Monday, August 24, 2026

READ FULL TEXT OF 6-3 SCOTUS DECISION in Trump v. California, 609 U.S. ---- (August 24, 2026 response to "emergency application" by TRUMP DOJ

Full text:

Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

1

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 26A124

_________________

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED

STATES, ET ALv. CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY

_________________

No. 26A139

_________________

ALABAMA, ET ALv. CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY

[August 24, 2026]

PER CURIAM.

The President recently issued an Executive Order regard-

ing election integrity. A group of States sued the Govern-

ment in the District of Massachusetts, contending that the

Order unconstitutionally infringes on their authority to ad-

minister elections. The District Court agreed and enjoined

the Government from implementing the Order. In doing so,

the District Court rejected the Government’s argument that

it lacked jurisdiction over the States’ claims because the

States lack standing to bring them. The Government has

asked us to stay the injunction, arguing that it is likely to

succeed on the merits of its jurisdictional argument, that

the injunction is causing it irreparable harm, and that the

equities do not favor leaving the injunction in place while

the Government’s appeal is pending. We agree and grant

the stay.2 TRUMP v. CALIFORNIA

Per Curiam

I

About five months ago, President Trump issued an Exec-

utive Order designed to maintain public confidence in fed-

eral elections. See Exec. Order No. 14399, 91 Fed. Reg.

17125 (2026). The Order is an internal directive from the

President to his subordinates mandating that certain agen-

cies pursue certain policies. It neither requires nor forbids

anything of anyone outside the Executive Branch. Three

sections of the Order are relevant here.

First, §2(a) orders the Secretary of Homeland Security to

“take appropriate action to” create and send “State Citizen-

ship List[s]” to each State. Ibid. These Lists will catalog

the residents of each State who are U. S. citizens and “who

will be above the age of 18 at the time of an upcoming Fed-

eral election.” Ibid. States are not required to use the Lists,

and the Secretary may compile and transmit them only “[t]o

the extent feasible and consistent with applicable law.” Id.,

at 17125–17126.

Second, §2(b) requires the Attorney General to “prioritize

the investigation and, as appropriate, the prosecution of

State and local officials or any others” who issue federal bal-

lots to ineligible voters. Id., at 17126.

Third, §3(b) directs the Postal Service to “initiate a pro-

posed rulemaking” that includes several “[p]roposed provi-

sions.” Ibid. One such provision is that outbound ballot

envelopes must contain a unique barcode to facilitate track-

ing. Ibid. The Order does not demand that any proposed

provision appear in the final rule. Id., at 17126–17127.

All provisions of the Order must “be implemented con-

sistent with applicable law.” Id., at 17127.

A few days after the Order was issued, a group of States

and the District of Columbia (hereinafter “States”) filed suit

in the District of Massachusetts. As relevant here, the

States argued that §§2 and 3 are unconstitutional and

sought to enjoin their implementation; the Government

countered that the States’ suit is not justiciable because theCite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

3

Per Curiam

Order does not injure them. The District Court largely

agreed with the States and entered a final judgment forbid-

ding the Government to implement §§2 and 3 as to them for

the upcoming midterms. After the First Circuit denied the

Government’s request for a stay, the Government sought a

stay from this Court.

To secure a stay pending appeal, the Government must

show that it is likely to succeed on the merits and that it is

likely to suffer irreparable harm without a stay. See Trump

v. Cook, 609 U. S. ___, ___ (2026) (slip op., at 8). It must

also demonstrate that the balance of equities does not coun-

sel against relief. See ibid. Of these factors, the likelihood

of success on the merits and the likelihood of irreparable

harm “are the most critical.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418,

434 (2009).1

II

As to the first factor: The Government is likely to prevail

on the merits of its argument that the District Court lacked

jurisdiction to enter the judgment.

Two related doctrines of justiciability block the States’

suit. One is standing, which requires “an injury that is con-

crete, particularized, and imminent rather than ‘conjec-

tural or hypothetical.’” Carney v. Adams, 592 U. S. 53, 60

(2020). The other is ripeness, which forbids federal courts

to adjudicate disputes that are “dependent on ‘contingent

future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed

may not occur at all.’” Trump v. New York, 592 U. S. 125,

131 (2020) (per curiam). Because “standing is not dis-

pensed in gross,” we address each challenged provision of

the Order separately. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594

U. S. 413, 431 (2021).

——————

The States do not dispute that this application presents a significant

legal question. Trump v. Cook, 609 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8).4 TRUMP v. CALIFORNIA

Per Curiam

A

Section 2(a) directs the Secretary of Homeland Security

to take appropriate action to create and distribute State

Citizenship Lists. This provision is an internal directive

from the President to a subordinate. It imposes no obliga-

tions on the States, so they “suffer no concrete harm from”

it. Trump v. New York, 592 U. S., at 134. And without con-

crete harm, there is no standing. TransUnion, 594 U. S., at

442.

The true “source of any injury” to the States would be the

downstream action that the Secretary “might take in the

future” to implement §2(a). Trump v. New York, 592 U. S.,

at 133–134. Emphasis on might. Section 2(a) can be imple-

mented only “[t]o the extent feasible and consistent with

applicable law.” 91 Fed. Reg. 17125. And as the Court ex-

plained in another case involving a Presidential directive

with a similar qualifier: “Any prediction how the Executive

Branch might eventually implement” §2(a) while balancing

feasibility and lawfulness “is ‘no more than conjecture’ at

this time.” Trump v. New York, 592 U. S., at 131. The Sec-

retary’s “eventual action will reflect both legal and practical

constraints, making any prediction about future injury just

that—a prediction.” Id., at 133; see 91 Fed. Reg. 17125.

To see why, consider the unduly long “chain of inferences”

necessary to support the States’ supposedly concrete injury.

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. 398, 414–415, n. 5

(2013). The District Court first had to speculate about

whether it would be “feasible” for the Secretary to create

and transmit the Lists before the midterms. 91 Fed. Reg.

17125. But §2(a) “may not prove feasible to implement in

any manner whatsoever.” Trump v. New York, 592 U. S.,

at 132. The court then had to guess how the Secretary

might tailor his implementation to be “consistent with ap-

plicable law.” 91 Fed. Reg. 17125. Next, the court had to

predict what “action” the Secretary would deem “appropri-

ate” for implementing §2(a). Ibid. After all that, the courtCite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

5

Per Curiam

still had to estimate whether those actions would be taken

“in a manner substantially likely to harm” the States.

Trump v. New York, 592 U. S., at 132. But Article III pro-

hibits federal courts from stacking hypothetical on hypo-

thetical to speculate that harm will eventually materialize.

Clapper, 568 U. S., at 414–415, n. 5. Adjudicating this

claim requires a prediction not only about whether the Sec-

retary will act before the midterms, but also about the

shape that any such action might ultimately take. Article

III demands more certainty.

The lower courts saw it differently, concluding that the

States suffered “a present injury” from §2(a) because it re-

quired them “to begin planning now on how to comply with”

it. App. to Application in No. 26A124, pp. 7a–8a. But the

States “cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting

harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical fu-

ture harm that is not certainly impending.” Clapper, 568

U. S., at 416. And the hypothetical future harm that the

States fear—the Secretary’s implementation of §2(a)—is far

from “certainly impending.” Ibid. By allowing the States

“to bring this action based on costs they incurred in re-

sponse to a speculative threat,” the District Court “improp-

erly water[ed] down the fundamental requirements of Arti-

cle III.” Ibid.

Perhaps recognizing the weakness of that standing ra-

tionale, the Court of Appeals added another: §2(a) infringes

the States’ sovereign authority to create election rules. But

§2(a) does no such thing. Instead, it simply directs the Sec-

retary to take certain actions if appropriate, feasible, and

lawful. 91 Fed. Reg. 17125–17126. This internal directive

does not regulate the States’ voter registration processes.

