IN 2005, S. GARY SNODGRASS LEFT COMMONWEALTH EDISON'S BOARD OF DIRECTORS

ComEd Announces New Directors and Senior Officers
Chicago, Illinois, United States November 28, 2005

ComEd announced today several actions intended to affirm the fact that ComEd is an independent entity, separate and distinct from parent Exelon Corporation, and to strengthen the company's ability to successfully manage some potentially difficult financial and strategic issues as Illinois completes its transition to restructuring after 2006. The actions include the election of a new board of directors and a slate of senior officers who no longer have responsibilities at Exelon.

ComEd announced that effective immediately, a new five-member board of directors has been elected for the company. The five directors are Frank M. Clark, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of ComEd, Sue Ling Gin, founder, owner, chairman and CEO of Flying Food Group, LLC, Edgar D. Jannotta, chairman of William Blair & Company, LLC, John W. Rogers, Jr., chairman and chief executive officer of Ariel Capital Management and Richard L. Thomas, retired chairman of First Chicago NBD It also noted that Gin, Jannotta, Rogers and Thomas are currently independent directors on the Exelon Board. ComEd's previous board members were Barry Mitchell, Gary Snodgrass, John Rowe and John (Jack) Skolds.

In addition, the company announced the appointment of a new slate of ComEd officers, each without responsibilities to Exelon. They are Frank Clark, Chairman and CEO, Barry Mitchell, President, John Costello, EVP, Chief Operating Officer, Bob McDonald, SVP, Chief Financial Officer, Anne Pramaggiore, SVP, Regulatory Affairs, John Hooker, SVP, Government Affairs and Darryl Bradford, VP, General Counsel

"ComEd has taken these actions in light of recent regulatory and political developments in Illinois that have put its ability to recover its costs of doing business, as well as procure power, at risk," said Clark. He noted that Exelon is not obligated nor can it use its financial resources to subsidize ComEd, if the utility were forced after the end of 2006 to acquire power on the open market at prices greater than those it is permitted to collect from customers. "We hope that the actions taken today make it clear that ComEd's destiny is entirely in its own hands," added Clark. Clark said he hopes that "a comprehensive resolution of these regulatory and political issues can be achieved without the necessity of further steps at ComEd." As part of this process, ComEd has stated its commitment to helping consumers avoid "rate shock" as they transition from nearly a decade of frozen, below-market electricity rates to current market rates. That is the goal of the "safety net" approach the company announced earlier, which would limit rate increases for electricity purchases to single digits through 2009. ComEd's current supply contracts expire at the end of 2006, at which time it must go to the open market to purchase power on behalf of its customers.

The company divested its generation assets several years ago and has become strictly a transmission and distribution company, meaning that it needs to acquire power from others to fulfill customer needs. This divestiture of generation assets, both to outside companies and to an Exelon affiliate, was made in the wake of legislation enacted in 1997 that encouraged the divestiture, and sought to restructure the electric power industry and move to full competition for power generation, following a transition period that ends on December 31, 2006. ComEd management has repeatedly noted that the company could suffer significant financial distress if it is not afforded a procurement process that enables it to pass through the cost it incurs to procure power. Rating agencies have confirmed ComEd management's concerns. For example, Moody's has put ComEd's credit rating on its "watch" list, and Standard & Poor's has recently downgraded ComEd and its affiliates, citing the "heightened adversarial regulatory environment" in Illinois. "Given the potential serious consequences if ComEd cannot recover its costs, the new governance structure put in place today ensures that ComEd is able to make independent decisions about its financial and strategic interests, and to continue to advocate positions that we believe are in the best interests of our customers," Clark said. He noted the value of the new, majority board of outside directors as a factor that would help provide more effective independent oversight of the company.

Exelon executives noted that this action would not affect Exelon's timetable for its merger with New Jersey-based Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated (PSEG).

Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd) is a unit of Chicago-based Exelon Corporation (NYSE: EXC) one of the nation's largest electric utilities with more than $14 billion in revenues and a customer base of five million. ComEd provides service to approximately 3.7 million customers across Northern Illinois, or 70 percent of the state's population. Exelon's renewable portfolio is strong and continues to grow. Through it's power purchase agreements for four wind farms in Pennsylvania and West Virginia, Exelon has become the largest marketer of wind-generated energy East of the Mississippi River. With a wind generation portfolio exceeding 175 megawatts, Exelon Generation has committed to providing clean, environmentally friendly power generation to customers located in the PJM Interconnection . Complimenting Exelon's wind agreements, Exelon Generation owns and operates a landfill gas facility, an environmentally friendly form of power generation that utilizes landfill gas to generate electricity. Exelon Generation owns and operates two hydroelectric stations along the Susquehanna River. Though two separate types of facilities, the two hydroelectric stations provide much needed load leveling and base load power to the region.

1999 BIO OF GARY SNODGRASS says he was over nuclear security!

http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=124298&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=570427&highlight=

S. Gary Snodgrass currently is a senior vice president and officer of Unicom Corporation and ComEd. He has oversight for corporate resources including supply chain management, information services, quality, corporate security and corporate human resources. Prior to joining Unicom, he served as vice president of human resources at USG Corporation. During his 24 years with USG, he progressed through the organization in various plant, subsidiary and corporate human resources management positions in the areas of labor relations, compensation, training and development, and college relations.

NICOM, PECO ENERGY MERGER TO BE NAMED EXELON CORPORATION; MCNEILL AND ROWE ANNOUNCE SENIOR LEADERSHIP TEAM
Chicago, IL and Philadelphia, PA December 16, 1999 - Corbin A. McNeill, Jr., chairman, president and chief executive officer of PECO Energy Company, and John W. Rowe, chairman, president and chief executive officer of Unicom Corporation, have announced that when the two companies are merged, the name of the new company will be Exelon Corporation.

“Exelon stands for experience and excellence,” said McNeill, “and that’s what the new company will be all about.”

“Exelon has been a very successful name in the competitive energy market and we intend to build upon that,” said Rowe.

The two companies announced on September 23 that they intended to merge as equals by September, 2000, forming a new holding company but retaining the names Commonwealth Edison (ComEd) and PECO Energy for their distribution operations in Chicago and Philadelphia.

McNeill and Rowe said that while the name Exelon – the existing brand of some of PECO Energy’s unregulated business ventures – has been chosen for the new holding company, the future names and brands for all other company operations, except distribution, are still under review.

McNeill and Rowe also announced the selection of the senior leaders who will direct major line and staff units for the new company. The appointments are:

* Michael J. Egan: Chief Financial Officer

* Paul A. Elbert: Unregulated Enterprises President

* Pamela B. Strobel: General Counsel

* Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.: Chief Nuclear Officer

* Ian P. McLean: Power Team President

* Kenneth G. Lawrence: PECO Energy Distribution President

* Carl J. Croskey: ComEd Distribution President

* S. Gary Snodgrass: Chief Human Resources Officer

Additional members of the senior management team will be announced in the near future.

John W. Rowe who will have the responsibility for overseeing transmission and distribution operations and the unregulated retail enterprises said, “we are most fortunate to have this wealth of management talent. Under this leadership team, the company will become a major force in this emerging marketplace.”

Corbin A. McNeill Jr. who will have the responsibility for generation and power marketing operations said, “this team brings the experience and vision that will lead the combined company to the top tier of national energy companies. This combined talent, along with our combined resources will result in the new company being a national leader in the energy industry.”

Michael J. Egan is currently senior vice president and chief financial officer of PECO Energy and recently was named Chief Integration Officer for the merger of the two companies. Egan also is Chairman of AmerGen Energy, a joint venture between PECO Energy and British Energy Plc which was formed for the acquisition of nuclear power plants. Egan came to PECO Energy from Aristech Chemical Corporation where he served as a member of the Corporate Management Committee and Board of Directors and as its Chief Financial Officer.

Paul E. Elbert is currently executive vice president of Unicom and president, Unicom Enterprises, the company’s unregulated subsidiary. Prior to joining Unicom, he was president and chief executive officer, Natural Gas for Michigan based Consumers Power Company. At Consumers, Elbert led the formation of the gas business unit and the subsequent public offering of gas company stock. Earlier he was responsible for energy distribution, marketing, rates and wholesale power transmission as well as fossil and hydro operations.

Pamela B. Strobel is currently, senior vice president and general counsel of Unicom Corporation and its subsidiary, ComEd. Prior to joining ComEd in 1993, Ms. Strobel was a partner in the law firm of Sidely & Austin which she joined in 1988 following 11 years with the firm of Isham, Lincoln & Beale. She was a member of Sidley & Austin’s Labor group, where she concentrated her practice in employment discrimination litigation and counseling.

Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr. is currently executive vice president of Unicom and president and chief nuclear officer of Commonwealth Edison’s (ComEd) nuclear generation group. Before joining ComEd, Kingsley was Chief Nuclear Officer of the Nuclear Generation Group at the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), where he was credited with the turnaround of the TVA nuclear program. Before joining TVA, Kingsley was vice president, nuclear operations for Middle South Utilities.

Ian P. McLean is currently a corporate senior vice president and president of Power Team, PECO Energy’s wholesale power marketing organization. McLean joined PECO Energy in 1999 from Engelhard Corporation, where he was the group vice president responsible for the global trading, refining and recycling business with sites around the world. McLean began his career with Engelhard in 1985 as managing director of the London trading operation. In 1987 he was appointed to senior vice president of the USA group with global accountability for all trading and commercial business.

