Earl M. Johnson, Jr. v. Mayor, City of Jacksonville -- June 10, 2026 U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals Decision finding no standing to sue on Confederate monument

Read 11th Circuit Court of Appeals decision:

FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11937

____________________

EARL M. JOHNSON, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

MAYOR, CITY OF JACKSONVILLE,

GOVERNOR, STATE OF FLORIDA,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:21-cv-00726-MMH-PDB

____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.

GRANT, Circuit Judge:

Confederate memorials are a pressure point. Some say they

are significant historical markers that should remain undisturbed—

preserved, even. Others are deeply offended by what they see as  

outdated and offensive reminders of a shameful time in our history.

Still others likely give the question little thought. Earl M. Johnson,

Jr. falls in the middle group, and he asked for a judicial decree that

any use of city or state tax dollars supporting a public place with a

Confederate name—streets, schools, and the like—violates his

statutory and constitutional rights.

Like those who came before him seeking to force the

government to preserve these memorials, Johnson lacks standing

to sue. The political branches—not the federal courts—are the

forum for his challenge. His disgust, no matter how deep and how

sincere, is not the kind of injury that can give rise to a lawsuit.

Indeed, what Johnson seeks is not the removal of the monuments

or street names, but a declaration that they are wrong. Because he

has not suffered a concrete injury unique to him, he does not have

standing to ask for that relief. And with no case or controversy

before us, even a statement that we agreed with Johnson would be

hollow. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of his lawsuit.

I.

Earl M. Johnson, Jr., a black resident of the Middle District

of Florida, is a descendant of slaves “then-held in Confederate

states.

”1 In his complaint, Johnson points to nearly fifty

1 Because this case comes to us in a facial challenge on a motion to dismiss, we

evaluate Johnson’s standing “based on the facts alleged in the complaint.”

Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2001). We accept the factual

allegations as true, construing them in his favor. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323

F.3d 920, 924–25 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003).USCA11 Case: 23-11937 Document: 89-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 3 of 15

23-11937 Opinion of the Court 3

“monuments and naming tributes to the Confederacy and White

supremacists on tax-funded public land.” The list includes parks,

schools, streets, a courthouse mural, and a government building

flying the Confederate battle flag. Nine of these are in Duval

County, which forms a consolidated government with the City of

Jacksonville. See Jacksonville Charter, § 1.101; Ordinance 2010-616-

E. Among them are the Florida Confederate Soldiers Memorial

Pedestal at City Park, Monument to Women of the Confederacy at

City Park, Yellow Bluff Fort Monument at State Park, Confederate

Point Road, Confederate Street, Stonewall (Jackson) Street,

(Stonewall) Jackson Street, (Jefferson) Davis Street, and Jefferson

(Davis) Street.2

Johnson says that he has visited or traveled on most of the

locations identified in the complaint. Doing so left him “deeply

repulsed, disheartened, and intimidated by” what he calls

“governmental celebrations of White supremacy,

” affirmations that “encourage the incitement of intimidation and violence

against Black Americans.” But Johnson alleges no specific

connection between a violent incident and any of these landmarks;

nor does he claim to have taken any alternate routes to avoid the

displays or roadways.

2 The City points out that two memorials, the Florida Confederate Soldiers

Memorial Pedestal and Monument to Women of the Confederacy, were

removed in 2023. Constrained as we are by the facial nature of the City and

State’s attack on Johnson’s complaint, however, we accept his allegations as

true. See Morrison, 323 F.3d at 924–25 n.5.USCA11 Case: 23-11937 Document: 89-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 4 of 15

4 Opinion of the Court 23-11937

In a five-count complaint, proceeding pro se, Johnson sued

Florida Governor Ron DeSantis and Jacksonville Mayor Lenny

Curry in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

3 He sought

a declaratory judgment that both the City and the State violated

Title II of the Civil Rights Act, the Thirteenth Amendment, the

Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth

Amendment, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1981, by maintaining the

Confederate memorials on public land with taxpayer dollars.

