Pete Hegseth’s Failure to Learn. Even members of his own party have become dissatisfied with his performance. (Mark Hertling, The Bulwark, November 9, 2026)

From The Bulwark:

Pete Hegseth’s Failure to Learn.Pete Hegseth’s Failure to Learn

Pete Hegseth’s Failure to Learn.

Pete Hegseth’s Failure to Learn. 

Even members of his own party have become dissatisfied with his performance.

MARK HERTLING

NOVEMBER 9

UPGRADE TO LISTEN13 MINUTES

(Photo illustration by Bill Kuchman/The Bulwark | Photos: Getty, Shutterstock)

WHEN THE HOUSE RETURNS FROM RECESS, it will almost certainly vote on impeachment articles against Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. In the aftermath of the midterm elections, President Trump is already reportedly canvassing allies on whether Hegseth should stay in his job. And Hegseth himself, just days after releasing a six-minute social media videoabout how he won’t back down from a fight, has scheduled a press conference for tomorrow morning. The secretary’s time in office might be coming to a close—which may not surprise many people.

There has probably never been a nominee for secretary of defense who was completely prepared for the scope, scale, and extraordinary responsibilities of the position. Even accomplished past leaders like Gen. George Marshall quickly discovered after taking up the role that the position demands knowledge, judgment, diplomatic skill, political acumen, and organizational leadership on a scale few can properly appreciate. No one arrives knowing everything required, and every secretary must be willing to learn, adapt, and grow to effectively lead one of the most demanding positions in government.

I laid out just how steep Hegseth’s learning curve would be in January 2025, shortly before his confirmation hearing. Having worked with several defense secretaries during my military career, I outlined five essential requirements of the position. My concerns were that nominee Hegseth seemed unaware of the demands of the job, what he needed to learn, and that he might not possess the humility, curiosity, and temperament necessary to grow into the job.

Now, looking back nearly two years later, I consider those concerns justified. Rather than learning and demonstrating growing mastery of the responsibilities of secretary of defense, Hegseth has devoted extraordinary attention to ideological battles, personnel purges, public confrontations, and political messaging; he has shown more interest in demonstrating loyalty to the president and attacking the administration’s perceived enemies than mastering the challenges of running the Department of Defense. His confidence has far outrun his competence, and his hubris has frequently overwhelmed the judgment the position demands.

Whether Hegseth departs his post now or later, the harm he has done to our national security and alliances are increasingly obvious to members of Congress and the American people.

LET’S REVIEW THE FIVE REQUIREMENTS of the job I outlined in January 2025.

The first was that the secretary must have a mind that can master both details and the big picture. During my assignment on the Joint Staff, I observed Secretary Donald Rumsfeld question combatant commanders for hours about contingency plans, resources, risks, and operational assumptions. I later watched Secretary Robert Gates engage soldiers on battlefields in Iraq to get a tactical feel, then transition to discussions with political leaders about the broader strategic implications of operations. Neither man was perfect, and I disagreed with some of their decisions. But both understood that military action must serve achievable political objectives, and tactical success does not automatically produce strategic victory.

Hegseth’s conduct during the Iran war raises questions about whether he understands that crucial principle. The administration has struggled to make clear the political ends it has pursued through its military engagements, and it has offered shifting explanations of its objectives, timelines, and anticipated outcomes. Tactical achievements have repeatedly been touted as strategic successes, even as the conflict continues and costs mount. A secretary must constantly ask what comes next, how the enemy will respond, what resources are required (plus how depleted resources will affect other contingencies), and how military operations contribute to a political outcome. Those questions aren’t answered through declarations of victory.

The second requirement is that the secretary must think strategically about both the short and the long term. Military decisions made today shape national security for decades. Readiness, modernization, force structure, alliances, and personnel development demand sustained attention and difficult trade-offs.

Hegseth has instead demonstrated a preference for sweeping announcements, dramatic organizational changes, and public displays of decisiveness. His proposals on autonomous warfare, military institutions, and personnel policies may contain ideas worth considering, but announcements are not strategies. Strategies require defined objectives, resources, plans, and measures of effectiveness. His ambitious initiatives generate more questions than answers about feasibility, strategic purpose, and consequences.

The third requirement is the capability to lead an enormous, complex, and diverse organization. The Department of Defense includes millions of uniformed personnel, civilians, and reservists, serving in organizations with almost unfathomable missions and responsibilities. Leading such an institution requires more than issuing orders. It demands an ability to prioritize listening over talking, a respect for expertise, and the sort of rapport with subordinates that encourages them to offer candid advice, even (perhaps especially) when that advice challenges those in authority.

Instead, Hegseth has repeatedly removed experienced senior officers and civilians, attacked established institutional practices, and portrayed disagreement as resistance to his agenda if not disloyalty to the country. His supporters, including those secretly in his employ, celebrate these actions on social media as reform. But make no mistake: Eliminatingexperienced leaders without clear, legitimate reasons and ready replacements creates uncertainty, diminishes trust, and weakens institutional effectiveness.

