A landmark March 20, 2026 Supreme Court decision on my birthday vindicates First Amendment rights. Read decision below.
Footnote: On August 5, 2025, St. Johns County residents won a landmark 5-0 County Commission vote ending "free speech zone" signs at Pier Park and other County parks, which restricted our First Amendment rights and chilled protected activity rights. On March 20, 2026, the United States Supreme Court voted 9-0 to affirm the rights to sue of a preacher protesting abortion, finding jurisdiction under the 1871 Civil Rights Act (the Ku Klux Klan Act) to challenge Brandon, Mississippi criminalizing free speech outside of such a free speech zone. Let freedom ring. https://cleanupcityofstaugustine.blogspot.com/2015/08/county-eliminates-free-speech-area-sign.html
Read the Supreme Court's unanimous 9-0 decision in Olivier v. Brandon, Mississippi:
e as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 24–993
_________________
GABRIEL OLIVIER, PETITIONER v. CITY OF
BRANDON, MISSISSIPPI
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[March 20, 2026]
JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Gabriel Olivier was once convicted of violating
a city ordinance restricting expressive activity near a public
amphitheater. He now wishes to return to that venue to
voice his beliefs—but this time, without the threat of crim-
inal punishment. He therefore filed this suit, alleging that
the city ordinance infringes the First Amendment. The
suit, brought under 42 U. S. C. §1983, seeks an order de-
claring the ordinance unconstitutional and preventing its
enforcement in the future. The suit, in other words, re-
quests only forward-looking relief—nothing to do with Oliv-
ier’s prior conviction.
The question presented here is whether this Court’s deci-
sion in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 (1994), bars Oliv-
ier’s suit. The answer is no. Heck prohibits the use of §1983
to challenge the validity of a prior conviction or sentence so
as to obtain release from custody or monetary damages.
That decision has no bearing on Olivier’s suit seeking a
purely prospective remedy.2 OLIVIER v. CITY OF BRANDON
Opinion of the Court
I
Olivier was convicted some five years ago for violating the
local ordinance he now challenges. Olivier is a street
preacher in Mississippi—a Christian who believes that
sharing his religious views with fellow citizens is an im-
portant part of exercising his faith. His vocation sometimes
took him to the sidewalks near an amphitheater in the City
of Brandon, where he could find sizable audiences attend-
ing events. Olivier was apparently not the only speaker at-
tracted to that area, and the activities there caused some
disruption. In 2019, the City adopted an ordinance requir-
ing all individuals or groups engaging in “protests” or
“demonstrations,” at around the time events were sched-
uled, to stay within a “designated protest area.” Supp. to
App. 70 (capitalization deleted). On his next trip to the am-
phitheater, in 2021, Olivier checked out that area, but
found it too remote for communicating his message. So he
returned, along with his signs and loudspeaker, to the side-
walk fronting the amphitheater. And there he was arrested
by the Brandon police chief for violating the city ordinance.
The next month, Olivier pleaded no contest in municipal
court. The court imposed a $304 fine; one year of probation;
and ten days of imprisonment, to be served only if, during
his probation, he again violated the ordinance. Olivier did
not appeal, paid the fine, and served no prison time.
Because he still wanted to preach near the amphitheater,
Olivier’s next step was to file this lawsuit in federal court,
naming the City and its police chief as defendants. The suit
is brought under §1983, which authorizes claims against
state and local officials for the “deprivation of any rights”
secured by the Constitution. Olivier’s complaint alleges
that the city ordinance violates the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment by consigning him (and other speak-
ers) to the amphitheater’s out-of-the-way protest area. The
complaint seeks, as a remedy, a declaration that the ordi-
nance infringes his (and other speakers’) First AmendmentCite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
3
Opinion of the Court
rights and an injunction preventing city officials from en-
forcing the ordinance in the future.1 In other words, the
relief requested is only prospective; Olivier seeks neither
the reversal of, nor compensation for, his prior conviction.
And Olivier has since made clear that he has no interest in
using a favorable judgment in this suit to later get his rec-
ord expunged or avoid his conviction’s collateral effects. See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. The suit is just meant to ensure that
Olivier may return to the amphitheater to speak without
fear of further punishment.