Nor does it impinge on the States’ authority “‘to create and

enforce a legal code’ for elections.” Contra, App. to Applica-

tion in No. 26A124, p. 13a.6 TRUMP v. CALIFORNIA

Per Curiam

B

The States lack standing to challenge §2(b) for much the

same reason: It does nothing to them. This provision di-

rects the Attorney General to “prioritize” the investigation

and prosecution of those who violate existing federal laws

by issuing ballots to ineligible voters. 91 Fed. Reg. 17126

(collecting statutes). Setting prosecutorial priorities lies

within the President’s Article II power. And his decision to

prioritize the prosecution of certain offenses does not inflict

a traditionally recognized harm on the States. See

TransUnion, 594 U. S., at 424–425.

The States try to avoid this straightforward analysis by

misreading the Order. They insist that §2(b) credibly

threatens them with prosecution if they do not use the Cit-

izenship Lists from §2(a). See Opposition to Applications

21–22, 29–30; see also post, at 2–3 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissent-

ing); post, at 14–15 (JACKSON, J., dissenting). But that view

is inconsistent with the text of §2. The States concede that

§2(a) does not require them to use the Lists at all (assuming

they receive them in the first place). Opposition to Applica-

tions 21. So it is logically impossible for a State to “violate”

§2(a)—and §2(b) does not suggest otherwise. Section 2(b)

directs the Attorney General to “prioritize” prosecutions of

those who violate federal election laws. It then provides an

array of existing statutes for the Attorney General to en-

force. 91 Fed. Reg. 17126. Absent is any reference to Citi-

zenship Lists. Without a textual basis for their concerns,

the States lack a “well-founded fear” that they will be pros-

ecuted for not using the Lists. Virginia v. American

Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U. S. 383, 393 (1988).

The States’ reference to certain state laws allowing 17-

year-olds to vote in primary elections is a red herring. See

Opposition to Applications 29–30. Because §2(b) defines el-

igible voters as otherwise qualified citizens who are “18

years of age or older,” 91 Fed. Reg. 17126, the States insist

that they face a real threat of prosecution if they deliver aCite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

7

Per Curiam

ballot to a 17-year-old who is eligible to vote in a primary

under state law. Not so. Section 7(b) of the Order requires

§2(b) to “be implemented consistent with applicable law.”

Id., at 17127. And on top of that, §2(b) limits itself to only

“appropriate” prosecutions. Id., at 17126. Given these pro-

visions, the Government has unsurprisingly disavowed any

intention to prosecute state officials for lawfully providing

ballots to 17-year-olds.

C

Last is the States’ challenge to §3, which directs the

Postal Service to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking. Ac-

cording to the States, this internal directive demands that

they overhaul their existing election procedures. See Oppo-

sition to Applications 24–26; see also post, at 1, 3, 7 (opinion

of JACKSON, J.). It does not. Section 3 orders the Postal

Service to initiate the process of proposing a rule that might

bind the States in the future. It is not a proposed rule, let

alone a final rule. And it imposes no legal requirements on

the States (or, for that matter, on anyone outside the Exec-

utive Branch).

The District Court’s conclusion that this internal di-

rective inflicts an Article III injury on the States necessarily

rests on an “attenuated chain of inferences.” Clapper, 568

U. S., at 414–415, n. 5. At the time this suit was filed—the

time when standing is measured—the District Court had to

engage in a string of speculations to find this suit justicia-

ble. It first had to speculate about whether the Postal Ser-

vice would propose a rule. Then it had to speculate about

how the agency would weigh the comments it received. Cf.

Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn., 575 U. S. 92, 96 (2015)

(emphasizing that agencies typically “must consider and re-

spond to significant comments”). Then it had to speculate

about whether the agency would issue a final rule. See

Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U. S. 158, 175

(2007) (explaining that a proposed rule is “simply a8 TRUMP v. CALIFORNIA

Per Curiam

proposal,” and an agency “might choose to adopt the pro-

posal or to withdraw it”). Then it had to speculate about

what the final rule would say. Cf. Encino Motorcars, LLC

v. Navarro, 579 U. S. 211, 218 (2016) (noting that the final

rule “took the opposite position from the proposed rule”).

Finally, after all that, the District Court still had to specu-

late about whether the text of a hypothetical final rule

would harm the States. It should go without saying that

the District Court made a decision “dependent on ‘contin-

gent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or in-

deed may not occur at all.’” Trump v. New York, 592 U. S.,

at 131.

The States cannot preemptively concretize their injury by

expending funds before the Postal Service finalizes a rule.

Spending money to hedge against a “speculative threat”

does not constitute an Article III injury. Clapper, 568 U. S.,

at 416. Though it may sometimes be “a reasonable reac-

tion” to “incu[r] certain costs” in advance of a final rule,

those costs cannot establish standing when the final rule

remains a “hypothetical future harm that is not certainly

impending.” Ibid. Federal courts review final rules, not

proposed rules—and certainly not antecedent internal di-

rectives to propose a rule. If the Postal Service’s final rule

harms the States, they may challenge that rule.

III

The remaining stay factors also favor relief. The Govern-

ment is likely to suffer irreparable harm without a stay.

The District Court’s breach of Article III interferes with the

internal operations of the Executive Branch. See INS v.

Legalization Assistance Project of Los Angeles County Fed-

eration of Labor, 510 U. S. 1301, 1306 (1993) (O’Connor, J.,

in chambers). The injunction bars Homeland Security from

trying to compile Citizenship Lists for about half the States

in the Union. It purports to forbid the Attorney General to

implement the President’s enforcement priorities as toCite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

9

Per Curiam

those same States.2 And it prevents the Postal Service from

so much as initiating a rulemaking that could yield a rule

applicable to these States. Because reversal of the District

Court’s judgment would come too late for the 2026 mid-

terms, the District Court’s errors deal “a serious setback” to

the Executive’s “goals” while this litigation unfolds. Cole-

man v. Paccar Inc., 424 U. S. 1301, 1307 (1976) (Rehnquist,

J., in chambers). When a federal court “improperly in-

trudes on a coordinate branch” in this way, interim relief is

justified. Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U. S. 831, 859 (2025)

(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Fighting this Court’s precedent, JUSTICE JACKSON main-

tains that “[t]he Government is not injured in the slightest”

because the Order contemplates that the Government will

engage in “patently unlawful conduct.” Post, at 7. That,

however, remains to be seen. And though JUSTICE JACKSON

wishes it were otherwise, an applicant can show “irrepara-

ble harm from a threshold error without also showing that,

at the end of the day, it will prevail on the underlying mer-

its.” CASA, 606 U. S., at 860. Such harm exists here be-

cause the injunction meddles in “the workings of ” the Ex-

ecutive Branch, preventing it from even trying to lawfully

——————

The principal dissent suggests that, if the Order does not legally bind

the States, then the Government cannot suffer irreparable harm from

the injunction. See post, at 3 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). The dissent

reasons that this is so because the injunction merely prohibits prosecu-

tions “ ‘stemming from violations or purported violations of the unconsti-

tutional provisions in’ ” the Order. Ibid. And if it is impossible to violate

the Order, then the injunction targets a null set of conduct, so the Gov-

ernment suffers no harm at all. Ibid. But the injunction is far broader

than the dissent lets on. It declares all of §2 ultra vires as to the States,

blocks the Government from “giving effect to” §2 as to the States, and

requires the Government “to prevent explicit or implicit implementation

of ” §2 as to the States. Final Judgment in No. 1:26–cv–11581 (D Mass.),

ECF Doc. 207, pp. 2–4. It is the breadth of these provisions—and the

resulting intrusion into the Executive Branch’s internal operations—

that irreparably harms the Government.10 TRUMP v. CALIFORNIA

Per Curiam

implement the Order. Legalization Assistance Project, 510

U. S., at 1306.

Finally, “the balance of equities does not counsel against

awarding the Government interim relief.” CASA, 606 U. S.,

at 861. The Executive Order makes no demand of the

States, so staying the District Court’s injunction will not

concretely harm them. That is why this suit was not justi-

ciable in the first place.

* * *

The Court’s disposition of this application does not mean

that any measure taken by the Government to implement

the Order will necessarily be lawful. On that score, time

will tell. But the Order itself does not harm the States, so

the District Court lacked jurisdiction to bar the Govern-

ment from trying to implement it. And for the reasons dis-

cussed, that injunction is likely to irreparably harm the

Government if it remains in place while the appellate pro-

cess runs its course.