Kenneth G. Lawrence is currently a corporate senior vice president of PECO Energy and President of PECO Energy Distribution. Prior to this assignment, he held a number of executive positions with the Company: senior vice president and chief financial officer, vice president gas operations, and vice president, commercial operations.

Carl J. Croskey is currently senior vice president and president of distribution for ComEd. Prior to joining ComEd, Croskey was president of Michigan Consolidated Enterprises, a subsidiary of Michigan Consolidated Gas. At Michigan Consolidated Enterprises, Croskey developed a strategy to address retail-marketing issues for the distribution company and he led all joint venture interstate pipeline projects. Prior to that he headed up production, storage, transmission and distribution operations along with related field services.

S. Gary Snodgrass currently is a senior vice president and officer of Unicom Corporation and ComEd. He has oversight for corporate resources including supply chain management, information services, quality, corporate security and corporate human resources. Prior to joining Unicom, he served as vice president of human resources at USG Corporation. During his 24 years with USG, he progressed through the organization in various plant, subsidiary and corporate human resources management positions in the areas of labor relations, compensation, training and development, and college relations.

Following the close of the merger, Mr. McNeill and Mr. Rowe will become co-chief executive officers of the new holding company for a transition period lasting until December 31, 2003. During the first half of the transition period, Mr. McNeill will be chairman of the board of directors and Mr. Rowe will be president of the new holding company and serve as chairman of the executive committee. During the second half of the transition period, Mr. Rowe will serve as chairman of the board of directors and Mr. McNeill will serve as chairman of the executive committee of the board. At the end of the transition period, Mr. Rowe will become chairman and sole chief executive officer of the new holding company. Mr. McNeill will remain on the board of directors.

The new holding company will be one of the nation’s largest electric utilities based on its approximately 5 million customers and it will have total revenues of $12.4 billion. The combined company will be the nation’s fourth largest power generator, with a generation portfolio of more than 22,500 megawatts, and will be a leader in the growing U.S. wholesale power marketing business. Based on current equity market values, the new company would rank third in the industry with a market capitalization of $15.2 billio

S. GARY SNODGRASS, Candidate for St. Augustine Beach City Commmission

What do we know about S. GARY SNODGRASS?

He's a former top executive at COMMONWEALTH EDISON (now EXELON), a nuclear utility -- one where he was identified as the source of fraudulent misrepresentations to older employees in an Age Discrimination case in federal court.

See below.

I reckon he "bares watchin'," as they say in East Tennessee.

IN HAEC VERBA: U.S. Court of Appeals Decision Identifying S. GARY SNODGRASS as Source of Mispresentations in Age Discrimination Csae

Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Company, 377 f3d 787

Dennis J. DUBICZ, Robert B. Magolan, and William Marsh, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, an Illinois corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal of: Edward P. Anderlik, Donand J. Arendarczyk, Randy Bales, et al., Proposed Plaintiffs.
No. 03-3057.
No. 03-3384.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued February 20, 2004.
Decided August 2, 2004.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Kocoras, C.J.
Jerome R. Weitzel (argued), Kozacky & Associates, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Glenn D. Newman (argued), Tamra S. Domeyer (argued), Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and BAUER and MANION, Circuit Judges.
MANION, Circuit Judge.
1
The appellants, current or retired employees of Commonwealth Edison Company ("ComEd"), appeal from a decision of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to deny their motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. Also at issue, however, is the jurisdiction of that court to consider the motion. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the district court had jurisdiction to consider the motion, but that under the unique circumstances of this case, it was an abuse of discretion to deny the appellants leave to file a second amended complaint.
I.
2
This case began as a pro se action by certain current or retired employees of ComEd. In a complaint filed with the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the initial plaintiffs (the "Cook Plaintiffs") alleged that ComEd discriminated against them on account of their age in relation to ComEd's pension plan (the "Plan").
3
The Cook Plaintiffs subsequently retained counsel and filed a first amended complaint. This complaint had six counts. In Count I, the Cook Plaintiffs alleged age discrimination and misrepresentation in relation to the Plan. In Counts II, III, and IV, individual plaintiffs raised allegations of age discrimination. In Count V the Cook Plaintiffs alleged that ComEd made material misrepresentations with respect to the Plan in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq. ("ERISA"). In Count VI, the Cook Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract resulting from material misrepresentations by ComEd with regard to the Plan.
4
ComEd moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim and, with respect to Count V, for failure to plead a claim of fraud with particularity. On September 25, 2002, the district court issued a memorandum opinion explicitly dismissing Counts II, III, and IV with prejudice and Counts I, V, and VI without prejudice. Accompanying the decision was form AO4050 (the "Judgment Form"). That form, titled "Judgment In A Civil Case," signed by the clerk of the court and dated the same day as the memorandum opinion, stated that "Counts I, V, and VI of Plaintiffs' first amended complaint are dismissed without prejudice." The Judgment Form, however, also included what purported to be an entry of final judgment: "All matters in controversy having been resolved, final judgment is hereby entered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs."
5
Eight months after the dismissal of the first amended complaint, the Cook Plaintiffs, now joined by a second group of plaintiffs (together with the Cook Plaintiffs, the "Appellants"), filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 3, 2003, the district court denied the motion and also converted its earlier dismissal of Counts I, V, VI without prejudice to dismissals with prejudice. The district court found that the passage of eight months was an undue delay and that the eight-month delay was also prejudicial to ComEd. In a memorandum opinion accompanying its decision, the court found that "eight months is beyond the pale in light of what was required of [the Appellants]." The district court attributed the delay in filing the motion for leave to an effort by Appellants' trial counsel to add new plaintiffs: "[I]nstead of taking what should have been weeks, Plaintiffs' counsel spent eight months busily hunting up new clients." The district court also agreed with ComEd that ComEd was prejudiced because during the eight-month delay, "memories faded and documents were lost." This appeal followed.
II.
6
The Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion in denying their motion for leave to amend. Before we reach that issue, however, we must consider whether the district court had the jurisdiction to consider the motion for leave to file the second amended complaint. ComEd argued before the district court, and repeats its arguments here, that the entry by the district court of the Judgment Form accompanying the district court's September 25, 2002 decision made that decision a final judgment and thus the district court did not have jurisdiction eight months later to consider the Rule 15(a) motion. The district court rejected ComEd's jurisdictional argument and stated that "we dismissed the claims at issue without prejudice and fully intended that the Plaintiffs be given the opportunity to amend their complaint."
7
When there has been an entry of final judgment, a complaining party may amend a complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a) only after that party has successfully altered or amended the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) or the judgment has been vacated pursuant to Rule 60(b). See Sparrow v. Heller, 116 F.3d 204, 205 (7th Cir.1997). The Appellants did not move to set aside or alter this judgment. Therefore, if the district court's September 25, 2002 order and the accompanying Judgment Form represented a final judgment, the district court should not have considered, and had no jurisdiction to consider, the Appellants' Rule 15(a) motion. Paganis v. Blonstein, 3 F.3d 1067, 1073 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that, absent a Rule 59(e) or 60(b) motion, a district court lacks the jurisdiction to review a Rule 15(a) motion where final judgment has been entered).
8
Interwoven with the district court's jurisdiction to hear the Appellants' motion for leave to file the second amended complaint is this court's jurisdiction. With some exceptions not applicable here, this court's jurisdiction is limited to the review of final decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A party seeking to appeal a final decision of a district court must file a notice of appeal with that court "within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered." Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The Appellants did not, of course, file a notice of appeal within 30 days after the district court's September 25, 2002 decision. Thus, if that decision were a final decision, any appeal would be untimely and this court would not have jurisdiction. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 203, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988) (holding that the filing of a timely notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional).
9
Despite the language in the district court's order of judgment, the district court's dismissal of the complaint was not a final judgment. With a limited exception, a dismissal without prejudice "does not qualify as an appealable final judgment because the plaintiff is free to re-file the case." Larkin v. Galloway, 266 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir.2001); see also Furnace v. Bd. of Trustees of Southern Ill. Univ., 218 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir.2000); Principal Mutual Life Ins. v. Cincinnati TV 64 Ltd. P'ship, 845 F.2d 674, 676 (7th Cir.1988) ("An order dismissing a complaint is not final because a plaintiff may file an amended complaint, resurrecting the lawsuit."). The exception to this rule arises "when it is clear from the record that the district court `found that the action could not be saved by any amendment of the complaint which the plaintiff could reasonably be expected to make.'" Furnace, 218 F.3d at 670.
10
The September 25, 2002 dismissal of three of the Cook Plaintiffs' claims was without prejudice. This is made clear both in the district court's opinion and, more importantly, in the Judgment Form. The Judgment Form states that three of the counts "are dismissed without prejudice." A review of the record does not suggest that amendments to the complaint would be futile. To the contrary, the district court's opinion accompanying the Judgment Form makes it clear that the first amended complaint was capable of being amended. For example, with respect to Counts V and VI, the district court concluded that the counts should be dismissed because the Cook Plaintiffs had not met the requirements of particularity for an averment of fraud required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Specifically, the district court found that "there are many dates, documents, and names that need to be included in the complaint in order to meet the Rule 9(b) requirements." Requiring a party to provide more specific dates, names and certain documents suggests that the party need only provide more detail, and the record does not show that adding such detail would have been impossible.
11
The problem arises, of course, because immediately after the Judgment Form states that certain of the counts are dismissed without prejudice, the Judgment Form also states that the final judgment is entered in favor of ComEd. Thus, the Judgment Form appears to be inconsistent — it tells the Appellants that their claim is dismissed without prejudice (meaning the Appellants could amend their complaint) but then goes on to state that all matters at issue have been resolved and that a final judgment had been reached. The district court's labeling of its decision as final (apparently inadvertently) should not, however, be conclusive. A district court's decision is a final judgment only when the decision meets the requirements for being a final judgment. The September 25, 2002 decision was not final, regardless of the label attached to it. See Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1221 (10th Cir.) (labeling a decision as a final judgment is not controlling), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 533, 157 L.Ed.2d 408 (2003). The district court dismissed three counts of the complaint without prejudice and, as discussed above, there is no indication from the record at that stage that attempts to amend the complaint would have been futile. There was no final judgment.
12
Potentially at odds with this conclusion, however, is the decision of this court in Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761 (7th Cir.2003). In that case, the district court dismissed a complaint without prejudice but also entered a judgment against the plaintiff "dismissing the `case' without any suggestion that Hoskins was entitled to plead again." Id. at 763. Hoskins immediately appealed the district court's decision and this court held that the decision was immediately appealable. This court noted that "[t]he district judge sent inconsistent signals." Id. Further, this court noted that, "[w]hen the district court's resolution looks both ways, the only safe route is to treat it as final: the alternative lays a trap for unwary (or even wary) litigants, who may forego appeal in reliance on the `without prejudice' language only to learn later, and to their sorrow, that the original order was appealable and the time for appellate review has lapsed." Id. at 764.
13
In Hoskins, therefore, this court permitted a litigant to take an immediate appeal from a district court's decision dismissing a complaint without prejudice because the district court's form of judgment stated that the case (rather than only the complaint) was dismissed. At first glance, it appears, therefore, that this court should hold likewise — that the September 25, 2002 decision because it "looked both ways" was immediately appealable, and that because the Appellants failed to appeal in a timely fashion, this court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Likewise, because the Appellants failed to reopen the judgment or have it vacated, the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the Rule 15(a) motion.
14
Hoskins is not, however, wholly incompatible with our approach. First, it is not clear from that opinion what exactly the Rule 58 judgment form (as opposed to the actual decision of the district court) stated. The opinion says only that there was no suggestion Hoskins was entitled to plead again. In this case, however, there was such a suggestion; in fact, the Judgment Form quite clearly suggests that the Appellants were entitled to plead again. The Judgment Form stated that certain of the counts were dismissed without prejudice. Second, it is also not clear to what extent Hoskins should apply in the reverse — in other words, should this court refuse to hear an appeal (and should the district court be stripped of jurisdiction to consider a Rule 15(a) motion) because the district court inadvertently labeled its decision a final judgment but also in the same form stated that certain of the counts were dismissed without prejudice? As discussed above, a district court's label cannot convert an otherwise non-final judgment into a final judgment, and a litigant, relying on the explicit language of the district court's Judgment Form bolstered by its written opinion, should not bear the price for the district court's inadvertence. We therefore hold that the district court properly considered the Appellants' Rule 15(a) motion.
15
That is not to say the Appellants chose the wisest course. The Appellants would have been better served had their trial counsel, upon receiving the Judgment Form, taken steps to confirm the status of the case (for instance, by requesting clarification from the district court). We see no reason why trial counsel could not have done so and doing so would have likely cleared up the discrepancy well before it reached this court. We turn next to the actual decision of the district court on that motion.
16
A party seeking to amend a complaint after the filing of a responsive pleading must have the consent of the adverse party or must move for leave to file the amended complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Leave to file "shall be given freely when justice so requires." Id. Although leave to file a second amended complaint should be granted liberally, a district court may deny leave for several reasons including:" `undue delay, bad faith[,] or dilatory motive[,] ... undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment.'" Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 612 (7th Cir.2002) (quoting Ferguson v. Roberts, 11 F.3d 696, 706 (7th Cir.1993)). "Delay, standing alone, may prove an insufficient ground to warrant denial of leave to amend the complaint; rather, `the degree of prejudice to the opposing party is a significant factor in determining whether the lateness of the request ought to bar filing.'" Id. at 613 (quoting Doherty v. Davy Songer, Inc., 195 F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir.1999)). This court reviews a decision of the district court to deny a motion for leave to amend for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 612.
17
The district court abused its discretion in denying the Appellants' motion for leave to amend. The primary factor in the court's decision was the eight months between the dismissal of the Cook Plaintiffs' first amended complaint and the Appellants' Rule 15(a) motion. As recited above, however, delay by itself is normally an insufficient reason to deny a motion for leave to amend. See Perrian v. O'Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 194 (7th Cir.1992). Delay must be coupled with some other reason. Typically, that reason, as the court determined it was in this case, is prejudice to the non-moving party.
18
ComEd argues that it was prejudiced by the delay because memories of witnesses have faded and documents have been lost during the intervening eight months. The case for prejudice is stated, however, only in the most conclusory of terms. No particular witnesses or documents are identified by ComEd. Further, and more importantly, this argument ignores the statute of limitations. It is undisputed that the statute of limitations had not yet run in July 2003 when the Appellants moved for leave to amend their second amended complaint. Hypothetically, therefore, assuming the Appellants had never filed their original and first amended complaints, the Appellants could have filed an original complaint in July 2003, identical in all respects to the second amended complaint (save the caption). Surely ComEd could not, in such a hypothetical (assuming a laches argument was unavailing), argue in response to an original complaint that, despite the fact that the statute of limitations had not yet run, it should be excused from defending the suit because documents in its possession may have been lost and the memories of witnesses had faded. Yet that is, in effect, what we have here.1 The second amended complaint was a second (really, a third) bite at the apple for the Appellants. There may have been reasons why the Appellants were not entitled to this bite. But, an allegation of prejudice premised entirely on memory and document loss, where the motion for leave to file was made within the statute of limitations, is an insufficient reason.2
19
We sympathize, however, with the frustration expressed by the district court at the delay by the Appellants' trial counsel in filing its Rule 15(a) motion. The failure of counsel diligently to follow up on the district court's invitation to refile its complaint is exasperating. That we do not believe dismissal of the claims was warranted in this case does not mean that trial counsel's delay was the best course of action. By waiting eight months to file a motion (without any intervening contact with the court), counsel needlessly put at risk a merits determination of his clients' claim.
20
ComEd also provides an alternative ground for affirming the district court. ComEd argues that the district court's decision to deny leave to amend should be sustained because the proposed second amended complaint did not correct any of the problems identified by the district court when it dismissed the first amended complaint. This argument was presented to the district court but not addressed by it when it denied the Appellants' motion for leave to amend. This court may nonetheless affirm the district court's decision to deny leave to amend on any grounds supported by the record. Sanders v. Venture Stores, Inc., 56 F.3d 771, 773 (7th Cir.1995).
21
The Appellants' proposed amended complaint cures the defects the district court identified in Counts V and VI of the first amended complaint. The district court dismissed these counts without prejudice because Appellants (more specifically, the Cook Plaintiffs) failed to plead claims of fraudulent misrepresentation by ComEd with the particularity required by Rule 9(b).
22
The gist of the Appellants' misrepresentation claims (stylized claims of fraud and breach of contract in the first amended complaint and a breach of fiduciary duty in the second amended complaint) is that ComEd misled the Appellants by promising them, in the lead-up to the renegotiation of a collective bargain agreement covering union employees of ComEd, that the retirement benefits of lower-and middle-management employees would remain identical to those provided union employees. The Appellants allege that these promises were not kept and, in fact, ComEd never had any intention of keeping these promises. The Appellants allege that they relied on these promises to make certain decisions concerning whether to retire, continue in their current job, or seek positions that were covered by the collective bargaining agreement.
23
As stated above, the district court determined that the first amended complaint ran afoul the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b). Specifically, the court found that the complaint was not clear that the exhibits to the complaint (copies of memoranda and e-mail that the Appellants claimed demonstrated the false promises by ComEd) were all of the alleged written misrepresentations. Further, the first amended complaint provided broad time ranges, instead of specific dates, for when misrepresentations were made to the Appellants. The district court also faulted the complaint for failing specifically to identify who, other than one person, Senior Vice President of ComEd, Gary Snodgrass, made the alleged misrepresentations. Instead, the first amended complaint referred to Snodgrass and "other managers." Finally, the district court also noted that the exhibits do not contain "an explicit promise that union and management pensions will remain unified."
24
The second amended complaint corrected these defects. First, the Appellants have made it clear, as ComEd concedes, that the only misrepresentations they are alleging are those identified in the complaint. The documents containing these alleged misrepresentations are attached to the second amended complaint as exhibits and described (and quoted from) in the complaint. Second, the Appellants have identified specific dates on which these misrepresentations were made. Third, the Appellants have identified the persons responsible for making the alleged misrepresentations. The complaint identifies two primary sources of the alleged misrepresentations: Snodgrass;3 and an e-mail account utilized by ComEd, titled "Corporate Communications Mailbox." Finally, the proposed second amended complaint identifies the particular statements the Appellants allege to be misrepresentations. Whether they were, in fact, misrepresentations, is not before us. We hold, therefore, that the proposed second amended complaint cured any defects in the first, at least insofar as the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) is implicated. We therefore reject ComEd's alternative ground for upholding the decision of the district court.
III.
25
The district court had jurisdiction to consider the Appellants' motion for leave to amend their first amended complaint. The district court, however, abused its discretion in denying the motion. Because we so decide, there is no reason to consider the Appellants' argument that the district court erred in dismissing Counts V and VI of their first amended complaint.
26
REVERSED.
Notes:
1
It is important to emphasize that this litigation has never progressed beyond the pleadings stage. This is not the case where a plaintiff seeks to amend its complaint after the close of discovery or on the eve of trialSee, e.g., Sports Ctr., Inc. v. Brunswick Marine, 63 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir.1995); Continental Bank, N.A. v. Meyer, 10 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir.1993). In this case, the proceeding never progressed much beyond the filing of a complaint, an amended complaint, and ComEd's responses (in the form of a motion to dismiss) thereto.
2
This is not to say, of course, that any time a plaintiff files a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint within the statute of limitations that such a motion must be granted. There are numerous ways in which a non-moving party may be prejudiced that do not involve allegations of memory and document loss and in no way implicate the statute of limitations. We mean to say here only that where a plaintiff moves for leave to amend its complaint prior to the running of a statute of limitations, a conclusory argument by a defendant that documents have been lost and memories have faded is generally insufficient to demonstrate prejudice
3
One of the documents at issue are talking points issued by Snodgrass to members of management known as "Town Hall Managers." These Town Hall Managers were expected (per Snodgrass' direction) to share the talking points with management employees, including the Appellants. It is, perhaps, more accurate to say, therefore, that the Town Hall Managers made the alleged misrepresentations contained in these talking points. It is clear, however, that the source of these talking points was Snodgrass and the Appellants' second amended complaint identifies both Snodgrass and the Town Hall Managers

