, and ordered highly expedited briefing and oral

argument.

II

Before reaching the merits, we must, as always, assure

ourselves of our jurisdiction, including Article III standing. At

the preliminary injunction stage, the National Trust needs to

“clear[ly]” show that it is “likely to establish each element of

standing.” Murthy v. Missouri, 144 S. Ct. 1972, 1986 (2024)

(quotation marks omitted).

An association like the National Trust has standing to sue

on behalf of its membership when (A) at least one of its

members would have standing independently, (B) the interests

the association is suing to protect “are germane to the

organization’s purpose[,]” and (C) the claim the association

asserts and the relief it requests do not require “the participation

of individual members in the lawsuit.” Students for Fair

Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College,

143 S. Ct. 2141, 2157 (2023) (quotation marks omitted).

At this preliminary stage, the National Trust clears those

hurdles.

A

1

With respect to the first prong of the associational standing

test, the National Trust has clearly shown that one of its

members likely has standing to sue in her own right.

Specifically, the Trust has shown that (i) its long-term member,

Professor Alison Hoagland, has suffered a concrete and

particularized “injury in fact” that is “actual or imminent”; (ii)31

her injury “is fairly traceable to the challenged action”; and (iii)

her injury will likely be redressed by a ruling in the National

Trust’s favor. Healthy Gulf v. Department of the Interior, 152

F.4th 180, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (quoting Center for

Sustainable Econ. v. Jewell, 779 F.3d 588, 596 (D.C. Cir.

2015)); see Students for Fair Admissions, 143 S. Ct. at 2157.

The National Trust identified Professor Hoagland as a

representative “example” of its “thousands of members” who

would be injured by the ballroom project. 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 22.

Professor Hoagland is an architectural historian, author,

consultant, and professor emerita in historic preservation.

Hoagland Decl. ¶¶ 4–5, 16. She has been a member of the

National Trust for over 40 years. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. She is currently

a Trustee of the National Trust and serves on its Executive

Committee. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. She previously worked for fifteen

years as the senior historian at the National Park Service’s

Historic American Buildings Survey, which documents

historic aspects of national sites, including the White House.

Id. ¶ 5.

Professor Hoagland routinely recreates by walking in front

of the White House and in Lafayette Square directly across

from the White House, and she “intend[s] to continue” doing

so. Hoagland Decl. ¶ 12. She “regularly walk[s] through

portions of President’s Park, including Lafayette Square, in

order to enjoy the historic buildings” in the area, the carefully

preserved historic architecture, and “the beauty of the L’Enfant

Plan[.]” Id. ¶ 9. She routinely “use[s], enjoy[s],” and

“derive[s] benefit from” President’s Park, “including the White

House[.]” Id. ¶ 3. A particular focus of Professor Hoagland’s32

tours is the “iconic” White House complex, which “continue[d]

to * * * impress[]” her after years of visits. Id. ¶ 12.4

In addition, as a Trustee and Executive Committee

member of the National Trust, Professor Hoagland attends

Board meetings that are “frequently” held at the Decatur

House, Merritt Decl. ¶ 9, a historic property “on the northwest

corner of Lafayette Square,” across the quadrangle from the

White House. Hoagland Decl. ¶ 12. She plans to attend those

meetings, which happen “at least annually,” at the Decatur

House in 2026. Hoagland Decl. ¶ 12. To get to the meetings,

Professor Hoagland, who lives just two miles away on Capitol

Hill, commonly walks along Lafayette Square in front of the

White House to enjoy its architectural simplicity and historical

significance. See id. ¶¶ 9, 12.

Professor Hoagland also is a professional academic who

continues to study and relies on the architectural design of the

White House and President’s Park in her work. See Hoagland

Decl. ¶¶ 11, 14. Specifically, she is a historian who publishes

works on historical architecture in Washington, D.C. Id. ¶ 4.

She has a special interest in vernacular architecture and the

District’s unique architectural history, and she has authored

several books and scholarly articles on those topics. See id.

¶¶ 4, 8. The structural appearance of the White House “affects

[Professor Hoagland’s] research” on “locally focused

architecture” because, throughout the Nation’s history, the

4 The dissenting opinion’s standing argument rests on a

misconstruction of Professor Hoagland’s declaration. It claims that

Professor Hoagland intends to travel to the area about once a month

only to “attend functions in neighboring buildings.” Dissenting Op.

14. The declaration actually states that she “intend[s] to continue to

travel to the area around the White House, to walk through Lafayette

Square, to attend functions in neighboring buildings, and to continue

to be impressed by this iconic building.” Hoagland Decl. ¶ 12.33

White House has “help[ed] to define” development in the

surrounding area, “while also serving as a landmark defining

L’Enfant’s plan for the city[.]” Id. ¶ 11. Indeed, as Professor

Hoagland notes, the White House sits at an important central

axis on the L’Enfant Plan, thus influencing the urban design of

the rest of the city. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11. Because of that, Professor

Hoagland uses “the White House as a reference point” for her

studies of D.C.’s architecture, given its role as “one of the first

prominent government buildings” in the early days of our new

Nation, and presently “as the most important house in the

city[.]” Hoagland Decl. ¶ 11; see also id. at ¶ 16. For Professor

Hoagland, the White House—designed to reflect “republican

simplicity”—“is one of the clearest examples of a building

constructed with the explicit intention of imparting meaning

with its style, size, and scale[,]” the message being that the

home of the elected United States President is designedly a

“modest building[.]” Id. ¶ 10.

Professor Hoagland further attests that building the 90,000

square-foot ballroom “would cause permanent and irreparable

harm to the White House and President’s Park” because it

would “overshadow[] the White House, exceeding it in height

and massing, [and] would diminish the primacy of the White

House[.]” Hoagland Decl. ¶ 13. She explains that “[n]o longer

would the eye be drawn to the jewel of the building in the

center,” which was designed to “declar[e] to viewers that our

president lives in a house[,]” and “not a palace.” Id. ¶¶ 10, 13.

Those changes, Professor Hoagland explains, will cause her to

“suffer both professional and personal injuries” to her

“aesthetic, cultural, and historic interests[.]” Id. ¶ 14. Her

“use” and “enjoy[ment]” of the White House, which have

already “been impaired by the destruction of the East Wing of

the White House[,] * * * will be impaired further by the

construction on the East Wing’s former site of a ballroom34

substantially similar” in size and design “to that which the

defendants propose to build.” Id. ¶ 3.