Accordingly, the application for stay presented to

JUSTICE JACKSON in No. 26A124 and by her referred to the

Court is granted. The injunction entered by the United

States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in

case No. 1:26–cv–11581 is stayed pending the disposition of

the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certi-

orari in this Court, if such a writ is timely sought. Should

certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automati-

cally. In the event certiorari is granted, the stay shall ter-

minate upon the sending down of the judgment of this

Court. The application for stay presented to JUSTICE

JACKSON in No. 26A139 and by her referred to the Court is

denied as moot.Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

1

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 26A124

_________________

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED

STATES, ET ALv. CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY

_________________

No. 26A139

_________________

ALABAMA, ET ALv. CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY

[August 24, 2026]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN joins,

dissenting.

Today’s decision does not address whether the

President’s attempts to interfere with States’

administration of the November 2026 elections are lawful.

Nor does it suggest that the Executive Branch has any

constitutional or statutory authority to implement the

President’s directives. Instead, today’s decision merely

postpones adjudication of those challenges. Nonetheless,

because I believe the respondent States’ challenges are

justiciable now, I respectfully dissent.

A commonsense reading of the Executive Order,

corroborated by the Government’s own representations,

makes clear that the respondent States face a sufficiently

concrete and imminent injury to satisfy Article III. Section

2 of the Executive Order has two subsections. Subsection

2(a) orders the Secretary of Homeland Security to create

state Citizenship Lists of “confirmed” citizens who will be

over the age of 18 as of an upcoming federal election.

Subsection 2(b) then directs the Attorney General to2 TRUMP v. CALIFORNIA

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

prioritize the investigation and prosecution of state and

local officials who provide ballots to individuals who are not

eligible to vote, citing statutes prohibiting non-citizens from

voting. The majority accepts the Government’s invitation

to divorce 2(a) from 2(b), parsing the text of each subsection

individually but refusing to read §2 as a unified whole.

According to the majority, the investigations and

prosecutions that subsection 2(b) prioritizes might have

nothing to do with the citizenship lists that the immediately

preceding subsection 2(a) orders to be created. The clear

import of §2, however, is that the Federal Government will

use its lists of “confirmed” citizens, which it has conceded

will be incomplete, App. to Application for Stay 5a, to

initiate those investigations and prosecutions.

Far from disclaiming such intention, the Government has

admitted that the lists “might be used solely to facilitate

this sort of post-election law-enforcement activity,” Govt.

Brief in Opposition in No. 1:26–cv–11581 (D Mass.), ECF

Doc. 157, p. 47, and that a State’s “refusal to consider” the

Federal Government’s list “could conceivably, depending on

the circumstances, be relevant evidence of an intent to

violate, or to facilitate the violation of, the federal laws

prohibiting non-citizen voting that the Attorney General is

directed to prioritize for enforcement under Section 2(b),”

Reply Brief in No. 26A124, p. 13. To pretend that the lists

assembled pursuant to 2(a) bear no relation to the

prosecutions directed by 2(b) is to ignore the structure of

the Executive Order and the Government’s words alike. As

this Court has long recognized, “[p]eople do not lightly

disregard public officers’ thinly veiled threats to institute

criminal proceedings against them if they do not come

around,” Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 68

(1963), and the respondent States have standing based on

the credible threat that the Government will initiate

investigations and prosecutions because they refuse to use

the lists. See First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc.Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

3

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

v. Davenport, 608 U. S. 174, 183 (2026) (“Because this

standard tolerates suits involving ‘actual or imminent’

injuries, a party need not always wait for the government

to take coercive action against it before filing suit to

challenge the government’s conduct. Instead, a litigant

may bring a pre-enforcement suit seeking prospective relief

against government officials so long as it faces ‘a credible

threat of enforcement.’” (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v.

Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 161 (2014)).

Nor can I agree that the Government suffers irreparable

harm from the portion of the District Court’s injunction

tailored to these threatened prosecutions. The majority

suggests that the injunction “purports to forbid the

Attorney General to implement the President’s

enforcement priorities as to those same States.” Ante, at 8–

9. But this portion of the injunction prohibits the

Department of Justice and the Attorney General only from

“initiating any investigation or prosecution of Plaintiff

States . . . stemming from violations or purported violations

of the unconstitutional provisions in Sections 2 and 3 of the

EO.” Final Judgment in No. 1:26–cv–11581 (D Mass.), ECF

Doc. 207, p. 4, ¶2.C. If, as the majority explains, it is

“logically impossible for a State to ‘violate’ §2(a),” and §3

“imposes no legal requirements on the States,” ante, at 6–

7, this portion of the injunction would be toothless. If that

is true, it is hard to see how the Government suffers any

harm at all, much less irreparable harm, from this portion

of the injunction.*

The same is true for the §2(a) injunction. If, as the

Government insists, §2(a) “simply give[s] States a valuable

tool that can help in vetting their own lists of registered

voters if they wish to use it,” Reply Brief in No. 26A124, p.

——————

*The majority responds by pointing to other portions of the injunction.

Ante, at 9, n. 2 (quoting ECF Doc. 207, pp. 2–4, ¶¶1, 2.A, 2.D). Here, I

address only the part of the injunction tailored to the threat of §2(b)

prosecutions based on the §2(a) lists. See ECF Doc. 207, p. 4, ¶2.C.4 TRUMP v. CALIFORNIA

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

4, the Government suffers no harm if it cannot provide that

“tool” to the States who do not want it and will not use it.

As to §3, the respondent States assert that any

interference with the States’ “authority to create and

administer a mail voting program” is unlawful. Amended

Complaint in No. 1:26–cv–11581 (D Mass.), ECF Doc. 65,

¶169; see id., ¶¶167–178. If that is true, then no future

implementation could be “consistent with applicable law,”

and the States need not wait to challenge the precise

contours of a final rule.

The majority says it was speculative to think there would

be a final rule at all when this suit was filed, seemingly

accepting the Government’s representation that it may not

actually implement the Executive Order. Yet even as the

Government represents that it may not implement the

Executive Order at all for purposes of defeating standing, it

insists that it seeks to implement the Executive Order

immediately for purposes of establishing irreparable harm.

See Application 28–29 (“The irreparable harm is the

government’s inability to implement the order as to the

November 2026 election in the respondent States”). The

Government cannot have it both ways.

Because I believe the structure of the Executive Order,

the Government’s representations, and the equities counsel

against emergency relief requiring the States to wait to

bring their serious challenges to the Executive Order, I

respectfully dissent.Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

1

JACKSON, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 26A124

_________________

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED

STATES, ET ALv. CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY

_________________

No. 26A139

_________________

ALABAMA, ET ALv. CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY

[August 24, 2026]

JUSTICE JACKSON, dissenting.

The President has issued an Executive Order demanding

changes to the standard vote-by-mail systems that the

States have traditionally administered. The District Court

held that the President’s Order is unlawful, the Govern-

ment does not defend the lawfulness of the Order before

this Court, and no judge or Justice has held (or holds today)

that the Order comports with the Constitution. Still, the

Court sees fit to grant the Government equitable relief to

proceed with implementing the challenged Order on the

grounds that, because the Government had not yet issued a

final rule at the time the complaint was filed, the Plaintiff

States lacked a concrete injury for Article III purposes.

This ruling violates well-established precedents concern-

ing this Court’s equitable discretion and needlessly injects

chaos and uncertainty into the upcoming midterm elec-

tions. It also lets another shoe drop in the Kafkaesque

nightmare that our precedents have been steadily creating

for certain plaintiffs who seek to bring election-related chal-

lenges. The Court has held for a while now that even valid2 TRUMP v. CALIFORNIA

JACKSON, J., dissenting

election-related legal claims can come too late. See Purcell

v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1, 4–6 (2006) (per curiam). Today’s

revelation is that such claims can also come too early

never mind that an election is looming and related harms

are presently occurring. Never mind, too, that the Govern-

ment (which controls the timing of proposed and final rules)

can easily game the system.

To be sure, the Court has not foreclosed States from chal-

lenging this blatantly unconstitutional Order. But it de-

clines to explain when, exactly, is the right time to bring a

meritorious election-rule claim challenging unconstitu-

tional interference with electoral processes. The majority

just signals that these claimants had to wait—even though

the election cycle had started and despite facing pocketbook

costs, threats of prosecution, and an affront to their sover-

eignty—before receiving the relief to which they are likely

entitled.