County Commissioners expected to show a "Profile in Courage" on relocation of St. Francis house, rejecting anti-homeless bigotry

Bigotry got a boost from St. Johns County’s Planning Agency (PZA), September 16.
PZA voted unanimously to violate the constitutional rights of the St. Augustine Society, which operates St. Francis House, an acclaimed homeless shelter with proven results helping people.
Demagogic, uninformed State Representative Charles Van Zant (R-Keystone Heights), identifying himself as legislator/architect/preacher, intimidated PZA, spouting irrational opinions (then leaving without being cross-examined by SFH supporters). This windbag should go back to theology school and study Matthew: “Whatever you do to the least of my brothers, that you do unto me.”
The United States Supreme Court holds that “irrational prejudice” against mentally retarded people is not a “rational basis” for zoning decisions -- finding the City of Cleburne, Texas violated the Constitution’s equal protection guarantees by discriminating against a group home.
Carpet-bombing the Constitution, finding “no room at the inn,” PZA unconstitutionally denied St. Francis House a new home. Wonder why?
An angry bunch of Republican Party “leaders,” neighbors and St. Gerard House funders played politics with homelessness, misled by Rep. Van Zant. Acting badly, some chauvinists (some from as far away as Ponte Vedra) haughtily hooted at speakers who supported St. Francis House’s plans to locate across from Target. Sadly, PZA voted 7-0 to indulge their “fear and smear tactics,” appeasing bigotry, hatred and prejudice. Enough.
SFH’s new location is close to social services (EPIC, VA, Flagler Hospital, County Health Department). SFH and St. Gerard Campus are compatible land uses, both serving disadvantaged people. SFH is working zealously to accommodate St. Gerard’s concerns about security, lighting and fencing.
Commissioners reviewing PZA’s decision will be well-advised to ignore irrational prejudice against homeless people. Speak out.
Our government must decide the appeal based upon facts, not fears.
We expect five County Commissioners to show us “Profiles in Courage,” in JFK’s words.

ENRON AND SAUDI ARABIAN LOBBYIST WORKS FOR JOHN MICA'S CAMPAIGN

a href="http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/saudi_arabia_rel91.jpg">









KENNETH LAY a/k/a "KENNY BOY," PRESIDENT BUSH's PAL











Here's ex-President Bush holding hands with the king of the Royal Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It figures that Republicans, being economic royalists, would have a special affinity for the dictators of Saudi Arabia.

Congressman JOHN MICA's been bragging about his political consultant, who has received millions of dollars from ENRON and the ROYAL KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA for propaganda -- in fact, MICA's political consultant registered with the Justice Department as a foreign agent for the ROYAL KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA.

ORLANDO WEEK: MICA'S MILLIONS

a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://www.orlandoweekly.com/sb/24842/mica11-12.jpg">

11/12/1998

News

Mica’s millions

John Mica: "I consider myself a pioneer in the cellular business, having helped to build two successful systems"

By Edward Ericson Jr.

John Mica is sitting pretty.

Re-elected last week as Florida’s 8th District congressman, Mica had campaign money to burn, no opposition from the Democrats and rides into a fourth term with a reputation -- carefully cultivated -- as a tough-talking political reformer.

He’s a crowd-pleaser on crime, steering federal money toward Central Florida as a "High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area" and voting to try 13-year-olds as adults. And as the first and only representative of a heavily Republican district drawn in 1991, Mica has taken off the gloves to fight powerful interests such as ... average federal workers, with dramatic hearings on what he regards as wasteful labor-union activities performed on government time.

Mica also has been fiercely partisan in his attacks on President Clinton, co-sponsoring an early impeachment resolution and calling the president "the little bugger" from the floor of the House.

A member of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, Mica attacked the White House over an obscure miniscandal involving Indian tribes in Wisconsin. One tribe reportedly used its casino-generated money to block a nearby tribe’s efforts to open a competing gambling hall. The Interior Department officials who blocked the new casino were accused of taking their marching orders from the White House, which received big campaign contributions from the wealthy tribe. Then the bureaucrats quit their government posts to take lucrative lobbying contracts with the tribe. Mica was incensed.

"Under the Ethics in Government Act, what was done by [those bureaucrats] is prohibited except for one loophole," Mica fumed during a hearing on the matter last year. "Do you think that that’s right for folks to step right out of government and then into a position of conflict?"

Mica came to Congress on a platform built on such stands, equating his financial security with political independence. "I’ve made a lot of money and I don’t need the salary," he said.

Proud of his status as a self-made entrepreneur, Mica would like to privatize as many services as possible, including public education. He would convert foreign aid into aid for U.S. businesses for "export assistance." Last year he put your money where his mouth is by voting for taxpayer-subsidized loans to nations that import U.S. weapons -- but only after taking $14,200 from political-action committees associated with those weapons merchants, according to the Center for Responsive Politics.

But while championing welfare for Grumman and Lockheed Martin, Mica’s tightwad side rules his philosophy regarding government aid to poor people.

In a 1994 survey on welfare, Mica chose all the most restrictive options regarding welfare reform, endorsing mandatory work and a requirement that teen moms must live with a parent. Then he added: "Six-month maximum on welfare."

Mica even endured a moment of infamy in the spring of 1996 when he likened welfare recipients to reptiles. "Do not feed the alligators," he said. "We post these warnings because unnatural feeding and artificial care create dependency."

The metaphor was denounced by many Democrats and caused even some Republicans to wince.

Yet few could know that at least $2 million of Mica’s own wealth had come from a government giveaway of a public resource. And nobody at the time noted the irony of Mica’s dependence on that taxpayer-sapping bonanza -- which one federal official likened to "one of the biggest welfare programs in the United States."

The giveaway

The man who said those words was former Federal Communications Commission chairman Mark S. Fowler, who was in charge of the giveaway. The date was March 30, 1985. Fowler was addressing a Senate subcommittee on communications, trying to get Congress to help him turn off the spigot of public money.

It was a frustrating time for Fowler; nothing was done, and the result was a five-year opportunity for a few thousand sharpies in and out of government. Fowler’s welfare program was John Mica’s ticket to easy millions.

It was called the cellular telephone service lottery.

On announced occasions, beginning in 1984, in a windowless room on the eighth floor of the FCC building, three big air-blown tanks full of pingpong balls were activated as groups of 30 to 50 anxious players looked on. Like Meyer Lansky or a Wisconsin tribe, the federal government was in the gambling business. But players of FCC Cellular Bingo, unlike the naive pigeons of Vegas, placed their bets for free or nearly free. And payoffs ranged from a few million dollars to hundreds of millions.

The prize was the right to use the radio spectrum between 800MHz and 920MHz, the frequencies cellular telephones use to communicate with each other and with wire lines. Conservative estimates at the time put the assets’ combined value at $20 billion.

The giveaway was supposed to spur competition. AT&T, whose Bell Labs had developed crucial cellular-switching technology two decades earlier, had just been dismantled by the largest antitrust action the U.S. government had ever undertaken. Regulators didn’t want a huge company to dominate the new service. Comparative hearings -- in which FCC bureaucrats weighed the merits of corporate proposals to provide service -- already had delayed widespread cellular service by 10 years. A call for proposals brought an avalanche of 5,000 -- a possible 20-year backlog -- in just a few days. "This was an inefficient system, and it delayed the delivery of new services to the public," remembers David Aylward, formerly an assistant to then-Colorado Sen. Tim Wirth, who chaired the Senate subcommittee on communications.

