xxxxxx
iling # 259388193 E-Filed 10/16/2026 02:28:37 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR ST. JOHNS COUNTY, FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO.: 55-2026-CF-000985-A
VS.
BRIANNA MAUREEN JORDAN,
Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, DENYING, IN PART, MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss,” filed
September 8, 2026, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(b). The State filed a
traverse, demurrer, and response to Defendant’s motion on September 25, 2026. On October 2, 2026,
a hearing was held on the motion. Upon consideration of the motion; the State’s traverse, demurrer,
and response; the legal argument of the parties; and the record, this Court finds and concludes as
follows:
1. Defendant moves the Court to dismiss the charges filed against her based on the
following grounds:
(A) (B) (C) (D) “Section 106.1436 is facially unconstitutional and cannot be enforced
against [Defendant]”;
“Count I must be dismissed because the State has not alleged a prima
facie case”;
“Section 106.1436 is unconstitutional as applied”; and
“The Circuit Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the
misdemeanors in this case, as they do not arise out of the same
Accepted 10/16/2026 02:43 PM by the Clerk of the Circuit Court, St. Johns County, Florida, DIN: 88ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, DENYING, IN PART, MOTION TO DISMISS
STATE VS. BRIANNA MAUREEN JORDAN
CASE NO. 55-2026-CF-000985-A
PAGE 2
circumstances as the felony.”
2. As to Ground A, the claim raised is without merit. Section 106.1436, Florida Statutes
(2024) (“Voter guide; disclaimers; violations.”), states:
(1) (2) (3) As used in this section, the term “voter guide” means direct mail that is
either an electioneering communication ora political advertisement sent
for the purpose of advocating for or endorsing particular issues or
candidates by recommending specific electoral choices to the voter or by
indicating issue or candidate selections on an unofficial ballot. The term
does not apply to direct mail or publications made by governmental entities
or government officials in their official capacity.
A person may not, directly or indirectly, represent that a voter guide is
an official publication of a political party unless such person is given
written permission pursuant to s. 103.081.
A voter guide circulated before, or on the day of, an election must, in
bold font with a font size of at least 12 points, prominently:
(a) Display the following disclaimer at the top of the first page of the
voter guide:
1. If the voter guide is an electioneering communication, the
disclaimer required under s. 106.1439; or
2. If the voter guide is a political advertisement, the
disclaimer required under s. 106.143.ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, DENYING, IN PART, MOTION TO DISMISS
STATE VS. BRIANNA MAUREEN JORDAN
CASE NO. 55-2026-CF-000985-A
PAGE 3
(b) Be marked “Voter Guide” with such text appearing immediately
below the disclaimer required in paragraph (a).
(4)(a) In addition to any other penalties provided by law, a person who fails to
comply with this section commits a misdemeanor of the first degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or by a fine of not less than $25 for each
individual voter guide distributed.
(b) Any fine imposed pursuant to paragraph (a) may not exceed $2,500 in the
aggregate in any calendar month.
(emphasis added).
3. As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Worley v. Florida Sec'y of
State,
The Supreme Court has held that “[l]aws that burden political speech are subject to
strict scrutiny, which requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Citizens United
[v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 340, 130 S.Ct. 876, 898, 175
L.Ed.2d 753 (2010)] (quotation marks omitted). “At the same time, [the Supreme
Court has] subjected strictures on campaign-related speech that [it] found less
onerous to a lower level of scrutiny and upheld those restrictions.” Arizona Free
Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC vy. Bennett, —— U.S. ——, 131 S.Ct. 2806, 2817,