4 See

Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

A magistrate judge recommended dismissing Johnson’s

complaint for lack of standing, concluding that he had failed to

satisfy Article III’s requirement of a particularized injury because

he alleged only a generalized grievance. Were it otherwise, the

magistrate judge warned, “any traveler in the Middle District of

Florida offended by any Confederate-related street name, school

name, or county name or by any Confederate-related memorial,

monument, mural, building, or program on government property”

could sue the government for violating his rights. The magistrate

judge also determined that Johnson lacked standing to sue as a state

or municipal taxpayer because he had neither shown a direct injury

3 Lawsuits against public officials in their official capacities operate as the

functional equivalent of suits against the government when the government

is the “real, substantial party in interest.

” Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521,

1524 (11th Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted).

4 Johnson has abandoned his § 1981 claim on appeal. See United States v.

Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 872–73 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc).USCA11 Case: 23-11937 Document: 89-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 5 of 15

23-11937 Opinion of the Court 5

nor demonstrated that taxpayer funds were used to maintain the

memorials.

5

Johnson filed objections to the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation, but provided no legal or factual basis for any of

his disagreements. Instead, he listed the magistrate judge’s

conclusions and stated that he objected. Consider objection

number two: “Plaintiff objects to the finding that ‘Mr. Johnson fails

to allege facts sufficient to establish ordinary or taxpayer standing,

this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, and dismissal is

warranted.’” And so on, for each of Johnson’s objections.

The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation in large part, dismissing Johnson’s complaint.

The court first observed that Johnson had not properly objected to

the report, because his objections to the magistrate judge’s

recommendation were not specific enough under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 72(b)(2). See United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353,

1359–60 (11th Cir. 2009); 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

Even so, the court analyzed Johnson’s standing de novo and

agreed that his allegations were insufficient. The court then

declined to address whether Johnson failed to state a claim or to

consider the defendants’ alternative arguments.

After some procedural back and forth—including dismissal

of Johnson’s appeal for lack of prosecution—this appeal followed.

5 In the alternative, the magistrate judge concluded that Johnson failed to state

a claim.USCA11 Case: 23-11937 Document: 89-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 6 of 15

6 Opinion of the Court 23-11937

II.

We review jurisdictional questions de novo. Malowney v.

Fed. Collection Deposit Grp., 193 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 1999).

III.

“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law.” Ex parte McCardle,

74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). Without it, we “cannot proceed

at all.” Id. “[N]o matter how weighty or interesting” a lawsuit may

be, Article III requires us to evaluate our jurisdiction before turning

to the merits. Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 944 F.3d 1287, 1296 (11th

Cir. 2019) (en banc). One bedrock part of that requirement is that

each plaintiff must have standing to sue—an appropriate “personal

stake” in the case. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; TransUnion LLC v.

Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021) (quotation omitted).

To have standing, a plaintiff must show three things: (1) an

injury in fact (2) that was caused by the defendant and (3) that can

be redressed by a court. See United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 676

(2023). This case, like so many others, is primarily about the injury

requirement, especially the need for the alleged harm to be

“concrete and particularized.

” Hunstein v. Preferred Collection &

Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 48 F.4th 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc)

(quotation omitted). An injury is concrete “if it actually exists—

that is, if it is real, and not abstract.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Federal courts are not “vehicle[s] for the vindication of the value

interests of concerned bystanders.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,

756 (1984) (quotation omitted).USCA11 Case: 23-11937 Document: 89-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 7 of 15

23-11937 Opinion of the Court 7

An injury must also be particularized in the sense that it

affects the plaintiff “in a personal and individual way”

—the alleged

harm, in other words, cannot be generalized or undifferentiated.

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016) (quotation omitted).

So when a plaintiff’s asserted injury is “shared in substantially equal

measure by all or a large class of citizens,” that’s not enough. Warth

v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). Simply put, a “generalized

grievance, no matter how sincere, is insufficient to confer

standing.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 706 (2013) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

And standing is more than a procedural speed bump before

the merits: it is a constitutional mandate “built on a single basic

idea—the idea of separation of powers.” Allen, 468 U.S. at 752.