By law the FCC could not sell public assets. A lottery was deemed the only fair thing.

To spur competition, the FCC divided the country into 734 regions, the largest 306 being outrageously valuable, city-based "Metropolitan Service Areas" (MSAs) and the remaining 428 deemed "Rural Service Areas" (RSAs), which ranged in value from perhaps $1 million to tens of millions of dollars. Each area or city would get two cellular providers: the local phone company and a newcomer. To discourage speculators, the FCC demanded 500-page applications packed with engineering reports. Applicants also had to submit a letter of credit attesting they had the million dollars it would take to build the system within five years.

But specialized "application mills" popped up immediately to do the paperwork for just a few thousand dollars. They knew that the right to use the radio spectrum, if won in the lottery, could be sold quickly to a big company like Southwestern Bell or Western Wireless that would build the actual towers and staff the billing and marketing departments. A lottery application, once created, could be duplicated for as many gamblers as would pay, making application services a profitable business in itself. Commercials appeared on the Financial News Network, urging folks to "roll the dice." Regulators were appalled. The FCC, Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission stepped in to collar the mountebanks. Journalists reported the scandal; editorialists clucked tongues.

As the greed frenzy began, Mica was an administrative assistant to Florida Sen. Paula Hawkins, who sat on the key Senate communications subcommittee. Also working for Hawkins was John Dudinsky; following Hawkins’ defeat in 1986, the two men would find themselves in business together as lobbyists.

More important, Mica and Dudinsky also formed a partnership as MD Cellular. It was MD Cellular that -- two years after Mica left Hawkins’ employ -- would put Mica himself into the communications business.

A driven man

John Mica would be a millionaire today even without his cellular profits. But the millions he made in the lottery appear to have been his best return on investment. Mica takes pride in his attention to such things.

Mica has been a dedicated public servant, a stalwart for conservative causes, a tireless go-getter and a careful cultivator of his own financial garden for more than 30 years of public life.

"He is extremely energetic," says brother Dan, a former Democratic congressman who now heads the National Association of Credit Unions. "He eats breakfast early, works to 8 or 9 p.m., then he’ll go out to get a refrigerator or stove to install in the house, and do the installation before bed."

John Mica also is a deliberative and sharp thinker, his mind toned early by the high-school debating society. "For many, many years he held the record for the most points ever accumulated," says his brother, a fellow debating team member.

As a student at the University of Florida, John Mica raised the money to rebuild his fraternity house and even sketched the design for it himself, his brother says. He worked as a necktie salesman and dishwasher, and networked Republican circles as his brother moved in Democratic ones, although little separated them politically.

Shortly after graduation, John Mica landed a job as executive director of the Palm Beach and Orange County Government Charter Study Commissions, and sold the idea of charter government to the citizens of West Palm Beach. He then turned his charter knowledge into a minor franchise, selling his expertise to Pasco and Manatee counties as well.

In 1975 Mica hooked up with Orlando architect Robert Koch and formed MK Development, which 10 years later would build Koch’s office building and a small strip-mall on Temple Trail, eventually earning Mica more than $50,000 a year in rent payments.

Beginning with his election to the Florida House of Representatives from Orlando’s District 17 in 1976, Mica’s personal finances improved yearly. In 1977, he and developer Loren H. Roby borrowed about $110,000 to invest in two oceanfront lots on New Smyrna Beach. After the pair built condos on the site, both were on their way to financial security; by June 1980, Mica pegged his net worth at $302,550.

When Hawkins was elected to the U.S. Senate during the Reagan landslide of 1980, Mica followed her to Washington. After she lost her bid for re-election in 1986 to Bob Graham, Mica joined his friend Dudinsky as a lobbyist, working for such clients as American Specialty Chemical, Coopers & Lybrand and 3M Corporation. Mica built his five-bedroom, four-bath home on Via Tuscany in Winter Park just a few months after leaving Hawkins’ employ. The house is now assessed at $350,000.

Money was always important to John Mica, brother Dan says, and he was ambivalent at best about the value of public service in amassing suitable wealth. "For a while he questioned why I spent so many years in public service," says Dan, who served a decade each as a congressional staffer and as a congressman from Palm Beach County. "He said I might do better financially for my family."

Dan says he was surprised in 1991 when John announced he was running for the newly created House seat, until he said he had made his fortune and worried no longer about paying the mortgage. "John wanted to make sure he could be assured for his family," Dan says.

Mica lent himself $100,000 to run against Democrat Daniel Webster. Mica positioned himself as a reformer, and depicted Webster as a tool of trial lawyers and labor unions; Webster called Mica "the epitome of the professional politician." Webster did not make an issue of the cell-phone lottery, from which Mica divulged at least a million-dollar profit in financial disclosures filed four months before the election.

Mica won with 53 percent of the vote and went on to distinguish himself as a bold entrepreneur, a self-made millionaire who created jobs and opportunity. It was this image Mica put forth when first queried about his cellular deals.

"I consider myself a pioneer in the cellular business, having helped to build two successful systems from the ground up, now all part of a national system we take for granted," Mica replied early this year in a letter after Orlando Weekly began inquiring about his finances.

Yet a closer look reveals not a "pioneer" but a man whose luck made him rich with no work required.

‘Little appointee’

Mica refuses to say exactly how much he invested or earned in cellular, although the financial disclosure forms he filed as a congressman indicate a gross profit of at least $2 million. Because those forms list only income ranges, and because two of the three companies that eventually bought Mica’s phone interests refused to divulge the prices they paid, it’s impossible to be more precise.

But precision has not been a hallmark of Mica’s cellular business. In interviews and letters over many months, he gives varied and confusing explanations of his role, at first depicting himself as a wheeler-dealer and, more recently, as a "little appointee." From interviews and available public records, it appears the latter role is most accurate.

In fact, so informal was MD Cellular -- Mica’s first phone venture with Dudinsky and Carl Medei of Maitland -- that as far as the state of Florida is concerned, it was not even a legal business entity, having failed to register as required with the state.

The oversight was understandable. MD was less a business than a betting pool, Mica’s claims to the contrary.

"We were lucky. We were lucky. We were lucky," says Medei. "The FCC does a drawing, and if they pick you, you get money. And if they don’t, you lose."

Medei remembers little else about MD Cellular. He can’t say when it was begun -- "All that’s so long ago, I don’t think I even have the paperwork anymore" -- or what work Mica did on its behalf. He would not divulge the amount of his own investment or profit, although he says his was much smaller than that of his partners.

Mica says his duties as "managing general partner" included setting up the partnership, providing facilities and expensing the partnership. But he also says that another company, Genesis Management, did all the actual work.

And the $90,000 fee he reported in 1991 as the start of his cellular income?

That was an accountant’s creation, for tax purposes, Mica says. In fact, Mica now says MD was not a partnership at all. "Similar to thousands of other investor applicants, we retained a packager to prepare legal, engineering and financial applications to file with the FCC," Mica wrote in another letter. "Rather than form a formal partnership or corporation, as investors we signed Service Contract Agreements (forms used by nearly all cellular packagers) provided by Genesis, the Virginia-based cellular packager."

Chance encounters

Genesis Management founder Wladimir Naleszkiewicz was a Polish émigré who taught economics at Notre Dame before stints with the FCC and the White House office of telecommunications policy under presidents Ford and Carter. He had spent the early 1980s trying to assemble financing for a visionary direct satellite broadcasting system -- much like the one Bill Gates is invested in today. But Genesis, founded in 1986, was a much more modest enterprise, filling out complex FCC forms and grouping investors for the cellular lotteries in a subtle -- and sometimes blatant -- attempt to beat the system. The goal was to enter the lottery process under as many names as possible.

FCC rules and federal law forbade the submission of duplicate applications, threatening a $10,000 fine and up to five years in prison for anyone caught doing so. But the FCC didn’t enforce the rule. And Naleszkiewicz was the engineer for several lottery syndicators, according to Mica, cranking out engineering specs for all comers. That gave packagers like Naleszkiewicz tremendous power, controlling which small investors were grouped with others and in some cases directing the whole profitable enterprise.

Some application mills would sign up anyone with a pulse, charge them next to nothing to enter, but require that if the applicant won, he or she would hire the packager -- at high cost, with perhaps a bit of equity -- as a consultant to set up the system. The other tactic was to charge unsophisticated investors high fees based on inflated claims about the chances of winning and the value of the asset to be won.

By mid-1986 FCC Chairman Fowler threatened to report "charlatan-type applications" to the Justice Department. But in the end the market ruled, and the speculators won. "We have seen that too many applicants have too little intention of actually providing telecommunications services and merely apply in order to sell out later to the highest bidder," Fowler complained in a speech to telecom industry officials. "Try as we might, we have no way to distinguish between authentic service providers and these racehorse Charlies."

Enter John Mica.

"We had done some research on packagers," says Mica. "Wladimir had the best reputation."

As the first of five RSA lotteries closed, Mica saw that instead of the expected thousands of applicants, only 800 to 1,200 people applied for each license. This created favorable odds for any savvy investor who could enter all of the remaining 340 drawings. Even if the number of applicants doubled -- which it nearly did -- the odds of winning still were better than seven to one.