In addition, Professor Hoagland’s work as a Trustee and

member of the National Trust “will be impaired” by the

construction of the ballroom as the Trust focuses on

“preserving and protecting historic and cultural resources in

Washington, D.C.,” Hoagland Decl. ¶ 3, including the Trust-

owned Decatur House, id. ¶ 12, a historic residence hugging

the corner of Lafayette Square, Merritt Decl. ¶ 9, and its

environs and neighboring historic structures that make up the

historic district.

Further, like many National Trust members, Professor

Hoagland “use[s], enjoy[s], derive[s] benefit from, and ha[s] a

substantial interest in preserving and protecting historic and

cultural resources in Washington, D.C., including the White

House and President’s Park[.]” Hoagland Decl. ¶ 3. She

“intend[s] to continue to travel to the area around the White

House, to walk through Lafayette Square, [and] to attend

functions in neighboring buildings * * * about once a

month[.]” Id. ¶ 12. With the construction of the ballroom, her

walks through President’s Park would no longer permit her to

“enjoy” the “innovative preservation project concerning the

buildings surrounding Lafayette Square[,]” if that historical

coherence is destroyed by such an ahistoric and asymmetrical

change to the most important building in the Square. Id. ¶¶ 9,

10, 14. Construction of the ballroom, in short, will cause

Professor Hoagland personal and professional “injuries,

including to [her] aesthetic, cultural, and historical interests[.]”

Id. ¶ 14.

In those ways, Professor Hoagland has adequately alleged,

at this stage of the litigation, concrete and imminent

“professional and personal[,]” historical-preservation, and35

aesthetic injuries that “[she] would suffer[.]” Hoagland Decl.

¶ 14. For her, the historical and architectural coherence of

President’s Park and the White House that she routinely enjoys

studying, viewing, and spending time with would be

permanently lost by the construction of a structure that

“overshadow[s] the White House,” “exceeding it in height and

massing[.]” Id. ¶¶ 10, 13.

Professor Hoagland’s specific, here-and-now, and

frequently recurring injuries qualify as an Article III injury. A

plaintiff like Professor Hoagland who “aver[s] that [she] use[s]

the affected area” and is an individual “‘for whom the aesthetic

and recreational values of the area will be lessened’ by the

challenged activity” has “adequately allege[d]” an injury in

fact. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC),

Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton,

405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)); see also Summers v. Earth Island

Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 494 (2009) (“[I]f [the alleged] harm in fact

affects the recreational or even the mere esthetic interests of the

plaintiff, that will suffice.”).

Numerous cases from the Supreme Court and this court

have recognized Article III injuries in similar circumstances.

See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181–183 (holding

that individuals who lived within driving distance of a river and

who fished in it and picnicked along its banks had standing to

challenge water pollution); Center for Biological Diversity v.

Fish & Wildlife Serv., 146 F.4th 1144, 1157–1158 (D.C. Cir.

2025) (holding that an amateur photographer and entomophile

who went on annual vacations to view the American Burying

Beetle had standing to challenge a change in its protected

status); International Dark-Sky Ass’n v. FCC, 106 F.4th 1206,

1217 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (holding that amateur stargazers and

astronomers who look at the sky for recreation had standing to

challenge an environmental assessment of a license permitting36

satellites that caused light pollution); Sierra Club v. Jewell, 764

F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that the National Trust’s

members who “view and enjoy” the historic battlefield site of

Blair Mountain “for purposes of studying and appreciating its

history” had standing to challenge governmental action

affecting the historical status of the Mountain); see also

Summers, 555 U.S. at 494 (recognizing government admission

that a plaintiff who had repeatedly visited a national forest to

view flora and fauna, and who had imminent plans to do so

again, suffered a cognizable aesthetic injury for purposes of

standing from a planned sale of felled logs).5

5 The dissenting opinion attempts to distinguish these cases by

pointing out that “stargazers” “use the sky” when looking at

constellations and history buffs “view and enjoy” a battlefield when

they visit it to study and appreciate its historical significance.

Dissenting Op. 13 (first quoting International Dark-Sky Ass’n, 106

F.4th at 1217, and second quoting Sierra Club, 764 F.3d at 5).

Professor Hoagland alleges the same. She has attested that she

“use[s] * * * the White House and President’s Park” when she

“regularly walk[s]” there “in order to enjoy the historic buildings, the

beauty of the L’Enfant Plan * * *, and the innovative preservation

project concerning the buildings surrounding Lafayette Square[.]”

Hoagland Decl. ¶¶ 3, 9. The dissenting opinion offers no principled

distinction between the injury in fact of disrupted star gazing,

battlefield gazing, animal viewing, and Professor Hoagland’s

disrupted historic architecture viewing (and studying).

The dissenting opinion also claims that Professor Hoagland’s

injuries are not sufficiently “imminent.” Dissenting Op. 13–14. That

is wrong. Her concrete plans to “travel to the area around the White

House” to see the “iconic [White House] building * * * about once a

month” plainly are imminent under established precedent. Hoagland

Decl. ¶ 12. The Supreme Court, moreover, has found an imminent

injury when the defendant was likely to award a relevant contract “at

least once per year,” and the plaintiff was “very likely to bid on each

such contract[.]” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,37

Before both the district court and this court, the

Defendants insisted that Professor Hoagland and members of

the public will not be able to see the massive ballroom from

various angles around Lafayette Square. See 2d P.I. Opp’n at

37 (“Dr. Hoagland could scarcely see the old East Wing from

public view, and the new East Wing will be equally

obscured.”); Oral Arg. Tr. 7:3–8 (“[A]t least in the classic

locations where people come to view the White House from the

south, you will not be able to see the east wing. * * * If you

come to the front from the north view, the classic view, the

trees are designed to shield the view.”); id. at 9:3–5 (“I think

[Professor Hoagland] would have to intentionally put herself in

the very narrow locations where you can actually view [the

ballroom].”).

“[P]ure fiction” was the district court’s response to that

factual argument. National Trust III, 827 F. Supp. 3d at 114

n.18. The district court found as fact that “Defendants’ own

renderings show that the proposed ballroom will be clearly

visible from Lafayette Park, and even from the steps of the U.S.

Capitol[.]” Id. (citing Executive Director’s Recommendation,

National Cap. Planning Comm’n 17–18 (March 5, 2026),

https://perma.cc/4LFC-YDEJ). The Defendants have not

argued those findings were clear error. See Doe v. Blanche,

172 F.4th 901, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2026). Nor could they given that

the National Park Service itself found that the ballroom will

“permanently alter[]” “views of the White House from

Lafayette Park[,]” and will cause “visual imbalance” in the

White House’s historic appearance. FONSI at 6, 7; Env’t

212 (1995). This court likewise has found aesthetic standing where

a plaintiff “plan[ned] to” observe beetles in the habitat at issue “[i]n

the coming years * * * during his annual summer vacation.” Center

for Biological Diversity, 146 F.4th at 1158 (quotation marks

omitted).38

Assessment at 19 (“[V]iews from certain locations, particularly

Lafayette Square and portions of the Ellipse, would be altered

[by ballroom construction].”).