Resolving only those disputes where a plaintiff has standing

ensures that the judiciary stays in our constitutional lane, not

encroaching on the prerogatives of the political branches. See

United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. at 675–76.

A.

Johnson’s asserted injury is neither concrete nor

particularized. First, concreteness. Johnson alleges that he feels

“deeply repulsed” and “disheartened” by the “governmental

celebrations of White supremacy” embodied in the monuments

and tributes. The same goes for streets with Confederate

monikers, which he says burden his liberty because they “abridge

central precepts of equality.” But the “psychological consequence

presumably produced by observation of conduct with which oneUSCA11 Case: 23-11937 Document: 89-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 8 of 15

8 Opinion of the Court 23-11937

disagrees” has long been held insufficient to establish an Article III

injury. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of

Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485–86 (1982). Johnson’s

sweeping allegations of harm are the very sort of abstract and non-

concrete injury that federal courts have rejected time and again.

E.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976);

Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 979 F.3d 917, 926 (11th Cir.

2020) (en banc); Gardner v. Mutz, 962 F.3d 1329, 1341 (11th Cir.

2020).

Our decision in Ladies Memorial Ass’n v. City of Pensacola

drives home the point. 34 F.4th 988 (11th Cir. 2022). There, we

rejected the argument that the removal of a Confederate memorial

inflicted a concrete injury. See id. at 993. “[P]urely psychic injuries,

like disagreeing with government action,” or “a mere recitation

that the Government is violating one’s constitutional rights,” we

explained, “fall short of the concreteness standard” required to

confer standing. Id.; see also Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 588

U.S. 29, 80–81 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). So

too here.

To be sure, that those plaintiffs sought to preserve a

Confederate monument offers a factual distinction between their

claim and Johnson’s. But that viewpoint differential changes

nothing about the nature of the claimed injuries; each is based on

disagreement with government action. And pure disagreement

with government action (or inaction), no matter how strong or

sincerely held, is not a concrete injury.USCA11 Case: 23-11937 Document: 89-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 9 of 15

23-11937 Opinion of the Court 9

Nor is Johnson’s injury particularized—it’s a hallmark

generalized grievance. The “repulsion” and “intimidation” that he

experienced are felt by all those offended by Confederate

memorials, and Johnson pleaded nothing distinguishing him “from

other interested observers” or placing him “among the injured.”

Gardner, 962 F.3d at 1343 (quotation omitted). Though he attempts

to “describe a personal, emotional injury,” the core of his claim is

that he is upset by the local government’s failure to excise

Confederate symbolism and names from public places. See Quinn

v. Sec’y of State, Ga., 175 F.4th 1309, 1315 (11th Cir. 2026). Put

differently, Johnson cannot show that he is more than a concerned

bystander seeking to vindicate his “value interests”—again, no

matter how deeply held. Allen, 468 U.S. at 756 (quotation omitted).

Once more, the Confederate memorial cases from the other

direction are instructive. Take Gardner v. Mutz. There, we

concluded that plaintiffs who opposed the removal of a

Confederate memorial lacked standing because their alleged

injuries were “undifferentiated, collective,” and “not distinct to any

of the plaintiffs.” 962 F.3d at 1342–43 (quotation omitted). Other

courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., McMahon v.

Fenves, 946 F.3d 266, 271–72 (5th Cir. 2020); Albert Sidney Johnston

Chapter, Chapter No. 2060 v. City of San Antonio, 14 F.4th 329, 332 (5th

Cir. 2021). The same is true here, where Johnson has not identified

any fact that makes his alleged injury different from that of scores

of other would-be plaintiffs who feel hurt by the memorials.USCA11 Case: 23-11937 Document: 89-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 10 of 15

10 Opinion of the Court 23-11937

Relying on slender support from some of our precedents,

Johnson disagrees. He says the district court’s conclusion that he

has not suffered a concrete and particularized injury flouts this

Court’s precedent in Sierra v. City of Hallandale Beach, 996 F.3d 1110

(11th Cir. 2021), as well as our now-vacated decision in Laufer v.