By mid-1988, Mica had entered several hundred lotteries. By 1990 he had won three times.

MD Cellular was part of two groups that won RSAs. Those service areas were based in Front Royal, Va.; Aberdeen, S.D.; and Monroe, La.

Within weeks the partnership sold the Virginia RSA, which covered a six-county territory 100 miles from the Washington beltway -- prime territory -- to Southwestern Bell. "I didn’t want to sell Virginia," Mica says. "If we’d gotten stock for this, we’d be so rich I wouldn’t even be here. I’d be out on my yacht somewhere."

Mica did get some stock in the next RSA sold, a seven-county area in the northeast corner of Louisiana.

The partnership to which MD Cellular belonged was in turn controlled by a larger partnership, Tri-Coastal Cellular; in 1991 Tri-Coastal’s 18 partners formed a shell corporation, Monroe Cellular, to operate a cellular-phone company there. "We built the system in Louisiana," says Jim Arch of Maitland, one of the partners.

By "built," Arch doesn’t mean he actually flew down there with a tool belt around his waist and worked the cranes that erected the towers. He hired the people who hired the people who did that. Or rather, like Mica, he invested with people who hired people who hired people who did the work. But Mica’s role was such that, today, he can’t even remember the name of the company, or its owner, that the partnership hired.

Eventually New Jersey-based Centennial Cellular came calling, and in 1994 they paid $11.5 million for the property, according to Centennial Comptroller Tom Bucks. Mica’s share of that sale would have been $862,500; he took half of that in Centennial stock, which he eventually sold.

The final RSA -- comprising five counties in South Dakota -- was sold in 1995, also for an undisclosed sum, to Western Wireless. Mica reported a gain of between $100,000 and $1 million on that sale, but has said that his 12 percent stake in the Aberdeen property was his least profitable.

Mica entered the 1990s more than $1 million ahead in the cellular game. Real losses were almost unthinkable. Instead, the risks were associated with business partners shuffled into the deck by Genesis Management.

The riskiest would prove to be the packager himself, Wlad Naleszkiewicz.

In January 1989, Naleszkiewicz told 40 clients he had submitted to the FCC their cellular lottery application fees -- $200 each for 1,438 applications -- but he didn’t. "The last ones, he never filed," says Arch. "He put the applications in the garbage."

Naleszkiewicz pled guilty in federal court to two counts of mail fraud in connection with this failing. He told the court he kept the $287,600 to save himself embarrassment and "avoid financial difficulties." He and his wife, Nancy, were fined double damages, and Wladimir faced 10 years in prison, though he served just four months’ home detention. Genesis’ was the first and only criminal indictment to arise from cellular licensing application fraud.

Genesis filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 in August 1993, claiming assets of $5,088 and liabilities of $1.4 million. Wladimir Naleszkiewicz died in February 1996. His wife could not be reached for comment.

Mica rests much of his credibility as a true cellular player -- and not a passive speculator -- on his choice of Genesis. "The firm had a reputation as the best engineering and packaging company for cellular applications," he wrote. "We researched the firm and found that all of the critical engineering studies required by the FCC for previously awarded MSA Cellular licenses and prepared by Genesis were approved."

But Genesis did not exist until 1986, well after the MSA process had gotten under way. And what was Naleszkiewicz doing immediately before then? He was vice president and director of economics for American National -- an application mill the FTC had shut down for fraud in 1985.

Mica says he knew nothing about that.

Tallying the costs

Today Mica is out of the phone business.

He’s coy about his income from the deals, noting that he put money into the systems he owned for years before deriving any profit. He says the cost of applications was high as well. "Application fees and packaging fees for engineering and legal work were costly," he wrote. "As I recall, just the FCC application for each block exceeded $80,000, not including packager fees for legal, engineering and financial application work."

But what did it really cost to get into the sweepstakes?

According to FCC records, the early lotteries were free. Later a $200 per application fee was instituted. Syndicators like Naleszkiewicz charged between $3 and $5,000 per application, depending on the worth of the properties being raffled off and what kind of deals they made with clients.

Mica’s real costs may never be known. But the aftermath of the Genesis fraud provides a glimpse at the figures.

In a letter dated May 15, 1997, Mica wrote to James Hanson, chairman of the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, regarding a payment Mica left off his 1996 financial disclosure statement. "In 1996 I received $7,502.23 as a court-ordered restitution (Naleszkiewicz Order of Restitution) from a case in which I and other investors were defrauded," Mica wrote. "Staff of the committee advised that this need not be considered ... for reporting purposes."

The restitution was for double the amount Naleszkiewicz collected from each applicant. That puts Mica’s cost for that final lottery, in which 83 RSAs were raffled, at $3,751.12. Multiplied by four application blocks, that represents an initial investment of less than $15,000 to make his first cellular million (or two).

Such speculation annoys John Mica, who doesn’t like to talk about his money.

Although he once pegged his net worth at $6 million and equated his financial independence with political independence, Mica is reticent about the details. "Someone might read that [I’m rich] and try to push down my door," he says.

So don’t ask him what he’s worth now. He’ll say only that it’s less than a few years ago. And don’t ask him to say just how much he invested, and earned, in the cellular-phone business.

He says he just doesn’t know.

Buy America Act, Crothall Services Group, Inc. and Compass Group PLC

To: ExDir@fdva.state.fl.us
Sent: Thu, Sep 30, 2010 2:39 pm
Subject: Buy America Act, Crothall Services Group, Inc. and Compass Group PLC

Dear Lt. General Milligan:
It has come to my attention that a multibillion dollar foreign multinational corporation has the contract(s) to run [catering and cleaning for] some five (5) FDVA nursing homes for Florida veterans. Is that correct?
As the proud son of a World War II paratrooper (the late Edward A. Slavin, Sr., after whom the Southern New Jersey Chapter of the 82nd AIrborne Div. Assn. is named), I would like to have a few questions answered by close of business tomorrow, October 1, 2010.
Please answer:
1. What is the total value of Florida and Federal Funds paid each year and in total over time to the world's largest catering company, Compass Group PLC and its Crothall Services Group, Inc., a British multinational corporation, and predecessor or affiliated companies, to run Florida Department of Veterans Affairs nursing homes in Florida?
2. Were these contracts ever subject of meaningful competitive bidding? How long do they last and when does each of them expire?
3. Does the Buy America Act apply? Are there any exemptions?
4. How do the past, present and current wage, health and retirement benefits compare between: (a) Florida Department of Veterans Affairs contractor employees and (b) employees of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs? Please provide a spreadsheet with comparisons, stating each of your assumptions.
5. How much profit has Compass Group PLC and its Crothall Services Group, Inc. ever made from this FVA contract and its predecessors over its course of performance, including bonuses and change orders? Are the contracts audited? Have there ever been audit exceptions or refunds? Have there ever been any been protests by American firms or veterans organizations?
Have any unions filed unfair labor practices charges? Please provide details.
6. How many of the FDVA facilities have a collective bargaining agreement in effect with Crothall/Compass?
7. Are FVA's Crothall/Compass contractor employees protected by any whistleblower rules/laws? If so, what are they? Have any Crothall/Compass employees ever been disciplined/fired for raising concerns about medical malpractice, health, safety or other concerns without any legal protections? If that ever happened, would they have any recourse with your office? What procedures exist? Are Crothall/Compass employees informed of them? Has FVA ever considered adopting policies to protect these employees? If not, why not?
8. Has anyone in the Florida State Legislature or Congress ever spoken out about these questionable contracting arrangements with Crothall/Compass?
9. Will you please send me copies of the contracts in quo in a PDF format? When do the contracts expire? Will they be subject to competitive bidding requirements? If not, why not?
10. Are you prepared to make a public statement tomorrow for attribution about this situation -- American veterans being cared for not by government employees, but by employees of a foreign multinational corporation, making profits from VA health care services and (possibly) underpaying U.S. workers, particularly when compared to the salaries, benefits and retirement plans that VA federal government employees would be paid?
I look forward to your answers. Please call me if you have any questions about any of my questions.
Sincerely,
Ed
Ed Slavin
Clean Up City of St. Augustine, Florida
www.cleanupcityofstaugustine.blogspot.com
Box 3084
St. Augustine, Florida 32085
215-554-1187 (cellular)

Here's the snooty response from Tallahasse:

Dear Mr. Slavin:



We are in receipt of your request from yesterday afternoon. As Chief of Staff for the Florida Department of Veterans’ Affairs (FDVA), thank you for your inquiry. The premise upon which your inquiry seems based is incorrect as FDVA owns and operates its state veterans’ homes. Our administrators and staff are state employees. Crothall is contracted to provide housekeeping and laundry services. Before addressing each of your ten requests, however, please allow me to explain our role in assisting you.



We will continue to produce and/or make available for your review the records and documents requested in our possession. However, for reasons outlined below, we do not research and prepare specific legal or policy statements at the request of the public. Likewise, we will also not explain the markings, handwriting, or other notations on each document provided. Although we have in the past answered general questions, this is done in an effort to assist the public with the services offered by the Florida Department of Veterans Affairs (FDVA).