I respectfully dissent. States administering elections and

the voting public that relies on them to do so deserve clarity,

not caginess or confusion. The Court does a disservice to all

concerned by distorting Article III standing and ripeness

principles to issue a ruling that contributes to pre-election

chaos instead of quashing it, and by using its equitable au-

thority to facilitate a patently inequitable result.

I

A

Our Constitution expressly delegates the power to con-

duct federal elections to the States. See U. S. Const., Art. I,

§4; see also Watson v. Republican National Committee, 609

U. S. ___, ___ (2026) (slip op., at 1); U. S. Term Limits, Inc.

v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 805 (1995). Accordingly, “elec-

tions in this country” have long been “administered at the

state and local level.” H. R. Rep. No. 107–329, pt. 1, p. 31

(2001). This “dispersal of responsibility for election admin-

istration has made it impossible for a single centrallyCite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

3

JACKSON, J., dissenting

controlled authority to dictate how elections will be run,

and thereby be able to control the outcome.” Id., at 32.

State-run elections are thus both foundational to democ-

racy and a key part of the self-governance scheme our Con-

stitution establishes.

On March 31, 2026, President Trump attempted to alter

this longstanding, constitutionally assigned structure by is-

suing Executive Order No. 14399, 91 Fed. Reg. 17125. This

mandate is entitled “Ensuring Citizenship Verification and

Integrity in Federal Elections.” The Order states (without

citing evidence) that, “[t]o enhance election integrity via the

United States Mail,” “additional measures are necessary.”

Ibid. It then lays out a series of directives, three of which

are relevant here.

Section 2(a) directs the Secretary of Homeland Security

to compile lists of the U. S. citizens who reside in each State

(Citizenship Lists), and send those lists to the States prior

to any federal election. Section 2(b) directs the federal in-

vestigation and prosecution of state and local election offi-

cials who issue federal ballots to individuals not eligible to

vote in federal elections. Section 3 mandates proposed rule-

making requiring both that “all outbound ballot mail” sent

by States and localities to voters “must be mailed” in enve-

lopes with new federal markings and barcodes, and that the

United States Postal Service (USPS) “shall not transmit

mail-in or absentee ballots from any individual” voter un-

less a State has successfully managed to “enrol[l]” that

voter with USPS such that the individual’s name appears

on the appropriate list. Id., at 17126.

The Order thus requires a fundamental overhaul of the

States’ existing mail-in ballot systems—changing from a

state-administered process to one in which the Federal Gov-

ernment controls who gets a ballot and whose vote counts.

Under the regime the Order envisions, States can only offer

ballots to citizens whose names appear on the appropriate

lists, forcing States to give their voter lists to the Federal4 TRUMP v. CALIFORNIA

JACKSON, J., dissenting

Government in order to have their voters’ ballots processed

by USPS. Ibid. And USPS can interdict and refuse to

transmit mail-in ballots submitted by individuals who are

not on the right list. See ibid.; see also A. Sella, Postmaster

General Confirms Plan to Hold Back Mail Ballots Under

Proposed Rule, N. Y. Times, June 24, 2026.

Moreover, and notably, due to the Order, a State’s elec-

tion officials face possible federal investigation and prose-

cution if they fail to compile and use the new Citizenship

Lists for administering federal elections. The Government

admits this. See, e.g., Reply in Support of Application for

Stay 13 (stating that “a State’s refusal to consider” a Citi-

zenship List could “be relevant evidence of an intent to vio-

late, or to facilitate the violation of, the federal laws prohib-

iting non-citizen voting that the Attorney General is

directed to prioritize for enforcement under Section 2(b)”).

B

Four days after President Trump signed Executive Order

No. 14399, 23 States and the District of Columbia (collec-

tively, the Plaintiff States) filed a lawsuit challenging the

Order as unlawful and seeking to enjoin its implementa-

tion. They alleged that §§2 and 3 of the Executive Order

are ultra vires and also violate the Constitution’s Elections

and Electors Clauses, the Tenth Amendment’s anticom-

mandeering doctrine, and the separation of powers.

On June 25, 2026, the District Court granted the Plaintiff

States’ motion for summary judgment and issued a perma-

nent injunction, narrowly barring implementation of §§2

and 3 only as to the Plaintiff States and only for the 2026

election cycle. ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, ___ (Mass. 2026), App.

to Application for Stay 28a–64a (App.). The District Court

found that election officials in the Plaintiff States faced ac-

tual and imminent harm because, even in advance of any

final rule, their “statutory obligations” to train local election

officials, create new legal-guidance documents, andCite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

5

JACKSON, J., dissenting

communicate with voters required immediate action in re-

sponse to the Executive Order. Id., at 42a.1 The District

Court also concluded that the President lacked legal au-

thority to implement §§2 and 3, and that his mandate im-

permissibly interfered with the Plaintiff States’ constitu-

tionally assigned duty to administer elections. Id., at 45a–

61a.

The Government appealed the District Court’s summary

judgment ruling and permanent injunction to the U. S.

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; it also requested that

the District Court’s injunction be stayed while the appeal

was pending. In a 2-to-1 panel decision, the appeals court

denied the stay request, concluding that the Plaintiff States

had shown imminent injuries from resource diversion,

pocketbook losses, the risk of prosecution, and federal in-

terference with the Plaintiff States’ sovereign interests in

conducting elections. See ___ F. 4th ___, ___–___ (CA1

2026), App. 7a–14a. The First Circuit further determined

that the balance of the equities favored the Plaintiff States,

given the significant harms those sovereigns would face due

to the Order while attempting to administer the November

election in an orderly fashion. Id., at 15a–16a.2

——————

See also, e.g., Opposition to Applications 26; Decl. of G. Rosenberg in

No. 1:26–cv–11581 (D Mass.), ECF Doc. 100–7, ¶23 (detailing that cer-

tain state officials “have had to divert time from the[ir] planned train-

ings” to create new “guidance on this [Executive Order]” to communicate

with local officials); Decl. of D. Dawson, ECF Doc. 100–19, ¶9 (noting that

officials have already had to respond to numerous inquiries from con-

fused and concerned voters); Decl. of S. Holmes, ECF Doc. 100–4, ¶43

(same).

One of the three panel jurists concurred in part and dissented in part.

See ___ F. 4th, at ___, App. 16a (opinion of Dunlap, J.). Judge Dunlap

agreed that the Plaintiff States had suffered harm and had Article III

standing as to §3’s ballot-change mandate. Id., at ___, App. 18a. He also

agreed that the Plaintiff States were sufficiently harmed for standing

purposes by the “imminent enforcement [in §2(b)] of a voting-age require-

ment (not established by federal statute) that conflicts with certain6 TRUMP v. CALIFORNIA

JACKSON, J., dissenting

II

The Government now asks us for a stay of the District

Court’s injunction. This Court is obligated to hold the Gov-

ernment (just like any other party) to a high bar when seek-

ing a stay under these circumstances. See Edwards v. Hope

Medical Group for Women, 512 U. S. 1301, 1302 (1994)

(Scalia, J., in chambers) (“[W]hen a district court judgment

is reviewable by a court of appeals that has denied a motion

for a stay, the applicant seeking an overriding stay from

this Court bears an especially heavy burden” (internal quo-

tation marks omitted)).

At a minimum, the successful stay applicant must make

a “strong showing” that it is likely to succeed on the merits,

that it will suffer irreparable harm while the case proceeds,

and that, on balance, the equities—including the public’s

interest—favor a stay. Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 426

(2009); see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U. S. 183, 190

(2010) (per curiam). The Government has not come any-

where close to carrying this burden here.

A

Begin with irreparable harm. The President is only con-

ceivably harmed by an injunction barring executive action

if that court order is preventing him from doing something

the law permits him to do. But here the Government has

not even bothered to assert, much less demonstrate, that

the President has the constitutional authority to issue an

order that directs the manner in which the mail-in ballot

aspect of federal elections is to be administered. This

means that the Government has failed to establish irrepa-

rable harm. And, to be clear, contrary to the majority’s

——————

States’ laws permitting voting by certain 17-year-olds in primaries.” Id.,

at ____, App. 17a. But he disagreed with the majority’s view that §§2(a)

and 2(b)—shorn of its unlawful enforcement in relation to certain 17-

year-olds and standing alone—caused States any imminent injuries. See

id., at ______, App. 17a–18a.Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

7

JACKSON, J., dissenting

contentions (ante, at 9 (citing Trump v. CASA, 606 U. S. 831

(2025))), the District Court’s injunction is not harming the

Government.