Arpan LLC, 29 F.4th 1268 (11th Cir. 2022), opinion vacated and appeal

dismissed as moot, 77 F.4th 1366 (11th Cir. 2023). We take the cases

in reverse order. Though we disagree with Johnson’s Laufer

argument, we need not consider it because, as this Court has

explained, vacated opinions “have no legal effect whatever” and

“are void”—it is as if they were never written. See United States v.

Sigma Int’l, Inc., 300 F.3d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc).

Moving on to Sierra, that opinion held that a “humiliated,

embarrassed, and frustrated” deaf plaintiff had standing to sue

under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act

because a city did not include closed captioning on some of its

online videos. 996 F.3d at 1111–12, 1114 n.4. That, we said,

inflicted a “stigmatic” injury on Sierra. Id. at 1114. Building on that

already expansive holding, Johnson insists that “looming tributes”

to the Confederacy in the Middle District inflict comparable

stigmatic harm on him as an African American.

We do not agree.

Although discrimination can inflict non-economic

“stigmatic harm,” that injury is only concrete if the person is

“personally subject to discriminatory treatment.” Allen, 468 U.S. at

757 n.22; see also Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739–40 (1984). InUSCA11 Case: 23-11937 Document: 89-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 11 of 15

23-11937 Opinion of the Court 11

Allen v. Wright—the Supreme Court’s paradigmatic stigmatic-harm

case—the plaintiff parents lacked standing to sue over the tax-

exempt status of racially discriminatory private schools because

they failed to “allege a stigmatic injury suffered as a direct result of

having personally been denied equal treatment.

” 468 U.S. at 755

(emphasis added). So those very sympathetic plaintiffs could not

bring suit to stop discrimination because their own children had

not been denied admission to a school on the basis of their race.

In Sierra, the plaintiff was on a different footing for a few

reasons. To start, Sierra at least alleged that he was denied

information, rather than relying only on his psychological harm.

See 996 F.3d at 1111–12. We also underscored that the plaintiff was

“personally and directly subjected to discriminatory treatment when

Hallandale Beach published videos on its website that he accessed

but could not understand.” Id. at 1114 (emphasis added). In other

words, unlike in Allen, the plaintiff had (at least arguably) suffered

the alleged harm in a concrete and individual way. Moreover, the

panel emphasized that this Court had “already recognized”

damages for emotional distress under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at

1114 n.4.

Not so here.

Though we do not question the sincerity of Johnson’s

objections, his “deep repulsion and intimidation” at Confederate-

named “parks, buildings, schools, courthouses, streets, [and] roads”

do not personally subject him to “discriminatory treatment.” Id. at

1114. Far from it. Disagreement with the names of publicUSCA11 Case: 23-11937 Document: 89-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 12 of 15

12 Opinion of the Court 23-11937

thoroughfares and the like is the very definition of an insufficiently

personal, generalized grievance—“no matter how sincere”

Johnson’s pain may be. Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 706.

Stretched to its logical end, this theory of standing is

limitless. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 756 n.21. To take but one example,

say a county names a bridge after a famed local mayor. Does any

person within that county who is “deeply repulsed” by the mayor’s

policy decisions have standing to sue? Of course not. And though

we have no doubt that Johnson’s reaction to the Confederate

monikers is more deeply held than this hypothetical citizen’s,

psychological injuries do not become more concrete as they get

stronger. See, e.g., Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485–86. “[S]tanding is

not measured by the intensity of the litigant’s interest or the fervor

of his advocacy.” Id. at 486; see also Quinn, 175 F.4th at 1315–16.

In sum, the “Framers deliberately left many disputes to the

political process, not the courts.” Polelle v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 131

F.4th 1201, 1247 (11th Cir. 2025) (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part). This is one of them. Because Johnson has

neither a concrete nor a particularized injury, he lacks standing

under Article III.6

6 Because Johnson lacks standing, we do not address his formulaic and

conclusory objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation.

See 11th Cir. R. 3-1; Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95

(1998).USCA11 Case: 23-11937 Document: 89-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 13 of 15

23-11937 Opinion of the Court 13

B.