By way of background, please accept this explanation of our duty to provide existing records. FDVA is not required to answer questions about its public records or to create a new record in response to a request for “information.” In other words, FDVA is not required to give out information from the records of this office. AGO 80-57. (Attorney General Opinion or AGO) For example, the Public Records Act does not require a town to produce an employee, such as the financial officer, to answer questions regarding the financial records of the town. AGO 92-38. Cf. In re Report of the Supreme Court Workgroup on Public Records, 825 So. 2d 889, 898 (Fla. 2002) (the custodian of judicial records "is required to provide access to or copies of records but is not required either to provide information from records or to create new records in response to a request").

Likewise, FDVA is not required to reformat its records to meet a requestor's particular needs. The intent of Ch. 119, F.S., is "to make available to the public information which is a matter of public record, in some meaningful form, not necessarily that which the applicant prefers." Thus, in AGO 97-39, the Attorney General's Office concluded that a school district was not required to furnish electronic public records in an electronic format other than the standard format routinely maintained by the district.



Ch. 119, F.S., provides a right of access to inspect and copy an agency's existing public records; it does not mandate that an agency create new records in order to accommodate a request for information from the agency. For example, the clerk of court is not required to provide an inmate with a list of documents from a case file which may be responsive to some forthcoming request. Wootton v. Cook, 590 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). However, in order to comply with the statutory directive that an agency provides copies of public records upon payment of the statutory fee, an agency must respond to requests by mail for information as to copying costs. Id. See also Woodard v. State, 885 So. 2d 444, 445n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), remanding a case for further proceedings where the custodian forwarded only information relating to the statutory fee schedule rather than the total copying cost of the requested records.

I provide this background analysis to you to explain why you will not receive a response, item by item, to many of your legal and policy questions presented in your multiple and ongoing requests. At the same time, we welcome providing you with the following in response to each numbered request:



(1) The contract with Crothall Healthcare Inc., will be provided.

(2) Yes, the contract was competitively bid; the procurement documents are integrated into the contract which will be provided.

(3) This is a legal question which we recommend you seek counsel of your choosing.

(4) We do not have any documents responsive to this request.

(5) We do not have any documents responsive to this request.

(6) There are no collective bargaining contracts with the State of Florida and contractor employees.

(7) This is a legal question which we recommend you seek counsel of your choosing.

(8) We do not have any documents responsive to this request

(9) The contract with Crothall Healthcare Inc., will be provided.

(10) Records requests do not include “preparing public statements for attribution about this situation”



The contract will be provided to you electronically by our Records Management Liaison Officer at no cost. Again, thank you for your inquiry and your interest in Florida’s veterans.





Earl Daniell
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret)
Chief of Staff
Florida Department of Veterans' Affairs (FDVA)
4040 Esplanade Way, Suite 180
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950
Phone: (850) 487-1533
Cell: (850) 559-0494
FAX: (850) 488-4001
Email: danielle@fdva.state.fl.us

Website: www.FloridaVets.org

FDVA Foundation: www.FloridaVeteransFoundation.org

USDOJ Press Release: Former Pleasantville, New Jersey Board of Education Member Sentenced to Prison for Extortion Conspiracy

For Immediate Release
September 27, 2010 United States Attorney's Office
District of New Jersey
Contact: (973) 645-2888

Former Pleasantville, New Jersey Board of Education Member Sentenced to Prison for Extortion Conspiracy

CAMDEN, NJ—Former Pleasantville, New Jersey Board of Education (PBOE) member David Thomas was sentenced today to a year and a day in prison for funneling $23,700 in bribes to former PBOE members Jayson G. Adams and Maurice “Pete” Callaway, United States Attorney Paul J. Fishman announced. David Thomas, 34, of Pleasantville, pled guilty on June 17, 2010, before United States District Judge Joseph E. Irenas to an Information charging him with conspiracy to commit extortion under color of official right. Judge Irenas also imposed the sentence today in Camden federal court.

According to documents filed in this case and statements made in court: From May to November 2006, Thomas facilitated the payments of bribes from a government cooperating witness (CW) to Adams and Callaway. Specifically, Thomas used a dormant contracting company that he owned to conceal the bribe payments. Thomas accepted several checks from Adams that Adams had been given by the CW, totaling approximately $23,700. Thomas deposited the checks, which were made payable to the company, into the company’s bank account and then provided cash payments of equal value to Adams, who then made cash payments to Callaway. Thomas admitted that he knew the payments were made in order to obtain Adams and Callaway’s official assistance, action and influence in matters pertaining to their positions on the PBOE.

In addition to the prison term, Judge Irenas sentenced Thomas to three years of supervised release.

On September 6, 2007, 11 public officials—including Adams and Callaway—were arrested in connection with this investigation. All of these individuals have pleaded guilty or been convicted at trial. Both Adams and Callaway pleaded guilty to attempted extortion under color of official right and were sentenced by United States District Judge Jerome B. Simandle to 30 and 15 months in prison, respectively.

U.S. attorney Fishman credited special agents of the FBI, under the direction of Special Agent in Charge Michael B. Ward, for the investigation leading to today’s sentence. He also credited prosecutors and investigators with the Atlantic County Prosecutor’s Office, under the direction of Prosecutor Theodore F.L. Housel, for their assistance in the investigation. The government is represented by Assistant U.S. Attorney Christopher J. Gramiccioni of the United States Attorney’s Office Special Prosecutions Division.

Defense counsel: James J. Leonard Jr., Esq, Atlantic City, N.J.

Press Releases | Newark Home

USDOJ Press Release: International Freight-forwarding companies plead guilty to price-fixing conspiracy, to pay more than $50 million criminal fines

Department of Justice
Office of Public Affairs
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Thursday, September 30, 2010
Six International Freight Forwarding Companies Agree to Plead Guilty to Criminal Price-fixing Charges -- Companies Agree to Pay a Total of $50.27 Million in Criminal Fines

WASHINGTON — Six international freight forwarders have agreed to plead guilty and to pay criminal fines totaling $50.27 million for their roles in several conspiracies to fix a variety of fees and charges in connection with the provision of freight forwarding services for international air cargo shipments, the Department of Justice announced today. These are the first charges filed as a result of the department’s antitrust investigation of the freight forwarding industry.



According to charges filed separately today in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, six companies–EGL Inc., a Houston-based company; Kühne + Nagel International AG, based in Schindellegi, Switzerland (K+N); Geologistics International Management (Bermuda) Limited, based in Hamilton, Bermuda; Panalpina World Transport (Holding) Ltd., based in Basel, Switzerland; Schenker AG, based in Essen, Germany; and BAX Global Inc., a Toledo, Ohio-based company–engaged in one or more separate conspiracies to impose certain charges or fees on customers purchasing international freight forwarding services for cargo freight destined for air shipment to the United States during various periods between 2002 and 2007.



Under the plea agreements, which are subject to court approval, the six companies have agreed to pay the following criminal fines: EGL, $4,486,120; K+N, $9,865,044; Geologistics, $687,960; Panalpina, $11,947,845; Schenker, $3,535,514; and BAX Global, $19,745,927. Each company has also agreed to cooperate with the department’s ongoing antitrust investigation.



Freight forwarders manage the domestic and international delivery of cargo for customers by receiving, packaging, preparing and warehousing cargo freight, arranging for cargo shipment through transportation providers such as air carriers and steamship lines, preparing shipment documentation, and providing related ancillary services.



“The department’s investigation uncovered six different conspiracies harming businesses and consumers in the United States and across the globe,” said Christine Varney, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division. “Our investigation continues in this important industry.”



According to the charges, the companies carried out the various conspiracies by, among other things, agreeing during meetings and discussions to coordinate various charges and fees on customers purchasing international freight forwarding services for cargo freight destined for air shipment to the United States. The six alleged conspiracies being charged today are:

*
A global conspiracy that took place from March 2003 to October 2007, to impose an Air Automated Manifest System (AAMS) fee on international air shipments of cargo to the United States, in which EGL, Geologistics and Panalpina and others participated;
*
A conspiracy that took place from July 2004 to October 2007, to impose an AAMS fee on shipments from Germany to the United States, in which K+N, Schenker and others participated;
*
A conspiracy that took place from March 2004 to October 2007, to impose an AAMS fee on shipments from Switzerland to the United States, in which K+N and others participated;
*
A conspiracy that took place from October 2002 to October 2007, to impose a New Export System (NES) fee on international air shipments from the United Kingdom to the United States, in which EGL, K+N, BAX and others participated;
*
A conspiracy that took place from July 2005 to June 2006, to impose a Currency Adjustment Factor (CAF) on international air shipments from China to the United States, in which K+N, Panalpina, Schenker, BAX and others participated; and
*
A conspiracy that took place from August 2005 to December 2007, to impose a Peak Season Surcharge (PSS) on shipments from Hong Kong to the United States, in which K+N, Panalpina, Schenker, BAX and others participated.

Each company is charged with price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act, which carries a maximum fine of $100 million per offense for corporations. The maximum fine may be increased to twice the gain derived from the crime or twice the loss suffered by the victims of the crime, if either of those amounts is greater than the statutory maximum fine.



Today’s charges are the result of a joint investigation into the freight forwarding industry being conducted by the Antitrust Division’s National Criminal Enforcement Section, the FBI’s Washington Field Office and the Department of Commerce’s Office of Inspector General. Anyone with information concerning price fixing or other anticompetitive conduct in the freight forwarding industry is urged to call the Antitrust Division’s National Criminal Enforcement Section at 202-307-6694 or visitwww.justice.gov/atr/contact/newcase.htm or call the FBI’s Washington Field Office, at 202-278-2000.