180 L.Ed.2d 664 (2011).
On this subject, Citizens United offered the following guidance: “Disclaimer and
disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, but they ‘impose no ceiling
on campaign-related activities,’ and ‘do not prevent anyone from speaking.’ The
Court has subjected these requirements to ‘exacting scrutiny,’ which requires a
‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently
important’ governmental interest.” 558 U.S. at 366-67, 130 S.Ct. at 914 (citations
omitted); see also Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 2818, 177 L.Ed.2d 493
(2010) (listing “precedents considering First Amendment challenges to disclosure
requirements” analyzed under “exacting scrutiny’).ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, DENYING, IN PART, MOTION TO DISMISS
STATE VS. BRIANNA MAUREEN JORDAN
CASE NO. 55-2026-CF-000985-A
PAGE 4
Worley v. Florida Sec'y of State, 717 F.3d 1238, 1242-43 (11th Cir. 2013). “[D]isclosure
requirements are examined under exacting scrutiny because they appear to be the least restrictive
means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption.” Worley v. Florida Sec'y ofState,
717 F.3d 1238, 1243 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Meta Platforms,
Inc., 590 P.3d 1099, 1109 (Wash. 2026) (“The rationale behind exacting scrutiny has always been
that disclosure laws are ‘a less restrictive alternative to flat bans on certain types or quantities of
speech,’ allowing the government to pursue the important goal of informing voters without banning
anyone from speaking.”) (quoting McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Com'n, 572 U.S. 185, 223 (2014)).
4. Disclosure requirements constitute a sufficiently important government interest. “In
Citizens United, the Court upheld disclosure and disclaimer requirements based, in part, on the
‘governmental interest in providing information to the electorate.” Worley, 717 F.3d at 1245
(quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 368, 130 S.Ct. at 914). “[T]he public has an interest in
knowing who is speaking about a candidate.” /d. “[D]isclosure [i]s a matter of sound public policy:”
Id. “[T]ransparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to
different speakers and messages.” /d. “[T]he Supreme Court has taught that disclosure rules do
promote a legitimate government interest, whether in the ballot issue or candidate election context.”
Worley, 717 F.3d at 1247.
5. Promoting an informed electorate is a sufficiently important governmental interest to
justify the requirements of section 106.1434, Florida Statutes. “[A] State has a compelling interest in
protecting voters from confusion and undue influence.” Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199, 112
S.Ct. 1846, 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992).ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, DENYING, IN PART, MOTION TO DISMISS
STATE VS. BRIANNA MAUREEN JORDAN
CASE NO. 55-2026-CF-000985-A
PAGE 5
6. Further, the statute is “not censorial, i.e., [it is] not directed at particular groups or
viewpoints, but rather seek[s] to regulate political activity in an even-handed and neutral manner.”
Doe v. Mortham, 708 So. 2d 929, 931 (Fla. 1998) (quotations marks omitted). The statute “protect[s]
the integrity of the election process by promoting truthfulness in campaign advertising; by fostering
fairness and civility in election campaigns; and by increasing the fund of information available to the
electorate.” /d. at 932 n.6. Thus, the statute is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest
with the least possible burden on expression.” State v. Catalano, 60 So. 3d 1139, 1145 (Fla. 2d DCA
2011), aff'd, 104 So. 3d 1069 (Fla. 2012). “[D]isclosure often represents a less restrictive alternative
to flat bans on certain types or quantities of speech.” McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Com'n, 572 US.
185, 223 (2014) (“Disclosure requirements burden speech, but... they do not impose a ceiling on
speech.”).
7. For the foregoing reasons, the claim raised under Ground A is without merit.
8. As to Ground B, the claim raised is meritorious. Section 918.13(1)(a), Florida
Statutes, states: “It is unlawful for any person, knowing that a criminal trial, proceeding, or
investigation by a duly constituted prosecuting authority, law enforcement agency, grand jury or
legislative committee of this state is pending or is about to be instituted, to [a]lter, destroy, conceal,
or remove any record, document, or other item with the purpose to impair its verity or availability in
such proceeding or investigation[.]” “To establish a violation of the statute, ‘the State must prove a
defendant ‘had knowledge of an impending investigation and destroyed evidence in order to impair
its availability for the investigation.’” Costanzo v. State, 152 So. 3d 737, 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)
(quoting State v. Major, 30 So.3d 608, 609 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)).ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, DENYING, IN PART, MOTION TO DISMISS
STATE VS. BRIANNA MAUREEN JORDAN
CASE NO. 55-2026-CF-000985-A
PAGE 6
9. “TA] defendant's equivocal conduct toward evidence is insufficient to demonstrate the
intent necessary for a section 918.13 violation; merely discarding evidence from one's person,
without more, does not amount to a violation of the statute.” /d. “The offense of tampering is
committed only when the defendant takes some action that is designed to actually alter or destroy the
evidence rather than just removing it from his or her person.” /d. (quoting EL. v. State, 25 So.3d 625,
627 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)). “[E]quivocal conduct differs from that conduct that completely destroys
potential evidence[.]” /d. at 739. “Each tampering case, accordingly, must be decided on its facts.”