Johnson also argues for taxpayer standing, which has

developed its own parameters. We apply those doctrines here.

As any taxpayer knows, there are three possible pipers to

pay: federal, state, and local. Johnson raises no federal taxpayer

claim for various reasons, but we still note that, at least outside the

Establishment Clause context, a plaintiff cannot sue the federal

government just because he pays federal taxes. See DaimlerChrysler

Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 343 (2006). State taxpayers face an

uphill battle too, and cannot “challenge state tax or spending

decisions simply by virtue of their status as taxpayers.” Id. at 346.

At the very minimum, a state taxpayer needs to show a direct

injury in a “good-faith pocketbook action”—not that he “suffers in

some indefinite way in common with people generally.” Doremus

v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 433–34 (1952) (quotation omitted).

But we need not linger on Johnson’s state taxpayer claim for

a simple reason: he forfeited the issue by not raising it in his initial

brief. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022)

(en banc); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a). Instead, Johnson’s briefing focused

solely on his standing to sue as a municipal taxpayer.7

7 Johnson’s pro se status does not change our conclusion, as pro se litigants are

“subject to the relevant law and rules of court.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d

835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). We need not consider whether Johnson’s status as a

formerly licensed attorney subjects him to an even higher standard.USCA11 Case: 23-11937 Document: 89-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 14 of 15

14 Opinion of the Court 23-11937

Municipal taxpayer standing indeed offers yet an easier road

for plaintiffs. A municipal taxpayer can sue to stop the illegal use

of local tax dollars because the “interest of a taxpayer of a

municipality in the application of its moneys is direct and

immediate.” Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923). Some

jurists have expressed reservations about the continuing vitality of

this doctrine, describing it as “increasingly anomalous” and “a relic

in the modern landscape of standing.

” Protect Our Parks, Inc. v.

Chicago Park Dist., 971 F.3d 722, 733 (7th Cir. 2020) (Barrett, J.); see

also Smith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 641 F.3d 197, 221 (6th

Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Sutton, J., concurring). Bound by precedent,

however, we must apply it. See Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d

1263, 1280 (11th Cir. 2008). We thus proceed to the two-part test

for municipal taxpayer standing, and conclude that Johnson cannot

meet even that lighter burden.

To prove standing as a municipal taxpayer, the plaintiff must

be “a resident who can establish that tax expenditures were used

for the offensive practice.” Id. Johnson contends that he has

standing to sue because the City of Jacksonville “enact[s] general

budgetary allocations inuring to the presence, maintenance,

preservation and protection of” Confederate memorials on public

land through “tax-based funding.

” And his injuries differ “from

those suffered by taxpayers in general,” Johnson says, because he is

African American and left feeling like a “second-class citizen” from

the “tax-supported Confederate tributes on public land.”USCA11 Case: 23-11937 Document: 89-1 Date Filed: 06/10/2026 Page: 15 of 15

23-11937 Opinion of the Court 15

These allegations fall far short. To start, Johnson alleged no

facts showing that the City devoted taxpayer funds to maintain or

preserve the Confederate memorials that he identified in the

complaint. It is “not enough to simply allege that the City is

spending money” in an unlawful way to establish standing as a

municipal taxpayer. Protect Our Parks, Inc., 971 F.3d at 735. So

generally claiming, as Johnson does, that the City’s mayor

“continues to maintain public funding for tributes to the

Confederacy” does not show that the City used taxpayer funds in

an unconstitutional way. Assuming that the spending is

happening, without alleging any facts to support the claim, is not

enough. Cf. Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1280–81. Because Johnson did

only that, he does not show that he is, “will, or possibly can be out

of pocket because of it.” Doremus, 342 U.S. at 433. He thus lacks

standing on this basis, too.

* * *

Earl Johnson strenuously objects to the continued presence

of Confederate memorials and tributes on public land. But the

“presence of a disagreement, however sharp and acrimonious it

may be, is insufficient by itself to meet Art. III’s requirements.”

Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986). That touchstone resolves

this case. Because Johnson does not have standing to sue, we

AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of his lawsuit.