The Constitution plainly assigns the power to conduct

federal elections to the States. See Art. I, §4. The President

does not have any legal authority to require that elections

be conducted in accordance with his preferences, or to with-

hold delivery of mail-in ballots that are not formatted con-

sistent with the President’s wishes. “The action [Executive

Order No. 14399] contemplates would involve the Presi-

dent, whom the Constitution vests with no express authority

over the conduct of elections, undertaking a substantial and

unfunded overhaul of election procedures—including the

implementation of a nationwide reform to Postal Service

mail-handling processes—on the threshold of the Novem-

ber election.” DSCC v. Trump, 2026 WL 2168617, *5

(CADC, July 28, 2026) (emphasis added). The Government

is not injured in the slightest by an injunction stopping it

from engaging in this patently unlawful conduct.3

——————

Our holding in Trump v. CASA, 606 U. S. 831 (2025), is thus inappo-

site to the irreparable harm analysis here. CASA’s conclusion that uni-

versal injunctions were irreparably harmful to the Government—be-

cause they “improperly intrud[e] on a coordinate branch” and “preven[t]

the Government from enforcing its policies against nonparties,” id., at

859 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)—presupposes

that the Executive Branch has the lawful authority to enforce its policies

in the first place. Not so here, as I have explained. Moreover, the District

Court’s injunction “does nothing to prevent the federal defendants from

taking steps today to implement the [Executive Order] for federal elec-

tions in all [S]tates after November 3, 2026.” ___ F. 4th, at ___, App. 15a.

And even if the Government is harmed by the injunction’s narrow re-

striction preventing implementation of the Order ahead of this Novem-

ber’s elections, that harm is obviously self-inflicted. See O’Brien v. Skin-

ner, 409 U. S. 1240, 1242 (1972) (Marshall, J., in chambers). The

Executive Order itself created the time crunch here: With an eye toward

the November elections, the Order set the date for the issuance of a final

rule regulating mail-in ballots as July 29, 2026, regardless of the States’

late-August envelope-mailing deadlines. Given that choice, the8 TRUMP v. CALIFORNIA

JACKSON, J., dissenting

Ironically, as presented here, the Government’s ripeness

and standing arguments contradict its contention that the

District Court’s injunction causes irreparable harm. The

Government says that it does not know “whether and to

what extent it may compile the relevant lists” or “[w]hat

role, if any, a State’s future decision to disregard its Citi-

zenship List may play in a future investigation and prose-

cution”; it insists that “much remains uncertain as to what

a final USPS rule might include or what the contents or

uses of any DHS lists might be.” Application for Stay 3

(first and third quotations); Reply in Support of Application

for Stay 5 (second quotation). But if implementation of Ex-

ecutive Order No. 14399 was hypothetical and uncertain at

the time the Plaintiff States filed this lawsuit, how can it be

that a limited injunction narrowly preventing implementa-

tion harmed the Government? When the Government is

unsure of what action it intends to take or whether it is even

lawful to take any action, an injunction limiting such action

is (by the Government’s own admission) irrelevant, not

harmful.

That straightforward analysis is enough to dispose of,

and dispense with, today’s misguided stay request.4 At bot-

tom, the Government’s irreparable-harm argument is “just

another species of the far-fetched contention that the Pres-

ident must be injured whenever he is prevented from doing

——————

Government should not be heard to complain about the limited time it

has to litigate the Plaintiff States’ challenges.

It suffices because stay applications turn on harm assessments—if it

were otherwise, the applicant could just wait to get a merits ruling from

the lower court. A party with no harm from an injunction (or with less

harm than his opponent) has no justification for asking this Court to in-

volve itself in the pending lower-court proceedings. Thus, in my view, a

stay applicant seeking our intervention needs to show not only that his

interim injury is irreparable but also urgency—i.e., that immediate relief

is required. See Labrador v. Poe, 601 U. S. 1110, 1130 (2024) (JACKSON,

J., dissenting from grant of stay). The Government has not cleared either

hurdle here.Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

9

JACKSON, J., dissenting

as he wishes.” Trump v. Orr, 607 U. S. ___, ___ (2025)

(JACKSON, J., dissenting from grant of stay) (slip op., at 10).

But the majority proceeds to probe the justiciability of the

Plaintiff States’ complaint (as if the States were the ones

seeking our intervention), and thereby inappropriately

transforms our discretionary emergency docket into a fo-

rum for mandatory review of this Administration’s argu-

ments.

The Court should have remained focused on what mat-

ters under our stay precedents: whether the District Court’s

injunction is harming the Government in a manner that

warrants equitable relief. Where a significant underlying

dispute as to the lawfulness of the Government’s behavior

is pending in the lower courts, allowing the Government to

obtain interim relief based on isolated, threshold concerns

about the justiciability of the plaintiffs’ claims facilitates a

patently inequitable Catch-Me-If-You-Can approach to pur-

suing the President’s policy agenda.5

B

Even assuming arguendo that the Executive suffers some

harm due to the District Court’s injunction, the balance of

the equities and the public’s interest strongly favor

——————

Under this approach, the Executive can intentionally act in harmful

ways that violate the law, decline to defend the legal merits of its unlaw-

ful actions, and nevertheless put challengers on the defensive (by thwart-

ing injunctions on the basis of alleged flaws with the form of plaintiffs’

legal claims), thereby extending its unlawful activity for as long as pos-

sible. See, e.g., CASA, 606 U. S., at 839 (considering only threshold pro-

cedural questions while the underlying merits issues festered). This is a

noxious litigation strategy that should be a red flag for courts. It fore-

stalls resolution of the merits, prolongs unjustified harms, and wounds

public confidence in the judiciary’s ability to award actual relief for mer-

itorious challenges. Furthermore, if sowing chaos is the Government’s

ultimate goal, as it is here (see Part IV, infra), the effectiveness of judicial

review is substantially undercut when the Court shunts all consideration

of the lawfulness of the Government’s conduct at the stay stage and

greenlights significant harms in the interim.10 TRUMP v. CALIFORNIA

JACKSON, J., dissenting

maintaining this injunction. Properly evaluating these stay

factors requires comparing the real-world impact of grant-

ing a stay versus the practical consequences of denying one.

See Barnes v. E-Systems, Inc. Group Hospital Medical &

Surgical Ins. Plan, 501 U. S. 1301, 1305 (1991) (Scalia, J.,

in chambers). That comparison yields a strikingly straight-

forward answer here.

Denying a stay permits the Plaintiff States to prepare for

the rapidly approaching election cycle per usual, without

undue interference or unjustified threats of prosecution

against state officials attempting to carry out their duties.

These election officials are busy finalizing the equipment

and materials that will be used for the upcoming election,

cross-checking the registration and qualifications of eligible

voters, and training the staff and volunteers who will be

distributing ballots and otherwise conducting the election

in those particular localities.6 A denial of this stay request

would greatly reduce the risk that these critical electoral

processes will be disrupted. Denying this stay would also

allow USPS to implement new rules regarding the mail-in

ballot procedures applicable to election cycles occurring af-

ter the November 2026 election.

Granting the stay, by contrast, risks severe disruption of

the upcoming midterm elections. Indeed, even before a fi-

nal rule, the Order and proposed rule had already caused

significant friction. See, e.g., Opposition to Applications 26

(describing the “challenging and costly” tasks of having to

“compile and convert voluminous data for submission to

USPS, train election officials, educate voters, and change”

the format of mail-in ballots, at the expense of other “im-

portant election-preparation work”); Plaintiffs’ Statement

of Undisputed Material Facts, ECF Doc. 105, ¶¶22–30, 47–

——————

See, e.g., Opposition to Applications 26–30; Decl. of J. Lean, ECF Doc.