Hataway v. State, 171 So. 3d 156, 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (quoting Obas v. State, 935 So.2d 38, 39
(Fla. 4th DCA 2006)).
10. Here, the probable cause affidavit avers that Defendant “burned some of the
fraudulent voter guides” at issue in this case (emphasis added). Many ofthe voter guides had already
been mailed out and were in the possession of law enforcement. Thus, Defendant did not destroy the
evidence of the allegedly fraudulent voter guides by destroying “some” of the hundreds of voter
guides that were recoverable by law enforcement.
11. The facts of this case are analogous to those in Costanzo v. State, 152 So. 3d 737 (Fla.
4th DCA 2014). In Costanzo, the defendant deleted electronic media from an electronic device.
However, the defendant has already disseminated the media to other persons; and, thus, the media
was not destroyed within the meaning of section 918.13, Florida Statutes. Here, the allegedly
fraudulent voter guides had been mailed out and many were recovered by law enforcement for use as
evidence in this case. Thus, Defendant did not destroy the evidence in this case was not destroyed
within the meaning of section 918.13, Florida Statutes. Mailing out hundreds of copies of theORDER GRANTING, IN PART, DENYING, IN PART, MOTION TO DISMISS
STATE VS. BRIANNA MAUREEN JORDAN
CASE NO. 55-2026-CF-000985-A
PAGE 7
evidence “is the antithesis of trying to destroy it.” Costanzo, 152 So. 3d at 739.
12. This Court additionally notes that because the evidence was not destroyed and 1s in
possession of law enforcement and the State, the evidence of the allegedly fraudulent voter guides
would be available at trial. Defendant’s actions did not constitute a destruction of the evidence.
13. For the foregoing reasons, the claim raised under GroundB is meritorious.
14. As to Ground C, the claims raised are without merit. First, as to Defendant’s selection
enforcement claim, “[s]elective enforcement claims require courts to separate unlawful
discrimination from the ordinary and lawful exercise of prosecutorial discretion.” Frederick
Douglass Found., Inc. v. D.C., 82 F 4th 1122, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2023). “Because the executive cannot
address every violation of the laws, the prosecution (and non-prosecution) power is a vital aspect of
the executive power.” /d.; see also State v. J.M., 718 So. 2d 316, 317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“The
state attorney possesses complete discretion in determining whether to prosecute, which includes the
authority to continue to prosecute.”).
15. “TT]the selective enforcement must be deliberately based on an unjustifiable standard
such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.” Thomas v. State, 583 So. 2d 336, 340 (Fla.
Sth DCA 1991) (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962); Bell v.
State, 369 So.2d 932 (Fla.1979)). “The mere failure to prosecute all offenders is not grounds for a
claim of denial of equal protection.” /d.
16. “TA]lthough prosecutorial discretion is broad; it is not unfettered. Selectivity in the
enforcement of criminal laws is subject to constitutional constraints.” Wayte v. United States, 470
U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (quotation marks omitted). “In particular, the decision to prosecute may not beORDER GRANTING, IN PART, DENYING, IN PART, MOTION TO DISMISS
STATE VS. BRIANNA MAUREEN JORDAN
CASE NO. 55-2026-CF-000985-A
PAGE 8
deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification, including the exercise of protected statutory and constitutional rights[.]” /d. (cleaned
up).