Nor can the Defendants claim that Professor Hoagland is

misguided in asserting those injuries. The Defendants

themselves have admitted that constructing the ballroom will

cause the same substantial, adverse, and irreparable visual,

aesthetic, historical-preservation, and architectural

consequences to which Professor Hoagland gives voice and

which “thousands” of National Trust members share, 2d Am.

Compl. ¶ 22. In its August 2025 Environmental Assessment

and Finding of No Significant Impact, the National Park

Service concluded that “views of the White House from

Lafayette Park and the Ellipse will be permanently altered due

to the modifications to the East Wing.” FONSI at 6 (emphasis

added); see also id. at 5 (Park Service explaining that

“[s]ituated on a high point within the city, the White House is

a focal point on the principal north-south axis of L’Enfant’s

plan[,]” in which “[v]iews and vistas were among the most

essential features”).

The report also found that the ballroom “will disrupt the

historical continuity of the White House grounds and alter the

architectural integrity of the east side[.]” FONSI at 7. That is

because the addition of the ballroom “will dominate the eastern

portion of the site, creating a visual imbalance with the more

modestly scaled West Wing and Executive Mansion.” Id.

The Defendants’ own admission of the extensive and

permanent architectural, historical-preservation, and other

aesthetic harms that the ballroom construction will cause

underscores the concreteness, imminence, and substantiality of

Professor Hoagland’s individualized injuries, which arise from

her routine recreational, volunteer, and professional activities39

in President’s Park. At the same time, such official

concurrence, after in-depth and formal review by the Executive

Branch, certainly belies the Defendants’ effort to paint

Professor Hoagland’s injuries as the idiosyncratic grousing of

“a single pedestrian[]” who “occasionally walks near

President’s Park[.]” Defs.’ Opening Br. 4.

Nor is it accurate for the Defendants to categorize

Professor Hoagland’s injury as a mere “psychological

consequence” that similarly impacts everyone across the

country. Defs.’ Opening Br. 24 (quoting Valley Forge

Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church

& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982)). Professor Hoagland

has identified concrete ways she is personally and routinely

impacted by the ballroom construction in her professional

commitments that require her to meet in Lafayette Square, her

recreational time walking through President’s Park to enjoy its

historic architecture, and her professional research and writing

that focus on D.C. architecture and its connection to the

L’Enfant Plan, of which the White House serves as a critical

focal point. See Hoagland Decl. ¶¶ 9, 11–14; see also BERG,

GRAND AVENUES at 102 (In the L’Enfant Plan, “[t]he Congress

House and President’s House were set on the two highest points

in the territory, providing a pair of geometrical and

geographical anchors for the city’s road map.”); Alison K.

Hoagland, Nineteenth-Century Building Regulations in

Washington, D.C., 52 RECS. COLUMBIA HIST. SOC’Y 57, 58

(1989) (“[President] Washington’s regulations, primarily

concerned with aesthetics, were intended to produce buildings

which complemented L’Enfant’s plan[.]”).

In those ways, Professor Hoagland is a far cry from the

doctors alleging harm when thinking about or witnessing others

use abortion drugs. Defs.’ Opening Br. 10 (quoting Food &

Drug Admin. v. Alliance for Hippocratic Med., 144 S. Ct. 1540,40

1561 n.3 (2024)). She has alleged direct harm to her personal

“aesthetic, cultural, and historic” interests that she fulfills

through her regular visits to President’s Park, Hoagland Decl.

¶¶ 11–14, not mere “distress at or disagreement with the

activities of others[,]” divorced from the governmental action’s

direct effect on her, Alliance for Hippocratic Med., 144 S. Ct.

at 1561 n.3.

The Defendants maintain that Professor Hoagland can

easily avert her gaze to avoid viewing the new ballroom and so

she is “[u]nlike” the plaintiffs in cases in which we have found

standing when plaintiffs are “deprived of [the] opportunity” to

view something they wish to observe. Defs.’ Opening Br. 27.

That is wrong. Professor Hoagland will no longer be able to

“use[ and] derive benefit from” seeing and studying a White

House with historic and intentionally designed “republican

simplicity,” and that permanent loss will injure her “aesthetic,

cultural, and historical interests[.]” Hoagland Decl. ¶¶ 3, 10,

14. She will also lose forever the opportunity to view Lafayette

Square with the intentional architectural symmetry of the 235-

year-old L’Enfant Plan—an experience she greatly values—if

the ballroom is constructed as planned. See id. at ¶¶ 9, 13. The

proposed ballroom would so alter the symmetry of the White

House complex that it would no longer remain in harmony with

the symmetry of Major L’Enfant’s axial plan of the capital city,

in which the President’s House and the Capitol building sit

symmetrically on perpendicular axes. See FONSI at 6–7 (“This

change will disrupt the historical continuity of the White House

grounds and alter the architectural integrity of the east side of

the property.”); Env’t Assessment at 10 (noting that the

symmetrically designed “axial relationship” that had

previously existed between the Capitol and the White House

had been “one of the defining attributes for the entirety of

Washington, DC’s monumental core”).41

The Defendants nonetheless insist that aesthetic harm from

the permanent visual destruction of part of the Nation’s history

is insufficient unless it also changes the plaintiff’s conduct.

Defs.’ Opening Br. 28–29. That makes no sense. The whole

point of preserving historic buildings and sites, monuments,

and memorials is for members of the public to be able to visit

them, view them, and appreciate them, even though they cannot

use them in the tangible ways the Defendants would require.

Some people visit particular national sites—like the Mormon

Pioneer Trail, the First Baptist Meeting House in America,

Ebenezer Baptist Church, and Zion and Bryce Canyon National

Parks—because of their religious significance and inspiration,

and the loss of the ability to have that religious experience has

long been acknowledged to be an Article III injury. See, e.g.,

Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S.

439, 442 (1988) (adjudicating the merits of a case when the

alleged injury was that the construction of a road would

damage “the sacred areas which are an integral and necessary

part of the belief systems and lifeway of Northwest California

Indian peoples”); Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic Pres.

Off. v. FERC, 949 F.3d 8, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (noting that “the

destruction of the ceremonial landscapes” used by the

Narragansett Tribe for cultural and religious purposes

“certainly qualifies as an injury in fact”); Arizona Mining

Reform Coal. v. Forest Serv., 172 F.4th 641, 655 (9th Cir.