100–1, ¶8; Decl. of M. Tassinari, ECF Doc. 100–2, ¶¶36, 81; ECF Doc.

100–4 ¶35; Decl. of A. Albence, ECF Doc. 100–8 ¶75; Decl. of D. Barber,

ECF Doc. 100–15, ¶49.Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

11

JACKSON, J., dissenting

57, 60–63; ECF Doc. 100–4, ¶¶32–41.A stay grant puts

the Plaintiff States in a precarious position: Their election

officials would have to scramble in the coming weeks to

challenge or attempt to take on the potentially impossible

task of complying with the President’s new mail-in ballot

regime. See ___ F. 4th, at ___–___, App. 9a–10a (“[I]f the

district court’s injunction is lifted, the Plaintiff States will

promptly be forced to divert staff resources and incur costs

flowing from the EO in the coming days and weeks”). The

Plaintiff States have secured an injunction to stave off those

potential harms—lifting that relief keeps this Sword of

Damocles dangling over them, threatening to undo the com-

plicated work that election officials are currently undertak-

ing to protect their citizens’ electoral interests. 8

Granting this stay also risks the kinds of on-the-ground

chaos this Court has previously decried in the elections con-

text but does not even address today. See Purcell, 549 U. S.,

——————

These, by the way, are facts: The District Court considered evidence

and made findings about the detrimental consequences of allowing the

Order to stand. See ___ F. Supp. 3d, at ___–___, App. 35a–44a. Under

this Court’s precedents, those findings are entitled to “clear error” defer-

ence. See Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of NAACP, 602

U. S. 1, 18 (2024). We cannot simply set them aside or ignore them. See

Cooper v. Harris, 581 U. S. 285, 298–299 (2017); Anderson v. Bessemer

City, 470 U. S. 564, 575 (1985); Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 882 (2015)

(“Where an intermediate court reviews, and affirms, a trial court’s fac-

tual findings, this Court will not lightly overturn the concurrent findings

of the two lower courts” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But no-

where does this Court’s order suggest or conclude that the lower courts’

harm-related factfinding was clearly erroneous.

This is another way in which today’s case differs from CASA. In

CASA, the Court found that the balance-of-the-equities factor favored

the Government because the plaintiffs experienced “no harm” from the

Court’s partial stay blocking the universal nature of the injunction, as

they would “remain protected . . . to the extent necessary and appropri-

ate to afford them complete relief.” 606 U. S., at 861 (emphasis added).

The stay here leaves the Plaintiff States completely (and needlessly) un-

protected in the interim, experiencing harm before they can obtain relief

through future litigation.12 TRUMP v. CALIFORNIA

JACKSON, J., dissenting

at 4–5; see also Democratic National Committee v. Wiscon-

sin State Legislature, 592 U. S. ___, ____ (2020)

(KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in denial of application to va-

cate stay) (slip op., at 2) (acknowledging that “running a

statewide election is a complicated endeavor” involving “a

massive coordinated effort” of “thousands of state and local

officials”). The Court’s concerns about judicial interven-

tions that stress election officials and confuse the voting

public seem to have inexplicably vanished, for today’s rul-

ing requires the Plaintiff States to bring their legal chal-

lenges closer in time to the upcoming elections despite any

resulting confusion. Forget tamping down the chaos by en-

suring that claims are resolved well before Election Day;

the majority now delays resolution of potentially meritori-

ous challenges, compounding the uncertainties.9

The Court’s ruling imposes needless harms on the Plain-

tiff States in the interim (before they can again obtain re-

lief ) and does nothing to promote the public’s interest in

well-ordered elections practices and the institutions the

——————

Today’s ruling injects additional unknowns into the already fraught

pre-election period. Beyond whether the proposed election-related rule

changes are lawful, one must now wonder whether, when the Govern-

ment announces a rule change, a resulting legal challenge is too late, too

early, or just right? (And, of course, only this Court knows the answer.)

Today’s tolerance for delayed resolution of the Plaintiff States’ legal

claims is impossible to square with our admonishment in Bost v. Illinois

Bd. of Elections, 607 U. S. 71, 80 (2026) (directing lower courts not to

apply justiciability doctrines in ways that “channel . . . election disputes

to shortly before election day”). The last-minute litigation the majority

now endorses could also prompt further chaos, as election officials would

have to communicate the twists and turns of late-breaking legal devel-

opments to voters on the fly. Voters who disproportionately rely on vot-

ing by mail—including those who are elderly or physically disabled—

would then be on a knife’s edge, having to cast their ballots without

knowing the results of the litigation churning in the background. It

makes no practical sense to require the Plaintiff States (parties with sov-

ereign interests, constitutional duties, and valid election-related claims)

to wait until the eve of an election to file these kinds of lawsuits.Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

13

JACKSON, J., dissenting

Constitution tasks with safeguarding democratic norms.

Our precedents require balancing the equities precisely to

avoid this kind of damaging and pointless outcome.

III

Because the harm-related stay factors weigh heavily

against granting these stay applications (see Part II, su-

pra), the Government—and the Court itself—focuses al-

most exclusively on the merits of the Government’s thresh-

old arguments about standing and ripeness. But under this

Court’s precedent, the Government’s likelihood-of-success

effort also fails.

A

“[T]o establish [Article III] standing, a plaintiff must

show (i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete,

particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury

was likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury

would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion

LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 423 (2021) (citing Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561 (1992)). Ripe-

ness and standing originate from the same Article III case-

or-controversy requirement, and those two concepts often

“boil down to the same question.” Susan B. Anthony List v.

Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 157, n. 5 (2014) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Here, the Plaintiff States have both actual and imminent

injuries due to the Executive Order. Each suffices to make

the present controversy justiciable. See TransUnion, 594

U. S., at 423.

First and foremost, the undisputed record evidence shows

that the Order is injuring state and local officials right now,

as the lower courts found. See ___ F. 4th, at ___–___, App.

7a–8a; ___ F. Supp. 3d, at ___–___, App. 41a–42a. The facts

establish that the Order has already placed “an incredible

strain” on state election officials who, due to their14 TRUMP v. CALIFORNIA

JACKSON, J., dissenting

obligations to plan and prepare for elections well in ad-

vance, must devote time and resources today to “coordinate

the implementation of the changes articulated in the [Or-

der],” on “compressed timelines” and with “limited re-

sources.” See ___ F. 4th, at ___, App. 8a. And the Govern-

ment does not, and cannot, contest this. The majority

reaches the opposite conclusion by simply ignoring the Dis-

trict Court’s findings of fact and the record developed below.

See n. 7, supra.

The Court’s suggestion that these realities do not matter

for standing purposes because the Order constitutes a mere

“internal directive,” ante, at 2, is both factually wrong and

legally irrelevant. The Order explicitly directs federal offi-

cials to transmit the Citizenship Lists to the States, who

are then threatened with prosecution if they fail to use

those lists. And the legal test for justiciable harm is not

whether the injury was caused by an outward-facing order

as opposed to an “internal” one. Instead, the relevant in-

quiry is whether a plaintiff has been, or will imminently be,

injured by the directive they seek to challenge.10 See Lujan,

504 U. S., at 560–561.

Officials in the Plaintiff States are also presently im-

pacted by an existing “credible threat of criminal prosecu-

tion.” ___ F. 4th, at ___, App. 13a. That threat of prosecu-

tion burdens the Plaintiff States’ “sovereign interests” and

has already facilitated “unprecedented levels of involve-

ment by federal officials in how [S]tates administer elec-

tions” as directed by the Order. Ibid. (internal quotation

marks omitted). But the majority contends that “[w]ithout

——————

10 To appreciate the fallacy of the Court’s injury analysis, imagine a

purely “internal” directive that a President sends to the Postal Service

mandating that it not deliver mail-in ballots sent in by voters in disfa-

vored States. That mandate is no less injurious because the President is

only directing the “internal” conduct of his subordinates. States and vot-

ers would obviously have Article III standing to challenge that patently

unlawful directive, internal or not.Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

15

JACKSON, J., dissenting

textual basis for their concerns,”—meaning apparently

that there is no basis for prosecuting state officials in the

Order’s language or the text of any statute—“the States

lack a well-founded fear that they will be prosecuted for not

using the Lists.” Ante, at 6 (internal quotation marks omit-

ted). Yet even if prosecution is textually unfounded, the

Government has made it explicitly clear, including before

this Court, that it might well prosecute any state officials

who resist implementing the Citizenship Lists regardless.