17. Here, there has been no showing by Defendant that enforcement of section 106.1436,
Florida Statutes, in this case was deliberately based on an arbitrary classification or that the statute
was arbitrarily enforced in an unconstitutional manner.
18. Second, as to Defendant’s selective prosecution claim, “Florida applies a heightened
burden of proof on defendants to prove a selective prosecution claim.” Richardson v. State, 831 So.
2d 799, 801 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). “To establish a selective prosecution claim, “a defendant must
show that the prosecutorial policy had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a
discriminatory intent.” Casey v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr. & Florida Attorney Gen., No. 2:15-CV-696-
JLB-KCD, 2024 WL 1886985, at *29 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2024) (quoting Richardson v. State, 831
So. 2d 799, 801 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)). “To show discriminatory intent, [Defendant] must show that
[she] was singled out for prosecution based upon such impermissible considerations as race, religion,
or the desire to prevent [her] exercise of a constitutional right.” /d. (citing State v. Parrish, 567 So.2d
461, 465 (Fla. lst DCA 1990)); see also State v. Parrish, 567 So. 2d 461, 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
(“[T]he defendant must demonstrate that he or she is a member of an identifiable group or class.”).
“TDefendant] has not shown (and a review of the record does not suggest) that [she] was singled out
for prosecution based upon [her] race, religion, or a desire to permit [her] exercise of a constitutional
right.” /d. The record reflects that Defendant was not prosecuted for the content of her speech; but
instead for her failure to meet those statutory requirements of section 106.1436, Florida Statutes. TheORDER GRANTING, IN PART, DENYING, IN PART, MOTION TO DISMISS
STATE VS. BRIANNA MAUREEN JORDAN
CASE NO. 55-2026-CF-000985-A
PAGE 9
fact that Denver Cook, Chairman of the St. Johns County Republican Party, was not prosecuted for
failing to follow the internal rules of the St. Johns County Republican Party is factually
distinguishable from Defendant’s failure to follow the statutory requirements of section 106.1436.
Exhibit B of Defendant’s motion reflects that Denver Cook’s voter guide contained the requisite
disclaimer required under section 106.1436. Regardless, “[t]he second part of the selective
prosecution test requires a showing that the discriminatory selection ofthe defendant for prosecution
has been invidious or in bad faith, in that it rests upon such impermissible considerations as race,
religion, or the desire to prevent the exercise of political rights.” Parrish, 567 So. 2d at 467. “To
demonstrate discriminatory purpose, a defendant must establish that (1) he was singled out for
prosecution although the government was aware that others had violated the law, and (2) the
government had followed unusual discretionary procedures in deciding to prosecute.” /d. Here,
Defendant has failed to establish that she was singled out for prosecution. Additionally, she has
failed to establish that the State followed unusual discretionary procedures in deciding to prosecute
her.
19. For the foregoing reasons, the claim raised under Ground C is without merit.
20. As to Ground D, the claim raised is without merit. Circuit courts have jurisdiction
over misdemeanors arising out of the same circumstances as a felony which is also charged. Art. V,
§ 20, Fla. Const. As the Florida Supreme Court explained in State v. Croy,
[t]he key phrase in this constitutional provision, for present purposes, is ‘the same
circumstances’. Had the framers of the constitution intended to give the circuit court
jurisdiction over misdemeanors arising at the same Time and Place and from the
same Facts as a felony also charged, it would have been a simple matter for them to
say so. They stated explicitly, however, that the circuit court is given jurisdictionORDER GRANTING, IN PART, DENYING, IN PART, MOTION TO DISMISS
STATE VS. BRIANNA MAUREEN JORDAN
CASE NO. 55-2026-CF-000985-A
PAGE 10
over misdemeanors where they arise ‘out of the same Circumstances as the felony
which is also charged’. (Emphasis ours) Article V, s 20(c)(3), Fla. Const. The intent
of the constitution in this regard is clear and cannot be judicially enlarged.