There is a huge difference between confidence and competence. Confidence is essential when making difficult decisions, but confidence without competence is dangerous, and confidence without humility is just as bad. The best leaders I’ve observed understood what they did not know, and they subsequently surrounded themselves with expertise, listened to dissenting opinions, and recognized that voicing disagreement was not an act of disloyalty. Hegseth arrived with limited experience in most functions of the Department of Defense and no experience in strategic leadership. Theoretically, thatdeficiency might have been overcome through humility, hard work, and learning. Instead, his confidence appears to have hardened into hubris.

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THE FOURTH REQUIREMENT, particularly relevant to the impeachment controversy, is building political support. The military is nonpartisan, and the secretary of defense must work effectively with elected representatives of both parties. That’s because Congress authorizes military programs, appropriates funds, provides oversight, and represents the American people whose sons and daughters volunteer to serve.

During my military career, I frequently met with members of Congress, both in Washington and when they visited our forces overseas. Some enthusiastically supported our missions, while others were skeptical and sometimes even openly critical. I disagreed profoundly with some members, and occasionally our interactions generated frustration or even animosity. But I never viewed engaging with Congress as optional: Every member of Congress, from either side of the aisle, represents not only members of the armed forces but also the families who entrusted us with their loved ones’ lives. Elected representatives deserved our respect, even when we disagreed or when we didn’t like their approach.

That respect is essential to maintaining the relationship between the military and the democratic institutions responsible for its oversight. A thoughtful explanation, an honest answer, and a willingness to listen could sometimes turn a skeptical legislator into an informed supporter. But Hegseth approached these relationships differently; his interactions with Democrats have been consistently combative, and his habitual rhetoric suggests an almost deliberate desire to provoke those not in his party.

That approach may generate applause among Hegseth’s limited number of cheerleaders, but it is a poor substitute for leadership. Hegseth faces skepticism from both parties just as the Pentagon needs to approach Congress to ask for lawmakers to support an enormous defense budget and continued military operations. Relationships that should have been cultivated have instead been damaged. Members who believe the secretary has treated them with contempt will likely demand greater scrutiny, oppose his policies, and constrain even good initiatives. The military could ultimately pay the price for his failure to understand the fundamentals of civilian leadership.

The fifth requirement is understanding that defense requires diplomacy, not simply the capacity to wage war. During my various tours in the army, I witnessed how relationships among military leaders, defense ministers, diplomats, and elected officials strengthened alliances and helped prevent conflict. Those relationships required patience, cultural understanding, and respect for other nations’ interests. America’s military strength has always been enhanced by partnerships that allow us to operate effectively around the world.

As questions about his future intensify, Hegseth has launched a different kind of campaign: one designed to preserve his position. His recent video defending the Iran war and attacking critics was accompanied by coordinated social media messaging from civilian officials in the Pentagon and the broader administration. The campaign portrays criticism of the secretary as opposition to the president’s agenda and emphasizes ideological changes as evidence of success.

But the secretary of defense is not supposed to win a social media campaign; he is supposed to help the nation win its wars, prevent unnecessary ones, and maintain readiness for those that cannot be avoided. Political messaging doesn’t substitute for coherent strategy, and declarations of loyalty cannot replace effective leadership.

Report indicates Hegseth has acquired an influential protector in Stephen Miller, recently appointed White House chief of staff. The two certainly share an ideological approach to government, and Hegseth enthusiastically welcomed Miller’s promotion. As I wrote recently, changing an institution’s culture requires more than replacing leaders and imposing policies. Organizational culture develops through shared values, professional standards, trust, and the example of those in authority. Miller’s elevation raises the possibility that Hegseth will be reinforced rather than scrutinized and corrected.

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THERE’S ANOTHER LEADER WHO SHOULDN’T be overlooked: President Donald Trump.

Leadership theory distinguishes between transactional and laissez-faire approaches. Transactional leaders emphasize rewards and punishments, frequently measuring performance through compliance. Laissez-faire leaders give subordinates considerable autonomy, but they sometimes fail to provide necessary supervision and accountability. Both approaches can become destructive when poorly applied.

The president is known for his transactional style, but he appears to have combined the worst elements of these two leadership approaches with Hegseth. He rewards public demonstrations of loyalty while seemingly allowing a secretary with limited strategic experience extraordinary latitude to run the military. Whether Trump was fully informed of every consequential Pentagon decision is unclear, but what is clear is that the president selected Hegseth, defended him, and bears ultimate responsibility for the administration’s national security decisions.

The president cannot transfer responsibility for the Iran war to his secretary of defense. Trump is commander in chief, and he made the ultimate decision to initiate the conflict; he remains accountable for its consequences. Firing Hegseth might provide a convenient scapegoat, but it would not erase the president’s failures of strategy, judgment, supervision, and leadership.

In January 2025, I argued that the secretary of defense’s job was best suited to someone willing to work hard, keep his head down, learn the intricacies of the organization, and stay out of the spotlight. I believed then, as I do now, that the position demands competence, humility, judgment, and dedication to something larger than personal ambition. Nearly two years later, my worst fears have come true.

13 MINUTES

(Photo illustration by Bill Kuchman/The Bulwark | Photos: Getty, Shutterstock)