See Reply in Support of Application for Stay 13. Such

threats clearly suffice for standing purposes, for we have

long held that, “where threatened action by government is

concerned,” plaintiffs need not wait and expose themselves

to prosecution “before bringing suit to challenge the basis

for the threat.” MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549

U. S. 118, 128–129 (2007) (emphasis in original).11

The Plaintiff States also had Article III standing because,

in addition to their current injuries, they faced a significant

risk of harm in the immediate future due to the President’s

Order. See TransUnion, 594 U. S., at 423. These Plaintiffs

had “certainly impending pocketbook injuries from [the Or-

der’s] direction that USPS control the design of envelopes

in all federal voting-by-mail processes,” given that “several

——————

11 The fact that the President’s Order was not fully implemented before

this suit was filed does not render these Plaintiffs’ claims nonjusticiable.

Finality is not a prerequisite to Article III standing: Nonfinal acts can

still cause injury. In any event, the Plaintiff States are complaining

about a “final” act—the President has unequivocally issued an allegedly

ultra vires and unconstitutional Executive Order directing his subordi-

nates to act in a manner that is causing present and imminent harm.

The majority seems to forget that the Plaintiff States have not brought

Administrative Procedure Act claims that might logically falter due to a

purported lack of finality (and even then, those claims would fail for want

of a cause of action, not for nonjusticiability). The Court glosses over

what we have long said Article III standing requires (actual injury), opt-

ing instead to rest its conclusion on a brand-new, made-up finality bar-

rier for injured plaintiffs who want to have their constitutional claims

adjudicated.16 TRUMP v. CALIFORNIA

JACKSON, J., dissenting

states had already purchased mail-ballot envelopes” for the

2026 elections. ___ F. 4th, at ___, App. 11a. The States

would also almost certainly have had to bear other “signifi-

cant” financial “costs” from having to “update training ma-

terials for local election officials and their staffs.” Ibid. And

the on-the-ground chaos that would indisputably follow

from last-minute implementation of the President’s direc-

tives risked imminent harm to these States’ sovereign in-

terests in conducting orderly elections.

In short, although the Order had yet to be formalized into

a final rule when the complaint was filed, “the specificity of

[its] stated timelines and the inescapable legal require-

ments and impending deadlines that States currently face

in facilitating mail-in and absentee balloting for immedi-

ately upcoming elections together establish sufficient con-

crete injury from the [Order] in this unusual case.” ___ F.

4th, at ___, App. 18a (Dunlap, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part).

B

1

For its part, the Court has opted to take a blinders-on ap-

proach to evaluating the merits of the Government’s argu-

ments about the Order’s directives, present impact, and an-

ticipated effects, despite this Court’s admonition that

courts “are not required to exhibit a naiveté from which or-

dinary citizens are free.” Department of Commerce v. New

York, 588 U. S. 752, 785 (2019) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The majority’s assertion that the courts below

had to “stac[k] hypothetical on hypothetical to speculate

that harm will eventually materialize,” ante, at 5, for exam-

ple, blinks reality. It also unfairly characterizes the lower

courts’ careful factfinding and written opinions.

Consider the Court’s strained attempt to establish that

the District Court relied on a “chain of inferences,” ante, at

7, an effort that begins with the contention that the DistrictCite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

17

JACKSON, J., dissenting

Court “first had to speculate about whether the Postal Ser-

vice would propose a rule,” ibid. Quite to the contrary, the

record reveals that the District Court just looked at the

facts. No speculation about whether USPS would “propose

a rule” was needed because the Executive Order explicitly

directs the Postmaster General “to initiate a proposed rule-

making . . . within 60 days.” 91 Fed. Reg. 17126 (emphasis

added). The Order further details the content of that rule,

stating that the proposed rule “shall include, at minimum,”

“[p]roposed provisions specifying that all outbound ballot

mail must be mailed in an envelope that . . . bears a unique

Intelligent Mail barcode.” Ibid. The Order also demands

that the proposed rule expressly provide “that the USPS

shall not transmit mail-in or absentee ballots from any in-

dividual unless those individuals have been enrolled on a

State-specific list.” Ibid. So, the Court’s conclusion that the

District Court engaged in sheer speculation about whether

a proposed rule would issue and what it might say, ante, at

7, is a stunning misinterpretation of the factual record.

That USPS actually proposed a rule in response to the

Order further demonstrates that the District Court did not,

in fact, speculate about the Order’s effects. On these facts,

the Order’s impact was not even remotely hypothetical.

The proposed rule, which USPS promulgated on June 2,

2026, lays out new standards for ballot envelope design—

exactly as the Order directs—and incorporates the Order’s

mandate “limit[ing] the distribution of mail-in ballots to in-

dividuals included in” lists submitted by States and over-

seen by the Federal Government. ___ F. 4th, at ___, App.

18a (opinion of Dunlap, J.).

There was also no need for the District Court to prognos-

ticate when the Government’s own evidence demonstrates

its intent to proceed full steam ahead with implementing18 TRUMP v. CALIFORNIA

JACKSON, J., dissenting

the Order; nothing in this record portrays any hesitation.12

This very stay application is a testament to imminent ac-

tion: The Government asked us to lift the District Court’s

injunction precisely because it insisted that it must be per-

mitted to implement the Order by promulgating a final rule

ahead of the November election. See Application for Stay

2. There is simply no factual basis for the Court’s conten-

tion that the lower courts were engaged in speculation or

its suggestion that the Government might yet abandon the

full court press the President’s Order has prompted.

The majority’s analysis thus fails to draw obvious infer-

ences about the Order’s downstream effects from the undis-

puted facts in this record. It also sidesteps a key factual

finding: that the Plaintiff States are imminently injured by

an Order directing any changes to their balloting materials

or systems before the November elections. See ___ F. 4th,

at ___, App. 11a (“[T]he summary judgment record reflects

that any change to the kind of envelopes state and local of-

ficials must use for voting by mail will necessarily force the

Plaintiff States to incur monetary and operational costs”

(emphasis in original)). The Court chastises the District

Court for “guess[ing]” and “speculat[ing]” regarding the ex-

act “shape” of the final rule. Ante, at 4–5. But such preci-

sion is immaterial when well-supported findings of fact in-

dicate that any alteration is injurious.

2

The Court applies language from our precedents to these

misconstrued facts, primarily relying on two cases: Trump

v. New York, 592 U. S. 125 (2020) (per curiam), and Clapper

——————

12 See, e.g., Decl. of S. Monteith, ECF Doc. 194–2, ¶7 (“Consistent with

the Proposed Rule, the Postal Service has been taking steps to create a

Postal Service portal that state and local election officials . . . will utilize

to provide their lists to the Postal Service of voters who are mailed bal-

lots” with the intent that States “will be preparing to mail their first

mail-in ballots by the end of August [2026]”).Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

19

JACKSON, J., dissenting

v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. 398 (2013). But the reason-

ing of those cases is not applicable here.

Start with New York. There, the implications of the chal-

lenged memorandum were distant in time, and the plain-

tiffs conceded that its effect had dissipated by the time the

case reached this Court. See 592 U. S., at 129–133. Here,

by contrast, Executive Order No. 14399 sets strict deadlines

for implementation, and the effects of that government ac-

tion on election planning are already upon us. The New

York plaintiffs’ standing argument was further complicated

by the fact that the Government conceded that it could not

“feasibly implement the memorandum” as written. 592

U. S., at 133. The Government has made no such conces-

sion here. Far from it: USPS officials have instead con-

firmed that the Government is well on its way to imple-

menting procedures consistent with the proposed rule. See

Decl. of S. Monteith, ECF Doc. 194–2, ¶7.

The majority’s reliance on Clapper is likewise misplaced.