2026) (finding standing for Apache Tribe members challenging

a copper mine’s construction when the Forest Service’s

assessment identified “physical and visual impacts on

traditional cultural places” that the Apache used for religious

ceremonies) (formatting modified); South Texas Env’t Just.

Network v. Texas Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 165 F.4th 356, 366

(5th Cir. 2026) (holding that the Carrizo Comecrudo Tribe had

standing to challenge the construction of a natural gas pipeline

when the Tribe alleged that its members’ “recreational,42

aesthetic, and religious experiences in the area surrounding the

site will be harmed”).

In that same way, others seek aesthetic, familial, cultural,

historical, or educational connection and enrichment from

visiting national sites and parks and culturally significant

places. See Lemon v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1312, 1314–1315 (D.C.

Cir. 2008) (finding standing for plaintiffs alleging harm due to

“the closure and redevelopment of Fort Ritchie[,]” “an historic

site they visit and enjoy”); Sierra Club v. Department of

Transportation, 125 F.4th 1170, 1181–1182 (D.C. Cir. 2025)

(finding standing for a native Tribe challenging the shipping of

natural gas through tribal land, which affects “the Tribe’s

heritage, its land, its people, and its resources”) (quotation

marks omitted).

The Defendants’ cramped standing theory would deem no

one injured by a decision to raze the Statue of Liberty, to

obscure the names on the Vietnam War Memorial, or to install

a political billboard atop Mount Rushmore. People wounded

by the lost historical view could just “shift [their] gaze[.]”

Defs.’ Opening Br. 25. Yet the harm would remain from being

unable to look upon, learn from, or commune in a location

where, for example, a personal hero was born, an ancestor first

arrived in the United States, a relative died on September 11th,

or the battle for the individual’s equal rights and dignity first

started. The Defendants’ argument, in other words, simply

brushes off the signification, emotion, meaning, and

particularized value to individuals of witnessing certain places

where their history happened, looking upon architectural

marvels, reveling in sweeping landscapes, and viewing

buildings, memorials, and monuments that tell the American

story.43

The Defendants’ and the dissenting opinion’s resort to

Environmental Defense Fund v. FERC, 2 F.4th 953 (D.C. Cir.

2021), is of no help. In that case, the plaintiff complained that

a metering station she would drive by and incidentally view

was an “eyesore,” but “she never indicate[d] how she derived

aesthetic value from the land as it had existed before the

construction[,]” “that she intended to use the land in the

future[,]” or “that her planned future uses of the land have been

foreclosed by the construction[.]” Id. at 969; see also Gardner

v. Mutz, 962 F.3d 1329, 1342–1343 (11th Cir. 2020) (finding

no aesthetic injury for individuals opposing the move of a

Confederate statue because the plaintiffs failed to allege that

they “routinely visited the monument [in the prior location] or,

alternatively, that they won’t be able to visit the monument at

its new location”). Professor Hoagland, by contrast, has

detailed (i) her aesthetic and professional interests in

appreciating and studying the historic design of the White

House, the architectural significance it embodies, and the

political statement it makes about her value as a citizen,

Hoagland Decl. ¶¶ 10–14; (ii) her regular visits to enjoy and

take in the views, id. ¶¶ 9–10, and intent to continue to do so

on a routine basis, id. ¶ 12; and (iii) how the proposed ballroom

would materially injure her personal and professional

enjoyment of the historic site, id. ¶¶ 13–14.

Further, Professor Hoagland has alleged a “particularized

connection” to the Lafayette Square historic district. As a

Trustee of the National Trust, Professor Hoagland has a

professional interest in the historic nature of Lafayette Square,

which houses the Trust’s meetings. See Section II.B., infra.

Moreover, unlike the plaintiff in Environmental Defense Fund,

Professor Hoagland’s individualized harm goes beyond just

passing distaste. She chooses routes through President’s Park

that provide her with views of the White House for personal

recreation, enjoyment, and aesthetic pleasure, both as an44

individual and as someone with a keen appreciation for the

architecture. Further, her academic work using the unique

architecture of “the most important house in the city” as a

central “landmark defining L’Enfant’s plan for the city” will be

hampered by the construction of the looming ballroom as part

of the White House. Hoagland Decl. ¶¶ 9, 11.

2

The National Trust has also clearly shown a likelihood of

establishing that the Defendants have caused Professor

Hoagland’s injuries and that court-ordered relief can redress

them. Indeed, the Defendants have not challenged the National

Trust’s standing on these grounds. For good reason. The

National Trust, as voiced by its member Professor Hoagland,

has explained—and the district court found as fact—that

constructing a ballroom of the looming size the Defendants

intend on the East Wing’s former site will cause the very harms

identified by Professor Hoagland. Hoagland Decl. ¶¶ 13–14;

National Trust II, 821 F. Supp. 3d at 70–71; see Diamond Alt.

Energy, LLC v. EPA, 145 S. Ct. 2121, 2135 (2025); Duke

Power Co. v. Carolina Env’t Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,

77–78 (1978); see also P.I. Hr’g, ECF No. 57, 11:12–14

(“Once above-grade construction proceeds, those adverse

aesthetic impacts and the adverse cultural impacts will be

locked in.”); Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1799 (2021)

(noting that the traceability inquiry asks “whether the

plaintiffs’ injury can be traced to allegedly unlawful conduct of

the defendant, not to the provision of law that is challenged”)

(quotation marks omitted).

In addition, the Defendants do not dispute that an

injunction from the district court preventing ballroom

construction will remediate that injury. See Friends of the

Earth, 528 U.S. at 185–186 (“It can scarcely be doubted that,45

for a plaintiff who is injured or faces the threat of future injury

due to illegal conduct ongoing at the time of suit, a sanction

that effectively abates that conduct * * * provides a form of

redress.”).

B

Having clearly shown that an individual member of the

Trust likely has standing, the National Trust also is likely to

establish the second prong of associational standing—

germaneness—because the historical and architectural injuries

asserted fall squarely within its area of expertise and concern.

Germaneness requires “pertinence” between the object of

the litigation and the plaintiff’s “organizational purpose.”

Center for Sustainable Econ., 779 F.3d at 597 (quotation marks

omitted); see International Dark-Sky Ass’n, 106 F.4th at 1218.

The point of the inquiry is to prevent organizations from

litigating “issues as to which the organizations themselves

enjoy little expertise and about which few of their members

demonstrably care.” Center for Sustainable Econ., 779 F.3d at

597 (quotation marks omitted). In that way, the germaneness

requirement guards against an association “alleging injury

from governmental action wholly unrelated” to its own

interests; otherwise, an association could become akin to a law

firm “seeking to sue in its own name on behalf of a client * * *

alleging injury from governmental action wholly unrelated to

the firm.” Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45,

57–58 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (emphasis omitted).