The parties contested in the lower courts whether this
Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey bars the suit from go-
ing forward. On the City’s view of Heck, a person previously
convicted of violating a statute cannot challenge its consti-
tutionality under §1983 because success in the suit would
cast doubt on the prior conviction’s correctness. On Oliv-
ier’s contrary view, that rule is subject to two limitations,
either of which enables his suit to proceed. First, Olivier
contended, Heck does not preclude a suit seeking wholly
prospective relief, rather than relief relating to the prior
conviction. And second, Olivier argued, Heck does not apply
(regardless of the relief sought) when the person suing was
never in custody for his conviction, so never had a chance to
challenge it in federal habeas proceedings.2
——————
1Originally, Olivier also sought damages for the City’s prior enforce-
ment of the ordinance against him. But he abandoned that request as
the suit progressed, leaving only the above-described pleas for declara-
tory and injunctive relief.
2 The premise of Olivier’s second argument is, of course, that he had
not been in custody following his conviction. That premise appears to be
wrong. Under his sentence, Olivier served a year of probation—indeed,
was still serving that time when he filed this suit. And a person on pro-
bation is generally “ ‘in custody’ for purposes of federal habeas corpus.”
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U. S. 420, 430 (1984); see Jones v. Cunning-
ham, 371 U. S. 236, 241–243 (1963). For whatever reason, though, the
City failed to raise that objection below, and both lower courts accepted
that Olivier was not put in custody for his conviction. See 2022 WL4 OLIVIER v. CITY OF BRANDON
Opinion of the Court
The District Court agreed with the City’s understanding
of Heck, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed on the same reasoning. If Olivier’s §1983 suit suc-
ceeded, the District Court reasoned, the judgment would
“undermine his Municipal Court conviction.” 2022 WL
15047414, *11 (SD Miss., Sept. 23, 2022). And so the suit
was categorically barred under Heck. Similarly, the Fifth
Circuit viewed Heck as precluding any §1983 claim that, if
successful, would “necessarily imply the invalidity of the
plaintiff ’s criminal conviction.” 2023 WL 5500223, *1 (Aug.
25, 2023); see Heck, 512 U. S., at 487 (using near-identical
language). Olivier’s claim, the court maintained, was of
that sort: If he showed that the city ordinance violated the
First Amendment, he also would show that his prior convic-
tion should not have happened. And that fact, the court
concluded, was dispositive. It did not matter whether Oliv-
ier’s conviction had landed him in custody. See 2023 WL
5500223, *4. Nor did it matter whether Olivier’s suit
sought only prospective relief. See ibid.
The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, but eight (of
seventeen) judges dissented. Those judges understood Heck
to bar only the “retrospective use of [§1983] to collaterally
attack criminal convictions.” 121 F. 4th 511, 514 (2024)
(Oldham, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). A suit like
Olivier’s for “prospective injunctive relief,” the dissenters
argued, is not precluded because granting a “forward-
looking injunction” neither “invalidate[s]” nor “impose[s]
tort liability” for a prior conviction. Id., at 514–515; see id.,
at 513 (Ho, J., dissenting) (similar). The dissenters noted
that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had adopted
their view, which meant there was now a Circuit split about
——————
15047414, *10 (SD Miss., Sept. 23, 2022); 2023 WL 5500223, *4 (CA5,
Aug. 25, 2023). Given that the case has proceeded so far on that basis,
we treat any contrary argument as forfeited and proceed in the same
way.Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
5
Opinion of the Court
Heck’s proper reach. 121 F. 4th, at 515 (Oldham, J., dis-
senting) (citing Martin v. Boise, 920 F. 3d 584, 614 (2019)).
We granted certiorari, 606 U. S. 959 (2025), to consider
the two independent reasons Olivier offered below for why
his suit escapes the so-called Heck bar: that he was never
in custody for his prior conviction, and that he now seeks
purely prospective relief. See Pet. for Cert. i. We need not
address the former reason today because we agree with
Olivier (and the Fifth Circuit’s dissenting judges) on the lat-
ter. Given that Olivier asked for only a forward-looking
remedy—an injunction stopping officials from enforcing the
city ordinance in the future—his suit can proceed, notwith-
standing his prior conviction.3 Heck, properly understood,
does not say otherwise.
II
Before our decision in Heck, the City would have had no
plausible basis for claiming Olivier’s suit is barred. That
type of suit, as no one here disputes, falls within §1983’s
heartland: Assuming a credible threat of prosecution, a
plaintiff may bring a §1983 action to challenge a local law
as violating the Constitution and to prevent that law’s fu-
ture enforcement. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S.
452 (1974). And a half-century ago, in Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U. S. 705 (1977), this Court held that rule to apply even
when the plaintiff (like Olivier) was previously convicted
under the challenged law.