The no-standing determination in that case involved attor-

neys who were not directly targeted, had no statutory du-

ties requiring them to act, and were perceived by this Court

to be attempting to “manufacture standing merely by in-

flicting harm on themselves.” 568 U. S., at 410–416. Here,

the opposite is true. The rule changes the President has

ordered federal authorities to make target state election of-

ficials. See 91 Fed. Reg. 17125 (requiring federal officials

to “transmit to the chief election official of each State” the

Citizenship Lists); id., at 17126 (requiring the Attorney

General to “prioritize the investigation and, as appropriate,

the prosecution of State and local officials”). And the Plain-

tiff States have not manufactured the complained-of harms;

“[they] have no practical choice but to respond to the [Or-

der] now.” ___ F. 4th, at ___, App. 9a.

One case that the Court’s order does not mention is our

ruling just last Term in Bost v. Illinois Bd. of Elections, 607

U. S. 71 (2026). In Bost, we assessed the standing of a20 TRUMP v. CALIFORNIA

JACKSON, J., dissenting

political candidate who wanted to challenge a new election

rule that extended a ballot-receipt deadline. Id., at 71–72.

The Court concluded that political candidates who chal-

lenge election-rule changes easily clear Article III’s harm

hurdle based solely on the risk that an unlawful rule poses

to their general interest in a fair election—i.e., they do not

need to demonstrate any other actual injury. See id., at 77.

The majority holds the opposite now. Today, less than a

year after issuing Bost, the Court concludes that States

with even greater fair-election interests do not have stand-

ing to sue even when the election-rule changes they seek to

challenge pose significant risks of injury to those inter-

ests.13

In short, none of the justiciability cases the Court relies

on supports its conclusion on the facts presented here. And

there is obvious tension between today’s reasoning and

Bost’s.14 So the Government has failed to demonstrate a

strong likelihood of success on the merits of its standing and

——————

13 It is true that candidate Bost challenged a final election rule, while

the Plaintiff States sought to assail an Executive Order that directs

USPS to propose one. But that distinction makes no difference: Proposed

orders can cause injuries. See n. 11, supraBost found standing based

upon the general risk of harm to a candidate’s fair-election interests, and

that same interest is similarly threatened here, albeit under circum-

stances that are far less speculative than in Bost. But today we find that

the risk of harm to the Plaintiff States’ interests is not sufficient to confer

standing. This means either Bost is wrong or today’s decision is indefen-

sible (or both).

14 One more note on this: Two Justices in Bost concluded that a candi-

date’s voluntary spending to guard against the possibility that the chal-

lenged rule would impact the election’s outcome—a highly speculative

risk—counted as a classic pocketbook injury that sufficed to confer Arti-

cle III standing. See 607 U. S., at 83 (BARRETT, J., concurring in judg-

ment). Today’s ruling embraces (but then misapplies) the antithesis,

adopting the Court’s (original) principle regarding self-inflicted economic

harms: that “[s]pending money to hedge against a ‘speculative threat’

does not constitute an Article III injury.” Ante, at 8 (quoting Clapper,

568 U. S., at 416). Thus, the gap between Bost and today’s analysis might

be greater than the fair-election-interest flip-flop I’ve described.Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

21

JACKSON, J., dissenting

ripeness arguments, as our stay precedents require. See

Nken, 556 U. S., at 426. The contention that sovereign

States with a constitutionally assigned duty to administer

elections do not have a concrete injury when the President

orders his subordinates to interfere with the ballot-distri-

bution plans those States are in the midst of executing (the

majority’s bottom line) is not a strong argument.

IV

In the end, though, what makes today’s ruling so off-base

is the Court’s lack of situational awareness regarding this

equitable judgment. It treats the Government’s stay appli-

cation as if the whole point is merely to demonstrate that

the Plaintiff States’ claims are not justiciable. Taking its

eye off the ball, the majority misses the Government’s ac-

tual objective: to secure our imprimatur for its effort to fo-

ment chaos ahead of the November elections.

Consider (as the Court has failed to do) what the Govern-

ment has and has not argued, as well as how it has behaved.

In seeking this stay, the Government has not made any ef-

fort to prove that the enjoined mail-in ballot directives are

lawful. Nor has it worked diligently to ensure that the vote-

by-mail changes the President has ordered were finalized

timely so as to be effectively implemented ahead of the No-

vember elections.

Instead, the Government has nonsensically insisted that

the mail-in voting changes it is planning to implement were

too speculative and distant for the Plaintiff States to chal-

lenge them in court, while simultaneously asserting that it

needs emergency relief right now to immediately imple-

ment those changes. This suspect scenario appears tailor-

made to weaponize this case as a means of destabilizing the

nation’s vote-by-mail systems through court-assisted proce-

dural maneuvers. And the Government seems well on its

way to accomplishing that tactical objective, as evidenced

by its decision to delay issuance of a final rule beyond July22 TRUMP v. CALIFORNIA

JACKSON, J., dissenting

29, 2026, while this Court considered its stay application.

See 91 Fed. Reg. 44880 (2026).15

Rather than swallow the Government’s gamesmanship

whole, the Court should have given this empty, strategic,

and bad-faith stay bid the swift rejection it deserves. Cf.

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 483–484 (1928)

(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The governing principle has

long been settled. It is that a court will not redress a wrong

when he who invokes its aid has unclean hands. . . . Where

the government is the actor, the reasons for applying it are

even more persuasive”); Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U. S.

155, 172 (2021) (“If men must turn square corners when

they deal with the government, it cannot be too much to ex-

pect the government to turn square corners when it deals

with them”).16 Notwithstanding the perceived legal merits

——————

15 Reconciling the Government’s request for this Court’s urgent inter-

vention, on the one hand, with the fact that the stay it has requested has

been treated as a justification for postponing implementation of the

planned election-rule changes, on the other, is a struggle—and an obvi-

ous tell. Either the Government wanted a new mail-in voting process for

the midterm elections or it didn’t. If it did, one would have expected it

to go ahead and promptly promulgate a final rule on or before July 29,

2026 (even if doing so undercut the stay application’s justiciability argu-

ments). And if it didn’t, its stay request is pointless. Either way, it seems

that delaying a final rule—and working instead to secure a Court order

that blesses the strategy of proposing contestable changes, and prompt-

ing chaos, while keeping valid legal claims at bay—was more beneficial

to the Government than actually implementing the mail-in voting policy

changes it is now urging.

16 If nothing else, rejecting this stay request now would prevent the

Government from potentially asserting that the Purcell principle bars a

new complaint, contrary to its current representations. See Application

for Stay 5 (promising that “the [Plaintiff States] can pursue claims” after

the issuance of a final rule, and that “courts can [then] resolve any legal

questions presented”). Given all that has happened, Purcell would be an

odd and inequitable fit. Judicial estoppel would plainly preclude it. And

it cannot logically be the case that the Plaintiff States are deemed too

early to challenge the Executive Order’s proposed rule changes now, but

are later denied judicial review on the ground that their subsequentCite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

23

JACKSON, J., dissenting

of the Government’s standing and ripeness arguments, stay

applications call for an equitable judgment. And, all things

considered, there is no way to rationally conclude that eq-

uity favors the Government here.

* * *

This is not a close call. The Government suffers no harm

from an injunction limiting unlawful actions, much less

“hypothetical” and “speculative” acts that the Government

says it was not even sure it would take. Denying this stay

request preserves the status quo in the fraught period

ahead of a national election. Granting it, on the other hand,

risks significant harm, including continued affronts to the

Plaintiff States’ sovereign interests, a strain on their pock-

etbooks, and the possibility that last-minute rule changes

will cause confusion on the ground, jeopardizing the public’s

interest in a fair and orderly election cycle. There is also

more than enough evidence in the record here to support

the lower courts’ conclusion that these harms were actual

or imminent when the Plaintiff States filed their complaint

such that these claims are presently justiciable.

In any event, this Court should not have gone out of its

way to error correct the District Court’s purported misap-

plication of our standing and ripeness doctrines, especially

given the Government’s abject failure to defend the Execu-

tive’s underlying legal authority and all that is at stake in

disputes involving last-minute changes to election rules.

When the Government’s obvious goal is to interfere with the

Plaintiff States’ practices and prerogatives in a manner

that the Constitution does not authorize, it is both a serious

legal error and a grave misuse of our equitable emergency

powers to let the Executive proceed even one step further.

——————

challenges to the Order’s chaotic prompting of a new mail-in ballot rule commix too close to the election.



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