Thank you, Commissioners Bryan and Mays

Two County Commissioners who are registered Republicans have wisely endorsed Alex Sink for Governor (see below). Thank you.

Sink's opponent is a greedy, fraudfeasing billionaire who makes everyone cringe.

Ken Bryan and Phillip Mays, Two of our Republican St. Johns County Commissioners Endorse Alex Sink for Governor

By Florida Times-Union

Democratic gubernatorial candidate Alex Sink has picked up endorsements from Republican St. Johns County Commissioners Phillip J. Mays, who represents District 4, and Ken Bryan, who represents District 5 and is the commission's vice-chairman. "I'm supporting Alex Sink for Governor because of her integrity and no nonsense style of leadership," Mays said in a statement e-mailed by the Sink campaign. "Alex doesn't bother with partisanship, she is focused on doing what's best for Florida." Mays, who was appointed by Gov. Charlie Crist after Commissioner Tom Manuel was indicted in a bribery scheme, has been on the commission since 2008. He's a Ponte Vedra Beach resident and Senior Managing Director for GlassRatner Advisory and Capital Group. Bryan has been on the commission since 2000.

IN HAEC VERBA: DAN GELBER's letter to Ken Feinberg on BP claims in Florida

September 27, 2010

BY FAX & U.S. MAIL

Mr. Ken Feinberg
Feinberg Rozen, LLP
The Willard Office Building
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Suite 390
Washington, D.C. 20004-1008

Dear Mr. Feinberg:

As you administer your duties relative to BP, I wanted to raise two issues of concern: the limitation on damages based on proximity; and the failure of BP to reimburse all costs attendant to preparing legitimate claims for damages.

BP has promised to “make things right.” That means they should not be limiting damages to only instances where oil directly reached our shores. Many communities, businesses and residents beyond the immediate proximity of places where oil reached our shores, have been damaged. Whether it is Sarasota or the Florida Keys or Pensacola – quantifiable damages are being felt throughout the state – directly and indirectly. But for the negligence of BP, Florida’s coastal communities would not be suffering diminished tourism or loss of earning capacity from stigma damages to fishing industries. And homeowners in communities that have seen loss of property values directly due to the spill are properly within the zone of damages that should be recognized in your claims process. In short, I would like some assurance from you and BP that when BP promises they are going to “make it right” they don’t mean “for some of you, and for only some things.”

Secondly, I am extremely concerned that Floridians are being compelled to pay for the costs of preparation of their claims. Recently I participated in a State Senate hearing in Pensacola where a representative of BP indicated that in some instances they were reimbursing victims for the costs of preparing claims, but in other instances they were not. Regrettably, the BP representative indicated there was no definable metric for when the costs of claims were reimbursed. This is troubling. If someone has a valid claim, then reasonable costs attendant to preparing the claim must be reimbursed – otherwise, victims are not being made whole.

Citizens of our state are rightfully frustrated. They see promises from BP actors in commercials suggesting the company is prepared to do the right thing. Yet on the ground, they see obfuscation, and a process that is filled with more chutes than ladders.

Thanks for your service in this process.
Senator Dan Gelber
Florida Senator, District 35

IN HAEC VERBA: DAN GELBER's letter to Ken Feinberg on BP claims in Florida

September 27, 2010

BY FAX & U.S. MAIL

Mr. Ken Feinberg
Feinberg Rozen, LLP
The Willard Office Building
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Suite 390
Washington, D.C. 20004-1008

Dear Mr. Feinberg:

As you administer your duties relative to BP, I wanted to raise two issues of concern: the limitation on damages based on proximity; and the failure of BP to reimburse all costs attendant to preparing legitimate claims for damages.

BP has promised to “make things right.” That means they should not be limiting damages to only instances where oil directly reached our shores. Many communities, businesses and residents beyond the immediate proximity of places where oil reached our shores, have been damaged. Whether it is Sarasota or the Florida Keys or Pensacola – quantifiable damages are being felt throughout the state – directly and indirectly. But for the negligence of BP, Florida’s coastal communities would not be suffering diminished tourism or loss of earning capacity from stigma damages to fishing industries. And homeowners in communities that have seen loss of property values directly due to the spill are properly within the zone of damages that should be recognized in your claims process. In short, I would like some assurance from you and BP that when BP promises they are going to “make it right” they don’t mean “for some of you, and for only some things.”

Secondly, I am extremely concerned that Floridians are being compelled to pay for the costs of preparation of their claims. Recently I participated in a State Senate hearing in Pensacola where a representative of BP indicated that in some instances they were reimbursing victims for the costs of preparing claims, but in other instances they were not. Regrettably, the BP representative indicated there was no definable metric for when the costs of claims were reimbursed. This is troubling. If someone has a valid claim, then reasonable costs attendant to preparing the claim must be reimbursed – otherwise, victims are not being made whole.

Citizens of our state are rightfully frustrated. They see promises from BP actors in commercials suggesting the company is prepared to do the right thing. Yet on the ground, they see obfuscation, and a process that is filled with more chutes than ladders.

Thanks for your service in this process.
Senator Dan Gelber
Florida Senator, District 35

St. Augustine Record: Sunshine Law seminar invaluable to citizen access

Posted: September 16, 2010 - 12:08am

There's no question that Florida's Sunshine laws have opened access to state and local governments for more than a century.

The Florida Legislature annually acts on access laws, creating some new protections but sometimes blocking access, too. The maze of access laws and the exemptions that are carved out at times can frustrate the public in their access to their governments.

On Monday, Oct. 4, The First Amendment Foundation and The St. Augustine Record will host a Sunshine Seminar led by Barbara Petersen, president of the First Amendment Foundation, a non-profit organization that fights to protect public access to government.

The First Amendment Foundation was founded in 1984 by The Florida Press Association, the Florida Society of Newspaper Editors, and the Florida Association of Broadcasters "to ensure that public commitment and progress in the areas of free speech, free press, and open government do not become checked and diluted during Florida's changing times," according to its premise. It also offers open government education and training, legal aid and information services.

Florida's Public Records Law, Chapter 119, was signed into law in 1909 opening up records access to all citizens.

In 1967, Chapter 286, the state's open meetings law took effect, likewise allowing the public to be present for government meetings at which decisions are made from the local City Hall to the state Capital in Tallahassee. A few exceptions are allowed by law for "shade" meetings regarding legal settlements and collective bargaining;

In 1992, voters further strengthened access to public records and meetings by adopting an amendment to the Florida constitution.

Before Chapter 286 became law, the business of government was pretty much conducted behind closed doors. Though the people making the decisions were elected by the people, their decisions were often decided outside the public meeting room. Open meetings tended to be rubber stamps.

Public officials today know that it is against the law for two or more members of the same board to discuss issues coming up in the foreseeable future before their boards, without official notice to the public in advance. Those who still try to skirt the law are investigated, may be suspended, and put on trial. If found guilty, they are fined and removed from public office.

In St. Johns County, the School Board, and the municipalities of St. Augustine, St. Augustine Beach and Hastings, public officials are committed to access and ensure that their staffs know the rules. They want to share their inner workings with the public to gain more support for their decisions.

If you are public officials, citizen access advocates, or lawyers working in media law, this seminar is for you. Petersen is the expert on leading you through the laws on government and access. Time will be allowed for questions and answers. The Florida Bar Media and Communications Law Committee will make a presentation in the afternoon.

Nominal fees are charged to cover the seminar costs. Participants receive, as part of their registration, a copy of Florida's Government-in-the-Sunshine Law manual.

Those trusted with ensuring public access and citizen advocates for access should not miss this opportunity to get to know better Florida's Sunshine Laws.



More information

The Sunshine Law seminar is on Monday, Oct. 4, at the St. Johns County Convention Center at the World Golf Village. Registration is available at www.floridafaf.org and click on the link to 2010 Sunshine Seminars.



Pre-payment is as follows:

FAF members, $10; nonmembers, $25; students, $10 (student ID required); government employees, $15. The seminar is approved for continuing education credits for various associations. Please see the seminar information for details and additional charges.

First Amendment Foundation -- 2010 Sunshine Seminar – St. Augustine Seminar on Monday, October 4, 2010

St. Augustine Seminar on Monday, October 4, 2010
Register Now: Members ($10.00) – Please include Member # below when adding to your cart.
Non-members ($25.00)
Students ($10) – Please submit a copy of valid student ID via fax, email or mail.
Government Employees ($15.00) – Please submit proof of government employment via fax, email or mail.

PLEASE NOTE THE REGISTRANTS NAMES IN THE "COMMENTS" BOX WHEN PAYING
Click here for printable registration form.
Location: World Golf Village
1 World Golf Place
St. Augustine, FL 32092
Agenda: 8:30 — 9:00 am Registration
9:00 — 12:00 pm Florida’s Government in the Sunshine Law: Open Meetings & Public Records
Barbara Petersen, President, First Amendment Foundation
12:00 — 1:15 pm Lunch (On your own)
1:15 — 2:30 pm Florida Media Law Presentation
Jennifer Mansfield, members of The Florida Bar Media & Communications Committee