That concern has no purchase here. The National Trust

was chartered by Congress in 1949 as a nonprofit corporation,

“to facilitate public participation in the preservation of sites,

buildings, and objects of national significance or interest[.]” 54

U.S.C. § 312102(a); Merritt Decl. ¶ 2. Its “self-described46

mission[,]” International Dark-Sky Ass’n, 106 F.4th at 1218, is

to “protect[] America’s historic sites through stewardship,

advocacy, and direct assistance[,]” 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 21.

The National Trust also has unquestioned “expertise” in

historic sites and the preservation of historic buildings and

land, and its members are “demonstrably” invested in that

cause. See Center for Sustainable Econ., 779 F.3d at 597

(quoting Humane Soc’y of the U.S., 840 F.2d at 57); see also

2d Am. Compl. ¶ 22 (“Members of the National Trust use,

enjoy, derive personal and professional benefit from, and have

a substantial interest in preserving and protecting historic and

cultural resources in Washington, D.C., including the White

House and President’s Park.”); Letter from Nat’l Trust to Defs.,

ECF No. 2-16, at 2 (“[The National Trust’s] mission is to

protect America’s significant historic sites and to advocate for

historic preservation as a core public value.”); International

Dark-Sky Ass’n, 106 F.4th at 1218 (holding that the mission of

an association of “stargazers” that “exists primarily to provide

information and education to the public” was germane to a

lawsuit challenging the environmental assessment of a license

for satellites emitting light pollution).

The Defendants contend that the National Trust’s purpose

is limited to just two of its enumerated statutory authorities—

that is, to “receive donations of sites, buildings, and objects

significant in American history and culture” and to “preserve

and administer” those sites “for public benefit.” Defs.’

Opening Br. 32 (quoting 54 U.S.C. § 312102(b)(1), (2)).

Because the Trust cannot acquire property within a National

Park, 54 U.S.C. § 312105(g), the Defendants assert that the

National Trust lacks any “role to play” in regard to the White

House. Defs.’ Opening Br. 33; see also Dissenting Op. 7–8.47

At the outset, we are skeptical that the germaneness

inquiry is limited to the National Trust’s statutorily delineated

functions. We have specifically rejected the idea that an

association fails to satisfy the germaneness requirement

because there is “no specific reference in its certificate of

incorporation” to the “litigation subject[.]” Humane Soc’y of

the U.S., 840 F.2d at 58–59; see also id. at 59 (“[T]he

[Supreme] Court nowhere has suggested that mention of a

given purpose in an organization’s organic papers is

talismanic[.]”). True, the National Trust is differently situated

from some other associational plaintiffs because its purposes

are statutorily defined. But neither the Defendants nor the

dissenting opinion offer a good reason that difference should

matter.

The dissenting opinion argues that a congressionally

chartered nonprofit corporation may sue “only to vindicate its

statutory authority.” Dissenting Op. 7. None of the cases cited

for that proposition are relevant to the National Trust’s

challenge. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Texas & Pacific Railway

Company, 241 U.S. 295, 302–303 (1916) (Railroad foreclosure

case interpreting a 1915 law that stripped federal courts of

jurisdiction over cases against railroads where the federal

question jurisdiction was based only on the railroad being

incorporated by federal statute); Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n

v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (Telecommunications case

holding that agency action does not preempt state law when the

agency has acted outside its statutory scope of authority);

Department of Transportation v. Association of American

Railroads, 575 U.S. 43, 54–55 (2015) (holding that separation

of powers claims could be brought against Amtrak because

“[t]he political branches created Amtrak, control its Board,

define its mission, specify many of its day-to-day operations,

have imposed substantial transparency and accountability

mechanisms, and, for all practical purposes, set and supervise48

its annual budget”). These cases have nothing to say about

congressionally chartered nonprofits or the germaneness

requirement of associational standing.

Anyhow, even if the National Trust’s associational

interests to which litigation could be pertinent were tied tightly

to the mast of its charter, the Defendants’ argument would still

fail in multiple respects.

To start, the Defendants and dissenting opinion ignore that

the National Trust’s charter also charges it with “carrying out

[a] preservation program” that goes beyond just receiving

pieces of property. 54 U.S.C. § 312102(b)(3). Specifically, the

National Trust is directed to work with agencies at all levels of

government, “corporations, associations, [and] individuals” to

promote the “protection, preservation, maintenance, or

operation of any historic site, building, object, or property used

in connection with the site, * * * regardless of whether the

National Trust has acquired title to the property, or any

interest in the property.” Id. § 312105(h) (emphasis added).

The National Trust’s interest in preserving the architectural

history of the White House and President’s Park accordingly

falls squarely within its congressionally chartered role and

concern.

Indeed, the National Trust’s ability to preserve the

architectural and historic environment of property it owns—

including the Decatur House in President’s Park—is directly

affected by the ballroom construction. See Nat’l Trust Br. 27–

28; Env’t Assessment at 11 (The new ballroom “would have

permanent adverse impacts on the cultural landscape [of

President’s Park], particularly the White House Grounds

cultural landscape.”). The Decatur House was the first private

home built in the area near the White House and sits on the

northwest corner of President’s Park, looking out onto the49

future ballroom site. See Merritt Decl. ¶ 9; FONSI at 15

(“[V]iews of the White House from Lafayette Park and the

Ellipse will be permanently altered due to the modifications to

the East Wing.”). Lafayette Square is home not only to the

Decatur House, but also to other historic buildings that have

played a key role in American history, like the Dolley Madison

House and the President’s Guest House. Matthew R. Costello,

Lafayette Square: The People’s Park, 32 WASH. HIST. Fall

2020, at 10; see also Merritt Decl. ¶ 9.

Protecting the nature of its own historic neighborhood is

certainly pertinent to the National Trust’s mission. Congress

has charged the National Trust to “preserve * * * for public

benefit” the Decatur House, 54 U.S.C. § 312102(b)(2), and to

“facilitate public participation in the preservation of sites,

buildings, and objects of national significance” more broadly,

id. § 312102(a). After all, the significance of the Decatur

House is dependent, in part, on its location in one of the most

architecturally historic areas in the District of Columbia.

Tearing a hole in the architectural cohesion of President’s Park

and the Lafayette Square historic district diminishes the

historic significance of the Decatur House itself and threatens

the legacy of the oldest residence in the area. See Merritt Decl.

¶ 9. By bringing this lawsuit on behalf of its thousands of

members who share “a substantial interest in preserving and

protecting historic and cultural resources in Washington,

D.C.,” the National Trust is facilitating just such participation

and fulfilling its “advocacy” mission. See Hoagland Decl. ¶ 3;

2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21–22; see also International Union, United

Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of America v.

Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 286 (1986) (reasoning that “there is little

question that the interests” of a union advocating for its

members’ unemployment benefits were “germane to the

organization’s purpose” when one of the goals enumerated in50

the union’s constitution was to advocate “on a national scale”

for benefits).

Further, the National Trust was established “to facilitate

public participation in the preservation of sites, buildings, and

objects of national significance or interest[,]” 54 U.S.C.

§ 312102(a), as well as to “further” the “national policy” of

preserving such sites, buildings, and objects “for the inspiration

and benefit of the people of the United States[,]” id.; id.

§ 320101. Such a mission is certainly pertinent to the National

Trust’s aim of ensuring a historically integrated and cohesive

design for whatever is built where the East Wing used to stand.

See id. § 312105(k) (“The National Trust may generally do any

and all lawful acts necessary or appropriate to carry out the

purposes for which the National Trust is created.”).

In that regard, we note that this court has previously held

that the National Trust has associational standing to challenge

the spoliation of historic sites over which it has no ownership

or legal interests. In Sierra Club v. Jewell, 764 F.3d 1 (D.C.

Cir. 2014), we held that a group of “environmental and historic

preservation organizations,” including the National Trust, had

associational standing to challenge the delisting of Blair

Mountain battlefield from the National Register of Historic

Places. Id. at 3. This court so held even though “the Battlefield

area [was] privately owned” and there was no evidence that any

member “possess[ed] any legal entitlement to set foot” on it.

Id. at 6. We explained that “there is no reason that the

cognizability of aesthetic and associated interests in a particular

site could turn on owning a legal right to enter or view the

property.” Id.

The dissenting opinion insists that Sierra Club amounts to

nothing more than a “drive-by jurisdictional ruling[.]”

Dissenting Op. 10. Hardly. Sierra Club did not “silently51

assume[] jurisdiction or merely state[] without analysis that it

existed[.]” United States v. Jones, 846 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir.

2017) (citation omitted). Quite the opposite, Sierra Club’s

only holding was that the plaintiffs there—the National Trust

included—had standing. See 764 F.3d at 3. And Sierra Club

did so in express reliance on declarations from the National

Trust’s members. See id. at 5; Decl. of Barbara Rasmussen,

Sierra Club v. Salazar, 894 F. Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2012) (No.

10-1513), ECF No. 23-6, at ¶ 1; Decl. of Nell Ziehl, Sierra

Club, 894 F. Supp. 2d 97, ECF No. 23-8, at ¶ 1. See also

National Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Semonite, 925 F.3d 500,

501 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (National Trust participation

in suit challenging a utility’s erection of electrical transmission

towers across the James River); National Trust for Historic

Pres. in the U.S. v. Dole, 828 F.2d 776, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

(per curiam) (challenging construction barriers on the Duke

Ellington Bridge).

C

Finally, there is no serious question that the injunctive and

declaratory relief sought by the National Trust does not require

the participation of an individual plaintiff. Hunt v. Washington

State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 344 (1977)

(holding that a “request for declaratory and injunctive relief”

does not mandate “individualized proof[,]” and so it is

“properly resolved in a group context”); Animal Legal Def.

Fund, Inc. v. Vilsack, 111 F.4th 1219, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 2024)

(holding that animal rights group seeking declaratory and

injunctive relief against an agency did not require “personal

participation” by individual members).52

* * * * *

For all of those reasons, we affirm the district court’s

conclusion that the National Trust has clearly shown a

likelihood of associational standing.

III

We now turn to the merits of the Defendants’ appeal. For

a preliminary injunction to issue, the district court must find

that (1) the moving party is likely to “succeed on the merits”;

(2) the moving party is likely to “suffer irreparable harm in the

absence of preliminary relief”; (3) the equities favor the

issuance of an injunction; and (4) “an injunction is in the public

interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S.

7, 20 (2008). We review the district court’s issuance of a

preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Media Matters

for America v. Paxton, 138 F.4th 563, 573 (D.C. Cir. 2025).

On this record, the Defendants have not shown that the

district court abused its discretion in enjoining above-ground

construction of the planned ballroom itself while still allowing

the below-ground construction of security features and the

above-ground construction of measures necessary to ensure

safety and security.

A

The National Trust has shown that it is likely to succeed

on the merits.

The Defendants concede that the Executive lacks any

inherent constitutional authority to construct the ballroom.

Instead, as all agree, the Constitution gives Congress exclusive

authority to regulate federal property and the District of53

Columbia. See U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; id. Art. I, § 8,

cl. 17. The only question is therefore whether Congress has

authorized the Defendants’ ballroom construction by statute.

The Defendants point to two potential sources of authority.

The first is 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a), a provision of the statute

creating the National Park Service. The second is 3 U.S.C.

§ 105(d), which addresses the President, and under which the

Office of the Executive Residence (EXR) is purportedly acting

to lead the construction.

Importantly, however, the Defendants have authority to

carry out the ballroom construction only if both statutes apply.

Section 100101(a) alone cannot support the project because, as

we detail below, the only statute that could supply EXR

authority to lead the project is Section 105(d). And the

Defendants conceded at oral argument that Section 105(d)

alone cannot support the project. Oral Arg. Tr. 55:4–56:19.

That is so because the project is funded by private donations

given to the National Park Service and—even on the

Defendants’ view of the case—those funds can be used to

support the ballroom construction only if the National Park

Service could use the funds under Section 100101(a) for the

identified purposes of conservation and preservation.6

6 The dissenting opinion asserts that we “need not address the

Trust’s APA challenge to NPS’s construction authority[.]”

Dissenting Op. 24–25 n.8. That assertion rests on the premise that

the Park Service’s sole involvement is “collecting donations and

transferring them to EXR[.]” Id. But the Defendants themselves

claim that the Park Service can fulfill that role only “because the

[ballroom construction] is authorized by the [Park Service’s] Organic

Act.” Defs.’ Opening Br. 45. Indeed, that is why the Defendants

concede that the Organic Act must apply for them to be able to

undertake the ballroom project using donations to the Park Service.54

Regardless, the Defendants are unlikely to succeed on the

merits under either provision. If the Park Service is acting

under 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a), then the Defendants violated the

Administrative Procedure Act because Section 100101(a) does

not authorize the ballroom construction. And to the extent the

project instead rests on the President’s authority under 3 U.S.C.

§ 105(d), then the Defendants acted ultra vires by relying on a

patent misconstruction of that statute. Indeed, the statutory

landscape reveals that over the decades, Congress has jealously

guarded its authority over the White House and President’s

Park in multiple ways. Contrary to the Defendants’ telling,

Congress has not relinquished to the Executive Branch full

authority to reshape these iconic, historic sites.