——————
3 In reaching that holding, we do not say that every person can chal-
lenge his statute of conviction through a §1983 suit for wholly prospec-
tive relief. The Government, appearing here as amicus curiae, urges us
to reserve the issue whether a person may bring such a suit while he is
in custody for violating the statute challenged. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 41–
42, 46–47; see also Brief for United States 27 (positing why that circum-
stance might matter). We think it appropriate to do so because, as we
have explained, our assumption here is that Olivier was never in custody.
See supra, at 3–4, n. 2.6 OLIVIER v. CITY OF BRANDON
Opinion of the Court
For anyone who has followed along this far, a description
of Wooley should strike a chord. George Maynard viewed
the “Live Free or Die” motto on his New Hampshire license
plate as “repugnant to [his] moral and religious beliefs.”
Id., at 707. So he covered those words with reflective tape,
in violation of a state statute. Maynard was convicted for
that conduct three times over in state court, receiving
(mostly suspended) sentences involving small fines and
short jail terms. After the last proceeding had concluded—
and presumably anxious that there not be a fourth—
Maynard brought a §1983 suit in federal court, seeking a
declaration that the state statute violated the First Amend-
ment and an injunction to prevent its future enforcement.
New Hampshire argued, as its front line of defense, that the
suit was precluded “because [Maynard] has already been
subjected to prosecution” under the challenged law. Id., at
712, n. 9. Our decision in Heck had not yet issued. Instead,
New Hampshire relied on “Younger principles,” which cau-
tion against federal interference with state-court proceed-
ings. Ibid.; see Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971).
Those principles would be offended, New Hampshire
claimed, if a federal court were to enjoin the enforcement of
a state law at the behest of someone earlier convicted under
it in state court.
This Court rejected New Hampshire’s argument on the
ground that Maynard’s suit sought only to prevent “further
prosecution” under the New Hampshire statute. Wooley,
430 U. S., at 711. The suit, the Court explained, was “in no
way designed to annul the results of a state trial” (as indeed
would have been troubling under Younger doctrine). 430
U. S., at 711. Maynard had “already sustained [his] convic-
tions” and “served [his] sentence[s].” Ibid. And he did “not
seek to have his record expunged, or to annul any collateral
effects” his convictions might have—for example, “upon his
driving privileges.” Ibid. Rather, Maynard sought “wholly
prospective” relief: He wanted “only to be free fromCite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
7
Opinion of the Court
prosecutions for future violations of the same” (allegedly
unconstitutional) statute. Ibid. Because that was so, the
Court held, §1983 provided an avenue to bring his claim.
See id., at 710. Were it otherwise, the Court reasoned,
Maynard would have no good way to vindicate his First
Amendment rights: He would be trapped “between the
Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis
of forgoing what he believes to be constitutionally protected
activity” so as to avoid yet another criminal prosecution.
Ibid.
All of that could as easily be said of Olivier’s suit. Like
Maynard, Olivier was convicted under the statute he now
alleges to violate the First Amendment. But also like
Maynard, Olivier did not seek in his §1983 suit to upset that
conviction, or even to avert its collateral effects. Rather,
Olivier sought “wholly prospective” relief—an injunction to
preclude “further prosecution” under the law he had earlier
broken. Id., at 711. If not able to bring such a suit, Olivier
would face the same untenable choice as Maynard: violate
the law and suffer the consequences (the Scylla), or else give
up what he takes to be his First Amendment rights (the
Charybdis). See id., at 710. Our decision in Wooley, taken
alone, would thus defeat the City’s attempt to prevent Oliv-
ier’s suit from going forward.
Some two decades later, though, the Court encountered
Heck v. Humphrey, which the City now argues requires the
opposite result. Roy Heck had been convicted in state court
of manslaughter, and was serving a fifteen-year prison sen-
tence. While his appeal was pending, he filed a §1983 suit
in federal court naming two prosecutors and a police inves-
tigator as defendants. Heck alleged that they had commit-
ted misconduct, such as destroying exculpatory evidence, to
gain his conviction. He sought as a remedy monetary “dam-
ages attributable to [his] unconstitutional conviction.” 512
U. S., at 489–490. The question raised was whether §1983
allowed the suit.8 OLIVIER v. CITY OF BRANDON
Opinion of the Court
The Court held it did not. The Court took as settled that
Heck could not have used §1983 to “challenge[] the fact or
duration of his confinement and seek[] immediate or speed-
ier release” from custody. Id., at 481 (citing Preiser v. Ro-
driguez, 411 U. S. 475, 488–490 (1973)). A claim of that
sort, the Court noted, “must be brought in habeas corpus
proceedings.” Heck, 512 U. S., at 481. And so too, the Court
held, Heck could not use §1983 to seek damages deriving
from a conviction, unless it had already been overturned.