State v. Croy, 289 So. 2d 398, 400 (Fla. 1974). Further, “Florida courts have affirmed consolidation
on the basis of an uninterrupted or causal sequence establishing a meaningful relationship.” Barry v.
State, 264 So. 3d 1176, 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (citing Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784, 786
(Fla. 1992) (where the defendant filmed his accomplice killing a man, and then used the video as
leverage to ensure the accomplice's cooperation with the second offense)). “But Florida courts have
not held that such a sequence is the only basis for a meaningful relationship.” /d.
21. As the First District Court of Appeal explained in Lindsey v. State,
[p|ractically speaking, a meaningful relationship requires that the crimes in question
must be linked in some significant way. The state can establish the necessary
connection by demonstrating (1) an uninterrupted crime spree or (2) a causal link
irrespective of the passage of time. In determining whether crimes are connected,
courts may consider whether the acts or transactions are temporally or geographically
associated, the nature of the crimes, and the manner in which they are committed.
Even where there is a significant lapse of time, if there is a causal link—one crime is
used to induce the other—then consolidation is appropriate.
Lindsey v. State, 220 So. 3d 1255, 1257 (Fla. Ist DCA 2017) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Here, the felony charge in Count I and the misdemeanor charges in Counts II and III are
causally linked. The State alleges that Defendant tampered with physical evidence, 1.e., the allegedly
unauthorized voter guides, that she conspired to represent as official voter guides. Thus, there was a
sufficient causal link between the charges in each of the counts in the State’s Information. For the
foregoing reason, the claim raised under this ground is without merit.
22. Because this Court is dismissing Count I (Tampering with Physical Evidence) of theORDER GRANTING, IN PART, DENYING, IN PART, MOTION TO DISMISS
STATE VS. BRIANNA MAUREEN JORDAN
CASE NO. 55-2026-CF-000985-A
PAGE 11
State’s Information, which is the only felony with which Defendant is charged, it no longer has
jurisdiction over the remaining misdemeanor counts (Counts I and II). See Andujar-Ruiz v. State, 320
So. 3d 228, 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (‘When the circuit court dismissed the battery charge, Mr.
Andujar-Ruiz no longer faced a felony charge. Consequently, the circuit court could not adjudicate
the unrelated misdemeanors.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 579 So. 2d 334, 335 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
(holding that when “the court granted Hawkins' motion to dismiss the felony count .... the circuit
court no longer had jurisdiction over the misdemeanor count’); Oglesby v. State, 911 So. 2d 1288,
1288 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (“The circuit court was divested of jurisdiction when the information was
amended and all that remained to be tried by the court were two misdemeanors.”); Glass v. State,
832 So. 2d 837, 838 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try
defendant where information had been amended to charge defendant with two misdemeanors and no
felonies)). Accordingly, Counts I and III will be dismissed without prejudice to the State refiling
those charges in county court.
Based on the foregoing, itis ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
I Defendant’s motion is hereby GRANTED as to Ground B and DENIED in all other
respects.
IL. The charge of Tampering with Physical Evidence (Count J), in violation of section
918.13, Florida Statutes (2024), in the State’s Information is hereby dismissed with
prejudice.
Ill. The charges of Conspiracy (count IT) and Unauthorized Voter Guide (count ITD) in
the State’s Information are hereby dismissed without prejudice as to BRIANNAORDER GRANTING, IN PART, DENYING, IN PART, MOTION TO DISMISS
STATE VS. BRIANNA MAUREEN JORDAN
CASE NO. 55-2026-CF-000985-A
PAGE 12
MAUREEN JORDAN (DEFENDANT “A”),
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers on this 16" day of October 2026.
“ (A) ¢ €, J
; 4 .
WILLIAM E. DAVIS,
CIRCUIT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing Order was furnished by e-mail delivery, on
this 16" day of October 2026, to the following:
Thomas E. Bishop, Esq. Ralph Yazdiya, Asst. State Attorney
State Attorney’s Office
Lindsey
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