1

The National Trust is likely to succeed on its claim,

brought under the APA, that the National Park Service Organic

Act does not authorize the ballroom project.

The starting point for the National Trust’s claim is 40

U.S.C. § 8106. That statute, first enacted in 1912, provides that

“[a] building or structure shall not be erected on any

reservation, park, or public grounds of the Federal Government

in the District of Columbia without express authority of

Congress.” The Defendants do not dispute that, by

constructing the ballroom, they would “erect[]” a “building or

structure” on a “park [or] public grounds of the Federal

Government in the District of Columbia[.]”

The plain text of Section 8106 unambiguously bars the

ballroom construction, absent another statute providing the

National Park Service with “express authority” to construct

buildings in federal parks in the District of Columbia. The

Defendants nevertheless argue that Section 8106 does not bind55

the Executive Branch at all, because “it was concerned with

stopping construction by unauthorized third parties[.]” Defs.’

Opening Br. 50–51. The statute’s text makes no such

suggestion. The Defendants’ only support for this theory is a

statement by an Executive Branch official in 1926 suggesting

that the statute was enacted to “prevent[] encroachments upon

park property by other Government offices or by the public,

and has never been construed to prevent such construction by

the park authorities within the limits of the appropriations.” Id.

at 51 (quoting District of Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1927:

Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on

Appropriations, 69th Cong. 533 (1926)). It suffices to say that

this solitary statement, made over a decade after Section 8106’s

enactment, cannot change the clear statutory text.

Because Section 8106 applies by its plain terms, the

Defendants must identify “express authority” for the Park

Service to erect structures in federal parks in the District of

Columbia, and thus to engage in the ballroom construction. As

noted, they rely upon 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a), which was

enacted after Section 8106 in 1916 and today states:

The Secretary, acting through the Director of the

National Park Service, shall promote and regulate the

use of the National Park System by means and

measures that conform to the fundamental purpose of

the System units, which purpose is to conserve the

scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life in

the System units and to provide for the enjoyment of

the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life

in such manner and by such means as will leave them

unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.

54 U.S.C. § 100101(a). Because the White House is within a

National Park Service “System unit[]”—President’s Park, see56

Act of Sept. 22, 1961, § 1, 75 Stat. at 586—the Defendants

contend that this general language confers the requisite express

authority for construction on federal property in the District of

Columbia, and so the National Trust is unlikely to succeed on

its contrary-to-law claim under the Administrative Procedure

Act, see Defs.’ Opening Br. 43–45.7

There are two flaws with that position. First, Section

100101(a) says nothing about construction, much less

construction in the District of Columbia. The operative

language is instead strikingly general, providing that the Park

Service “shall promote and regulate the use of the National

Park System by means and measures that conform to the

fundamental purpose of the System units[.]” 54 U.S.C.

§ 100101(a). Perhaps Section 100101(a)—by permitting

“means” and “measures” that conform to the fundamental

purpose of the Park System—authorizes certain construction in

national parks generally. But Section 8106 bars construction

on parks and other public grounds of the federal government

specifically in the District of Columbia, unless Congress

provides “express authority” to do so. Read in context, we do

not think a statute that arguably authorizes an agency to engage

in construction and other acts throughout the country—without

addressing the District of Columbia in particular—constitutes

the type of “express authority” Section 8106 demands.

Second, and independently, the Defendants’ claim that the

ballroom construction is authorized by Section 100101(a) also

contravenes the express condition the statute places on the Park

Service’s authority. The statute authorizes the Director to take

7 System units are defined as “any area of land and water

administered by the Secretary [of the Interior], acting through the

Director [of the Park Service], for park, monument, historic,

parkway, recreational, or other purposes.” 54 U.S.C. § 100501; see

id. § 100102(6).57

actions that “conform to the fundamental purpose of the

System units,” and specifies that purpose as “to conserve the

scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life in the System

units and to provide for the enjoyment of the scenery, natural

and historic objects, and wild life in such manner and by such

means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of

future generations.” 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (emphases added).

To drive the point home, Congress in the 1978 Redwood

Amendment expressly “reaffirm[ed], declare[d], and

direct[ed]” that the Park Service’s authority “shall not be

exercised in derogation of the values and purposes for which

the System units have been established, except as directly and

specifically provided by Congress.” Id. § 100101(b)(2).

Reading those provisions together, Congress has

prohibited any action that does not “conserve the scenery * * *

and historic objects” in national parks. “Conserve” means “to

keep from being damaged, lost, or wasted; save.” Conserve,

WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 297 (3d college ed.

1988); see also Conserve, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE

DICTIONARY 313 (2d college ed. 1991) (defining “conserve” as

“[t]o protect from loss or depletion”). The East Wing is a

“historic object[]” within President’s Park. 54 U.S.C.

§ 100101(a). The Defendants do not explain how their

construction project—which will significantly and

permanently alter the historic appearance and architecture of

the entire White House campus by demolishing and replacing

the East Wing—can possibly “conserve” the East Wing, much

less the “scenery” of President’s Park, so as to “leave them

unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.” Id. To

the contrary, the Defendants tout the many ways in which the

project, in their view, will “demoli[sh]” and “replac[e]” that

historic object. Defs.’ Opening Br. 12, 38; see also Env’t

Assessment at 11, 14 (observing that “[d]econstruction and

replacement of the East Wing would result in the permanent58

alteration of a component that has been integral to White House

operations since its construction in 1942[,]” and that the

ballroom “would have permanent adverse impacts on the

cultural landscape”). Section 100101(a) certainly does not

“directly and specifically” authorize that impairing

construction as the Redwood Amendment requires. 54 U.S.C.

§ 100101(b)(2).

The Defendants assert that this express statutory obstacle

amounts only to a “policy dispute” with the Park Service’s

determination that the ballroom construction generally

promotes the purposes of President’s Park. Defs.’ Reply Br.