See id., at 486–487. To be sure, Heck could not get damages
by way of a habeas action. See id., at 481. But in suing for
them under §1983, Heck was in truth mounting a “collat-
eral attack” on the validity of his conviction, and thus in-
truding on the habeas statute’s domain. Id., at 485. Such
a suit could lead to “parallel litigation” respecting “the is-
sues of probable cause and guilt.” Id., at 484. And it could
give rise to “conflicting” judgments about the same conduct,
with the §1983 suit suggesting that Heck should be re-
leased even as criminal or habeas proceedings found the op-
posite. Ibid. Hence the Heck bar on Ҥ1983 damages ac-
tions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the
unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement.” Id., at 486.
“[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a §1983 suit,”
the Court went on, “the district court must consider
whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would neces-
sarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”
Id., at 487. A judgment for Heck would have done so, for
his success rested on proof discrediting his conviction. His
§1983 suit therefore could not go forward.
In two later decisions, though, the Court drew a line be-
tween Heck-type claims and those seeking forward-looking
relief. In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U. S. 641 (1997), a state
prisoner alleged that procedures used in a disciplinary
hearing—which had deprived him of good-time credits and
thus lengthened his sentence—violated his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights. He sought money damagesCite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
9
Opinion of the Court
for the alleged past violation; he also sought an injunction
requiring prison officials to adopt new procedures, so as to
“prevent future violations.” Id., at 643. The Court made
short work of the claim for damages. As in Heck, the Court
reasoned, the prisoner could not obtain damages without
demonstrating “the invalidity of the punishment imposed”
on him (i.e., the loss of his good-time credits), and thus im-
pinging on habeas. 520 U. S., at 648. But the claim for
“prospective injunctive relief ”—the use of fairer procedures
in the future—was a different thing. Said the Court: “Or-
dinarily, a prayer for such prospective relief ” may “properly
be brought under §1983,” because it does not depend on
showing the “invalidity of a previous” sentencing decision.
Ibid. Likewise, in Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U. S. 74, 77
(2005), the Court allowed state prisoners to bring a §1983
suit alleging that existing parole procedures violated the
Due Process Clause and requesting an injunction that the
State “comply with constitutional” requirements “in the fu-
ture.” That claim for “future relief,” the Court determined,
was “distant” from “the core of habeas” and so not barred by
Heck. 544 U. S., at 82 (emphasis in original).
The same is true of Olivier’s suit. Olivier is not challeng-
ing the “validity of [his] conviction or sentence,” for the pur-
pose either of securing (or speeding) release or of obtaining
monetary damages. Nance v. Ward, 597 U. S. 159, 167–168
(2022). Instead, Olivier is seeking (in Wooley’s words)
“wholly prospective” relief—“only to be free from prosecu-
tions for future violations” of the city ordinance. 430 U. S.,
at 711. And that request, as Balisok and Dotson recognized,
falls outside habeas’s core—and likewise outside Heck’s
concerns. See 520 U. S., at 648; 544 U. S., at 82. Olivier’s
suit does not, as habeas suits do, “collateral[ly] attack” the
old conviction. Heck, 512 U. S., at 485. It thus cannot give
rise, as Heck feared, to “parallel litigation” respecting his
prior conduct. Id., at 484. Nor does it risk “conflicting”
judgments over how that conduct was prosecuted or10 OLIVIER v. CITY OF BRANDON
Opinion of the Court
punished. Ibid. The suit, after all, is not about what Olivier
did in the past, and depends on no proof addressed to his
prior conviction. Unlike in Heck, the suit merely attempts
to prevent a future prosecution. So the Heck bar does not
come into play.
The City’s main argument to the contrary (echoing the
decisions below) rests on one sentence of our Heck opinion.
That supposedly dispositive line states: “[W]hen a state
prisoner seeks damages in a §1983 suit, the district court
must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed” (un-
less the conviction has already been invalidated). Id., at
487; see supra, at 8. Of course, Olivier does not “seek[]
damages” in his §1983 suit, but the City points out that sev-
eral post-Heck decisions dropped the sentence’s prefatory
phrase while repeating the rest. See, e.g., Dotson, 544 U. S.,
at 81–82; Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U. S. 521, 533–534 (2011).
And in the City’s view, that modified inquiry suggests that
the Heck bar should apply to Olivier’s suit. That is because,
the City says, a judgment in Olivier’s favor would “neces-
sarily imply the invalidity of [his] prior conviction[].” Brief
for Respondent 33. To declare the city ordinance unconsti-
tutional, as Olivier seeks, would be to imply that no one—
including Olivier—should have been convicted under that
law.
The argument is a fair one, but hardly dispositive. We
have to agree that if Olivier succeeds in this suit, it would
mean his prior conviction was unconstitutional. So, strictly
speaking, the Heck language fits. But that could just show
that the phrasing was not quite as tailored as it should have
been. This Court has often cautioned that “general lan-
guage in judicial opinions should be read as referring in
context to circumstances similar to the circumstances then
before the Court and not referring to quite different circum-
stances that the Court was not then considering.” TurkiyeCite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
11
Opinion of the Court
Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States, 598 U. S. 264, 278
(2023) (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U. S. 419, 424
(2004)). The City’s argument raises the question whether
that is true here.
We think, with the benefit of hindsight, that it is—that
the sentence relied on swept a bit too broad. That language
was used in Heck to identify claims that were really as-
saults on a prior conviction, even though involving some in-
direction. One example was found in Heck itself: a claim
seeking not straightforward reversal of a conviction (and
release from custody), but damages attributable to that con-
viction, requiring proof that police misconduct made it in-
valid. Another example Heck offered was yet further atten-
uated. See 512 U. S., at 486–487, n. 6. A person convicted
of resisting arrest—defined as preventing an officer from
effecting a lawful arrest—brings a §1983 action for dam-
ages against the arresting officer for violation of his Fourth
Amendment right not to be unreasonably seized. The dam-
ages sought, unlike in Heck, are not attributable to his con-
viction (for resisting arrest); they are damages deriving only
from the underlying arrest. Still, a Ҥ1983 action will not
lie” because the plaintiff, to prevail, “would have to negate
an element of the offense of which he has been convicted”—
i.e., that the underlying arrest was “lawful.” Ibid. Once
again, the suit requires looking back to conduct involved in
a prior conviction, and offering contradictory proof. By con-
trast, there is no looking back in Olivier’s suit. Both in the
allegations made, and in the relief sought, the suit is all
future-oriented—even if, as a kind of byproduct, success in
it shows that something past should not have occurred. The
Heck Court did not consider such a suit, and the Heck lan-
guage was not meant to address it.
Proof positive comes from the logical—but wholly unten-
able—consequences of the City’s position. Suppose that af-
ter Olivier’s conviction, another citizen brings a §1983 suit
to enjoin the city ordinance so that he can speak outside the12 OLIVIER v. CITY OF BRANDON
Opinion of the Court
amphitheater. Let’s name this citizen Laurence and say
that he boasts a clean police record. Would Heck allow Lau-
rence’s suit to proceed? See 121 F. 4th, at 514 (Oldham, J.,
dissenting) (offering a similar hypothetical). The very ques-
tion seems ludicrous: No one would say Heck poses a bar.
But under the City’s logic, it should—because here, too,
Heck’s language fits. The hypothetical suit—no less than
Olivier’s own—would, if successful, “necessarily imply the
invalidity” of Olivier’s conviction (as well as all other con-
victions under the statute). 512 U. S., at 487. A judgment
in that suit too would demonstrate, and in just the same
way, that Olivier’s conviction was unconstitutional. The
hypothetical thus shows that the “necessarily imply” lan-
guage cannot extend as far as the City wants. Contra the
City’s logic, the Heck language does not preclude Laurence’s
§1983 suit because, rather than challenging a prior convic-
tion, that suit only attempts to prevent future ones. And
contra the City’s actual position, the language does not pre-
clude Olivier’s §1983 suit for the identical reason—because,
as explained above, it looks forward only. See supra, at 9–
10.
With Heck thus out of the way, Wooley returns to center
stage. Recall the Court held in that case that Maynard
could sue under §1983 to prevent future enforcement of an
allegedly unconstitutional statute, despite a prior convic-
tion under that law. See supra, at 6–7. The same rule al-
lows Olivier to sue under §1983 to enjoin future prosecu-
tions under the city ordinance, despite his prior conviction.
Were that not so, Olivier would face the same dilemma as
Maynard: flout the law and risk another prosecution, or else
forgo speech he believes is constitutionally protected. See
Wooley, 430 U. S., at 710; supra, at 7. We declined to put
Maynard to that choice, and we will not put Olivier to it
either. His suit to enjoin the ordinance, so he can return to
the amphitheater, may proceed.Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
13
Opinion of the Court
We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals and remand the case for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion.
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