21. The Defendants miss the point. There is no finding—and

we do not see how there could be—that the ballroom

construction “conserves” the “historic objects” in President’s

Park as the statute requires. See generally Env’t Assessment;

FONSI. In fact, the Park Service found that the ballroom’s

construction would do the opposite. Env’t Assessment at 15

(“These changes would affect elements that have shaped the

property’s character since the early 20th century.”); FONSI at

6 (“These changes will result in long-term adverse effects on

the cultural landscape.”); id. at 7 (“Adding a second story to the

East Colonnade will further modify the setting, contrasting

with the single-story design of the West Colonnade and

changing the traditional spatial organization[.]”).8

8 President’s Park’s enabling legislation provides that “nothing

done under this Act shall conflict with the administration of the

Executive offices of the President or with the use and occupancy of

the buildings and grounds as the home of the President and his family

and for his official purposes.” Act of Sept. 22, 1961, § 3, 75 Stat. at

586. The plain text of this provision limits the Park Service’s

authority. And the massive destruction and construction involved in

building the ballroom does not plausibly qualify as the

“administration,” “use,” or “occupancy” of the residence or grounds.59

In urging that Section 100101(a) expressly authorizes the

ballroom construction, the Defendants’ brief is notably devoid

of any argument based on the statute’s text. Instead, the

Defendants’ position rests on three previous Park Service

projects in the District of Columbia: the construction of the

National Capital Region headquarters campus in East Potomac

Park; the construction of a tennis stadium in Rock Creek Park;

and the renovation of the U.S. Park Police Horse Stables on the

National Mall. See Defs.’ Opening Br. 44–45; see also Supp.

Decl. of Tammy Stidham, ECF No. 52-1, at ¶¶ 14–22. They

assert that none of those projects was specifically authorized

by Congress, and that the Park Service instead relied on Section

100101(a)’s general authority. Perhaps that is true. But no one

challenged those projects in court, and “the existence of a prior

administrative practice” does not “relieve us of our

responsibility to determine whether that practice is consistent

with the agency’s statutory authority.” SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S.

103, 118 (1978); cf. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 573

(2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[P]ast practice

does not, by itself, create power.”) (quoting Medellín v. Texas,

552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008)). Even on the Defendants’ own

terms, moreover, those prior projects appear far more

consistent with Section 100101(a) than the ballroom project. It

is easy to see how construction of the Park Service’s regional

headquarters and renovation of Park Police stables might

enable “conserv[ation]” and safe “enjoyment” of Park sites

without meaningfully impairing any “natural and historic

objects” within the Park. 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a). But it strains

credulity to think that the demolition and replacement of the

So nothing in that language empowers the Park Service to bypass its

express statutory confines just to accommodate the President’s

“longstanding need[s].” Env’t Assessment 31.60

East Wing constitute an effort “to conserve” that “historic

object[.]” Id.

At bottom, we may assume that Section 100101(a)’s

general language authorizes the Park Service to engage in some

construction projects in national parks generally—at least as

long as those projects are designed to promote conservation

and leave historic objects unimpaired for the enjoyment of

future generations. But it cannot constitute the “express

authority” for “erect[ion]” of “building[s] or structure[s]” on

public grounds in the District of Columbia that 40 U.S.C.

§ 8106 demands—especially when there is no argument that

the construction at issue will “conserve” historic sites in

keeping with Section 100101(a) and Congress’s express

reaffirmation of that requirement in the Redwood Amendment.

Indeed, Congress has time and again expressly authorized

construction projects on public grounds in the District of

Columbia. See, e.g., Act of June 28, 1902, ch. 1301, § 1, 32

Stat. at 460 (East and West Wings); An Act To provide for the

construction of certain public buildings, and for other purposes,

ch. 380, § 1, 44 Stat. 630, 630–631 (1926) (buildings of Federal

Triangle); An Act To provide for the construction of a building

for the Supreme Court of the United States, ch. 9, §§ 1–3, 46

Stat. 51, 51 (1929); An Act To authorize the Board of Regents

of Gunston Hall to establish a memorial to George Mason in

the District of Columbia, Pub. L. No. 101-358, § 1, 104 Stat.

419, 419 (1990); National Museum of African American

History and Culture Act, Pub. L. No. 108-184, § 8, 117 Stat.

2676, 2680–2682 (2003) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 80r-6).

Section 100101(a) bears no resemblance to those express

authorizations.61

2

We now turn to the Defendants’ assertion that 3 U.S.C.

§ 105(d)(1) grants the President himself authority to build a

towering ballroom on the former East Wing site. Before

proceeding, we note again the secondary role that Section

105(d) plays in the Defendants’ theory: The Defendants

expressly conceded that if Section 100101(a) does not

authorize the construction, then Section 105(d) cannot

independently support it because the Defendants are relying on

National Park Service funds. Oral Arg. Tr. 55:4–56:19. Our

analysis of Section 100101(a) thus resolves the likelihood of

success on the merits factor on the Defendants’ own terms. For

completeness, we nevertheless address Section 105(d).

The National Trust’s challenge to the President’s reliance

on Section 105(d) cannot proceed under the APA because the

President is not an “agency” subject to APA review. See

Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992). Instead,

the National Trust brings an equitable ultra vires claim. Ultra

vires review provides a critical backstop when “there is no

other means * * * to protect and enforce [a statutory] right.”

Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 190 (1958). It is available when

the President “has taken action entirely ‘in excess of [his]

delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition’ in a

statute.” Nuclear Regul. Comm’n v. Texas, 145 S. Ct. 1762,

1776 (2025) (quoting Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v.

Association for the Benefit of Non-Cont. Emps., 380 U.S. 650,

660 (1965)). We will thus grant ultra vires relief when the

President acts based on an “utterly unreasonable” statutory

interpretation or a “patent[] * * * misconstruction” of the law.

Federal Express Corp. v. Department of Com., 39 F.4th 756,

764–765 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted).62

The baseline for this analysis is again Section 8106, the

statute providing that “[a] building or structure shall not be

erected on any reservation, park, or public grounds of the

Federal Government in the District of Columbia without

express authority of Congress.” 40 U.S.C. § 8106. This is a

“clear and mandatory” provision that leaves no discretion and

thus can support ultra vires review. Changji Esquel Textile Co.

v. Raimondo, 40 F.4th 716, 722 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quotation

marks omitted).

The Defendants counter that Section 8106 should play no

role in the ultra vires analysis because it does not apply to the

President. They argue that, per Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505

U.S. 788 (1992), “generally applicable statute[s]” like Section

8106 “should not be construed as restricting the President

without a clear statement to that effect.” Defs.’ Opening Br.

51.

The Defendants overread Franklin. That case concerned

whether the President was an “agency” within the meaning of

the APA, as the APA’s definition of “agency” neither

“explicitly excluded” nor “explicitly included” the President.

Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(b)(1),

551(1)). Had the Court held that Congress’s “textual silence”

was sufficient to bring the President within the APA’s purview,

then “the President’s performance of his statutory duties

[could] be reviewed for abuse of discretion[,]” which would

implicate “separation of powers and the unique constitutional

position of the President[.]” Id. at 800–801. The wide-ranging

implications of applying the APA—which could conceivably

apply to any presidential action under any of his statutory and

constitutional authorities—warranted caution without an

“express statement” that Congress intended that result. Id. at

801. v63